

CASSELL'S HISTORY OF
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR



A DRINK UNDER FIRE AT THE SHA-HO.

CASSELL'S
HISTORY OF THE
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

ILLUSTRATED

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VOLUME IV

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER LXIX.

PAGE

NORTH SEA INCIDENT CONTINUED—BRITISH GOVERNMENT TAKES ACTION—NAVAL PREPARATIONS—RUSSIAN ADMIRAL'S REPORT—ON THE BRINK OF WAR—A PEACEFUL SOLUTION—CONTINENTAL VIEWS—RUSSIAN FLEET PROCEEDS—DOUBTS AND FEARS—ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT SIGNED	289
---	-----

CHAPTER LXX.

PORT ARTHUR ONCE MORE—SUBSIDIARY DEFENCES—THE GREAT FORTS ATTACKED—FOUR DAYS OF FRENZIED FIGHTING—BLOCKADE RUNNERS—INSIDE THE FORTRESS—THE "BIRTHDAY ATTACK"	312
--	-----

CHAPTER LXXI.

JAPAN'S WINTER OUTLOOK—PROVISION AGAINST WAR WASTAGE—A NEW MILITARY SYSTEM—NAVAL PREPARATIONS—HOME-MADE BATTLESHIPS—A PAINFUL EPISODE—FINANCIAL PROSPECTS—FOREIGN RELATIONS—BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND AMERICA	328
---	-----

CHAPTER LXXII.

RUSSIA IN OCTOBER—ARMIES IN MANCHURIA—SIDERIAN RAILWAY—DISCONTENTED RESERVISTS—FRESH WARLIKE PREPARATIONS—DARDANELLES QUESTION REVIVED—FEELING IN ST. PETERSBURG—EFFECT OF THE WAR ON TRADE—FINANCIAL OUTLOOK	346
---	-----

CHAPTER LXXIII.

VLADIVOSTOK—JAPANESE RAID IN KAMCHATKA—THE DAMAGED SQUADRON—INTERRUPTED COMMUNICATIONS—IMPROVED DEFENCES—WINTER PROSPECTS—THE DALIC FLEET—AN ANXIOUS OUTLOOK	364
--	-----

CHAPTER LXXIV.

ON THE SHIA-HO—THE JAPANESE AND YEN-TAI—MURDEN FORTIFIED—CAPTURE OF WAI-TAU-SHAN—CORDIAL INTERCOURSE—KING'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION—DESULTORY FIGHTING—ATTACK ON RUSSIAN LEFT—WINTER—THE THREE RUSSIAN ARMIES	376
--	-----

CHAPTER LXXV.

THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR—SUGGESTIONS OF SURRENDER—THE RAZTOROPAY INCIDENT—DRAMATIC SEQUEL—OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GREAT FORTS—ATTACK BY JAPANESE SWORDSMEN—FIGHTING ROUND METRE RANGE—COSTLY ASSAULTS—FINAL ADVANCE—CAPTURE OF 203 METRE HILL	390
--	-----

CHAPTER LXXVI.

SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR CONTINUED—SEQUEL TO THE CAPTURE OF METRE RANGE—DESTRUCTION OF THE RUSSIAN FLEET—TORPEDO ATTACKS AGAINST THE SEI'ASTOPOL—A GRAND NAVAL RECORD—THE LAND OPERATIONS—THREE PRINCIPAL FORTS TAKEN BY ASSAULT	406
--	-----

CHAPTER LXXVII.

	PAGE
THE SECOND PACIFIC SQUADRON—AN INSTRUCTIVE VOYAGE—THE THREE DIVISIONS—SHAMEFUL BEHAVIOUR IN CRETE—PASSAGE OF THE SUEZ CANAL—OFF MADAGASCAR—JAPANESE PREPARATIONS—THE KLADO INCIDENT—A THIRD SQUADRON—NEW RUSSIAN NAVY	419

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

MORE FIGHTING ROUND PORT ARTHUR—THE BEGINNING OF THE END—NEGOTIATIONS FOR CAPITULATION—HISTORIC MEETING OF DELEGATES—TERMS OF SURRENDER—THE FORTRESS FALLS—PRISONERS AND SPOILS—NOGI AND STOESEL—DEPARTURE OF THE RUSSIANS—VICTORS AND VANQUISHED—STRIKING CONTRAST—REJOICINGS AT TOKIO	436
---	-----

CHAPTER LXXIX.

JAPANESE ENTRY INTO PORT ARTHUR—A NOTABLE PROCESSION—THE KAISER DECORATES NOGI AND STOESEL—FOREIGN OPINIONS ON THE FALL OF THE FORTRESS—THE NEW SITUATION—WAS SURRENDER JUSTIFIED?—OPINION IN RUSSIA—A TRIBUTE FROM THE TSAR	455
--	-----

CHAPTER LXXX.

TROUBLE LOOMING IN RUSSIA—THE BLESSING OF THE NEVA—SENSATIONAL INCIDENT—STRIKES AT ST. PETERSBURG—FATHER GAPON—PETITION TO THE TSAR—RED SUNDAY—SHAMEFUL SLAUGHTER—FURTHER REPRESSION—SPREAD OF THE MOVEMENT	474
---	-----

CHAPTER LXXXI.

ON THE SHA-HO—CONDITION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES—KUROPATKIN'S GOOD SPIRITS—TYPICAL ENCOUNTERS—TRYING TO PIERCE THE LINE—MISHTCHENKO'S RAID—RAILWAY WRECKING—ATTACK ON A STORE DEPOT—CHINESE NEUTRALITY VIOLATED	492
---	-----

CHAPTER LXXXII.

THE NORTH SEA INQUIRY—THE COMMISSIONERS—FIRST PUBLIC SITTING—BRITISH AND RUSSIAN CASES—THE EVIDENCE—QUESTIONABLE TESTIMONY—THE FISHERMEN EXAMINED—A BRITISH NAVAL EXPERT	510
--	-----

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

IN THE SHA-HO REGION—SEQUEL TO MISHTCHENKO'S RAID—A LIKELY BATTLE-GROUND—GRIPENBERG CROSSES THE HUN-HO—AN IMPRESSIVE MOVEMENT—THE BATTLE OF HEI-KOU-TAI—DEFENCE OF SAN-DE-PU—JAPANESE ATTACKS—RUSSIANS DRIVEN BACK—GRIPENBERG AND KUROPATKIN	522
--	-----

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

A YEAR OF WAR—THE LESSON OF MAINTENANCE—AN EXCEPTIONAL STRUGGLE—DRAMATIC ATTRIBUTES—THE ACTORS—THE "SCENERY"—NAVAL AND MILITARY LESSONS	539
---	-----

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.


	PAGE		PAGE
	289	Prison harge on the Amur	Down the Amur
		in times of peace	372
		The wooded banks of the Amur	Cossack
		camp on the Amur	373
	291	The Japanese battleship <i>Asahi</i>	375
	293	Harbin	376
	294	The enormously strong palisade erected by	
	295	the Russians at Liao yang which the	
	297	Japanese hacked down at great loss	377
		The Japanese advance in Manchuria a night	
		attack on a Russian position	381
	299	Celebrating the birthday of their allies King	385
	300	Russian soldiers bartering with Chinese street	
	301	vendors	389
	305		
			393
	306	and defence of a fortress	396
	308	The Russian night assault on the Japanese	
	309	sappers and miners when cutting parallels	
		on Banduzan (Pan lung shang) October 2	
	313	1904	401
		Map of the main defences of Port Arthur	404
	317	General Nakamura	405
	320	Underground fighting before Port Arthur	409
	321	Russian battleship <i>Sevastopol</i>	412
	325	Captain Essen who first commanded the <i>Notik</i>	
		and afterwards the <i>Sevastopol</i>	413
	329	The engineer who fortified Port Arthur	416
		The ghastliest post before Port Arthur the	
	332	thirty minute trench	417
	333	An international scene at Tang er during the	
		Russian Fleet's stay at the Moroccan	
	337	port	420
		Rear Admiral Folkersahm	421
	341		424
		health on board ship	425
	344	Admiral Birileff	429
	345	Outside Port Arthur Metre Range from Hoo	
	348	zan Hill	433
	349	Captain Hlado	435
	351	The grim escarpment of Pilusan	436
	353	The West Erhlung Port after its capture	
	355	December 31 1904	437
		Useless for the fight the sunken <i>Pobieda</i> and	
		<i>Pallada</i> in harbour of Port Arthur	440
	357	General Iyuchi with members of General	
	361	Nogi's staff	441
		The staff of the	445
	365		
	368		
			449
		A panorama of the Russian positions around	
		Port Arthur	452
	369		
the time of the crisis			
Ready aye ready!			
Lord Charles Beresford			
The Rock of Gibraltar from Algeciras			
Britain's sea power			
Sketch map showing the relative positions of			
the Russian and Fishing Fleets when			
the warships opened fire			
Effect of shell fire on the trawler <i>Moitner</i>			
Shot holes on the trawler <i>Mino</i>			
Mr Balfour speaking at Southampton			
M Paul Cambon French Ambassador in			
London			
Count Benkendorf Russian Ambassador in			
London			
Sir Charles Hardinge			
How the Japanese tightened their grip upon			
Port Arthur			
The weariness of strife the dawn of another			
day at Port Arthur			
A flag of truce			
A human pyramid			
Night turned into day at Port Arthur			
Shooting below the water line submerged			
torpedo tube in action			
A war correspondent's passport in the Far			
East			
A sadly familiar scene at Tokio			
Russ an pitfalls an ingenious device for			
arresting the impetuous attacks of the			
Japanese			
The great struggle on the Sha ho fighting in			
the streets of Lin chin pu			
The assault on the Key to the Russian centre			
at Liao yang			
Native quarter Harbin			
General Kaulbars Commander in chief of the			
third Russian Manchurian Army			
The railway station Harbin			
The Trans Siberian Railway under construction			
A reminiscence of the early days of the war			
Russian Moujiks			
A Russian fort that cost the Japanese 3 000			
men the semi permanent redoubt on the			
level plain one mile south of Liao yang			
common incident on the Trans Siberian			
Railway			

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.		PAGE
viii		
The first Japanese to enter Port Arthur after the capitulation	156	A British witness before the North Sea Inquiry Commission
The fortress in the balance	157	The Right Hon. Sir Edward Fry, D.C.L., F.R.S., British Legal Ambassador
General Kondratichenko	161	Russian cruiser <i>Albatross</i>
Perils of Red Cross work before Port Arthur	164	The hospital mission ship <i>Albatross</i>
Men of the Japanese 6th Division awaiting their turn in the "shikhanimant" trench	171	Supplies for the Russian country pack train coming into a Manchurian town
Champanne and shell-bell's constabulary interrupting Port Arthur firing the Japanese battery of French guns	175	A remarkable scene of activity between the hills of Manchuria: Japanese building their dog-hole trenches, and temporary places of shelter
A Russian battery hunked by the smoke of a Japanese gun	175	A Russian battery hunked by the smoke of a Japanese gun
The cost of conquest: the scene after an attack upon the Cockscumb Fort	175	General Dragomirov
A near view of 203 Metre Hill from the Russian side before its capture	175	Sketch map of the battle of Hsienkai
Russian peasant types	175	What is seen war-like hills: A fierce artillery engagement in the Manchurian hills
The ceremony of the blessing of the Neva	175	A Russian column in retreat
Father Gapon's fruitless appeal	175	Captain Chum-hung being tortured before a Chinese magistrate's yamen
Precincts of the Winter Palace, St. Petersburg	175	Sketch map showing the situation at the beginning of 1905, and by the shaded portion, the territory then in the hands of the Japanese
The grand entrance, Winter Palace, St. Petersburg	175	Port Arthur's heavy artillery: a big gun ready for action
Nevisky Prospect, St. Petersburg	175	The huge shells hurled by the Japanese siege artillery against the Russian ships and forts
Maxim Gorky	175	The cost to Japan of the capture of 203 Metre Hill, Port Arthur
General Trepo	175	The battered <i>Pravda</i> in Port Arthur harbour
Workmen of St. Petersburg	175	The last days of Port Arthur: the battered town and submerged ships in the harbour
Martyrs in the cause of freedom	175	The fortified hill outside Port Arthur, called by the Russians "The Eagle's Nest" which was captured by the Japanese
Grand Duke Vladimir	175	January 1, 1905
British Embassy, St. Petersburg	175	The casemates of Fort No. 11, Port Arthur where General Kondratichenko was killed
In defence of Mukden: the quarters of the Tomsy regiment at Ku-an-shan	175	
Desolation!	175	
A change of sides: big Russian guns being used by the Japanese on the Sha-ho	175	
A typical Japanese trench in Manchuria	175	
The Russian cavalry raid on the railway near Niu-chwang	175	
General Mishchenko	175	
Examining passports on the Manchurian Railway in times of peace	175	
Commissioners of the North Sea inquiry	175	

LIST OF PLATES.

A DRINK UNDER FIRE AT THE SHA-HO
 RUSSIAN TRIUMPHS: RUSSIAN RESCUING A WOUNDED JAPANESE OFFICER UNDER
 PORT ARTHUR



THE WATCH DOGS OF THE STRAITS

Line of British battleships cleared for action lying off Gibraltar at the time of the crisis

CHAPTER LXIX

NORTH SEA INCIDENT CONTINUED—BRITISH GOVERNMENT TAKES ACTION—NAVAL PREPARATIONS—RUSSIAN ADMIRAL'S REPORT—ON THE DRINK OF WAR—A PEACEFUL SOLUTION—CONTINENTAL VIEWS—RUSSIAN FLEET PROCEEDS—DOUBTS AND FEARS—ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT SIGNED

AT the time the Baltic Fleet was firing on the defenceless Hull fishermen the British Home Fleet was in Scottish waters at Cromarty. It consisted of the battleships *Fremont* (flying the flag of Vice Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson, commanding the Fleet), *Royal Oak* (flying the flag of Rear Admiral Barlow), *Empress of India*, *Renown*, *Royal Sovereign*, *Russell* and *Swiftsure*, cruisers *Bedford*, *Dido*, *Isis*, and *Junon*. The *Triumph* battleship was also attached to the Home Fleet, but was at the moment at Portsmouth undergoing repairs.

At various Home ports the ships of the Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir Wilmot Luke, were refitting, the *Good Hope* (flagship) and


Drake at Portsmouth, the *Donegal* and *Monmouth* at Devonport and the *Berwick* and *Kent* at Chatham.

In addition to the eight battleships and ten cruisers above mentioned, there were available at home or in reserve eight battleships and four cruisers in commission, with others which could be commissioned at short notice.

At or near Gibraltar lay the Channel Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, and consisting of eight modern battleships—*Cesar*, *Victorious*, *Hannibal*, *Illustrious*, *Jupiter*, *Magnificent*, *Majestic*, and *Mars*, and the cruisers *Theseus*, *Endymion*, *Doris*, and *Hermes*. Lord Charles Beresford's flag was carried on the *Cesar*, that of his

take up its station at Portland, overtime being ordered on the battleship *Triumph*, in order to enable it to join the fleet at the earliest possible date. Work was also hurried on in the case of the six ships of

stores, and the entire Gibraltar torpedo flotilla was commissioned. That portion of the Mediterranean Fleet which had been in the Adriatic, under Admiral Sir Compton Domville, moved down, con-



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE COURSE OF THE BALTIC FLEET FROM KRONSTADT TO VIGO AND TANGIER, AND THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE BRITISH FLEETS AT THE TIME OF THE CRISIS

the Cruiser Squadron, with the result that in a very few days the squadron was ready for sea. The ships of the Channel Fleet promptly filled their bunkers, and replenished their ammunition and other

centrated at Corfu, and sailed thence to Malta, a considerable portion of the fleet being immediately and subsequently despatched to Gibraltar, which was now on a war footing, the entrance to

hour being closed mightily by boom defences.

It will be seen that, from the very moment the outrage occurred, the British Navy was in a position to bring the "Second Pacific Squadron" of the Russian Fleet to book, if the situation rendered such a drastic proceeding in any way desirable. With the Home or Channel Fleet would have been amply sufficient to deal with such a heterogeneous collection of vessels as those under Admiral Rozhdestvensky's command, and accordingly the Second Pacific Squadron had no sooner left the scene of its disgraceful exploit than it became, to use a happy phrase employed by a correspondent in writing on the subject to the *Times*, "the ham of a strategical sandwich." As far, in fact, as the whole strength of Russia in European waters was concerned, the position became, automatically as it were, so hopeless as to render any but a *q. v. a.* solution impossible. If Admiral Rozhdestvensky had been ordered to fight he had but the option of being sunk by Sir A. K. Wilson or blown out of the water by Lord Charles Beresford. Retreat and advance were equally deadly alternatives, and escape across the open Atlantic was out of the question in view of the necessity for coaling. There remained but two or three Russian vessels fit for service in the Baltic. The Black Sea Fleet might have attempted to force the Dardanelles, but the "Overlord of the Mediterranean," as the Commander-in-Chief of that station has been appropriately called, has always ample forces within sufficiently easy call to deal effectively with any eruption of that sort.

Why, then, all these tremendous preparations, all this massing of ships, all this throbbing activity at half-a-dozen

dockyards and arsenals? Such measures cost large sums of money, and they are apt to disturb the public mind to a dangerous extent. Could not the matter of reputation for the North Sea outrage have been safely left to diplomacy backed up by the normal strength and distribution of the Home, Channel, and Mediterranean Fleets?

The answer to such questions is one which, simple as it is, cannot be easily asserted without even plainer speaking than that which was necessary in the chapter devoted to the attitude maintained towards Russia in respect of the war by Germany. Of course, in the first instance, it was a measure of the most ordinary precaution on our part to secure ourselves against the operation of any possible clause, known or secret, in the alliance between Russia and France. We could not afford to take it for granted that the latter would decline to intervene in a quarrel which was none of her own making, more especially having regard to the chivalrous sentimentality using the word in its best sense—habitually displayed by our gallant neighbours where they imagine their honour to be even remotely involved. But it may freely be stated that in no considerable section of the British public did the idea prevail that France would, in any circumstances, back up Russia should the latter refuse to give reasonable satisfaction for the North Sea outrage. The *cercle credite* was at its brightest and best during the anxious period which followed that terrible episode, and it will be seen later that not without reason did we count upon France to stand aloof from the support of her ally in a situation in which the latter's position was so wholly indefensible.

But with Germany the case was differ-

READY AYE READY!

A gun's crew on a *Bristol* cruiser sleeping at their post during the typhoon



out. For some past past Germany's naval power has been growing at a rapid pace that it would be useless to deny that there is no doubt that Germany had been at some distance with Great Britain the supremacy of the sea. Germany's main fleet at sea made a battle ship, and even the British Navy was not so far from possibly being possible to meet for something quite outside the scope of German's commercial aim. We had made the right, not the inclination to suppose openly that Germany would have been well placed at that moment she could have caught us napping, and, by siding with Russia, have produced a condition of affairs with which we might have been unable, even navally, to cope. But neither had our statesmen, holding

been seen in the narrative, entirely in the light. Of Germany's feeling towards us, we had not decided of it to any extent, and it is not to make us doubt her elevated programme to do so had turned out to be a great deal to her self-governed. The sea, and human nature to be considered. Proud in the process, we had undoubtedly formidable may, the German nation might reason, by well-known, and the ability of employing it in

building a serious blow upon the prestige of the preponderant power of the world. If Admiral Rozhdestvensky's seven battleship had been as up-to-date and well-handled as Germany's twelve, and Great Britain had shown at this crisis any sign of weakness, it would hardly have been surprising if the partiality of the German Emperor for his



ADMIRAL ROZHDESTVENSKY
1854-1916

Eastern neighbour had undergone some remarkable developments.


Accordingly, the British Government, and the British Navy acting under its orders, took no risks, and made its preparedness, in Europe at any rate, on almost the same scale as if we were already at war with two or three Continental Powers of the first magnitude. The Home Fleet stood for the moment on guard, while the powerful Cruiser Squadron completed its refitting, and, although no complete mobilisation took place at home, we may be sure that the preparations for utilising the ships and men in reserve were being unostentatiously put

in trust our enormous and many-sided interests, the right, let alone the inclination, to suppose that Germany would stand our friend, or would even remain neutral, if we came to blows with Russia. In the latter's trouble with Japan, she had preserved a sort of neutrality as regards Kiao-chan, well knowing that, if she had not done so, her hopes of dominating Shan-tung would soon be rudely imperilled. The disarmament of the *Tsarévitch* was a matter of policy as well as of good faith. But at home the tender solicitude displayed by the German Emperor for the welfare of the Tsar's army and navy was, as has

forward, and that, if war had supervened, the Home Fleet would have assumed impressive proportions in an incredibly short space of time. Up to Gibraltar rolled battleship after battleship of the Mediterranean Fleet, ships and officers and bluejackets all in superb fighting trim, and the two last almost pathetically eager for the "ball to opeo." At the glorious old Rock itself—that grim

White, the gallant Irishman who, as a regimental officer, had won the Victoria Cross for cool gallantry in Afghanistan, and, later, as a General, had successfully held Ladysmith against the Boers in one of the famous sieges of history.

It was at Gibraltar that the naval preparations of Great Britain, in view of a possible untoward consequence of the North Sea incident, were most brilliantly



THE ROCK OF GIBRALTAR FROM ALGECIRAS

memorial of so much of Britain's naval and military valour in the past, that splendid sign of her greatness and tenacity in the present—the hum of warlike preparation was heard on every side. The demonstrative measures now being taken were necessarily naval ones, but at such a centre as this some show of military activity, too, was inevitable. In which connection it deserves to be recorded in passing that the Governor of Gibraltar at this time was that grand veteran, Field-Marshal Sir George

and impressively exemplified in the alertness with which the Channel Fleet made ready for all emergencies. Almost in a flash Lord Charles Beresford's command not merely cleared its decks for action, but, to use a metaphor which denotes the last stage of naval fitness for the fray, prepared for battle. Using his cruisers as eyes and ears, the gallant and popular Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Squadron kept his battleships together, in order to bar, if necessity arose, the further passage of Admiral Rozhdest-

vensky's ships. Nor is there much question that, if matters had come to the stern arbitrament of war, the care and labour expended by this able fighting seaman upon the condition of his ships, and the shooting capacity of officers and men, would have been abundantly justified. But we must not anticipate. Rather let us close our account of this phase of the affair by recalling the characteristic message reported to have been signalled on the morning of October 20th by Lord Charles Beresford to some cruisers detached to watch the movements of the oncoming Russian ships between Cape St. Vincent and Cape Spartel: "Situation critical; good luck."

While the British Navy was thus pointedly demonstrating its ability to back up the just demands of the British Government for satisfaction on account of the North Sea outrage, matters were by no means standing still in other directions. For a couple of days after the publication of the news of the disaster, the British public had to rest content with the knowledge that the British Government's Note to Russia had been duly presented, and with such additional scraps of information concerning the outrage itself as could be gathered from the fishermen of the Gamecock Fleet. Not until the morning of October 27th was it generally known that a portion of the Russian "Second Pacific Squadron," including Admiral Rozhdestvensky's flagship, had arrived at Vigo, and that an attempt would be made to explain the attack on the fishing vessels by the suggestion that there were Japanese torpedo boats among them! Some vessels of the squadron had been previously reported to have put in at Brest, but these had been detached from the main squad-

ron, and had seen nothing of the firing on the night of October 21st-22nd.

The arrival of Admiral Rozhdestvensky at Vigo was attended by some little disturbance, quite apart from the general anxiety to hear his explanation of his recent performances. Notwithstanding the protests of the Spanish authorities, the Russian war vessels sought to take in coal from German colliers in Spanish waters, and, by dint of urgent representations, were eventually allowed to ship four hundred tons each, in defiance of the generally accepted rules of neutrality. Remonstrances were subsequently addressed by Japan to the Spanish Government on this subject, the latter declaring that she had followed a precedent established by other Powers. But the Japanese have long memories, and it is not unlikely that some day the indulgence accorded to Admiral Rozhdestvensky on this occasion at Vigo may be recalled, to Spain's distinct inconvenience. In any case, such precedents as those quoted—presumably the facilities afforded by Germany and France—need hardly have led Spain to depart from an attitude in the maintenance of which she would have had prompt and ample support. The incident is, for the moment, at any rate, trifling, but it is curiously instructive, as indicating yet another direction in which this tremendous war has, to some extent, involved a country many thousands of miles from the actual area of conflict, and not in the remotest degree connected with or interested in the points of dispute.

But Admiral Rozhdestvensky's coaling requirements are of small concern compared with his demeanour on the subject of the North Sea outrage. It would seem that when first questioned upon the incident the Admiral exhibited much



BRITAIN'S NEW POWER

... of the coronation of King Edward VII



irritability, and declined to give details beyond stating that he had acted according to his conscience, with the object of preventing the destruction of his squadron. He is said to have added that, before leaving Libau, he had made known his intention of attacking any ship that approached his fleet. It should be mentioned in this connection that evidently the Admiral's apprehensions as to the possible existence of mysterious enemies had not yet left him, for all his ships were still cleared for action, and all movements of the craft in Vigo harbour were closely watched by the Russian sentries.


More illuminating than Admiral Rozhdestvensky's veiled utterances was the explanation given by some of the officers as to the Dogger Bank episode. This explanation, afterwards, it will be seen, expanded in Admiral Rozhdestvensky's report, is interesting as the first sign of the course intended to be taken in reference to Russia's responsibility for what had occurred. According to a Madrid newspaper, the Russian officers stated to a Vigo correspondent that during their voyage down the North Sea two torpedo boats were observed between the lines of the squadron. Supposing they had to deal with a Japanese attack, they opened fire. They asserted that they saw guns in two of the boats, and that none of the sailors looked like fishermen. They were unaware that any of the crew were wounded, and they regretted "the mistake."

Not until the 28th was the full text of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's official report available. On that day the Russian Naval General Staff published the two following telegrams from the Admiral Commanding the Second Squadron of the Pacific Fleet:—

1.—"The incident of the North Sea was provoked by two torpedo boats which, without showing any lights, under cover of darkness advanced to attack the vessel steaming at the head of the detachment. When the detachment began to sweep the sea with its searchlights, and opened fire, the presence was also discovered of several small steam vessels resembling small steam fishing boats. The detachment endeavoured to spare these boats, and ceased fire as soon as the torpedo boats were out of sight.

"The English Press is horrified at the idea that the torpedo boats of the squadron, left by the detachment until the morning on the scene of the occurrence, did not render assistance to the victims. Now, there was not a single torpedo boat with the detachment, and none were left on the scene of the occurrence. In consequence, it was one of the two torpedo boats, which was not sunk, but which was only damaged, which remained until the morning near the small steam craft. The detachment did not assist the small steam craft, because it suspected them of complicity, in view of their obstinate persistence in cutting the line of advance of the warships. Several of them did not show any lights at all. The others showed them very late."

2.—"Having met several hundreds of fishing boats, the squadron showed them every consideration, except where they were in company of the foreign torpedo boats, one of which disappeared, while the other, according to the evidence of the fishermen themselves, remained among them until the morning. They believed her to be a Russian vessel, and were indignant that she did not come to the assistance of the victims. She was, however, a foreigner, and remained until the morning looking for the other torpedo



SKETCH MAP SHOWING THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE RUSSIAN AND BRITISH FLEETS WHEN THE WARSHIP OPENED FIRE

board, her companion, either with the object of repairing her damage or from fear of betraying herself to those who were not accomplices.

"If there were also on the scene of the occurrence fishermen imprudently involved in this enterprise, I beg, in the name of the whole fleet, to express our sincere regret for the unfortunate victims of circumstances, in which no warship could, even in time of profound peace, have acted otherwise.

It need hardly be said that this remarkable report did not meet with acceptance in this country, where the idea of the mysterious torpedo boats moving about among the trawlers was regarded as a wild fragment of the imagination. The fact that the

no torpedo boats and the suggestion that Great Britain had connived at the use of her ports by Japanese naval officers bent upon thus waylaying the Baltic Fleet at its outset was only partly repudiated. These details will be dealt with later, but in the meantime a point made by the Prime Minister in his first speech on the subject at Southampton on October 28th may usefully be anticipated. There is no question that on the night of October 21st-22nd the Baltic Fleet was thirty miles out of its course. There is equally no question that the Admiralty must have known that the *Dongha* was crowded with fighting men. There is a note to this effect in the *Official Report* of the

as Mr. Balfour pointed out, must have gone "thirty miles out of his course to a spot which he knew was crowded with fishing boats, and there he found lying in wait among those fishing boats two torpedo craft. Why did the commander of these two torpedo craft choose that particular station for preparing their attack upon the Russian Fleet? Why did they choose a station which, from the nature of the case, involved publicity? The very fact that the Dogger Bank is crowded with fishermen—and fishermen of all nationalities—would make such an operation absurd on the face of it, and if these mysterious craft wanted to conceal their very existence from the public eye, would they have gone over the whole North Sea and chosen alone among all the spots open to them that one where publicity was inevitable and certain? And, in the second place, if they had wanted to lie in wait for the Russian Fleet, by what extraordinary powers of prevision did they foresee that the Russian Fleet would come thirty miles out of its ordinary course?"

To this may be added the statement made by Viscount Hayashi, the Japanese Ambassador in London, when interviewed on the subject of the torpedo boat yarn:—

"The story is so ridiculous that it is not worth a denial. I would, however, myself ask a few questions which, perhaps, the Russians may be able to answer.

How is it possible that Japanese torpedo boats or other small craft could have remained constantly at sea in wait for the Baltic Fleet ever since it was first reported to be on the point of sailing? Is it known by what means such vessels could exist away from bases for food, water, or coal? Is it generally regarded as possible that torpedo boats could make the voyage from the Far East to the British coasts without coaling and without their presence being known?"

While cold logic made it difficult for

the British public to regard Admiral Rozhdestvensky's two torpedo boats as anything but pure fancy, the receipt even of this doubtful explanation produced at once a great revulsion of feeling in St. Petersburg. Here there had previously prevailed a pretty general apprehension lest the culpability of the Baltic Fleet should prove beyond question. The story of the torpedo boats came as an immense relief to the Russian public mind, and several of the St. Petersburg papers waxed very eloquent over "the presentation of indisputable facts which justify the action of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, not only in our eyes, but in the



Photo Gledstone & Bernard, Hull
EFFECT OF SHELL FIRE ON THE TRAWLER
MOULMEIN

eyes of every impartial observer on the European Continent.' The lessons of the first days of the war, the *Arcturion* went on to observe, have not been wasted and the new and treacherous attack by the Japanese has been met by the vigilant and pitiless eye of our Admiral and the straight fire of our guns!


It is a little unfortunate that, while these and similar vapourings were being indulged in in St. Petersburg news should be received of other though happily not so tragic, instances in which the Russians while still in Danish waters, had displayed extraordinary nervousness and a ferocious readiness to regard the most harmless craft as treacherous enemies. Throughout October 21st in particular, Russian imagination appears to have run riot in conjuring up fictitious foes. Thus

according to a statement made by the captain of the Swedish steamer *Aldebaran*, that vessel was on the evening on which the North Sea outrage occurred, chased by a foreign warship apparently a cruiser of the Russian fleet, which threw her searchlights upon her. The cruiser then increased her speed and, passing the *Aldebaran*, fired a shot which however, did no damage. The *Aldebaran* now hoisted her flag

but did not stop. The cruiser again threw its searchlights upon the *Aldebaran*, and in a few minutes poured a perfect hail of bullets all over her, but without hitting her. The

run now gave orders for the steamer to be stopped, and took refuge with his men below. The foreign warship thereupon disappeared in the darkness. The *Aldebaran* luckily sustained no damage notwithstanding the straight fire of the Russian guns of which the *Arcturion* speaks so proudly.

Another unpleasant experience was undergone by the German trawler *Somtag*, the skipper of which reported as follows — On the 21st we were off the Horns reef fishing grounds, on the west coast of Jutland. In the morning five large Russian ships passed, and in the evening nine more. To the north of us was a large cargo steamer. At half past eight searchlights were thrown on us immediately afterwards the first shells fell in our vicinity. A Russian ship fired in all directions and in many



This is the *Arcturion* at sea.

SHOT 1 - EX-02 - E-221 LPP 51

25 eight miles a hour. The
put fire the large enemy
the ship was firing
the ship was firing
the ship was firing

we then observed to the south a second searchlight, and noticed shells falling near the ship which was firing at us. We sustained no damage. After eleven o'clock the shells ceased coming." Here, again, the shooting of the Russian naval gunners seems to have been temporarily a little at fault.

Before leaving this section of a thorny and painful subject, it is desirable to draw attention to a very remarkable narrative published by the *Daily Mail*, in which the North Sea incident is vividly described by a steward on board one of the Russian ships. This curiously realistic account was procured by the Special Correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, Mr. Edgar Wallace, who was at Vigo during the visit of the Russian Squadron. The statement, in which, for obvious reasons, the names are suppressed, is of such unique interest that it is here reproduced *verbatim* :—

"I am a wardroom steward on the Russian battleship ———. On the night of the attack in the North Sea I was on duty in the pantry cleaning glass after dinner. I afterwards went into the mess-room, where I found six officers seated and playing cards. Nobody on board the vessel was drunk that evening, except one of the under officers in the men's quarters.

"I was engaged in writing when a midshipman rushed into the messroom, and exclaimed in most excited tones, 'The Japanese are attacking us!'

"All the officers immediately rushed on deck. I remained below. Some little time afterwards a sailor came down to me and said that Lieutenant ——— wanted me to bring up on deck two glasses of brandy. I went up with the brandy, and just as I reached the upper deck I heard shooting.

"All the sailors on deck were lying down on their faces, and the officers were all under cover. I must admit that I was very much frightened, for the officers were greatly excited, and were all talking together at the top of their voices. Midshipman B—— was waving his drawn sword, crying out, 'The Japanese!'

"I took the brandy to the lieutenant, who told me that I was to remain on deck, as I might be wanted. Looking over the side of the vessel I could see nothing, as there was a thin fog on the counter, but I could plainly discern the signals made by the flagship.

"I heard one of the marine officers say that four Japanese torpedo boats had attacked the fleet. At that moment all the ships were firing.

"We fired several rounds from two small guns, and very soon afterwards, under the glare of our searchlights, I perceived the enemy. There were a number of small torpedo boats, about twenty, I should say, at a distance of less than a kilometre (1,100 yards) from us. We continued firing for about ten minutes, and passed the enemy without sustaining any damage.

"During the whole of that night the entire crew stood to the guns. At daylight speed was reduced, and divers went over the side of the vessel to ascertain what injury, if any, had been done to her.

"On Sunday (October 23rd) the flagship signalled by means of the secret code, and orders were subsequently issued calling attention to the regulations prohibiting sailors and soldiers from imparting military secrets to any of their relatives or friends.

"On Wednesday an order was issued that any man speaking, writing, or

having any communication whatever with relatives or friends on the subject of Friday night's incident would be summarily dealt with under the provisions of the penal code.

You ask me whether our officers were not drunk. They were not drunk, as I have already said, but they were very much excited, and one of the lieutenants fainted from sheer excitement.

Comparison of this personal narrative with the official report furnished by Admiral Rozhdestvensky certainly favours the theory that the nervous fears of the Russian sailors were at their height during the passage of the fleet through the North Sea, and the discrepancy between the Admiral's two torpedo boats, the marine officers four, and the stewards twenty, seems to point clearly to inability to distinguish between a trawler or equally pacific steam carrier and a chooser of the skin.

On October 27th the two men killed on board the trawler *Crane* were buried at Hull. The bodies were followed to the grave by a long procession of mourners and the simple funeral was watched by many thousands of deeply moved spectators. The same evening the Mayor of Hull received from the Mayor of Tokio a telegram asking him to accept the profound sympathy of the inhabitants of the Japanese capital for the victims of the Russian outrages and their bereaved families. History and human nature are both condensed in this touch and feeling despatch which showed with curious distinctness how, though East is East and West is West, the twin can sometimes meet.

The 27th and 28th were anxious days for the country. On the 27th a Cabinet Council was held at which, it was understood, Admiral Rozhdestvensky's report

was discussed, and at the close of the day the Press was informed that the British demands had not yet been satisfactorily complied with, and that no public announcement was yet possible. Meanwhile the British naval preparations, as we have seen, progressed rapidly, and the nation, although assuredly in no Jingo spirit, made ready to hear the worst.

On October 30th another Cabinet Council was held, and the same evening Mr Balfour made an eagerly looked for statement at a meeting of the National Union Conservative Associations at Southampton. At the opening of this historic speech the Premier dwelt with satisfaction on a previous utterance of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in which the Leader of the Opposition had finely enunciated the doctrine that in a matter such as the North Sea incident there could be no question of party feeling. Mr Balfour went on to say that happily what he himself had to say on the subject of the situation created by the outrage was of a favourable complexion. After recapitulating and commenting on what had occurred Mr Balfour stated that the Russian Government had now ordered the detention at Vigo of that part of the Baltic Fleet which was concerned in the North Sea incident, in order that the naval authorities might ascertain what officers were responsible for it. These officers and any material witnesses would not proceed with the fleet on its voyage to the Far East. An inquiry would be instituted into the fact, an International Commission of the kind provided for by the Hague Convention would be held, and any person found guilty by this tribunal would be tried and punished adequately. These arrangements were, Mr B.

was careful to remark, supplementary to the regrets expressed and promises of liberal compensation made by the Tsar and the Russian Government.

"I think we must admit," said Mr. Balfour in the course of a striking peroration, "that the Russian Government has shown an enlightened desire that truth and justice in this matter shall prevail. Only a few hours ago I should myself have taken a very gloomy view of the possibilities of a satisfactory, and, therefore, a peaceful solution of this question: I think the Tsar has shown himself an enlightened judge of what is right in this matter as between nation and nation. We, after all, have asked nothing of others that I believe we should not gladly have granted had we been in their place. We have shown no desire—and I do not think such desire was present in the heart of any man—to take advantage of what might, perhaps, be thought Russia's difficulties, to enforce our demands. We have appealed simply to justice, to equity, to the principles which ought to govern good relations between nation and nation, and we have not appealed in vain. It might have been otherwise. We might have seen the delay of diplomacy intervene. We might have seen one excuse urged after another, until either the Russian Fleet had vanished into the Far East, or until other things had occurred. That we have not seen this is due, I hope, in part, to the justice and moderation of our requests. It is also due to the far-sighted wisdom of the Emperor. The world has now got its eyes concentrated on one great warlike tragedy moving through its appointed course in the Far East. It would have been appalling, but it was not at one time impossible, that that great world-tragedy should have been doubled

by another, and that we should have seen the greatest calamity which could befall mankind—a struggle between two first-class Powers. Speaking for the Government, I may say that we have done all we could, consistently with national honour, to avert that calamity. I, speaking for my colleagues, gladly grant that we have been met in a like spirit by the Government with which we have had dealings."

It goes without saying that the announcement made by Mr. Balfour was received throughout the country with feelings of profound relief. Conscious of the strength of its position, resolute in its determination not to allow the outrage to pass into the limbo of purely diplomatic controversy, confident in the capacity of the Navy to take what warlike steps might be necessary, the nation naturally shrank from the thought of becoming so soon involved in another devastating war. The conflict in South Africa had caused such countless bereavements, had been attended by such grave financial, industrial, and commercial depression, was even now an open sore in thousands of saddened homes and shattered businesses, that a peaceful, if honourable outcome of the present crisis was intensely welcome. For, although it was understood that the cloud had not yet rolled away, it was felt that the trouble had assumed a different aspect. Mr. Balfour's speech had shown clearly that, at one stage during the past few days, the situation had, indeed, been extraordinarily critical, and that a score of things might have occurred to precipitate a "locking of horns," from which no extrication would have been possible until a terrible end had been reached. That tense condition of affairs was over, and with the continuance of such sensible



MR. DALIOLK SIKAKING AT SOUTHAMPTON

and enlightened counsels as had already prevailed on both sides, a completely satisfactory solution of the difficulty might surely be hoped for.

This satisfaction and hopefulness on the part of the British public were considerably enhanced by the discovery that the settlement arrived at had been greatly assisted by the good offices of France.

No sooner had Mr. Balfour's announcement become generally known than evidence began to accumulate that our neighbours across the Channel had acted from the first a part in reference to the outrage which was splendidly worthy of a great and high-minded nation. Promptly perceiving that war between their allies and their friends would be a calamity second only to a war in which they them-

selves were implicated, the French Government set themselves to make every possible effort to bring about a better understanding, and the consummate friendliness and tact displayed to this honourable end will always remain one of the brightest features of the incident. It will, perhaps, never be generally known exactly what steps were taken by M. Delcassé, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, to

produce a *rapprochement* in place of the extremely dangerous situation which at one time undoubtedly existed. But there is no question, and on no side has there been any disposition to raise a question, as to the immense importance of the good offices of France on this occasion, good offices which were the more significant in that they were rendered on the

eve of the discussion of the Anglo-French agreement in the French Parliament.

On the Continent generally, the news that Great Britain and Russia had come to an arrangement with reference to the North Sea outrage was received with marked gratification. In Austria and Italy, particularly, there was great rejoicing over the prospect of a peaceful solution of a difficulty which had caused

grave forebodings. The Austrians appear to have specially admired the spectacle of the numerous and powerful British squadrons "assembling at a few hours' notice, and clearing for action without flurry or mishap," a spectacle rightly regarded in Vienna as far more impressive than organised parades of strength, like the Jubilee naval reviews. This sight, to quote the Vienna correspondent of the *Times*, was expected to work as a most salutary reminder in



Photo: Abdullah Fetics, Constantinople.

M. PAUL CAMBON, FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON.

quarters where the remainder was sorely needed, while friends of England rejoiced to see that the British Navy, which they regarded as the solidest guarantee of liberty and justice in the world, should have been ready at a moment's notice to emphasise the principle that wanton wrong-doing on the high seas shall not go unpunished. The *Tribuna* of Rome went further, and declared that England had acquired a new right to be considered the natural champion of justice and humanity. Such a result, it observed, 'is well worth a slight sacrifice of *amour propre*, one may say that England has won two battles, of which certainly the most glorious is that which she has won over herself.'

Even Germany was not behindhand in acknowledging that the issue of the negotiations redounded to the credit of the British Government, 'which had an altogether exceptionally strong case, but exercised the greatest moderation and wisdom in pressing it upon the Russian Government.' At the same time the feeling was expressed in some circles in Berlin that England had lost a golden opportunity of crushing her traditional enemy, that the outrage would leave behind it a residuum of unsatisfied rancour, and that in any case it was somewhat doubtful whether Russian methods of evasion and procrastination would not hinder a really satisfactory outcome of the present arrangement.

The last day of October saw matters between England and Russia in a fair way towards amicable settlement, the understanding being that a portion of the Russian Fleet would remain for the present at Vigo, and that no time would be lost in making the necessary preparations for the assembling of the International Commission agreed upon. But

the early days of November brought certain complications, which, for a fortnight at least, produced on all sides a feeling of great uneasiness lest, after all, the situation should again become acute. Public opinion, even in Great Britain, was not a little stirred by the occurrences of this anxious period, which seemed to indicate a weakening tendency on the part of the British Government, notwithstanding the continued vigilance and readiness of the British Fleet. The latter maintained its imposing attitude, both in home waters and at Gibraltar. At Portland on November 1st the eight battleships and four cruisers of the Home Fleet were ready for action, together with four of the ships of the Cruiser Squadron, a squadron of eight cruisers and torpedo gunboats and fifty-nine destroyers and torpedo boats of various types, in all one hundred and three ships of war. At Gibraltar or in the neighbourhood there were on the same date fourteen battleships, thirteen first class armoured and other cruisers and a strong flotilla of torpedo boat destroyers.

During the past few days a portion of the Russian Baltic Fleet had been assembled at Tangier pending the inquiry which was to take place at Vigo, and which, in this country, was expected to last some little time. To the general surprise it was suddenly announced that on November 1st all the Russian warships remaining at Vigo had left the harbour, merely leaving behind them four officers, one a Captain Clido, said to be the bearer to St. Petersburg of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's detailed official report, the remainder being three lieutenants detailed to give evidence before the International Commission of Inquiry. On November 3rd it was known that Admiral Rozhdestvensky had

arrived with his battleships at Tangier, and a few days later the Russian Second Pacific Squadron proceeded calmly on its way to the Far East, some of the ships making their way through the Straits of Gibraltar with the evident intention of going through the Suez Canal, the others proceeding to the South with a view to rounding the Cape of Good Hope.

This was not at all what the British public had been led by the firm language of Mr. Balfour to expect, and a good deal of indignant surprise was expressed at the turn which affairs had taken. It was felt, and not altogether, perhaps, unreasonably, that Russia was treating the matter of the International

Inquiry somewhat perfunctorily by leaving only three or four witnesses, none of them of high rank, to give evidence before it. It was also clear that, except by "shadowing" Admiral Rozhdestvensky's ships for the remainder of their voyage, Great Britain would lose the control of the situation, which she had enjoyed so long as the Russian Fleet, or even an appreciable portion of it, remained in the

neighbourhood of Gibraltar. It was also thought that Admiral Rozhdestvensky was escaping rather too easily from the consequences of an act of which he had assumed the full responsibility. It was argued that before the world Great Britain

would seem to have made a great deal of noise and to have put itself to a great deal of expense and inconvenience in order to secure what was apparently a very trifling result. It must be admitted that some of the irritation thus expressed was justified by the rather mocking references of certain foreign journals to the fact that Russian methods were likely in this instance to prove successful, since Great Britain could hardly now hope to secure much more than the indemnity which Russia had from the first been willing to pay.

Matters were in this unsatisfactory state when at the Guildhall Banquet on November 9th the Marquis of Lansdowne

was enabled to make a statement which, to some extent, induced a calmer frame of mind on the part of the British public. Speaking of the fewness of the witnesses left behind at Vigo by the Russian Fleet, the Foreign Secretary said that the responsibility for the selection lay with the Russian Government, and it would be a great mistake to relieve them of it. "But," he continued, "we have



COUNT BENKENDORF, RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR
IN LONDON.

within the last day or two received from them a distinct assurance that the officers detained were those actually implicated in this disaster, and we have received a further supplementary assurance that if it should result from the investigations of

the International Commission that other officers were culpable, those officers also will be adequately punished.

Unfortunately this pronouncement, while it soothed British susceptibilities, produced a fresh complication by aggravating the growing annoyance in Russia on the subject of the punishment of the offenders. The Russian view was that for one Power to dictate to another the punishment of the latter's officers was an arrogant and unjustifiable proceeding. It was further pointed out that Admiral Rozhdestvensky's report, to which full credence was attached at St. Petersburg

had introduced the question whether the Russian naval officers who directed the firing were not fully justified in their action, and whether Great Britain had not, in fact, brought the North Sea out-rage on herself by lending assistance to the mysterious torpedo boats.

For a time the feeling aroused in Russia on this punishment question would seem from the language of the Press to have been fully as bitter as that caused in England by the calm resumption by the Baltic Fleet of its voyage after the hasty inquiry at Vigo. But the real truth seems to be that much of the acrimony imported into the controversy on this account was carefully manufactured. It is suggested that the Tsar and Count Lamsdorf would willingly have

agreed to promise the punishment of the officers concerned in the firing, had, in point of fact entered into a provisional undertaking to this effect but were subsequently induced to adopt a different

attitude by the representations of the Russian Admiralty. Once again the efforts of that headstrong department, or rather of the personages at the head of it, were directed to bringing about a breach between Russia and Great Britain, and they cannot have fallen very far short of success. Ultimately the question was settled by the modification of one of the Articles of the proposed Convention—Article II—so that



I to I usel So s Haber St cet II
SIR CHARLES HARDINGE

the possible responsibility not only of Russia but of Great Britain or some other country should form the subject of inquiry.

It remains to bring a long story to a close by giving the official translation of the Agreement eventually signed at St. Petersburg by our Ambassador, Sir Charles Hardinge and Count Lamsdorf. The terms of this historic document were as follows:—

His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial Russian Government having agreed to entrust to an International Commission of Inquiry assembled conformably to Articles IX to XIV of the Hague Convention of the 29th July, 1899 for the pacific settlement of international disputes, the

HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

deciding by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation, the questions of fact connected with the incident which occurred during the night of 21st-22nd (8th-9th) October, 1904, in the North Sea (on which occasion the firing of the guns of the Russian Fleet caused the loss of a boat and the death of two persons belonging to a British fishing fleet, as well as damages to other boats of that fleet and injuries to the crews of some of those boats), the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have agreed on the following provisions:

ARTICLE I.

"The International Commission of Inquiry shall be composed of five members (Commissioners), of whom two shall be officers of high rank in the British and Imperial Russian Navies respectively. The Governments of France and of the United States of America shall each be requested to select one of their naval officers of high rank as a member of the Commission. The fifth member shall be chosen by agreement between the four members above mentioned.

"In the event of no agreement being arrived at between the four Commissioners as to the selection of the fifth member of the Commission, his Imperial and Royal Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, will be invited to select him.

"Each of the two high contracting parties shall likewise appoint a Legal Assessor to advise the Commissioners, and an agent officially empowered to take part in the labours of the Commission.

ARTICLE II.

"The Commission shall inquire into and report on all the circumstances relative to the North Sea incident, and par-

ticularly on the question as to where the responsibility lies, and the degree of blame attaching to the subjects of the two high contracting parties or to the subjects of other countries in the event of their responsibility being established by the inquiry.

ARTICLE III.

"The Commission shall settle the details of the procedure which it will follow for the purpose of accomplishing the task with which it has been entrusted.

ARTICLE IV.

"The two high contracting parties undertake to supply the International Commission of Inquiry to the utmost of their ability with all the means and facilities necessary in order to enable it to acquaint itself thoroughly with and appreciate correctly the matters in dispute.

ARTICLE V.

"The Commission shall assemble at Paris as soon as possible after the signature of this agreement.

ARTICLE VI.

"The Commission shall present its report to the two high contracting parties, signed by all the members of the Commission.

ARTICLE VII.

"The Commission shall take all its decisions by a majority of the votes of the five Commissioners.

ARTICLE VIII.

"The two high contracting parties undertake each to bear, on reciprocal terms, the expenses of the inquiry made by it previous to the assembly of the Commission. The expenses incurred by International Commission after the date of its assembly, in organising its staff,


and in conducting the investigations which it will have to make, shall be equally shared by the two Governments.

'In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present agreement (declaration) and affixed their seals to it.

Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, 23th November, 1904.

At this point we may leave the episode of the North Sea outrage for the present. Admiral Rozhdestvensky with the major portion of his fleet is now steering along the west coast of Africa; the remainder of his ships are preparing to enter the Suez Canal. The British Navy is gradually assuming its ordinary aspect and the British public has regained its calm. Diplomacy has reasserted its sway, and for the present it only remains to wait the assembling of the International Commission with patience and good temper. But whatever the outcome may be, the actual happenings of the past month will be long in fading out of men's minds. The mere fact that Russia and Great Britain were literally on the brink of war is alone sufficient to invest the whole of this anxious period with peculiar interest for the readers of this narrative. The participation of the Baltic Fleet in what occurred, the alleged implication of Japan also as the real

fons et origo mali, the questions of neutrality incidentally involved, are all points of added interest. But these are of small significance compared with the certainty of the frightful consequences which must have ensued had the limit been transgressed and the Russo-Japanese War been converted into what might have swiftly become a World War, more terrible, more devastating than any yet recorded in history. That moderate counsels, tactful statesmanship and the kindly intervention of a third great Power did much to avert that unspeakable calamity may be readily granted. But for many it will be an abiding conviction that what really kept the peace was the British Fleet. Be this as it may, it is not likely that the civilised world will readily forget the part played by that tremendous institution in asserting Great Britain's angry refusal to allow the lives of her humblest citizens to be trifled with. Incidentally it may be remarked that while land forces as large as those marshalled by Russia and Japan on the Shaho have previously operated in time of war, no such assemblage of fighting ships has ever yet cleared for action as that which in this side issue of the Russo-Japanese struggle came into business-like being under the glorious White Ensign of England.



CHAPTER LXX.


PORT ARTHUR ONCE MORE—SUBSIDIARY DEFENCES—THE GREAT FORTS ATTACKED—
FOUR DAYS OF FRENZIED FIGHTING—BLOCKADE-GUNNERS—INSIDE THE FORTRESS—
THE "BIRTHDAY ATTACK."

AT the close of Chapter LXVIII. our narrative of the Siege of Port Arthur had been brought down to September 15th, by which time the Japanese had advanced to a line represented roughly by the arc of a circle starting in the northern portion of Pigeon Bay, and running through Shui-shi-ying to a point in Ta-khe Bay about four miles north-east of Golden Hill.

It is now more than ever necessary to understand the difference between the main and subsidiary defences of Port Arthur. Terrible as has been the fighting up to date, fearful as the losses suffered by the Japanese unquestionably are, substantial as is the progress which they have made in the accomplishment of their tremendous task, it must be remembered that as yet the attackers have not captured a single one of the series of greater forts, the positions of which are indicated in the Plan on page 152 of the present Volume. Accordingly, the work which now lies before them is even yet more grim and deadly than that which for the past three months has made such heavy and constant demands upon their magnificent stock of reckless courage and tenacity.

At the same time it would be a grave error to suppose that the Japanese have only, so far, touched the fringe of the Port Arthur defences. Although between the main line of forts and the outer line of works a sharp distinction must be drawn, the latter in the case of

Port Arthur are of such great strength, and occupy such an enormous area, that it is hardly too much to say that their reduction is literally, as well as metaphorically, half the battle. Of these outer defences no plan which will be available for a long time to come is likely to be really accurate, for the simple reason that, even after the siege commenced, fresh works appear to have been constructed, and great efforts made to strengthen those already in existence until their character had, largely speaking, been altered. As a rule there is a marked difference between advanced works and those constituting the main line of a fortress's defence, the former often hardly being worthy to be regarded as coming under the head of "permanent fortification." But at Port Arthur some of the auxiliary works were really of immense strength. A correspondent of the *Times* gives an interesting description of the outer forts lying close to Shui-shi-ying which may be taken as an example of this auxiliary system. "Two lunettes or flanked redans, each in plan forming the equal sides of an isosceles triangle, with shorter perpendiculars at their unjoined ends, were constructed. Deep moats, in which were built bomb-proof defences, roofed with steel plates covered with earth, surrounded them. In front, connecting the apices of the lunettes, which measured thirty yards across their open bases, was a vast crown work. It extended like a



HOW THE JAPANESE TIGHTENED THEIR GRIP UPON PORT ARTHUR

AND THE JAPANESE TIGHTENED THEIR GRIP UPON PORT ARTHUR
 WITH THE HOPES OF GAINING THE VICTORY OF THE 200000 MEN OF THE FORTRESS ITSELF.

hollow square across the valley-head between Fort Er-lung-shan and Pan-lung-shan. The parapets or walls were of earth not less than twenty-five feet thick. Behind these, balks of timber, iron plates, etc., covered with many feet of earth, constituted shelters safe from fire for the garrison. This great work was defended by no fewer than two field guns, two mortars, three quick-firing guns, and four machine guns, disposed in the west lunette and east and west rear lunettes. Besides these inner defences, three great *fougasses*, or mines, filled with huge stones, to explode by electricity, were dug and carefully hidden in front of the crown work. Inside, again, were torpedo tubes, fish-torpedoes, and, last but not least, 1,000 stout Siberian riflemen."

The fact that the Japanese had already captured several works of this description must surely be taken as strong evidence of their capacity for dealing in due course with the greater forts of the main line.

It will also be readily understood that in a progressive siege—as distinct from one in which the besiegers merely sit round a place and wait for starvation to produce surrender—the advantages attached to a strong inner line of defences are often sensibly decreased by the wear and tear of the incidental fighting, as well as by the insidious approach of the determined enemy. As long as the auxiliary line is held there is every cause for hopefulness, for a variety of things may happen, if not to bring the siege to an end, at any rate to render it easier to keep the attackers at arm's length. But, when one by one the advanced works fall, and are promptly occupied by an enemy which refuses to be turned out, or, if turned out, comes

back again time after time until a final foothold is gained, the moral and material effect upon the defence begins to become serious. However scientifically constructed the inner forts may be, the fact that they constitute, practically speaking, a last resort is apt to be strangely impressive, and its significance is enhanced by the greater frequency and accuracy with which the enemy's shells come dropping into the heart of the defence, mostly to no purpose it may be, but here and there doing real damage and discounting seriously the chances of the final struggle.

Casualties, too, may sap the confidence of the besieged in their main line of defence. Of course, to garrison a contracted ring of forts does not require as many men as are needed to hold a greater outer circle, or semi-circle, or arc of scattered works. But, when fighting in the advanced line of defences has been so desperate as has been the case at Port Arthur, the sadly attenuated garrison cannot but be, to some extent, depressed by the thought that perhaps twice their number have already been killed or wounded in the attempt to resist an enemy who will not be repulsed, and whose striking power is maintained by constant reinforcements.

All these considerations must be carefully weighed in order to grasp the significance of the stage at which the siege of Port Arthur had arrived about the middle of September. For now, to all intents and purposes, the attack has passed out of the intermediate stage dealt with in Chapter LVIII., and an organised attempt is about to be made to wear down the resistance of some of the main line forts. By this we must not infer that all the auxiliary defences have been captured and occupied, for, as will be gathered

from the succeeding narrative, there are yet important positions held by the Russians in front of their greater works, positions which it will cost the Japanese weeks of fierce fighting to gain. Also it will be understood that the line we have roughly drawn to represent Japanese progress up to this point must not be followed too precisely, especially, perhaps, as regards Shui shi ying. From some accounts it would appear that the latter was still in the Russian hands about this time and in one map, purporting to be highly authoritative the Japanese are represented as being on August 28th still north of Shui shi ying while on September 21st they are an equal distance to the south of it. The truth seems to be that, while the tide of success in this quarter ebbed and flowed a good deal during August and September a portion at least of Shui shi ying was pretty steadily held by the Japanese from, at any rate, about the middle of August.

In this connection the relative positions of Shui shi ying and Wolf's Hill may have caused some dubiety in the minds of the readers of this narrative. It will be remembered that we have hitherto located Wolf's Hill about half a mile south of Shui shi ying, and this is where it is marked on the maps printed in the *Times* on August 18th and again on September 17th. But in later maps the position of the hill has been shifted to the north or north west of Shui shi ying. The discrepancy is not of first-class importance in a narrative like this in which some corrections by the light of later information are inevitable. But it will serve to show the occasion of difficulties which the conscientious compiler even of a popular war history has to face. It should also support the present writer's plea that,

if in this detail he has erred, he has at least erred in excellent company.

Let us now endeavour to pick up the thread of our fighting story. It will be recalled that it dawned on September 15th the Japanese bombardment from Shui shi ying, Pa li chwang, and Pigeon Bay was redoubled in intensity. This now appears to have been due to the bringing up of some exceedingly powerful siege guns or howitzers, which are heavier than any artillery the Japanese have hitherto had in position. Having placed these monsters in battery, the Japanese now proceed with what is known as the sap advance against the great forts which are now their main objective. In sapping, a trench is first dug under protection of a sap roller or iron screen, from this another trench is pushed forward diagonally to a convenient distance when another trench is dug parallel to the first and so on. By this means the attackers can approach closer and closer to their objective without exposing themselves unduly to the defenders' fire until the time comes to issue from the last parallel and make a final rush at the fortification which it is hoped to capture.

On September 19th commenced the big assault foreshadowed in Chapter XVIII, of which Er lung shan and Chi huan shan (sometimes called Ku kwan shan) were the principal objectives. These are the Nos. 5 and 6 on the Plan on page 132. Simultaneously an effort was to be made to capture two new forts which had been built on what is known as Metre Range to cover the approach to the I-tzu shan and An-tzu shan forts (Nos. 1 and 2 on the Plan). There were also four lunettes south of Shui shi ying which had to be dealt with before any real headway could be made.

Of the operations immediately south of

Shui-shi-ying a very vivid account is furnished by Mr. B. W. Norregard, the War Correspondent to the *Daily Mail* with the Japanese Army before Port Arthur. Mr. Norregard writes:—

“To take Er-lung-shan it was necessary first to capture Lung-yen redoubt, which, together with the lunettes, had been unsuccessfully attacked on August 19 and 20, the positions forming a large wedge in the investing lines, making attacks on I-tzu-shan from the east and Er-lung-shan from the north impossible.

“The whole line of forts was shelled from early in the morning, but the main bombardment was concentrated on the above-mentioned fortifications at two in the afternoon. The lunettes were constructed at the corners of the large parallelogram connected with the trenches. Those on the north-west side were strongest, being armed with two quick-firers, one field gun, and three machine guns.

“Two regiments were detailed to attack them. Two battalions in the evening and twice in the night assaulted the strongest lunette, which had in front of it a deep trench and a deep wall stopping the advance. A standing fight took place under the breastwork, both sides using hand grenades effectively. Two companies attacked a small lunette on the north-west, but all attacks were repulsed.

“From dawn on September 20 for many hours a tremendous shrapnel fire was poured on all the lunettes. Saps had been constructed to within fifty yards, and from the strongest a whole regiment which had been concentrated at this point rushed the lunette at nine o'clock in the morning, using scaling ladders. After a fierce hand-to-hand struggle, the Japanese rushed into the connecting trenches and took three other

lunettes after a brief resistance. The shrapnel fire of the Japanese demoralised the defenders.

“Simultaneously Lung-yen was attacked by four battalions. This position was held by two companies with three field guns and several machine guns. It was surrounded by a fifteen-feet deep moat, with almost perpendicular sides, the walls being very steep. There were two strong kaponiers inside, and the redoubt was loopholed and protected by sandbag trenches.

“On the evening of September 19th two battalions attacked the north-east corner, where a breach had been made by shells. One battalion attacked the eastern and the other the western trenches, but both were repulsed.

“After several hours' bombardment the attack was renewed at noon. The Japanese advanced through a breach, and a fierce and protracted hand-to-hand fight took place inside the redoubt.

“The kaponiers were smashed by hand grenades in the attack on the trenches, but the Japanese made little headway, and were unable to cut off the retreat of the Russians, who saved their machine guns and destroyed the large guns. They retreated at 4.30 o'clock. The Japanese casualties were over a thousand.”

Not less difficult and desperate was the assault delivered against the Russian defences on Metre Range. Here, as noted above, were two works of recent construction on hills known as 180 Metre and 203 Metre Hill respectively. On the former was a plateau round which ran trenches fronted by wire entanglements. The work on 203 Metre Hill was of much greater strength, forming a large parallelogram 100 yards by 500. Its trenches were revetted—*i.e.* their slopes were



THE WEARINESS OF STRIFE THE DAWN
OF ANOTHER DAY AT FORT ARTHUR.

strengthened—with sandbags, and overhead protection was afforded by steel plates covered with additional layers of timber and earth. This work, which was also protected by wire entanglements, mounted two heavy guns, three field guns, and three machine guns.

The trenches on 180 Metre Hill appear to have been carried with little difficulty after an extremely severe artillery preparation. But the other work offered a much more serious resistance. Mr. Norregard says:—

“The saps were carried to the foot of 203 Metre Hill from the south-west. On the 19th there was no attack. On the 20th one regiment made an assault from the saps, but was unable to reach the breastwork owing to the furious fire. A battalion from another regiment attacked from the west side, and had to pass over an open field about 300 yards in extent. Two bodies of men, each numbering about sixty, tried to cross by spreading out and running at top speed. The shrapnels from 203 Metre Hill killed every man. This was the best artillery practice seen in the war.

“On September 21st, at dawn, both regiments made a combined assault from the south-west. They gained a position close under a fort, when a false report that the hill had been taken stopped the artillery fire at a critical moment, giving the Russians the opportunity for repulsing the attacking force with heavy losses. ;

“At noon one regiment succeeded in taking the north-west corner, and held it for hours in spite of a tremendous shelling. . . . On Russian reinforcements arriving, the Japanese were forced out later. Attacks on September 23rd and 24th failed, and the attempt was relinquished, the Japanese, however,

holding 180 Metre Hill, though they were unable to stay on the plateau.”

Of the fighting during the four days from September 19th to 23rd a separate report is submitted to the Tsar by General Stoessel, who claims, with some justice, that the main Japanese assaults were heroically repulsed. He admits, however, that two field redoubts—the Temple Redoubt and the Reservoir Redoubt—remained in the enemy's hands, and that the Japanese destroyed the reservoir. The Temple Redoubt may be identical with the Lung-yen of Mr. Norregard's narrative. The Reservoir Redoubt seems to be one of several forts named after Kuropatkin. This one is said to have been situated to the south of Pa-li-chwang and to the north-east of the Parade Ground, having been built for the purpose of protecting the main water supply. The loss of this work did not, of course, deprive the garrison of all chance of procuring fresh water, as there were springs inside the fortress, and plenty of machinery for condensing sea water. But the destruction of the reservoirs must have been severely felt.

The total casualties in the assault on Metre Range were 2,400, of which 2,000 were incurred on 203 Metre Hill. Brigadier-General Yamatoto was among those killed in the 180 Metre Hill affair. “The Japanese,” says Mr. Norregard, “showed great gallantry in storming strong positions, while the Russians stubbornly resisted the onset of overwhelming forces and the tremendous shelling, manfully awaiting the charges, fighting to the bitter end, and even making vigorous counter-attacks. The greatest individual bravery was displayed by the Russians in spite of the awful stress of the long siege.

"Both sides used hand grenades filled with gun-cotton, and with a fuse that burns for fifteen seconds. These grenades were often picked up and re-thrown. They proved very effective. Latterly, also, they have been fired from light, bamboo hooped mortars, whose range varies from 50 to 200 yards with a regulated charge. Both Russians and Japanese frequently threw stones at one another. It is generally impossible to cut the wire entanglements.

A strong electric current runs along the wire. Now and then the poles are cut, but this is a difficult and dangerous task. Sometimes the men, covered with bullet proof shields, cut the wire, but more frequently they fasten ropes to the poles, hauling at them from the caps. When it was discovered that the poles were wire-braced, they were often blasted by long bamboos filled with black smoke giving powder. These were often used in the attacks on the kaponiers and bomb proof shelters inside the forts, choking the defenders and screening the attackers from view.

It most often happens that the men creep by night to the entanglements, and, lying on their backs, cut, and even bite, the wire. When the searchlights are turned on them the men pretend to be killed or wounded. When this ruse was discovered the Russians, finding it impossible to distinguish between the living and the dead, fired on the wounded in the ambulances.

In addition to the Temple and Reservoir Redoubts, the Japanese during this series of assaults captured some supplementary works, the possession of which enabled them to bring fresh guns into position and so continue the rapid advance to good purpose. From details furnished officially to St. Petersburg correspondents

of leading Paris journals, it would seem that the Russians did not regard these successes very seriously, in view of the belief that the garrison still numbered 12,000 men in good health, and that provisions were abundant. On the other hand, it was admitted that ammunition was falling low, and that the Cinet guns with which some of the forts were armed were no longer working well.

As regards the provisions, incidental information available about this period indicates that the garrison had for the present a sufficiency of food, but that the tinned meat supplies were nearly exhausted. Thirty donkeys were now being slaughtered daily for fresh meat, which was worth about 55 a pound. Eggs cost 10d each.

Before resuming our narrative of the land operations it should be mentioned here that on the night of September 15th the Japanese suffered a somewhat serious loss by the sinking of the armoured gunboat *Hei-jen*. This vessel was engaged in guard duty in Pigeon Bay when at dusk a storm arose and heavy seas were encountered. The *Hei-jen* was endeavouring to return to her base, when she suddenly struck a floating mine, which exploded under her starboard side amidships. The vessel began to sink, and an attempt was made to lower the boats. These, however, were swamped, and all but a handful of the ship's company were drowned, the total loss being 197.

During the remainder of September the garrison of Port Arthur enjoys, to use General Stoessel's words, comparative tranquillity. But the Japanese were gradually drawing closer, and on September 28th they commenced shelling not only the greater forts but the ships in the harbour, several of which were badly

knocked about. The *Pobieda* was hit once, the *Retrivan* four times, the *Peresviet* four times, and the *Poltava* five times. Some smaller craft were sunk or

they were trying to capture the heavy guns which the Japanese had mounted in that vicinity. They were in considerable force, with field artillery. and made



A FLAG OF TRUCE.

set on fire. The battleships were observed to be working their pumps, and using junks for landing their crews.

On September 28th and 29th severe fighting is reported on the west shore of Liau-ti-shan near Pigeon Bay, the Russians being the aggressors. Apparently

several ineffectual sorties from the western forts.

On the night of October 8th the Japanese landed a force in Ta-khe Bay, the Russians retiring in the face of superior numbers. On the next day the Japanese were driven out by the Russian



THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA
THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
AND THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARTS
AND LETTERS

artillery, one gun which the Japanese had already mounted being, according to Russian reports, destroyed.

Trivial as the last-mentioned incidents may appear when compared with the major operations of the siege, they are of interest as showing how general was the fighting all round the fortress at this stage, how careful the besiegers were to exercise a steady and continuous pressure, and how alert the defenders to contest, wherever possible, the gradual advance of the enemy. Particular attention may be paid to the Russian sorties, which, although not always effective, were carried out with commendable vigour and gallantry. Sorties are the habitual accompaniment of every well-conducted defence, and serve the double purpose of harassing the attack and *enabling the besieged from time to time to shake off the demoralising influences which are apt to creep over men who for months have been fighting under cover.*

During October and November the attempts to run cargoes of provisions, ammunition, and coal into Port Arthur became increasingly frequent, and sensational accounts are given of the daring displayed by those engaged in these exploits, and of the inducements offered to adventurers of various nationalities, Great Britain, one is sorry to say, included, to take the very serious risks involved. At one time it is said that no fewer than six firms were systematically engaged in the extremely profitable business of blockade-running. The craft usually employed were junks, of which an average of one in three was generally captured or sunk by one of the Japanese guardships, the prices obtained for the two remaining cargoes covering the loss and leaving a big margin of profit.

Vigilant as the Japanese were, it was impossible for them to prevent supplies reaching the enemy in this way. Their only consolation lay in the fact that Russia was being made to pay dearly indeed for the assistance thus afforded the beleaguered garrison. It is stated in this connection, that a German steamer, which cleared from Tsing-tau with a cargo of coal ostensibly for San Francisco, had been privately chartered for blockade-running purposes on terms which indicate meaningfully the risks and possible profits of such enterprises. The Russians are declared to have paid 60s. a ton for the coal, besides depositing in the bank the appraised value of the ship, plus a 25 per cent. bonus, and a special bonus to the captain of £250. Incidentally, of course, the fact that such prices were even regarded as probable shows clearly that the scarcity of coal in Port Arthur was thought to be growing most serious.

Meanwhile the Japanese have been receiving reinforcements, and the bombardment from the newly emplaced 11-in. howitzers continues daily, careful balloon observations being taken of the effects of the fire. To those unacquainted with the attributes of modern siege guns it may seem strange that balloons should be needed for this purpose when, under ordinary circumstances, a telescope in the hands of a standing officer should suffice. But it should be understood that in modern sieges almost all the artillery fire on the part of the attackers is "curved," the idea being not to strike directly some visible object, but to pitch, as it were, great shells filled with high explosives into the inner defences of the place which is being besieged. It was the introduction of accurate curved fire which not so very many years ago revolutionised siege

operations, and made it necessary to build fortresses on an entirely new plan. Of course, in the old days curved fire was not unknown, the means employed being the mortar, a stout, dumpy little gun, from which shells were lobbed into the air and descended at a high angle, often with considerable effect into the enemy's lines. But mortar fire which was largely a matter of chance, and could only be employed at short ranges, could hardly be compared with the fire from a modern howitzer of large calibre, which can cast a shell with surprising accuracy into a small area several miles distant. It must be remembered too that the shells used in modern siege operations are of infinitely greater destructive capacity than those formerly used. Very long in proportion to their diameter, and of forged steel, they carry an explosive several times as powerful as gunpowder, and, accordingly, when they descend at a high angle upon the works of a fortress their wrecking effect is enormous. Hence the necessity for cover of quite a different sort from that which *existed in the old days, when a shelter could be rendered 'bomb proof' with a very few inches of earth.*

In the third week of October the Japanese devoted their attention largely to the great Frlung-shin fort on the northern pier of the main line of defence. Several minor positions near Frlung-shin were captured, after fierce fighting, on the 16th. Both on Wolf Hill and on the section from Pih-chwang to T'akushin fresh guns of large calibre were brought into position, some of these, it is said, having been removed for the purpose from the fortifications of Tokio bay. Sapping and mining went on incessantly, and everything pointed to the early delivery of another great assault.

A private letter received at Shinghai on October 28th, and dated from Port Arthur a week earlier, gave a lurid account of the state of affairs inside the fortress. It ran as follows —

General Stoessel has telegraphed to the Tsun and Court 'I now bid you all good bye for ever. Port Arthur will be my grave.' General Stoessel has induced the garrison with in heroic spirit, and they are ready to prefer a glorious death to capitulation.

"The Japanese shells are inflicting great damage on the fleet and harbour works. The arsenal and all the ammunition and small arms which it contained have been destroyed. The water supply having been cut off, wells are now being sunk. Provisions are scarce, and only tinned meats are left. A meal made off the horses killed by shells is regarded by the soldiers as a banquet.

General Smuinoff is jealous of General Stoessel, and would have surrendered the fortress had he not been overruled. The Polish and Jewish soldiers in the garrison are being closely watched in case they should desert or show treachery. The field and naval hospitals are crowded, and hygienic conditions are becoming deplorable. The bombardment is at times so incessant that it is impossible to dig graves of any depth for the dead. Over one-half of the original garrison is dead, wounded, or sick. The high angle fire of the Japanese has practically destroyed the new town. When the fleet attempted to break through the blockade, the garrison was to have made a desperate sally, with the object of inflicting as much damage as possible, and then, if necessary, capitulating, but the failure of the fleet to escape frustrated the plan.

'The besiegers are pressing closer daily. It is hard to say how long we

can hold out. When the end comes there will be a desperate fight, and thousands of the enemy will perish, as everything is mined."

The letter was entrusted to a native boatman, who ran the blockade and despatched the letter from Chifu. The recipient of the news was a prominent Continental merchant, who had a representative at Port Arthur.

On October 26th commences what is sometimes called the "Birthday Attack" on Port Arthur, owing to the evident anxiety of the Japanese to produce a really marked impression upon the fortress, if not to complete its capture, by November 3rd, the birthday of the Emperor of Japan. By October 25th the Japanese saps had been carried up to within easy distance of the counterscarps of the Er-lung-shan, Sung-shu-shan, and East Chi-huan-shan (Ki-kwan) forts. At 8.30 a.m. on the following morning these forts were heavily bombarded with siege guns and naval ordnance, 250 shells taking effect. From the official despatches we learn that the parapet of Er-lung-shan fort was demolished, and openings were made in it, while several portions of the cover were destroyed. Two of the most important covers to Sung-shu-shan fort were also wrecked, and three guns dismantled or damaged. From two o'clock in the afternoon the remaining Japanese siege guns were directed against the trenches on all the slopes of Sung-shu-shan and the neighbouring works, all of which were observed to have been badly knocked about. At five in the afternoon a portion of the Japanese right wing charged against the Sung-shu-shan trenches, and a portion of the centre against Er-lung-shan, and effected a lodgment. On the slope of Er-lung-shan a large mine exploded

without, however, killing a single Japanese soldier. During these proceedings the Russian artillery responded briskly to the bombardment, but their shells were defective, and did not cause much damage. This interchange of big gun fire produced, as may be imagined, an impressive and dramatic scene.

On the night of October 26th, with the object, as the Japanese despatches are careful to state, of preventing repairs, the Japanese siege and naval guns shelled Er-lung-shan, East Chi-huan-shan, Sung-shu-shan, and also the Russian warships and the town. The Russians holding Sung-shu-shan and Er-lung-shan made several night sorties, under cover of shell and rifle fire, but were successfully driven back.

The Japanese despatches, which alone could be relied on for both comprehensiveness and accuracy at this stage, go on to state that on October 27th the bombardment was continued, the fire being directed against Sung-shu-shan, I-tzu-shan, An-tzu-shan, Pei-yu-shan, Er-lung-shan, the dockyard, and warships.

"Of the results of our bombardment, those deserving special mention are the effect realised against the fort East Chi-huan-shan, where a gun carriage was completely demolished, the destruction of a banquette lying between the east and north fort and the centre of Er-lung-shan fort, the scattering of the cover of that fort, the destruction of two small guns, and the demolition of a gun on the east front of the same fort.

"Several of our shells took effect in the south-eastern corner of the same fort, destroying the cover and smashing two machine guns into pieces. A gun placed on a projected point on Sung-shu-shan was dislocated. A twelve-centimetre gun placed on the centre of the left wing was



NIGHT TURNED INTO DAY AT FORT ALTHUR.

The first of the day's work was done by the 2nd and 3rd regiments of the 1st division, which were ordered to move forward and occupy the position of the 2nd and 3rd regiments of the 1st division.

demolished, while the covers were also destroyed.

"In the course of the same night our Engineer Corps was sent against the northern part of East Chi-huan-shan, and it succeeded in destroying the outer casemate at a projected point.

"During the night the enemy resorted to every means to obstruct our work, assaulting and using bombs. At the same time, the Russians worked energetically, effecting repairs on the portion damaged by our shells.

"On October 28th the bombardment with heavy and other siege guns was continued with good effect. Two hundred and eighty-five effective shells have been counted, besides several other shells, which took effect on forts An-tzu-shan and I-tzu-shan, the 203 Metre Hill, and Pei-yu-shan.

"The naval guns were directed chiefly against Tai-yan-ku, I-tzu-shan, An-tzu-shan, the warships in the east harbour, and the western portion of the city.

"Effects deserving special mention were on Er-lung-shan, banquette and buildings inside the fort destroyed, and vital portions of the fort considerably damaged. The enemy had placed a row of sandbags on the banquette destroyed by the previous bombardment. On the northern portion of East Chi-huan-shan the magazine exploded, and a field gun was destroyed. On Shan-shu-shan a twelve-centimetre Canet gun and another were hit. On I-tzu-shan the carriage of a twelve-centimetre Canet gun was overturned and another heavily damaged. On 203 Metre Hill two covers and the wire entanglements and trenches were considerably damaged.

"On Fort Tai-yan-ku the guns and works were heavily damaged. A conflagration occurred in the old town, and

a second conflagration was observed at a factory to the north-east of the base of Golden Hill, which lasted for three hours. A machinery building near the harbour was bombarded by our guns, as were the protected engineers' works."

On the night of October 28th the mine directed against Er-lung-shan reached the outer limit of the fort, and a portion of the advance defences was blown up. On the same night dynamite was twice applied to the outer casemate of the eastern point of the fort lying north of East Chi-huan-shan and caused wide openings, killing several of the enemy inside the casemates.

On October 29th and 30th the bombardment was continued with increased vigour and effect, heavy damage being inflicted on several of the forts, and the magazine on Tai-yan-ku being exploded. On the morning of the 29th the Russians made desperate attacks on the Japanese mines directed towards Er-lung-shan and Sung-shu-shan, and in the case of the latter effected a temporary and partial capture. In the afternoon, however, the Japanese succeeded, with the aid of artillery, in regaining possession.

At 1 p.m. on October 30th the troops on the Japanese right and part of the centre advanced, and by sunset occupied the glacis and "covered ways" of Sung-shu-shan, Er-lung-shan, and the north fort of East Chi-huan-shan, destroying some of the caponieres and the enemy's outer ditch. Here we may resume our quotation of the Japanese official despatches:—

"Simultaneously, another part of our right charged against the fort standing midway between East Pan-lung-shan and the north fort of East Chi-huan-shan, capturing it at 2 p.m. in spite of the enemy's heavy fire. We then formed intrench-

ments. During the night, however, the enemy made several counter attacks, one of which at 10.30 p.m., drove our men out of the fort, but Major General Ichinohe himself led the firing line and at 11 p.m. recaptured the fort, which from that time was firmly held.

At 1.15 p.m. our left also moved against East Chihuan-shan and the adjacent forts, capturing the fortified position north west of East Chihuan-shan.

At 5 p.m. on October 31st our left, charging the north fort of East Chihuan-shan, reached the crest of the eastern parapet, where they intrenched. Meanwhile, steps were taken to secure our tenure of the two forts captured on the previous day, and at the same time the ships in other parts were proceeded with rapidly.

On October 31st some of the heavy siege guns and naval guns were trained on the harbour mouth and dock and by this means the *Gilut* was hit several times, two steamers were sunk and a conflagration was caused near the wharf.

From 8.30 p.m. the enemy made repeated frontal attacks on our extreme left, all of which were repulsed.

On November 1st our heavy guns sank two steamers of about 350 tons in the western harbour, and one of 300 tons on November 2nd.

At about 11 a.m. on the 2nd two heavy explosions, probably of powder magazines, were heard at the north end of the old town.

In the first fort captured on October 30th we found three field guns, two machine guns, three fish torpedoes and 30 Ru-huan-shan.

From noon on November 3rd our naval guns directed a heavy fire against the dock and other parts of the eastern harbour, causing a great conflagration at 12.15 p.m., which continued until 4 a.m. on the next day. Our heavy guns on November 3rd inflicted much damage on the fort 300 metres north west of Wang-tu, and also put the field guns out of action in the gorge of East Chihuan-shan.

Thus ended the great 'Birthday Attack' upon Port Arthur, the results achieved falling very far short of that complete triumph which the Japanese had anticipated, but the progress made being still very considerable. Now for the first time have the Japanese made good their footing in the immediate front of some of the greater forts, and now at last the fire of the besiegers' big guns is beginning to tell heavily. It is part of the plan of the present work to anticipate ultimate results as little as possible, but it may be said here that from the defenders' standpoint the crisis of the siege of Port Arthur was reached when the 11 in howitzers of the Japanese came effectively into play which they may be said to have done with particular emphasis during the period from October 6th to November 3rd. For the rest it is sufficient to say that Port Arthur having escaped the intended honour of being handed to the Mikado as a birthday present by his devoted soldiers, was to continue for another two months a scene of continued carnage, an exhibition of almost superhuman tenacity on the part of both of desperately brave attackers and of a heroic defence.

CHAPTER LXXI.

JAPAN'S WINTER OUTLOOK—PROVISION AGAINST WAR WASTAGE—A NEW MILITARY SYSTEM—NAVAL PREPARATIONS—HOME-MADE BATTLESHIPS—A PAINFUL EPISODE—FINANCIAL PROSPECTS—FOREIGN RELATIONS—BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND AMERICA.

A JUNCTURE has now been reached at which it will be not only expedient, but also very interesting, to examine rather carefully the attitude and resources of the two combatant nations in regard to the continuance of the war through the winter months. Such an examination must necessarily be on broad lines, and there is no occasion to dwell on many details which, in the case of some previous campaigns, have been regarded as of special significance.

The mere fact, for instance, that winter is in prospect, and winter, too, of an exceptionally severe sort, has not anything like the same influence upon the warlike situation in the Far East as it has had even in comparatively recent operations in other parts of the world. In the first place, of course, this particular war commenced in the winter, and both sides have already had some experience in tackling one another to the trying accompaniment of blinding snowstorms and icy blasts. In one respect, moreover, winter in Manchuria is a very favourable season for military operations, since the roads, hard with the continued frost, are often more practicable then for heavy transport than at any other time of the year. In considering, therefore, the positions of Japan and Russia respectively at, say, the beginning of October, 1904, there is no need to lay undue stress upon the change of climatic conditions, or to take it for granted that there should be any serious


cessation of activity because for a time the greater portion of Manchuria may be exposed to rigours which might compel some Western troops to have recourse to the old-fashioned, sometimes very detrimental, expedient of "winter quarters."

Of course, apart from generalities, there are, even in this connection, some details which make for instructive contrast between the two opposing nations, but these are mainly such as will readily occur to the intelligent reader. In a naval sense, winter is on the whole at this stage of the war more favourable to Japan than to Russia, since it renders the harbour of Vladivostok for the time being a negligible quantity. On the other hand, the later blocking of the mouth of the Liao river with ice may cause a serious interruption of the sea transport of stores by that convenient route, which the occupation of the port of Niu-chwang, of Old Niu-chwang, and Liao-yang has rendered of so much greater significance than it was in February and March last.

Again, from the military standpoint, Japan may be expected to score a few additional points during the awful cold weather by reason of the extraordinary completeness of her organisation, and her close and continuous attention to details affecting the welfare and comfort of her soldiers in the field. At various past stages of the operations this proposition has been illustrated, and in Chapter

LXIV. a special account was given of the Japanese soldier's winter outfit, several points of which, notably the design of the winter greatcoat, afford strong evidence of the most careful forethought, and

But it is not every army that both takes such lessons to heart and adapts them to the purposes of war on a very much larger scale. In this connection it may be mentioned that the Japanese military authori-



SHOOTING FELLOW THE WATER LINE. SUPERHEATED TORPEDO TUBE IN ACTION.
The machine gun is on the deck by the ship's side. The ship's side has been hit
partly by the water line and the damage is very

shrewd appreciation of requirements, in this direction. Doubtless the less credit is due to the Japanese on this score in that they had a very illuminating experience of winter campaigning in Manchuria when fighting the Chinese in 1894-95.

ties have already anticipated the winter in a very practical fashion, as far as all semi-permanent occupations are concerned, by sending out double-walled wooden huts in sections which can be quickly put together as required, and are

an invaluable supplement to such rude Chinese structures as are locally available.


But the real interest of the situation for Japan, as for Russia, does not depend upon details of this sort. It is bound up with far larger considerations, among which may be reckoned such big subjects as the extent of the "war wastage" up to date, the development of the enemy's fighting capacity, the possible increase of home resources, the financial aspect, and relations with foreign countries, who are now spectators merely, but may, at almost any moment, be tempted or forced to take a hand in the game. Such considerations, always significant, are rendered peculiarly so by the signs that Russia is now tardily beginning to realise the nature of the struggle in which she is engaged, and to take measures, incommensurate perhaps with the actual necessities of the case, but still sufficiently impressive to demand attention, more especially from a combatant literally fighting for existence.

The question of war wastage is far more complex than it seems to those who regard it as a mere matter of numbers. In various ways it has been elaborately discussed by numerous military writers, but for the purposes of this narrative an extract from a letter written by the Special Correspondent of the *Times* at Tokio will both show what different things war wastage may mean, and what steps Japan was taking as far back as the middle of July to meet deficiencies which in October would otherwise have been very severely felt.

"The waste in every army long in the field," writes this correspondent, "must always be great; it can be scheduled under half a dozen heads: contact with the enemy, disease, communication requirements, loss of sea transports, etc.

Now you can put your standing army into the field fairly fit at all times, at least if your army system is a workable system. But if your standing army only totals some 150,000 men, and you require to take the field with 250,000 men, it requires considerable executive manipulation to keep pace with the wastage of so large a force, and to place the selections from the second and third reserves in the field in every way as physically prepared as the standing army had been. The majority of the older men who answer the call to arms have long lost the habit of a life so rigorous as that required from the soldier serving with the colours; moreover, many of the technicalities of drill and armament have undergone considerable changes since the reserves were themselves serving with the colours. No one would have anticipated that the Japanese would be blind to the requirements of a protracted campaign. Therefore, although we know that over 200,000 men have left Japan, yet from the activity which exists at all the military centres it would be difficult to realise that the fighting strength in the country had been reduced by a single infantryman. You miss, it is true, both cavalry and artillery; that is only natural, but in the matter of their infantry there appears to have been no reduction in the home establishments, and the scheme for reinforcement is prepared for a far heavier wastage than has as yet taken place.

"Since my return to Tokio," says a *Times* correspondent, "I have spent much of my time on the parade-grounds of the military centres in the capital. The training to which each batch of reservists is put as it comes up for service is interesting and instructive. They roll up from every walk in life. The farm labourer, bent with con-



A WAR CORRESPONDENT'S PASSPORT IN THE FAR EAST.

Note the numerous stamps which had to be impressed at each military station through which the holder passed.

to represent the face of a defended position. There is a deep 10-foot fosse, 20 feet in breadth, then a parapet revetted with stone, the whole surmounted with a mound. It is no mean achievement to negotiate this course at the double, yet the whole squad must negotiate it to the satisfaction of the inspecting officer before it is passed fit to undertake musketry instruction. As soon as the detachment is passed as physically fit, ordinary company training is proceeded with, and hitherto amongst the reservists I have seen nothing beyond company training. Battalion training doubtless takes place at other centres which I have not seen. Anyway, as soon as the men have done about two months at the divisional centres they are drafted off to one of the large camps near the embarkation ports, and are lost sight of."


A drawback from which the Japanese Army must have suffered considerably in regard to the training of these reservists was the lack of officers and non-commissioned officers for purposes of drill and discipline. But in the Japanese Army a little is made to go a very long way. Practically all the higher non-commissioned officers are quite able to discharge the duties of company officers, as indeed many were compelled to do in the fighting, more especially round Liao-yang. It is noteworthy, however, that the Japanese Army are averse from the Continental plan of giving numbers of non-commissioned officers commissions on the outbreak of a big war. As regards the drilling of reservists, this, it was found, could safely be entrusted to privates of the Regular Army, and accordingly the training of this immense mass of valu-

able material was accomplished with the very minimum of borrowing from the badly needed strengths of Regular battalions.

Some idea of the vital necessity for providing a reserve against war wastage alone may be gathered from an instructive statement telegraphed from Tokio by Reuter's Agency at the end of September, 1904. According to the unofficial estimates in this message, the number of sick and wounded at that time under treatment in Japan was not less than 45,000. The military hospitals in Tokio, Osaka, and Hiroshima were said to contain 10,000 patients each. Nine thousand had recovered sufficiently to be sent to mountain health resorts. Such figures as these are of themselves sufficient to

indicate the tremendous drain upon the manhood of Japan which had commenced, and which must continue, at any rate as long as the garrison of Port Arthur held out behind its deadly fringe of forts and guns.

Beyond this question of war wastage lies that of the development of the enemy's resources, to which we shall refer more particularly in the succeeding chapter. But already we have seen the Japanese awakening to a sense of the magnitude of the task before them, and taking at least one practical step toward supplying their present deficiency. In Chapter IX, the creation of a Second Russian Army in Manchuria under General Gripenberg was foreshadowed, and subsequently it transpired that y



A TYPICAL SCENE AT THE FRONT. THE LARGE CONICAL STRUCTURE IS A TENT OR A LARGE BARREL, AND THE GROUP OF PEOPLE AROUND IT ARE SOLDIERS OR LABORERS.

a Third Army was in contemplation. The Japanese, striking as had been their success hitherto, even when the numerical odds were not in their favour, could not afford to disregard such a dangerous symptom as this of their adversary's return to sanity. The prospect of such enormous increases to the Russian forces in the field was the more disquieting in view of the certainty that the new armies to be formed would fight as well as, if not better than, that which Japan had already encountered, and that no insuperable difficulty would probably be experienced in raising a Fourth or Fifth Russian Army if necessary. Accordingly Japan lost no time in preparing an effective reply to the new menace, and the smoothness and rapidity with which her Government acted seem to indicate that she had long ago realised the possibility that some such sacrifice would be necessary.

Under the Japanese military system in force at the outbreak of the war, service with the colours commenced at the age of 20, and lasted for three years, at the expiration of which term the men passed into the reserves for a period of nine years, and then into the Territorial Army, which is not liable to service abroad, for a period of eight years, a total period of 20 years' liability to military service. Japan's reply to the formation of the Second Russian Army in Manchuria was to extend the period of service in the reserves to 14 years, leaving only three years to be spent in the Territorial Army. As the new system became operative on the day it was promulgated, all men who served with the colours from 1887 to 1891 were added to the strength of the active Army, for, of course, all the Reserves were now considered to belong to the latter. "Statistics," writes a Tokio correspondent, "show the actual number

of such men to be 331,816, from which, deducting 10 per cent. for ordinary wastage, there remain 300,000 actually available. This calculation is necessarily based on returns of earlier date than the programme for the extension of Japanese armaments of 1896, which programme as now modified will ultimately give an increment of about double the above figures, thus making the total war strength of the army over 1,000,000."

It will be understood that this calculation of increased military strength must not be taken as representing with absolute exactitude the advantage secured. It is quite possible that the allowance for wastage by death and from other causes should be placed much higher than 10 per cent., and in a very great many cases it would be impossible to recall to the colours men who, having been for some years enrolled merely in the Territorial Army, had passed into an obscurity in which they could not easily be traced. The problem, again, of providing these new reserves with officers and non-commissioned officers would be a really difficult one. On the other hand, the efforts made by some Continental critics to disparage this counterblast to the formation of the Second and Third Russian Armies in Manchuria seem rather futile when we consider how careful the Japanese have always shown themselves in the matter of estimating their own strength, as well as in gauging that of their opponents. Hitherto they have never failed to put into the field at any given point as many men as were required for the purpose in view, and in all their preparations there seems to have been ample margin allowed for contingencies. This precise habit of mind has been illustrated with great clearness by the method adopted in the case of reinforcements. While it has

naturally been necessary to send many fresh units to the front, a principal object has been to keep those already in the field at war strength, a process which takes even a first class organisation very severely, but which when satisfactorily carried out, is a notable proof of warlike efficiency.

While then it is quite possible that something under 600,000 men have thus by a stroke of the pen been added to the active military forces of Japan, there is as an expert observes, no reason to doubt that the field army is in process of expansion to half a million, at least, in order to compete on level terms with the similar deployment which Russia proposes and hopes to display in the spring. It must be remembered too, that Japan has a marked advantage over Russia in this case by reason of her shorter line of main communications. Theoretically, of course, numbers must tell in the long run, but, practically speaking the fact that Tokio is within a week of Peking, and is connected with it by several routes while it still takes a single battalion anything from four weeks to seven to get from St. Petersburg to Mukden is of immense significance.

Before leaving this subject of Japan's special preparations for continuing the land campaign during the winter months it may be interesting to place on record the fact that at this period the Japanese military authorities seem to have been particularly active in supplementing from abroad their vast stocks of kit and supplies of every description. It may be mentioned for instance that in October we hear of a London firm purchasing at Gouda on behalf of the Japanese Government, 2,000,000 Dutch cheeses for Army supply purposes. It is also recorded that the Japanese placed large orders for win-

ter cloth and for tent canvas with Scotch manufacturers, who were urged to expedite delivery. Truly a nation terribly in earnest, Japan showed clearly by her vigorous and ample policy of preparation in such matters that she realised to the full the complicated strain to which she would still, in any case, be subjected for months to come.

Nor were the Japanese less alert and busy in their endeavours to anticipate the naval requirements of the coming winter. Here it is not easy for us to give many details for the Japanese were far more reticent in regard to their Fleet arrangements than in regard to those affecting the Army. But it is evident that, far from ignoring the possibility that the Baltic Squadron might eventually find its way into Japanese waters and thus modify very materially the naval situation the Mikado's Government kept a most vigilant eye upon the progress of Admiral Rodhjestvensky's ships from their onset, and were fully prepared with plans for their reception. They did not fail incidentally, to expostulate with countries which afforded the Fleet a freer harbourage than the laws of neutrality would seem to justify, but they certainly did not allow the making of such diplomatic protest to divert them from the consideration of the more practical points at issue. Not only were the authorities at Tokio kept fully aware of every movement of the Russian Squadron, not only were adequate arrangements made for watching the approaches to the China Sea, but orders were evidently conveyed to the forces round Port Arthur to redouble their efforts to destroy the Russian ships in harbour, in order to leave Admiral Togo free to engage the newcomers. Although everything was done as quietly as possible there is reason to

believe that in the later stage of the siege the Japanese Fleet was very little in actual evidence outside Port Arthur, the blockade being maintained by a few second- and third-class cruisers, and by gunboats and destroyers, the bulk of the squadron remaining in readiness at the naval base. Formerly Admiral Togo had been quite willing to adventure his precious ships in the neighbourhood of Port Arthur, and in the earlier stages of the siege his guns had on several occasions been used with marked effect against the coast fortifications. But there have been "accidents," possibly one or two besides those which were made public, and the oncoming of the Baltic Squadron made it doubly foolish to run risks. Accordingly we may take it that during the close of 1904 the Fleet of Japan was mainly engaged in resting, and in testing every joint in its armour, in order to prepare for what might prove a heavier struggle by far than any in which it had yet taken part.

Just as in the case of the Army, the Japanese Government did not restrict its naval preparations to mere obvious precautions. With equal thoroughness and watchfulness it anticipated a number of requirements in the way of material, sending, for instance, three experts to Fiume to watch over the construction of the torpedoes to be delivered during the following three years.

On October 13th, too, it was reported from New York that a Russian order for thirty submarines had been promptly followed by a Japanese order for fifty of these craft. In this connection it is interesting to recall the circumstance that, at the commencement of the war, a well-known Japanese naval officer had declared his countrymen to be averse from the adoption of submarines, which

were quite unlikely ever to be used by Japan. It is possible that the evident inclination of Russia to take advantage of this latter-day development may have modified the views of Japanese naval officers on the subject. But it is more likely that British naval manœuvres demonstrating the possibilities of submarine warfare, and the fact that this country was now building submarines with a rapidity which a few years ago would have been scouted as preposterous, had produced in Japan a sudden resolve to be up-to-date in this as in every other respect. It should be mentioned that, while the Russian order placed in New York is said to have been for submarines on the *Protector* model, the Japanese favoured the *Holland* type, a modification of that adopted by the British Navy.

But of even greater significance than its attention to torpedoes and submarines was the movement of Japan in another naval direction, a movement which was foreshadowed as far back as Chapter XLIV. of the present narrative. On page 546 of Vol. I. was reproduced Admiral Yamamouchi's statement to those who visited the Kure Arsenal in the course of the tour of the *Manchu Maru*, that in a few months Japan would be ready to start on the construction of battleships, and that it was hoped that very early in 1905 the keels of two large war-vessels would be laid. That statement was made in June, and in September it became known that Japan had given an order to the Carnegie Steel Works for 7,500 tons of the finest nickel steel plates, evidently intended as armour for new battleships or for very large armoured cruisers.

Japan had therefore lost little time in putting her intentions into practice, and the fact that the order would take about three months to execute, and that the



PA 19: "GREAT BATTLE"

RUSSIAN TITLES. AN INGENIOUS DEVICE FOR ARRESTING THE IMPETUOUS ATTACKS OF THE JAPANESE.

Two figures have been hastily used by the Russians as a method of defence of fortified positions. Those shown in the illustration were constructed at Liao-Yang and the Japanese are seen searching among them for their deal

great armour-plate rolling mill at Kure was expected to be ready by January, points to a very accurate forecast of working possibilities.

As has already been pointed out, a new departure of the very highest significance and interest is here indicated. Hitherto Japan has had to be content with the home construction of torpedo craft and an occasional small cruiser, such as the *Niitaka* and *Tsushima*, and she may well be proud of having attained even these modest results after such a short apprenticeship to the shipbuilding art. Now she is about to attempt developments which, if successful, will enable her to compete with the naval powers of the West in a vitally important direction, and will gradually remove the one drawback under which she has laboured, and laboured heavily, in respect to the present war. A long period must elapse before Japan's first home-made battleship can take the water, but the mere fact that she will soon have one or two under construction may at no distant date have a very serious bearing upon the continuance of the struggle. For, with such enthusiasm, skill, and industry at work as are to be found among the Japanese, we may be sure that the biggest ships will be turned out far more speedily at Kure and Yokosuka than on the banks of the Neva; ships, too, whose rivets are not of painted wood, whose sea-plugs are not "accidentally" left open, and whose design is as sound as experience, combined with the shrewdest assimilation of foreign ideas, can make it.

But it must not be supposed that Japan's condition as regards the coming winter operations has been one of alert and busy preparations only. Her anxieties have been numerous and considerable, and in more than one direction she has

had to combat untoward influences even among her own countrymen. Speaking generally, the people of Japan have been affording a magnificent example of unity and pertinacity combined, and the Press of Tokio has borne eloquent witness to the steadfastness and genuineness of the prevailing patriotic sentiment. But there have been "little rifts within the lute" which have needed careful treatment to prevent their widening out and causing real mischief. A good deal of bad feeling, for instance, has been generated by aspersions directed against two prominent members of Tokio society, Count Matsukata and Count Inouye, who founded during the early stages of the war an Imperial Association for the relief of widows and families rendered destitute by the death or absence on service of husbands and relatives.

When Japanese feelings are aroused on a subject of this sort the expression of them is apt to become forcible to the verge of violence, and, accordingly, when statements appeared alleging a fraudulent misappropriation of the funds of this society, public indignation rose to a high pitch. Happily an answer was forthcoming to these aspersions in the shape of a declaration on the part of a former President of the Bank of Japan showing that the amount collected by the Imperial Relief Association—some £50,000—had been securely deposited in various good banks, and was earning interest sufficient to pay the expenses of management. There had been delay in distributing the fund because the Government and local societies were successfully caring for the destitute. All may have been well that thus ended well, but it is conceivable that not a little lasting soreness was created by this incident which might well have been avoided by the ex-

hibition of a little tact and common-sense.

Of another and more serious matter it is difficult to speak with complete freedom. The story—an extremely painful one—is told in a letter sent by a *Daily Express* correspondent from Tokio under date September 19th. It relates to the sinking of the transport *Istach Maru* and the shelling of the *Sado Maru* by the Vladivostok Squadron as narrated in Chapter XXXII. From what has since transpired it would appear that the loss sustained by Japan on that occasion was not confined to hundreds of valuable lives. The *Istach Maru* is said to have been loaded with the largest and best siege guns in Japan, and also to have carried two armoured trains and railway plants. The siege guns were, of course, intended for use against Port Arthur, and it is easy to understand that their loss contributed in no small degree to the delay in the reduction of the fortress.

The interception of the two transports by the Vladivostok Squadron produced a painful sensation at Tokio, where the details of the disaster were eagerly discussed and very free opinions were expressed as to the culpable parties. Miss McCaul, in whose bright book, "Under the Care of the Japanese War Office," is a vivid description of the incident as related to her by two of the survivors during her stay at Hiroshima, makes special mention of the "grave criticisms" passed on Admiral Kamimura for not having prevented such a serious blow. That gallant sailor has long ago been exonerated from the charge even of want of vigilance, but it would seem that a brother admiral on the staff at Tokio, who later incurred suspicion of a different kind, has been found guilty of an infamous connection with the disaster

of June 15th, and paid a terrible penalty for his treacherous act.

The story as related by the *Express* correspondent is to the effect that the Japanese admiral in question received a bribe of £12,000 from the Russians for telegrams, which were despatched first to Fusan and thence by wireless telegraph to the Vladivostok Squadron, and which enabled the latter to locate the transports soon after they left Moji. When on investigation the admiral's treachery leaked out, the vengeance of the Naval General Staff was swift and, according to our Western ideas, horrible. The doomed man having formally been found guilty, the sentence of death was read out to him by his intimate friend and comrade. Then followed a scene over which we need not linger. "The Staff assembled and entered the room, which had been cleared of all furniture. The prisoner was made to take off his uniform. He was then beaten to death by his comrades."

Let us turn hastily from this ghastly episode to other considerations connected with this period. It is not the business of the present historian to discuss closely great questions of finance, but this is a juncture at which the "sinews of war" cannot be wholly disregarded in any fair survey of the warlike situation. As regards Japan, there is no sort of question that the financial outlook continues quite extraordinarily favourable, in spite of the terrific expenditure which has been, and is being, incurred. "The strain of the war and the drain upon the country's resources," says Reuter's well-informed correspondent at Tokio, "are not felt to any extent among the people. Some businesses have suffered, but the aggregate foreign and domestic trade exceeds that of last year, and the crops, particu-

larly the rice crop, are the largest ever grown." This statement was made at the end of September, and a few days later was amplified by an important pronouncement by the Japanese Minister of Finance, Count Okuma, whose survey of the financial position was distinctly optimistic notwithstanding several frank admissions. He pointed out that if the war lasted another two years the total cost to Japan would probably be from 1,200 to 1,300 million yen, or from 120 to 130 millions of pounds sterling. Therefore, with the present debt and the cost of the *post bellum* undertakings, the country's liabilities would aggregate £200,000,000. Russian war-outlays over the same period would approximate, he thought, 400 to 500 million pounds sterling. Even assuming Japan's indebtedness to rise to a couple of hundred millions, that would only amount to £4 per head of the population. There was no reason why Japan should regard such a prospect with dismay, provided she husbanded her strength and resources, and did not resort too freely to foreign loans, the result of which would be to depreciate her securities.

On the day on which Count Okuma made this statement, the Prefectural Governors were having a conference with the Cabinet, at which some interesting conclusions were arrived at. Since the outbreak of the war the prefectural expenses had been reduced by no less than two millions sterling, and now other retrenchments were being effected in order to strengthen the national finances. A striking instance this of the readiness of all classes of the population to make sacrifices in aid of the prosecution of the war to the bitter end. For we may be sure that these reductions in prefectural expenditure affected the pockets not only

of leading provincial officials, but of far humbler employes. Fair comparisons in such a case are difficult, but it may be doubted whether any similar process of retrenchment could be carried out in any Western country with such apparent absence of irritation on the part of those affected. For of all forms of taxation the reduction of small official salaries and perquisites is, perhaps, the most unpopular, and, taken all round, the hardest to be borne.

The old saying that Heaven helps those who help themselves seems likely to be exemplified in the case of Japan by an incident which, although of doubtful historical value, seems worthy to be chronicled in passing. War time, and especially during such a war as that which is now absorbing Japan's best energies, is hardly a favourable season for developing or exploiting the mineral wealth of a belligerent country. But it may happen that Japan's financial responsibilities during the coming winter—to say nothing of subsequent periods—may be a little lightened by an interesting discovery made about this time of goldfields situated in the Kesen district of the Rikuzen Province, in Government property. The fields were promptly inspected by Government engineers and a proclamation issued entirely reserving the mining rights. According to an early estimate transmitted by the *Times* correspondent, the fields were believed to be of considerable extent and richness, and capable of producing gold to the value of two or three millions sterling annually. Many a far richer country than Japan would welcome such a pleasant windfall.

It remains to say a few words as to Japan's relations with foreign countries at the commencement of the winter campaign. In the first place, it is pleasant



THE GREAT STRUGGLE ON THE SHIA-HO - FIGHTING
IN THE STREETS OF LIN-CHIN-PU



to notice that, notwithstanding the efforts of sundry Continental journals to the contrary, the good feeling between Japan and her ally, Great Britain, continued unabated, and that from time to time the confidence of the Japanese in the steadfast character of British sympathy found very happy and frank expression in all the more influential organs of public opinion. As to the Continental Press campaign referred to, it is sufficient to say that it consisted chiefly of a systematic endeavour to twist British recognition of Russian valour into a sign of waning regard for Japan and growing preference for her adversary. As was pointed out earlier, there was such persistence and method about these silly insinuations that it was impossible not to think that they were in some measure inspired, the object being the twofold one of disheartening Japan and discrediting British diplomacy. Fortunately Japan and England are alike in their capacity for admiration of high courage and military skill, and while the London papers were applauding Kuropatkin's masterly retreat from Liao-yang, and the dogged tenacity of his brave soldiers, the Tokio papers were doing just the same thing. There was, then, no chance of misunderstanding on this point, and, even if there had been, it would doubtless have been neutralised by the other and substantial proofs given by Great Britain of her goodwill. The very considerable fund raised in this country for the Japanese wounded, alone, to say nothing of the marked public satisfaction displayed whenever news arrived of a Japanese success, would have been sufficient, if necessary, to convince the Island Nation of the Far East that the friendship of the other Island Nation was of the right enduring sort.

Of the North Sea incident, it may be said in passing that the Tokio Press took a singularly sane view, refraining, in particular, from any sort of expressed wish that Great Britain should be forced into the conflict against her will. Warm-hearted sympathy with the victims of the outrage was generally exhibited in Japan, and, as we have seen, the Mayor of Tokio was at pains to cable direct to the Mayor of Hull the sincere condolences of himself and his fellow-citizens upon what had occurred. Of what Japan thought about Britain's naval preparations in connection with the outrage it might savour of self-complacency to speak at length. But it may safely be said that the spectacle of her ally's magnificent readiness to assert, if necessary, her maritime supremacy in Europe was not lost upon a nation which had herself given the world such a striking object-lesson in the value of sea-power.

Another foreign country Japan's relations with which were of unusual interest at this stage was Germany. There is no question that for the first six or seven months of the war Japan had viewed Germany's, or rather the German Emperor's, pro-Russian tendencies with grave suspicion, and even now the assistance lent in the matter of coaling the Baltic Fleet was not unnaturally creating a good deal of resentment in Japanese minds. But some modification of this bitter feeling took place at the end of September and the beginning of October in consequence of the visit of Prince Karl Anton of Hohenzollern to Tokio, preparatory to proceeding to the front. Prince Karl arrived at the Japanese capital on September 25th, and received a notable welcome, several of the leading papers taking the opportunity of emphasising the friendship between Japan

and Germany. At a farewell banquet on October 2nd one of the Japanese Princes, in proposing the health of the Kaiser coupled with that of Prince Karl, remarked that the despatch of so distinguished a member of the German Imperial family to accompany a Japanese army constituted a strong proof of the friendship cementing not only the two Courts, but also the two Empires of Germany and Japan.

It is not suggested that these amenities should of themselves be taken very seriously, and, as hinted above, there are still reasons, and urgent reasons, why Japan should not regard Germany with special lovingkindness. To those reasons may be added the strong commercial rivalry which has already arisen, and which cannot fail to become still stronger in the future, between two countries who have never disguised their intention to have a finger in the Chinese pie. But it is none the less noteworthy that in October, 1904, a marked improvement in the relations between Japan and Germany took place, the mere fact of which may prove to be of some historical significance.

It is a singular instance of Russian diplomatic methods that she should have stooped about this time to seek to create in the United States an uneasy feeling that Japan's continued success would jeopardise America's position in the Philippines. As the *Times* correspondent at Tokio observed nothing could be more chimerical since it is very doubtful whether even England holds a higher place in Japan's esteem and affection than America. In explaining that this sentiment is of long and unchecked growth the correspondent quoted indulged in a short historical retrospect, and added a note on the present relations between the

two countries so admirably lucid and to the point that an extract is subjoined *verbatim* —

'America first among Occidental States agreed to relieve Japan from the indignity of alien tribunals administering foreign laws within her borders and although this concession, inexpressibly prized by the Japanese, had no immediate practical value because of an arrangement which made its operation conditional on the concurrence of other Powers, the reservation, having been suggested by the Japanese themselves, did not in any sense detract from the grace of the act. America, again, by restoring her share of an indemnity wrested from Japan under painful circumstances, greatly strengthened her place in the Island Empire's heart, and, when to this record is added the fact that in the demeanour of the average United States citizen towards the Japanese there has always been a subtle something which differentiates him from the generally condescending and too often contemptuous representative of other Western nations, it becomes comprehensible that among all her Occidental friends there is none more cherished by Japan than the American. These considerations alone should suffice to show how extravagant is the suggestion that Japan would ever resent the flouting of the Stars and Stripes over the Philippines. And there is the further cardinal fact that, although Japan is actually allied in this war with only one section of the Anglo-Saxon race, she believes herself to be theoretically allied with the whole of Anglo-Saxondom, since she is fighting for the British American programme of equal opportunities for all peoples in an independent China, and for the Anglo-Saxon ideal of constitutional liberty against the sway of despo-



THE ASSAULT ON THE KEY TO THE RUSSIAN CENTRE AT LIAO-YANG.

This illustration, drawn from a sketch made upon the battlefield, represents the attack of the 3rd (Okui's) and 5th (Nozaki's) Divisions of the Japanese forces upon the enormously strong Russian redoubt, seen crowning the high hill on the left of the picture, and its accessory defences. One of the latter, called "The Round Top," shown in the immediate foreground, was the scene of constant fighting; its trenches were found filled with dead. Below this foreground hill and in the middle distance are seen the wire entanglements and pitfalls which cost the Japanese so many lives. The low hill on the right of the picture is the Chinese graveyard where Okui's men hugged the ground the whole of one day, and lost 30 per cent. of their number under cross-fire. In the cane-field beyond, the Japanese screened 300 of their guns. The anti-like figures scaling the slopes of the further hills are the attacking Japanese. The ground explosions seen at the front of these hills are the land-mines which the Russians fired by electricity. On the extreme right of the picture, but not shown, lies a cane-covered plain through which the Japanese advanced on a four-mile front, charging every Russian position at once. Kuraki's position in the hilly country seen in the distance was marked by continuous shrapnel smoke bursts.

trism America's withdrawal from the Philippines would be regarded by the Japanese as little short of a calamity, since her presence there constitutes a guarantee for the continuance of her wholesome interest in the affairs of the Far East.

The only other foreign relations with which Japan is seriously and specially concerned at this moment are with China, and here the considerations involved are so numerous and complex that they must be left for separate treatment, should occasion arise in a future chapter. It is sufficient to say here that at present no cause for particular anxiety exists in this direction, and that accordingly, neither in the East nor West is there any immediate indication that Japan will be hampered in her prosecution of the war by extraneous contingencies. This circumstance gives added point to the simple

but impressive appeal addressed by the Mikado to his people in the second week of October. Since the outbreak of the war, and his Majesty, 'our Army and our Navy have demonstrated their bravery and their loyalty, while both officials and people have acted in unison to support the Cause. So far, success has attended our Cause, but, the end being yet very far distant, it is necessary to be patient and steadfast in the pursuance of our action and thus attain the final accomplishment of our purpose.'

Well may the Japanese have paid respectful heed to such a message, knowing as they did how earnestly and tactfully their noble Emperor was working to lessen the strain of the war by careful conservation of the national resources, and by the maintenance of studiously friendly intercourse with all neutral nations.



THE STREET OF JAPAN

THE STREET OF JAPAN

CHAPTER LXXII.

RUSSIA IN OCTOBER — ARMIES IN MANCHURIA — SIBERIAN RAILWAY — DISCONTENTED RESERVISTS — FRESH WARLIKE PREPARATIONS — DARDANELLES QUESTION REVIVED — FEELING IN ST. PETERSBURG — EFFECT OF THE WAR ON TRADE — FINANCIAL OUTLOOK.

IN seeking to do for Russia in this chapter what was done for Japan in the last, namely, to examine her condition and resources at the commencement of the winter operations, a somewhat less grateful task is encountered. In the case of Japan the prospect, by no means one of unmixed freedom from care and apprehension, was relieved by many bright features. In particular we saw an enlightened monarch loyally supported by a united people in a policy of persistent and self-sacrificing endeavour. We saw, too, a splendidly efficient Navy and Army, not only maintained at a glorious pitch of enthusiasm and achievement by their own valour and endurance, but backed up to the utmost by the sedulous efforts made at home to keep them well furnished with supplies and war material. The inevitable strain of a costly and devastating conflict we found to be both sensibly relieved by wise administration of the nation's finances, and notably assisted by the circumstance of a record crop and an encouraging maintenance of trade prosperity.

When we turn to Russia's winter outlook we shall meet with much less cheering symptoms. But, before we proceed to discuss these in detail, a word of warning is necessary. While in relation to the actual winter operations themselves, the condition of Russia may be shown to be little short of deplorable, while figures might easily be cited to prove that the

blow already dealt to Russia's finance and commerce, to say nothing of her world-prestige, has been an extraordinarily heavy one, it would be very foolish to generalise too freely from any statements of this kind. Russia, in October, 1904, presents a very imposing figure, notwithstanding the fact that she has been handled during the past eight months by Japan much in the same way as a big-framed Western wrestler is sometimes handled by an undersized professor of *ju-ji-tsu*. She must still be reckoned a very great Power, temporarily, perhaps, taken at a disadvantage, but still an adversary of giant strength and literally immense resources. What a country like Russia can do in the way of fighting can never be measured by a few months of war. Over such a vast area, where such enormous possibilities and reserves of wealth and other aids to resistance are concerned, powers of self-recovery may come into play, of which history has already provided some instructive examples. France, while she was being humbled by Germany, did wonderful things, and, her humiliation over, recovered herself with extraordinary swiftness. Russia herself did the same after her war with Turkey in 1877. Again, Russia's very weakness as a nation may prove, as Turkey's has done, her strength as a fighter.

If, then, we proceed somewhat ruthlessly to examine Russia's position in re-

guard to the continuance of the war during the winter months, let us do so with our eyes open to big historical and political facts. Rome was not built in a day, and for that very reason did not decline in a day, although the causes of her ultimate fall were such as would have brought about a speedy collapse in any less strongly based empire. But Russia is even less liable than Rome in her later days might have been to feel the full weight of such a hammering as she has received. For Russia is not only an Empire which has been a long time growing, but one which has not done growing yet, as far as internal development, at any rate is concerned. There are more signs of coming emancipation than of imminent decadence about Russia, and this is one of those considerations which has to be reckoned very seriously when estimating the reserve of fighting strength possessed by a belligerent nation at any stage of a great war.

With these few words of caution, based on purely historical arguments which need not be elaborated here, let us turn to the matter directly in hand, and try to gauge fairly the effect upon the winter's work which Russia's special preparations and the conditions under which she is making them were likely to have. In the first place we have to deal with the Russian Army on the spot and here, before we proceed to projects of expansion, one or two serious points present themselves. In the first place there can be no question that the Russian cause has been helped to an almost incredible extent by two circumstances both of a personal nature: one the recall of Admiral Alexieff, the former Viceroy of the Far East—which has been dealt with at length in Chapter LXII—the other the magnificent efforts of Prince Khudoff,

the Minister of Public Works and Communications to maintain and increase the carrying capacity of the Siberian Railway.

We have already seen how the recall of Alexieff, the 'heavy handed intriguer' of the Far East, has coincided with the formation of a Second Russian Army in Manchuria under General Gripenberg, the original idea being that Kuropatkin should have supreme control of these two armies only. But the formation of armies is a fascinating process, and only a few weeks after the notion of a Second Army a Third Army began to be contemplated, and shortly afterwards became an accomplished fact. It is not necessary to go into the preliminary details of this new organisation. A simpler plan will be to anticipate the state of affairs at the end of the year, when we find the Russian military strength in Manchuria scheduled by a military expert as follows:—First Army (General Linavitch)—First, Second, Third, and Fourth Siberian Army Corps, viz. 150,000, to the east of the great Manchurian Road. Second Army (General Gripenberg)—First, Tenth and Seventeenth Russian and Fifth Siberian Army Corps, perhaps 150,000 strong, to the west of the same road. Third Army (General Kaulbars)—Eighth and Sixteenth Russian Army Corps (even in January not completely mustered at the front), and the Sixth Siberian Army Corps, viz. 80,000 men. To the above must be added the cavalry under General Rennenkampf, which is directly under the Commander in Chief.

It will thus be seen that, thanks to the extraordinary energy of the Minister of Works and Ways, the Russians had no lack of men at the front both at the beginning of, and during, the winter. Also according to General Kuropatkin

the Commissariat Department was working well, at any rate, in the autumn, for in September the Commander-in-Chief made special mention of the manner in which the Commissariat officials had carried out their duties hitherto, and

note that at the commencement of the winter operations the question of food supplies does not seem to have caused any particular anxiety. The only serious deficiency seems to have been in the matter of forage, which had run very



GENERAL KAULBARS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE THIRD RUSSIAN MANCHURIAN ARMY.

asked that their services might be brought directly under the notice of the Tsar. It is true that later accounts seem to indicate that this praiseworthy efficiency was not well maintained. But we are dealing in this chapter with the winter prospect, and it is important to

short since the Russian evacuation of Liao-yang, where the bulk of the forage stores had been accumulated since the commencement of the campaign. Even the Harbin depôt appears to have been rapidly exhausted, with the result that cavalry leaders were beginning to com-

plain loudly of the restrictions thus placed on their movements.

But it is when we come to look into other circumstances at the front that we begin to discover signs of a pinching shoe. We have already seen how, through want of proper winter uniforms, the Russian troops were compelled to wear Chinese clothing. It is further stated that there was a serious lack of boots, a grave matter indeed at the commencement of a Manchurian cold season. Another significant drawback is the condition of the hospitals some of which for months past have been in an appalling state

of people suffering from dysentery those in authority hide, and then excuse themselves on the plea that the matter has not been reported to them.

The chance of any improvement in this painful condition of affairs is very small. Some indication has previously been given of the scandalous misappropriation of funds subscribed in Russia for the alleviation of the sufferings of the sick and wounded. To this may now be added the testimony of one of the Russian correspondents of the *Times*, who



THE LATER LIT

THE RAILWAY STATION, HARBIN

Writing from Mukden a Russian officer under date July 20th, had drawn a terrible picture of the situation in this respect. In the railway hospital cases of diphtheria and scarlet fever are lodged in the same building as surgical cases. There is literally not a vacant spot. Splendid Royal trains for the wounded go half empty. But men suffering from dysentery are carried on straw in goods waggon at the rate of twenty five sick men to a wagon or in tiers of two tiers. And all this arouses little interest. When some wretched train arrives full

says. Very little confidence is now felt that money given to the Red Cross Society will ever reach the Russian sick and wounded at all and in the circumstances this is not surprising. But even those who are willing to make and pay for their own arrangements find the task no easy one. An association of nobles in the south of Russia wished to equip a special ambulance for the sick, but although all preparations had been completed and the train was ready to start the requisites for the journey were not procured.

last one of the members of the association went himself to St. Petersburg to try to accelerate matters. After being passed on from office to office and obtaining nothing but evasive replies and unsatisfactory promises, he discovered that the cause of the trouble was a certain highly placed military official, who would not give the permission until he had received a substantial *douceur*. This having been provided, all difficulties vanished and the ambulance was allowed to proceed.

"Another instance of peculation which occurred out at the seat of the war was related to me by a Russian who had had to do with the equipment of one of these private hospitals. A chief of police at Kronstadt, who had been dismissed and imprisoned for peculation some years ago, was appointed to an important position in the Red Cross Society, and entrusted with a sum of 600,000 roubles (£60,000) to be expended in the Far East. He went out there, and soon the whole sum had disappeared, but nothing had been spent on the object for which it was intended. The affair came to light and the ex-chief of police was recalled, but actually given another appointment in the Red Cross Society's headquarters at St. Petersburg.

"Although most of the nurses have behaved with the greatest gallantry and self-sacrifice in their task at the front, the conduct of others has been less praiseworthy, and 25 per cent. of them have been ordered back to Russia for scandalous misbehaviour."

It is a relief to be able to turn from these unpleasant stories to the details of the working of the Siberian Railway, to which approving allusion has been made above. In this connection the personality of Prince Khilkoff is particularly

interesting. He is described by Mr. John Foster Fraser, in his "The Real Siberia" (Cassell & Co.), as an elderly gentleman with the easiest of manners, and nothing Russian or official about him. He studied engineering as a young man in Birkenhead and afterwards in America. According to Prince Khilkoff's own account he is "just a working man, you know—a sort of blacksmith." But he is something very much more than that. Not only is he a striking combination of intellect, vigour, and industry, but he is one of the few men who have been able successfully to cope with the blight of corruption and peculation which is such a frightful hindrance to the proper development more especially of great Russian engineering enterprises. One after the other he has weeded out the higher officials of the vast Siberian line, until a staff has been formed upon which real reliance can be placed. Moreover, there is little chance of backsliding, for the Minister of Communications, having set his headquarters at Irkutsk, is constantly travelling up and down the line, personally superintending the strengthening of the permanent way and the badly-wanted construction of new sidings. The result has been that, in spite of heartrending difficulties, there has not only been no serious breakdown, but the carrying capacity of the line has been sensibly increased.

Brief mention has been made in preceding chapters of the opening of the Circum-Baikal extension, by which the voyage across the lake is satisfactorily avoided. Of this extension, which was opened for traffic on September 26th, some interesting details are now available. The line was actually commenced in 1899, but, until the outbreak of the war, the progress made was very slow

owing to the almost insuperable natural obstacles encountered. The railway is about 150 miles long, and no fewer than thirty-three tunnels had to be cut through the mountains with dynamite, the ultimate cost being nearly six millions sterling. Some idea of the value of the line for purposes of reinforcement may be gained from the statement that ten trains, each of thirty carriages, can be run on the extension daily, whereas the ice-breaker *Baital*, formerly the only link between the Cis-Bukal and Trans-Bukal

convert the railway as far as Lake Balkal into a double line, and a first credit of ten million roubles had been opened for the purpose.

While on the subject of the transport of Russian troops to the Far East a glance may be given at the passage up from Southern Russia to the Moscow terminus of the Siberian line. Here is an interesting picture taken from a



THE TRANS-SIBERIAN
RAILWAY UNDER
CONSTRUCTION

lines, making three trips across the lake every day, could only carry twenty-five carriages each trip.

But even with this important improvement the carrying capacity of the Siberian Railway falls very far short of actual requirements. The real desideratum is a second line of rails, and it is significant of Russia's greatness that the tremendous task of meeting this demand does not deter her responsible officials from taking a start at the commencement of this last winter. In the third week in October it had been decided to


letter written about the middle of October —

"On a recent journey between Ekaterinoslav and Odessa I counted no fewer than seven military trains full of troops going eastward. They formed part of the Odessa Army Corps which has been mobilised and is being sent out to the front. Each train consisted of twenty to thirty cars, each of which contained about thirty men or eight horses. At the station of Znamenska there was a particularly busy scene, as there it was were there simultaneously, and a number of soldiers both infantry and cavalry, were scattered about the platforms. Most of the men wore dark uniforms, save a few

who had jackets of a light greenish-khaki colour. They were small in stature, but seemed well set up and strong. They had very swarthy skins, and were evidently to a great extent of non-Russian extraction — Tartars, Circassians, etc. One of the officers, too, a Mahomedan, wore a red fez. They appeared to be cheerful enough, and some were even dancing on the platform wild fantastic Oriental dances, interspersed with curious shrieks, to the tune of a violin played by a musical warrior in one of the cars. These antics aroused considerable curiosity and amusement among the ordinary passengers and lookers on, who formed circles round the performers.

“The cars in which the troops travelled were ordinary goods vans taken from all the railways of the Russian Empire. A good many, by the way, belong to the Eastern Chinese Railway, the name of which is painted on them in Russian only. In each van several planks had been placed crossways and lengthways so as to form benches for the soldiers, but they were so arranged that they could not be of much comfort to any one wishing to sleep, and the men usually slept, or tried to sleep, on the floor. Owing to the fatiguing nature of the journey, the troops are allowed a day's rest after three days' travelling. There seemed to be very little in the way of kit in the cars, but possibly the belongings of the troops were in other vans. A number of cars had a small iron stove for heating in winter. Where cavalry or artillery was being transported, the horses were placed at each end of the car, with the saddles piled up in a pyramid in the intervening space, which was also occupied by a few soldiers. In each train there were two or three second-class cars provided with sleeping couches for the officers.”

It was particularly noticed by the correspondent who penned the above graphic description that, although a number of the inhabitants of the various towns along the line assembled at the stations to see the troops pass, there appeared not to be the slightest enthusiasm, and not a single cheer was heard as train after train full of soldiers steamed off. This brings us to the contemplation of the state of affairs and of public feeling in Russia itself as regards the war, and more especially with reference to the continued calling up of reservists in connection with fresh mobilisations. That the later mobilisation orders issued have caused serious discontent, particularly in Southern Russia, there is abundant evidence. Here the standard of intelligence is, at any rate among those engaged in commerce, comparatively high, and even the lower classes have kept themselves fairly well informed as to the real progress of the war. Nor have officially organised lectures and other propaganda caused them to take a less critical view of the position of Russia in respect to this disastrous conflict, which has already had such a grave effect upon trade, and in which they have already seen so much Russian blood and treasure expended. Small wonder, then, that the receipt at Odessa, for instance, of the order to mobilise should be followed by some remarkable scenes, of which the following is an instructive example:—The Commander-in-Chief of the forces in South Russia was haranguing, according to custom, a large detachment of soldiers assembled for despatch from Odessa by military train. The men listened sullenly to the speech until the General thought fit to remind them that the call to arms was an honour of which they should show



A REMINISCENCE OF THE LARK
DAYS OF THE WAR

*The rush of Austin's reinforcements to the
Lark days crossing Lake Park*



their appreciation. This was too much for the patience of men whose sorrow at being torn from their homes had been aggravated by the refusal of the Governor to allow their wives, and other relations and friends, to see them off at the station. A murmur ran through the ranks, and one of the men shouted, "Davolno!"—"enough." The occurrence of such an incident at such a time is striking proof that neither the usual patriotism of the Russian public, nor their just fear of the iron discipline which pervades the military system of the country, could repress their dislike of the war and their indignation at being thus ruthlessly forced to take personal part in it.

Considerable cruelty is inflicted upon the lower classes in the matter of the horse mobilisation, the calling up of privately owned horseflesh for cavalry, artillery, and transport purposes. The custom is to commandeer horses freely alike from wealthy traders in the towns and from poor moujiks, or peasants, on their farms, a sum being paid by the military authorities which represents, as might be expected in Russia, a fraction of the real value of the animal taken. Also, as might be expected in this hot-bed of corrupt practices, the system leads to many abuses. A wealthy man has little difficulty in evading the requisitions by temporarily taking into use during the horse mobilisation period a few old creaks whose seizure he can regard without a pang, his better animals being kept discreetly out of the way. The connivance of the military authorities may be required, and is readily obtained for a consideration. "The poorer land-owners and eternally oppressed moujiks have no such means at their disposal for evading the law. The better the mou-

jik's horse the less chance there is of its escaping requisition. Moreover, he must take what the Government offer him for it. He weeps, appeals, offers his insignificant *bakshchesh*, and mumbles curses by turns as he stands with hundreds of others in the market-place 'concentration' enclosure. Half his land must remain unploughed until he can add enough out of his own pocket to buy a new horse with the slender dole he may get as compensation from the authorities."

A startling feature of the discontent in connection with the mobilisations was the broadcast distribution among the reservists themselves of pamphlets prepared by the revolutionary party. These pamphlets are described as beautifully printed and got-up, their tone being studiously moderate, in that no attempt is made to encourage outrages or even active resistance to authority. Passive resistance on a wholesale scale to the mobilisation orders is counselled, and a very careful effort is made to represent the war in its true colours. It is pointed out that the Russian people never have had, and never can have, any interest in Manchurian affairs, and that the war has been engineered solely in the interests of the governing classes. "Even a successful issue could only result in a fresh crop of Grand Ducal concessions." Somewhat curiously a point is made of the suggestion that Russia's prestige has already suffered through her failure to keep her promises as to the evacuation of Manchuria, a strange position, indeed, for the writer of a Russian pamphlet to take up.

Such discontent so skilfully fostered could not but produce an important effect among not only those liable to be called up, but also among those actually sent

to the front, and able to see for themselves the difficulties under which the Russian Army is prosecuting this ill-starred campaign. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the Russian

In spite of disturbances the work of reinforcement is carried on steadily, and unit after unit goes to the front more or less completely equipped for active service, and doubtless containing a fair pro-



RUSSIAN MOUJIKS
(From *The Times*'s "The Far' Side")

of the lower classes is, as a rule, either a very light-hearted or a very patient individual, and the close camaraderie of active service is often an effective solvent of those political grievances which these reflexes of the revolutionary party have sought to produce.

portion of willing and capable, if not of enthusiastic and highly-trained, fighters. The strain as yet is hardly felt as regards the non-commissioned ranks, but it is noticeable that towards the end of August it had been found expedient to issue an Imperial Army Order by which as

200 cartridges were taken to the rank of officer. Such a step would hardly be taken under the shortage of officer killed not already become an embarrassing to mighty Russia as it did to our side at one period of the South African War.

Here and there, no doubt, some warlike fervour was exhibited on the departure of regiments to the front. Such may well have been the case when the Minsk and Volhynia Regiments were assembled at Rukhovicha station and were addressed by the veteran General Dragomiroff in the following characteristic speech:—

"My brothers, do not forget each other. Remember that by dying yourselves to save your comrades you will be doing a good deed. Spare your cartridges, do not waste them. Do not fire to no purpose. Attention! Once more, spare your cartridges, spare them, spare them. If you fire well, twenty regiments of the enemy will not be able to beat you.

"You, officers, spare your reserves. They are your cartridges.


"My brothers, I have instructed your fathers, and now I speak to you. In attacking in line do not close up in masses; keep your ranks clear of each other. Advance boldly. 'Take care, enemy, I am marching on you!' Officers, take care not to give orders to fire at long range. It would be foolish and would be a useless waste of cartridges. In night encounters do not make a clamour. In silence all goes well. Let the enemy shout, but you rush in with the bayonet. Spare your cartridges, spare your reserves. At night dead silence. 'Ura' (hurrah) is a grand Russian word, but to shout it at the wrong time would be foolish. We have had such cases.

"Give my greetings to the men of Podolia and Jitomir. May God grant

you success with your bayonets. Brother, strike hard! Remember!"

Apart from mobilisation, the Russian Government, like that of Japan, was very busy at this period in procuring fresh warlike stores, for a considerable proportion of which it was necessary to draw upon foreign sources. Russia is fortunate in being able to manufacture most of what she requires for military purposes at home, but in the matter of guns and ammunition the expenditures and losses have been so enormous that it is not surprising that free advantage was taken of the enterprising disregard of the laws of neutrality displayed by not a few foreign firms. A favourite port for the loading of such goods appears to have been Antwerp, from which the sailing of a steamer for Libau with a full cargo of heavy guns and ammunition excited at the time little comment, although possibly some awkward questions on the subject may arise hereafter in this and similar cases.

But Russia had naval as well as military preparations to make, and contingencies to provide for, at this juncture. The despatch of the Baltic Fleet has been separately dealt with, but a few words may be added here with reference to the submarines which may or may not have accompanied Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron on its adventurous voyage. There is no doubt that Russia was now freely ordering submarines. The order placed in America for a number of boats of the *Protector* type has already been mentioned, while in the German Socialist papers it was freely averred that several submarines were in course of construction in the Germania Shipbuilding yards. But in connection with the Baltic Fleet an incident arose which is rather an entertaining example of up-to-date enterprisé in the contraband supply of war



A PILLBOX THAT COST THE JAPANESE 300 MEN. THE SAME FORTIFICATION DOUBT ON THE HEAVY TRAIN ONE MILE SOUTH OF HIAO YANG.

The cost of the pillbox was 300 men. As for the inner line of defense, General Stuekel was surprised to find that the Japanese had 11,000 men in the area. The Japanese had 11,000 men in the area. The Japanese had 11,000 men in the area.

material to belligerent nations. While the Baltic Fleet was preparing to set out, an American steamer arrived at Kronstadt with three submarine boats on board, which were promptly offered to the Russian naval authorities with a choice of alternative terms and conditions. Either the boats would be sold outright for a lump sum, or the vendors would undertake to man them with their own crews, requiring only one Russian officer on board each submarine as supervisor, etc. In the latter case, the Americans would require 25 per cent. of the registered value or cost of each Japanese vessel sunk to be paid to them.

The cream of the proposal soon came to the top. "You may arrest us, if you like," said the Yankee negotiators, "but, if you do, we can tell you that your Baltic Fleet, with which we are anxious to co-operate, will be at a serious disadvantage, because we have sent another steamer, with three other submarines of the same kind, to the Japanese, who will certainly take them!"

In addition to submarines the Russian Government was careful to order large fresh consignments of torpedoes for immediate use, and to extend as far as possible her ship-building programme by placing contracts for the construction of new cruisers and torpedo-craft in foreign yards. Here, of course, no breach of neutrality is immediately involved, since delivery in the case of such orders may not take place until long after the war is over. But it is rather interesting that Russia should not have allowed the war-like preoccupation of the moment to divert her from keeping a steady eye on future naval requirements. We may have something to say later of her new naval programme; for the present it may be recorded that quite at the end of Sept-

ember the French Compagnie des Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée received an order for eleven destroyers of the latest pattern, and that further orders were expected to be given very shortly for four cruisers of the *Bayan* type.

But these were by no means the only signs that in some Russian official quarters the mere despatch of the Second Pacific Squadron was not regarded as a conclusive bid for the recapture of naval supremacy in the Far East. In October there began to be heard with growing distinctness those suggestive murmurs as to the unfairness of bottling up a large portion of the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea, the echo of which is from time to time wafted over Continental Europe.

There would seem to be some question whether this time there was not more bluff than seriousness about the Russian attitude concerning that long-standing grievance. For the Black Sea Fleet was now in a very bad state, and there would have been the greatest difficulty in putting any appreciable portion of it on a war footing. The ships' companies had been heavily drawn upon, more especially in regard to the engine-room staffs, for the purpose of supplying deficiencies in the Baltic Squadron, and there had recently been an exhibition of wholesale insubordination amounting almost to open mutiny. But, these drawbacks notwithstanding, the old, old question was warmly revived, "Ought the passage of the Dardanelles any longer to be closed to the warships of Russia, and was Great Britain justified in maintaining her inconveniently stubborn opposition to Russia's national wishes on this point?" At one moment it seemed possible that the controversy might assume a critical shape, and that, following on the complications created by the North Sea incident,

fresh and yet more serious trouble would be created by a Russian attempt to force the matter to an issue.

We are not likely for many years to come, if then, to know the exact course of Anglo-Russian diplomacy in regard to the raising of the Dardanelles question in the autumn and early winter of 1904. It may be that the Russian Government took no direct hand in the matter, and contented itself with merely looking on while its agents, volunteer and other, flew their little *ballons d'essai* through the windy columns of a certain section of the Press of Europe. But it will not be surprising if some day we learn that the British Government was about this time formally approached on the subject of the Dardanelles, an intimation being conveyed to it that neither Germany nor France would object to a revision of the international treaties on this point. Still less astonishing would it be to discover that Great Britain, having given definite assurances to her ally, Japan, had categorically and uncompromisingly declined to be a party to any alteration of the existing agreement. Be this as it may, the discussion even in the Press dropped with some suddenness. Russia would doubtless have been delighted to send a march upon both Japan and Great Britain in this matter, but the absurdity of attempting to do so with the certainty that the Black Sea Fleet, on emerging from the Dardanelles, would find the British Mediterranean Squadron waiting for it, was sufficiently obvious.

It is now time to turn to a brief survey of the conduct of affairs in Russia itself as regards not merely the mobilisation orders, and other measures for the continuation of the operations, but also with reference to public opinion on the war generally, and to observed results upon

Russian society and trade. The picture we shall have to draw will be somewhat gloomy, but not without some bright features. Of these, by no means the least pleasing is the growing Russian tendency to admire their enemies. That this tendency has travelled beyond the ordinary bounds of respect which one combatant generally feels for an adversary who has quite unexpectedly given him a number of bad falls, may be gathered from the curiously changed tone of the Russian organs of public as distinct from official opinion. Here is an illuminating quotation from the *Russ*, one of the most popular papers in St. Petersburg:—

“‘Monkey’ was the most frequent expression heard at the beginning of the war concerning the Japanese. The application of such a term to a brave enemy was both undignified and shabby. Most of our travellers who have not devoted their entire attention to the Gaijins reported the Japanese as imitators. That seemed to be the opinion at the outbreak of the war. But the English knew better, and making an ally of the ‘monkey’ was on their part a master-stroke of diplomacy. All the stories told of the brutality of the Japanese have been shown to be unfounded. Our soldiers who have been prisoners and escaped are unanimous as to the kindness shown them by the Japanese. And the same feeling is expressed in letters coming from our soldiers, prisoners of war. Thousands of Japanese who have so heroically sacrificed their lives in front of Port Arthur have more than wiped out the first perfidious attack upon our ships. A feeling of mutual respect has grown up between ourselves and the Japanese with the common acknowledgment of the great sacrifices which each of us has made. Some

sentiment has grown and become rooted. Our opinion of the Japanese has completely altered. Probably the opinion of our enemies is also altered towards us. Amid the horrors of war we have learnt to understand one another, and it is earnestly to be hoped that the awful price we and the Japanese alike have paid for that knowledge will form the basis for future peaceful relationship."

These enlightened sentiments were largely fostered, no doubt, by the official reports of the singular scrupulousness displayed by the Japanese in regard to personal property found on the bodies of Russian officers and soldiers. For months past the General Staff at St. Petersburg had been receiving through the intermediary of the French Embassy large numbers of carefully fastened packets forwarded by the Japanese military authorities, and containing objects of value of all kinds, such as jewels, cigar-cases, purses, watches, gold crosses, and sums of money—sometimes even single rouble pieces. Even to the most simple-minded Russian the knowledge that the Japanese were behaving in this high-minded fashion could not fail to appeal with the greater force since Russian officialdom is often callous to the verge of brutality in such matters.

On the other hand, it must be added in the interests of historical accuracy that some particularly painful discoveries of Japanese espionage made in September must have gone some little way towards counteracting the pleasant tendency noted above. Before the outbreak of the war there were a good many Japanese in Russia, and among them two who were employed in commercial houses in St. Petersburg. One had gone so far as to join the Greek Catholic Church and had married a Russian lady. From docu-

ments seized at their residences it appeared that they were both naval officers and were acting as spies. Russians themselves sometimes go to considerable lengths in the matter of espionage, but a good deal of bitter and profound indignation must have been caused by these particular exhibitions of cynical disregard of religious and domestic scruples.

For the rest the social effect of the war in Russia can as yet be only dimly understood. A little later we shall see signs, if not of an upheaval, at any rate of a disturbing tendency to make the war an opportunity for pressing on the Tsar administrative reforms of which the better educated Russian has long been dreaming, and which it is hardly likely that he can be much longer denied without producing a genuine revolution. But this movement and its sequel hardly belong to the stage of which more particularly we are now speaking. Apart from the opposition to the mobilisation orders, and a good deal of rather more open murmuring than is usually heard in such a police-ridden country, there was still sufficient interest in the war to render the public keenly susceptible to the least rumour of success; and, as long as this feeling continues, so long we may be certain will revolution hang fire.

The spirited defence of Port Arthur heartened some, the despatch of the Baltic Fleet encouraged others, and if there had come news that Kuropatkin had won, or was within easy distance of winning, a marked success, the war might have become almost popular, so ignorant are the masses, and so completely are they under the thumb of the bureaucracy, the official class, which constitutes at once the nobility and the ruling influence in the Russian Empire.

In passing, the last proposition de-



mands a word of explanation. It is not, perhaps, sufficiently understood in this country that while in Russia there is, of course, a hereditary nobility, a hereditary title by itself commands no respect. As Mr. Geoffrey Drage points out in his "Russian Affairs," the man who in Russia is *à son poste* noble is the State official. Again, inasmuch as the State official owes his position indirectly if not directly to the favour of his Sovereign, it is his business to support the Sovereign in everything. An independent attitude may be assumed by the Grand Dukes, but there are not many of these exalted misances, and it is as impossible for the ordinary hereditary nobility of Russia to play the part of the old barons of England as it is for a sturdy-minded official to be "agin the Government" after the fashion permissible where there are "parties" and "an Opposition." It will readily be understood that under such a system it is not easy for the aspirations and passions of the lower classes to find an outlet, and that Russia might wage a frightfully unpopular war for many months before the bulk of the nation would denounce it, and insist upon an end being put to it, as would certainly happen in Great Britain and France, and probably in Germany also.

For the present, then, we see most of the Russian non-official classes angry and discontented with the reports of constant failures in the Far East, but still upheld to some extent by the prolonged resistance of Port Arthur, by confidence in Kuropatkin, and by vague hopes that the Baltic Fleet may gloriously adjust the naval balance now so heavily depressed in favour of Japan. But there is one class which is under no illusions as to the present effect of the war, namely, the commercial class, which has already

suffered heavily, and has little chance of recovering itself as long as hostilities continue. In Moscow, where the commercial influence is able to assert itself more freely than in St. Petersburg, the war is regarded in the light of a terrible plague, and no effort is made to conceal its ravages. The trouble is aggravated by its many-sidedness. For while a great shopkeeper complains that his sales have fallen off by fifty per cent., a large manufacturer points to the withdrawal from his factories of hundreds of usual hands called up as reservists to go to the front. A merchant, again, with interests over the half of Europe, sees his business wrecked by the dislocation of the railway traffic owing to the constant passage of troop trains and the engrossing transport of military supplies. Of the effect of the war upon Russian trade in detail this is not the place to speak. But a solitary instance may be given from official figures, published as far back as August, of the extent to which in one district trade has suffered owing to the conflict in the Far East. In the Government of Moscow alone 13 establishments with about 1,300 workmen have ceased work altogether; 14 factories with 6,000 workmen have reduced their output, throwing some 1,600 workmen out of employment; and 4 factories with 10,000 workmen are working reduced time. In other parts of the country the situation is even worse. In Lodz there are said to be 40,000 men out of work, and in Warsaw 30,000.

As yet there have been no very definite signs of war taxation beyond a sort of "benevolence" raised for the purposes of the Red Cross Society, a toll which, insignificant as it was, created considerable dissatisfaction. The extraordinary expenses of the war have hitherto ap-

parently been met chiefly by sweeping reductions of the expenditure previously assigned to public works, the Tsar himself living, it is said, made some extremely large contributions towards naval requirements out of his private purse.

But it became quite clear that foreign loans to carry on the war would be inevitable, and negotiations on the subject were opened, but it is whispered that the German bankers, evidently acting under official inspiration, have been stringently careful to include in their terms certain politico-commercial conditions connected with freedom for German enterprises, particularly in Turkish territory. Such conditions are distinctly impressing on Russia, but it remains to be seen whether the absolute necessity of meeting in some way or another the tremendous drain upon the national resources occasioned by the war disbursements will not produce a feeling of resignation on this subject, even in mighty Russia.

In connection with the provision of funds must be noticed the persistent rumours that the Russian Treasury might even find it necessary to draw upon the property of the Russian Church, which it is reported, received a suggestion to the effect that it should voluntarily offer some of its valuables to the State. It goes without saying that the bare prospect of such a proceeding is viewed with widespread dismay. Not only is the bulk of the Church treasure

in such a form—priceless mosaic work, ikons, and sacred paintings—that it could never be replaced, but the gifts which the Church has received have come from the middle classes and the peasantry as much as from the Tsars and the nobility, and to throw them down the sink of War Eastern war expenditure would be a blow severely felt and strongly resented in the most remote corners of the Empire.

This rapid survey of Russia's winter outlook must now be closed. The condition of affairs revealed is not a pleasant one, but, as has been urged, it is not by any means an altogether gloomy one, and, even if it were, the time has not come yet for the onlooker to prophesy too freely as to Russia's early humiliation, or the conclusion by her of an inglorious peace. Her resources, though strained, are still enormous, her supply of fighters, practically speaking, inexhaustible. She has not yet lost her greatest stronghold in the Far East, she has a great and steadily increasing army in the field, and she has despatched a second, and, in point of size and armament, formidable fleet. She is busy with continued preparations, her ruler is tenaciously clinging to the idea of ultimate success, and her foreign credit is still considerable. Even internally her condition is hardly such as to inspire real anxiety in a Government so inclined to popular discontent, so ready with weapons of repression, as that of twentieth century Russia.

CHAPTER LXXIII.

VLADIVOSTOK—JAPANESE RAID IN KAMCHATKA—THE DAMAGED SQUADRON—INTERRUPTED COMMUNICATIONS—IMPROVED DEFENCES—WINTER PROSPECTS—THE BALTIC FLEET—AN ANXIOUS OUTLOOK.

THE position of Vladivostok during the first eight or ten months of the war certainly falsified a very large number of intelligent and even, to some extent, inspired predictions. There must have been few who, at the commencement of the war, did not anticipate that Vladivostok would be "Ladysmithed," like Port Arthur, at a very early stage in the operations.

Almost equally certain at one time, as we have sought earlier to show, seemed the prospect of a Russian irruption on a large scale from Vladivostok into Korea. Neither of these things happened, and in their place events, in the shape of performances on the part of the Vladivostok Squadron, occurred which could not easily have been foreseen, and which came as an unpleasant shock even to the watchful and look-ahead Japanese.

With the sinking of the *Rurik* and the terrible battering of the *Gromoboi* and *Rossia* on August 14th, as described in Chapter L., the career of the Vladivostok Squadron came temporarily to a sudden close, and, no other striking instance of naval or military activity having been recorded at the port during September and October, it might be imagined that the "Sovereign City of the Far East" was likely to settle down into a sort of Sleepy Hollow as far as the war was concerned.

But there was little real chance of this; and Vladivostok is still so full of interesting possibilities that it must not be lost sight of by the careful student of the campaign. There is evidence, moreover, that in the autumn of 1904 not only was there a good deal being done at Vladivostok by the Russians with an eye to future attempts upon it, but that the Japanese also were by no means inclined to let this corner of the theatre of war fade from their memory.

Before proceeding further in this direction the opportunity may be taken to make passing allusion to the sequel of some of the Vladivostok Squadron's achievements in the way of captured ships sailing under neutral flags. There is no necessity to go at all closely into the matter here, since it is but a side issue of the war. But it may be recorded that, in one or two important cases, the Appeal Court in St. Petersburg reversed the decision of the Vladivostok Prize Court with reference to captured ships and cargoes, and some strong hints on the subject were doubtless conveyed to the Vladivostok naval authorities. At any rate, there was a notable cessation in the former frequent announcement of British vessels, either sunk offhand, or haled off to Vladivostok on the charge of carrying contraband of war, a cessation which cannot be attributed wholly to the temporary disablement of the *Gromoboi*



A TULL, DURING THE FIGHTING A RUSSIAN ENTRENCHED POSITION ON THE MANCHURIAN HILLS

and *Rossia*. For there were several destroyers still at Vladivostok, and these, we may be sure, would have cheerfully continued the work of interfering with British commerce had it been possible to do so with comparative impunity.

There is another matter to which allusion may conveniently be made here, as, although it does not concern Vladivostok, it has to do with that north-eastern section of the theatre of war of which Vladivostok is the most important station. We have already included in the same section the island of Sakhalin (see page 56 of the present volume), which has since witnessed (Chapter LII.) the end of the *Norik*, and now we must, for a brief space, jump across the Sea of Okhotsk, in order to tell the story of a queer and rather obscure performance in that dreary and sparsely populated peninsula of Eastern Siberia known as Kamchatka. This region, of which the chief settlement is Petropavlosk, where there is a Russian fort overlooking a splendid harbour, and a resident population of a few hundreds only, is the object of numerous fishing and fur-hunting expeditions, and from the end of May various Japanese schooners had from time to time appeared as usual in the Kamchatkan estuaries. But towards the middle of June a vessel turned up, the crew of which proceeded to indulge in "fishing operations" of a very questionable sort.

It would appear that the little northern Japanese colony of Shimushu rejoiced in an enterprising headman, styled Captain Bunji, who was so inflamed by the news that war had broken out between his mother-country and Russia, that he determined to take a hand. Accordingly, at the end of the first week in June he set out with a number of others on what purported to be a fishing expedition in a

sailing ship of 100 tons called the *Toba Maru*. The exploits of this expedition are variously described, but there is reason to believe that it landed near Javino on the west coast of Kamchatka, and proceeded to make itself a serious nuisance. According to the Russians, Captain Bunji's gentle fisherfolk plundered the adjacent villages, expelled the inhabitants, and issued proclamations calling upon the people to recognise Japanese sovereignty. One of these proclamations pasted on the chapel at Javino, on the roof of which the Japanese flag was hoisted, is said to have run as follows:—"This territory henceforth belongs to Japan; anyone not recognising this shall be killed!"

Captain Bunji's career as a patriotic filibuster was, however, destined to be a short one. News came to Petropavlosk of these happenings, and the commander of the fort took prompt and effective measures. There happened to be a sailing vessel in the harbour, and on this a hundred Russian militia were sent round to the west coast under Lieutenant Shab of the Reserve, while another detachment of 100 men under a non-commissioned officer marched overland from a place called Bolsheretsk. The two forces joined hands near Javino, and, with the help of some of the villagers, proceeded to lay a trap for Captain Bunji. The latter, thinking he had only the villagers to deal with, consented to a conference, was surrounded by the Russian soldiers, and taken prisoner, seventeen of his men being killed. The *Toba Maru* slipped her cable and disappeared, whereupon the Russians proceeded to take vengeance upon several other Japanese vessels, said to be innocent fishing craft, which they burnt, killing a number of the men on board. The latter proceed-

ing was strongly criticised at Tokio, and may have been indefensible. But, if Captain Bunji's operations were as reported by the Russians, and as more or less admitted by the Japanese, it is not to be wondered at that Lieutenant Shrub's soldiers did not discriminate at all carefully between the fighting adventurers and their fellow trespassers on what, after all, is unquestioned Russian territory.

The whole incident is, of course, trivial, but it has an interest in showing how comprehensive are the tentacles of that grim cuttlefish War, and it is, moreover, rather a quaint illustration of the filth-lustering spirit as applied to a tiny community with which one would have thought the idea of self-preservation would have weighed more seriously than that of annexing a neighbouring peninsula.

Reverting to Vladivostok we find that no time was lost in setting to work on the repairs of the *Gr m lot* and *Rossia*, which, as we have seen, were very badly knocked about in the fight with Kimmura's squadron on August 14th. Meanwhile, the loss of the *Rurik* had been partially compensated in the minds of the Russians by the flouting of the stranded *Zetse*, and by the end of August Admiral Skrydloff is said to have decided, somewhat prematurely it would seem, that the repairs to all three ships would be completed in ten days' time, and that they would then proceed to Japanese waters. A month later there was a report that the *Gr m lot* and *Rossia* had actually sailed in the direction of Genoa, but even at the St. Petersburg Ministry of Marine no credence was attached to this flattering tale. According to the trustworthy intelligence received at Tokyo in November, the *Gr m lot* repairs were actually completed, and in

due course she went out on a trial trip. But all luck pursued the big cruiser. She ran on a rock, was seriously injured, and was barely floated off with the assistance of a number of lighters. A correspondent who left Vladivostok on November 20th, and arrived a few days later at Nagasaki, reported that the *Gr m lot*, presumably in this adventure, had twenty-five frames broken, and that she was so badly strained that her repairs would take some months. The cruiser *Bogatyr* he mentioned is not in dock, but unserviceable and supported forward by pontoons. The condition of the *Rossia* had previously been reported as hopeless. It would seem, then, that at any rate for the rest of the year, the larger ships of the Vladivostok Squadron could hardly be described as a fleet in being.

This notwithstanding, there is still naval activity of a sort to be observed in the Golden Horn. On September 23rd a despatch was received at St. Petersburg to the effect that two Russian destroyers had just returned to Vladivostok, having captured a Japanese transport and a sailing vessel. More interesting is the later announcement that several submarines had been despatched by train from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, and had arrived safely. By the middle of November they had completed their trials satisfactorily, and, as they had far to be the first submarines ever employed in actual warfare, their appearance on the scene of actual hostilities is of peculiar interest.

The tenacious belief of the Russians in the immortality of their warships seems to be demonstrated by the steps taken from Vladivostok to do all that is possible towards saving the unfortunate *Yurik*. As explained in Chapter III, the step-ladder 'Korskovs', or Submarine

entirely submerged with a small portion of the wreck, and the Russians themselves may have despaired of the gallant little ship. But this did not prevent them from sending Vladivostok to ascertain the condition of the vessel, and accurately the cor-

Russians are so extraordinarily skilful—and experienced—in the art of raising sunk warships, that one begins to wonder whether the ship herself may not one day be restored to the Navy of which she was once such a brilliant ornament.

Another Russian peculiarity is reflected in Vladivostok annals about this date. At times official Russia displays towards



Native Drawing.

ROYAL SOLICITUDE FOR THE SUFFERING.

From a *press* presiding at a meeting of the Council of the Ladies' Branch of the Red Cross Society of Japan. Making bandages for the wounded.

Her Majesty the E

guns and shell ammunition. towards the end of September apparatus was damaged, have been necessary to suspend operations had not one of the divers volunteered in diving dress, receiving the George for his devoted conduct. Many, if not all, the *Novik's* guns have been recovered, and the seem to ha-

the war in the Far East a sort of mental detachment which is not without a certain impressiveness, although it may create here and there a smile. At the end of August, for instance, it was solemnly announced at St. Petersburg that Vladivostok had again been constituted a free port, and there was much speculation as to whether this decision would only hold good as long as the war lasted, or



SONGS ON THE WAY TO THE BATTLEFIELD. A COMMON INCIDENT OF THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY.



"These works," the order continues, "have been pushed on with indefatigable energy and zeal by all members of the garrison. If the fact that the greater part of the work was carried on under hind climatic conditions is taken into consideration, the success which has attended it testifies to their absolute devotion and self-sacrifice. I have found the garrison of the fortress to be in a perfect state of efficiency. I consider it an agreeable duty to express my deep gratitude to General Linewitch, commanding the Military District of the Amur, and to tender my sincere thanks to the commandant of the fortress of Vladivostok, as well as to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the land and sea forces composing the garrison who have taken part in the construction of the works intended to strengthen the defences of the fortress."

Independent confirmation of this complacent assurance was forthcoming through the special correspondent of one of the Paris papers who had a friend in Vladivostok at this time. This friend, a Major Hetz, had personally inspected the defences, and had found the town surrounded by an unbroken line of fortifications. The wood had been cut on the hills, and excellent roads connect the various forts. "You may telegraph to Paris," said Major Hetz, "that the Japanese may come if they like. They will find us superbly defended. Vladivostok is another Port Arthur."

Doubtless there was some authority for the last statement, but it is doubtful whether even Russian military engineers among whom are to be found some of the most skillful professors living of the art of permanent fortification could in a few months have transformed the rather scanty defences of Vladivostok into


such a marvel of strength as Port Arthur. Still it must be remembered that General Linewitch had had at his disposal a good many thousands of men with nothing to do in the way of fighting, and it is astonishing what massive and powerful works can be constructed in a short space of time when there are plenty of workers available, even if there be little else besides earth and timber in the way of materials.

Apart from the fortifications, which began many miles out of the town, and, as it Port Arthur, grew stronger as the city is approached, the harbour being heavily mined for a distance of seven miles, four miles with contact and three with electric mines. The location, however, of these must have been rather uncertain, for it is said that a Russian torpedo boat was sunk and a German steamer damaged by them.


About the beginning of October the presence of Japanese cruisers in the neighbourhood of Vladivostok was reported by several correspondents, and it is evident that the inhabitants were in expectation of an attack, which, however, was not delivered. Indeed, knowing, as they must have done, of the strenuous efforts which had been made to improve the defences of the place, the Japanese, preoccupied, moreover, by the siege of Port Arthur, would have been foolish indeed to risk their ships against the new forts and mines. Doubtless their visit was merely for purposes of reconnaissance, or in the hope of intercepting some of the foreign vessels which were known to be running contraband cargoes into the Golden Horn.

The "runners," however, appear to have had little difficulty in eluding the Japanese warship. Thus a German steamer which left

in the second week of September with a general cargo for Vladivostok, returned



PEERON CARGO ON THE AMUR.



DOWN THE AMUR IN TIMES OF PEACE.*

on October 7th, having easily escaped observation. She reported that a number of large ships had recently arrived at Vladivostok bringing stores of coal and ammunition. Captain Halversen of the *Tungus*, which left Vladivostok on November 1st, and reached Chi-fu six days later, also commented on the frequent arrival of ships laden with food, ammunition, guns, and all sorts of military supplies. Five vessels were in port unloading cargo when the *Tungus* left. A huge supply of coal from the neighbouring mines had, he said, been stored. By this time, too, communication with Harbin had been completely restored,

and mail trains were arriving and departing daily.

A supplementary word or two may here be given to General Liniévitch, who for the first eight or nine months of the war was Commander of the Military District of the Amur, and of whose previous service some details were given in the First Volume of this work (Chapter X.). General Liniévitch at the beginning of the winter was appointed, as we saw in the

preceding chapter, to the command of the First Army in Manchuria, under Kuropatkin as Generalissimo; but it was to be doubted whether in his new capacity he would do any better work for his country than he had done at Vladivostok, for he had more Court influence than is commonly supposed, and it was thought that Alexeieff, then at St. Petersburg, would seek to play him off against Kuropatkin.

General Liniévitch, by the way, is not of Russian blood, but comes of a well-known Polish Catholic family, which at one time had large estates in the Russian provinces of Volhynia and Tchernigoff. The family has fought well for Russia, the father of the present General having served with distinction in the army. General Liniévitch himself, whose portrait appears on page 120 of

* We are indebted to Mr. Foster Fraser for permission to include the above illustrations and those on the opposite page, from his book entitled "The Real Siberia."

the First Volume, is known to the Chinese by the expressive nickname, "The Manchurian Wolf."

Vladivostok was also about to lose Admiral Skrydloff, who was being recalled to St. Petersburg for work in connection with the despatch of naval reinforcements to the Far East. Certainly there was now more scope for his abilities in the capital than at Vladivostok, but it must be admitted that Admiral Skrydloff was beginning to be regarded with very mixed feelings by his compatriots at home, many of whom considered that he had failed miserably to realise the expectations raised by his appointment

isolation of the latter before he had time to reach, by very easy stages, the Far East, rendered it impossible for him to exercise any very active jurisdiction over the Port Arthur Fleet, but it was felt that, apart from the fiasco of August 10th, Skrydloff was much to blame for the very inglorious, and ultimately disastrous, career of the Vladivostok Squadron. He had, no doubt, many obstacles to contend with, but, at any rate, he had at one time a certain amount of naval force at his disposal, and it is hardly to the credit of one who professed so much that he personally should have stuck like a limpet to Vladivostok, without any better result

in the way of plans and orders to his subordinates than the sinking of the *Rurik*, the disablement of the *Rossia* and *Gromoboi*, and the raising of some very serious complications between his country and Great Britain.

We may leave Vladivostok for the present to her own resources as far as



THE WILDED BANKS OF THE AMUR

to succeed the gallant Makarov. It will be recalled that in taking up his post he was both leisurely in his movements and somewhat sanguine in his anticipations of what he proposed to do by careful conservation of his ships and a well ordered distribution of his time between Vladivostok and Port Arthur. The



CHANG CHANG O T E AMUR

the immediate winter prospect was concerned. Her defences had been considerably strengthened; the fortress had, it would seem, a strong and capable Commandant in the person of General Vorognetz, and there was every prospect that, if the Japanese attacked it in the same fashion as that which they were compelled to adopt in the case of Port Arthur, they would find the process a laborious and costly one. But it is instructive to remember that, whatever happened, the strategical situation remained the same. The really vital question was whether, on the capture of Port Arthur, the Japanese would not forthwith concentrate their attention upon an attempt to get first to Mukden and then to Harbin. A Japanese occupation of the latter would render the position of Vladivostok very precarious, and, strategically speaking, its land fortifications would not be of much more value than if they had been built of cards. For Vladivostok, unlike Port Arthur, had no detaining value. Nor could it any longer be used as a military base. The idea of a Russian invasion of Korea from Vladivostok had been clearly abandoned as hopeless. Moreover, most of the Vladivostok troops, supplementary to the garrison of the fortress, were being requisitioned for the formation of the Second and Third Russian Armies round Mukden.

Vladivostok's only hope, then, whether of offering an effective passive resistance or of developing a capacity for active offence, lay upon the sea, and here again its prospects were not rosy. There was little chance that the *Gromoboi*, *Rossia*, and *Bogatyr* would ever again become such a terror on the high seas as the Vladivostok squadron of a few months back had contrived for a short time to

render itself. But there was still a hope that the whole or part of the reinforcing squadron under Admiral Rozhdestvensky might reach Vladivostok in safety, and thus pave the way for a future naval campaign. Unfortunately, as we shall see in a future chapter, this chance was almost immediately to be minimised by the destruction of the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, and the consequent liberation of Admiral Togo's ships, which were thus enabled to take their choice of blockading Vladivostok or of sallying forth to meet Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron.

The prospects of Vladivostok were thus complicated by at least three serious risks. First, there was the risk—a not very probable one—of immediate attack. In any case the Japanese were not likely to do anything in this direction until Port Arthur fell, and even then the fact that preparations must be made to meet Admiral Rozhdestvensky had to be taken into consideration, as well as the circumstance that the entrance to the Golden Horn would soon be only practicable by means of ice-breakers. Nor would troops be readily available for an attack by land, since the whole of the forces released from the investment of Port Arthur, and many more, were being required to cope with the steadily growing reinforcement of Kuropatkin's great army on the Sha-ho.


Next, there was the risk that the Japanese might get to Harbin or drive a wedge between Harbin and Vladivostok which, in conjunction with a naval blockade, might render the eventual reduction of the fortress a mere matter of time and supplies.

Finally, there was a risk that a portion of the "Second Pacific Squadron of the Russian Navy" might succeed in making

Vladivostok, a portion not large enough to be of much practical use, but sufficiently large to make it an object with Japan to lay siege to Vladivostok on the same deliberate lines as those followed at Port Arthur.

It was probably felt by many, even at Vladivostok itself and at St. Petersburg, that these risks were sufficiently grave to cause some anxiety. But Russian op-

timism, especially of the official sort, is a plant of hardy growth, and there was a general tendency to attach more and more importance to Vladivostok, regardless of the lesson taught by the approaching fall of Port Arthur, between which and Vladivostok, whether as a military stronghold or a naval base, there never has been, nor can be, any sort of comparison favourable to the latter.



THE JAPANESE BATTLESHIP MIKASA.

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


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HARBIN.

CHAPTER LXXIV.

ON THE SHA-HO—THE JAPANESE AND YEN-TAI—MUKDEN FORTIFIED—CAPTURE OF WAI-TAU-SHAN — CORDIAL INTERCOURSE — KING'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION — DESULTORY FIGHTING—ATTACK ON RUSSIAN LEFT—WINTER—THE THREE RUSSIAN ARMIES.

IN Chapter LXVI. we left the main Russian and Japanese armies confronting each other to the south of Mukden, the Sha-ho serving to some extent, though not completely, as a dividing line. As pointed out on page 260, the Japanese on their extreme left, that is, to the west of the railway, held several important positions on the right bank of the river; while, on the other hand, a little to the east of the railway the Russians retained a small *enclave*, about three miles long, of the left bank. We have hitherto followed German accounts in placing the famous One-Tree Hill within this enclave, but later references in Kuropatkin's despatches render the location a little doubtful. It is, however, certain that the Russians held at least one eminence south of the river as a post of observation, namely, Wai-tau-shan or Outer Head Hill, which, like the position so brilliantly forced by Colonel (now Major-general) Putiloff, was soon to be the scene of a very brisk encounter.


After the incidental fighting of October 16th-18th, which formed the immediate sequel to the real battle of the Sha-ho, both armies remained for a couple of days in a condition of almost complete inactivity, largely due to sheer exhaustion on both sides. The hostile lines were on an average less than half a mile apart, and in some places a still smaller interval separated the trenches. There was occasional firing, but to very little purpose, the Japanese repeatedly tricking the Russians by displaying their caps on the points of their bayonets, in order to draw the enemy's fire. The Russian artillery was also moderately active, having, it would seem, the advantage of the Japanese in the matter of commanding positions.

Both armies had now for some little time to come a good deal to pre-occupy them besides the actual business of fighting. The Japanese had advanced their position considerably, and, while the bank of a river can often be held to ad-

vantage under such conditions as were here present, there were, in this case, circumstances which made it necessary to observe the greatest caution and vigilance. The fact that a considerable Japanese force was already across the river, in extremely close and continuous touch with the Russian right, was in itself a source of anxiety; and it is not surprising that, within a few days of the conclusion of the big Sha-ho battle, the Japanese should have been busily erecting earthworks, evidently of some strength, round the village of Li-mun-tun, the occupation of which was described on page 259. Still more serious was the work to be done in rear of the fighting line, and very seriously do the Japanese seem to have taken it in hand. Not only was the fortification of Li-io-yang steadily carried

forward, but a brisk effort was made to work the Yen-tai coal-mines, from which sufficient coal was soon obtained for all military purposes. The gauge of the railway, also, was now being changed as far as Yen-tai, and quantities of supplies and ammunition were being brought up on the altered line to within a few miles of the Japanese headquarters.

In passing, it may be said that in the whole history of warfare there is scarcely a more striking instance than this of the rapid and complete adoption to a field army's requirements of advantages wrested from an enemy by sheer fighting. The process was the more remarkable in that the Japanese position could hardly be termed absolutely secure. The enemy had been badly foiled, it is true, in his last attempt to sweep back the



THE RUSSIAN POSITION, JAPANESE EFFECTED BY THE FLOODING AT
JAPANESE PACKED DOWN AT GREAT LOSS

slowly advancing tide of Japanese advance towards Mukden, but he was being strongly reinforced, and was clearly still full of fight. Liao-yang was a useful point on which to fall back if necessary, but hardly one on which complete reliance could be placed if the Russians once succeeded in assuming an effectual offensive. That, in the face of these large and impressive facts, the Japanese should have acted as they did, is a singular proof of combined self-confidence and business-like anxiety to make the most of successes already won. It shows, too, to what a curious extent the mere capacity of first-class troops to hold what they have won may be presumed on, even in the intermediate stages of a campaign, when as yet no decisive action has been fought, and there has not been time to consolidate a position by elaborate defences, or by taking advantage of some tremendous natural obstacle. To work a captured coal-mine as well as a captured railway almost in the presence of an unbeaten enemy requires, no doubt, a good deal of nerve. But self-possession of this kind can be made to pay in war as in most other pursuits, and hereafter we may often see generals in the field profiting directly by the example set them by the Japanese at Yen-tai.

While the Japanese were thus making excellent use of what had been but a few weeks before Russian property, the Russians were finding the difficulties of their position sensibly increased by the approach of winter. In particular the dearth of fuel began to make itself felt severely, while the number of wounded from the Sha-ho battle must have rendered even Mukden a most dreary place of residence. But, in spite of recent discouragements, the spirit of the troops seems to have been fairly well main-

tained, and the utmost confidence was evidently felt in the capacity of Mukden itself to resist any sudden attack. Certainly no pains had been spared to render the place almost, if not quite, as strong as Liao-yang. Some interesting details of the fortifications were given about this time in a private letter from the Director of the Military Hospital at Mukden, who described the line of works as extending for nine miles, with several forts and redoubts to each mile. The redoubts were masked in such a manner that they could not be recognised even at a distance of 100 paces. Before every work had been dug deep, covered-up ditches, with stakes at the bottom, and there were three lines of these ditches. In front of the ditches there were barbed wire entanglements, and in front of these again mines were laid. Finally, there was a line of felled trees, with the crowns turned towards the enemy and connected with barbed wire. This whole space was exposed to gunfire from three sides.

The Russian extreme right appears to have been bent back so as to rest on the Lower Hun-ho; but the actual contact with the enemy began to the westward in the neighbourhood of Lin-shi-pu (see map on page 253). The line then followed the river—with a break a little to the east of Sha-ho-pu, where the Wai-tau-shan post lay south of the river as noted above—and terminated in the hills to the north-west of the Tumen Pass. On the Russian left some daring reconnaissances continued to be made after the fighting on October 16th-18th, and on October 20th some 200 Russian cavalry were reported by Marshal Oyama to have actually crossed not only the Sha-ho, but the Tai-tse to the south at a point east of Pen-si-hü, and to have moved for some little distance northwards. There is

some ground for the belief that this may have been part of a general Russian forward movement which was planned for the night of October 20th-21st, but had to be abandoned owing to the swollen state of the Sh-sha.

After rather more than a week of this indeterminate warfare the Japanese, on the 27th, managed to score a very considerable success by the capture of Wu-tsu shan or Outer Head Hill, to which reference was made in the opening paragraph of this chapter. Wu-tsu shan is a hill bare of vegetation, surmounted by a temple, which is situated about ten miles east of the railway, to the extreme left—from the Russian standpoint—of the enclave south of the Sh-sha which the Russians had been holding. It must have served as a very useful post of observation, to which the Russians evidently attached considerable importance, for they had occupied it with a regiment and five machine guns. These were well placed, a first and second position having been marked out with separate lines of trenches. It was clearly desirable for the Japanese to clear the enemy out of this troublesome post, and accordingly orders were given to the Right Army under General Kuroki to take the necessary measures of eviction.

At seven o'clock in the morning of October 27th two Japanese batteries opened fire on the Russian trenches on Wu-tsu shan, and the bombardment continued until about midday, when an infantry attack was commenced by the steady advance of two companies of the 15th rifles up the steep slope. The contest was a dangerous one, for there was little or no cover, and the Russians were evidently bent on offering a determined resistance. The artillery preparation failed to have been effective, and in

two hours the Russians were forced back from their first line of trenches. The Japanese had now been reinforced by the remainder of the battalion detailed for the attack, and the Japanese artillery reopened fire on the second line of trenches.

It is not difficult to realise the scene at this juncture, which was rendered the more interesting by the somewhat exceptional nature of the circumstances. This was now not only the sole point south of the Sh-sha which the Russians still held, but literally the southern terminal of Russian occupation in the whole of the Far East, with the solitary exception of closely beleaguered Port Arthur, now within nine weeks of its fall. Nor was the hill a mere isolated post, since in that case the Japanese would certainly have crushed to pulp the detachment holding it a week ago. It was a little Russian cape running out into a Japanese sea, and communication with the main Russian position was evidently easy. In these circumstances it might seem strange that the Russians did not heavily reinforce the regiment holding the hill, and drive the Japanese back by sheer superiority of numbers. Probably it was to prevent this that the Japanese showed so little of their strength, and doubtless the Russians imagined that a full regiment with five machine guns would leave very little doubt as to repulsing with serious loss a single battalion compelled to creep to the attack up a bare steep slope.

The result was that this morning afternoon saw what was little more than a desperate struggle between the troops of Russian infantry with machine guns against Japanese light troops, and ended by two hours of a very close and

active authority in Manchuria. Very full of grim suggestiveness must have been the spectacle at the moment when the retiring Russians were settling into their second line of trenches, and the Japanese, now occupying the first line, and rapidly gathering their strength, were watching the effect of their own shrapnel in order to seize a favourable moment for resuming the attack.


We may take it that the Russians were beginning by this time to realise the seriousness of the situation. The pressure brought upon the first line of trenches had evidently been severer than had been anticipated, for two hours was but a short time to hold such a position against two companies. But the hail of shrapnel had been continuous for six or seven hours, and the Japanese infantry advance had been steady and determined. Still graver was the position now with an entire Japanese battalion at no great distance, and the shrapnel bullets once more falling thick into the trenches.

It was about four o'clock when the Japanese artillery ceased firing, and a thousand Japanese bayonets came sparkling up to the second Russian position on Wai-tau-shan. It had been a weary wait of nearly two hours for the impatient battalion of the 18th Rifles, and one can understand the gleaming satisfaction with which the line of eager little infantrymen sprang from their temporary shelter and sped up the remaining slopes that led to the summit of the hill.

The Russian rifles were crackling all along their line, the machine-guns were vomiting lead to the accompaniment of that queer "pup-pup-pup" which always seems such a trivial noise compared with the death-dealing process with which it is connected, and at one instant of the Japanese rush a passing

tremor shook the attacking line as it does sometimes even in the most brilliantly successful assault. Those are the moments when the defenders' hearts are steeled into sterner resolve, when their rifles are held straightest, when the feeling is strongest that those in the trenches are meting out punishment, not in any danger of receiving it. But the tremor was but momentary, and any satisfaction it created was short-lived. For on came the Japanese, and with irresistible *élan* poured into the trenches, where, for a time, raged the bitter hand-to-hand fighting that has terminated so many infantry attacks in this war. It seems a little strange that even at this stage the Russians could not gain the upper hand. For they should have been still in some numerical superiority, since their casualties up to this time had not been in any way serious, and the Japanese themselves had suffered about equal losses in the two stages of their advance. But when first-class troops have made their way into the heart of a position, where they are not exposed to flanking fire or other fresh odds, they are seldom to be denied, and so it was in this case. Bayonets crossed bayonets in deadly earnest, revolvers spat, here and there a clubbed rifle wielded by a burly Muscovite may have smashed a Japanese skull; but in the end the Russians broke and ran, leaving behind them two of their machine-guns and a number of dead. Crowning the crest of the hill, the Japanese fired on the enemy as they retreated down the farther slope and across the river, and did further execution among their scattered ranks.

The Japanese were now to find their success, for the moment, discounted by the exposed nature of the ground they had gallantly won. No sooner was the Japanese flag hoisted on the temple at the



top of the hill than the Russian batteries across the river began to speak, and a storm of shrapnel came hurtling about the ears of the victors in the recent action. The crest of the hill was thus rendered untenable, but the Japanese had evidently made good their foothold in spite of the Russian official despatch to the contrary. For the Russian artillery steadily bombarded the hill all the next morning, which they would hardly have done had no signs of occupation been visible. In the afternoon of October 28th the large Russian force which was concentrated among the hills across the river disappeared rather suddenly. Subsequently a small detachment of Russian chasseurs attempted, on the night of the 29th, a counter-attack on Wai-tau-shan, but this was easily repulsed.

The Russian casualties at Wai-tau-shan were estimated at 200, the Japanese at 170—an insignificant butcher's bill, of course, which seems of itself to stamp the action as one of comparative insignificance. But, as the foregoing narrative seems to show, Wai-tau-shan was really a remarkable little fight, and must have come as rather an unpleasant surprise to the Russians, for whom now the Sha-ho along, practically speaking, its whole length was a definite obstacle. Nor could the Japanese fail to be heartened greatly by a success which demonstrated once more, and with vivid clearness, the right of Japanese commanders to regard their gallant fellows as, if anything, individually more than a match for the fittest and most seasoned soldiers of the Tsar.

The closing days of October, and nearly the whole of November, proved an uneventful, but by no means an idle, time for the confronting armies. For the most part the fighting consisted of pretty

continuous artillery firing, with frequent but unimportant infantry collisions, usually at night. The Russian cavalry reconnaissance work on both the Japanese flanks appears to have been well carried out, and on the extreme Russian left, where General Rennenkamf was in command, the Cossacks are shown to have been particularly active. On October 30th a party of the famous Cossacks of the Don—a division of which had recently joined the Army of Manchuria—for the first time took a part in the operations, and, with some infantry detachments, attacked a body of Japanese cavalry along the Hun River. This introduction of the Don Cossacks to Far Eastern warfare does not seem to have been particularly auspicious, the attack being promptly repulsed, and the Russians leaving behind them twenty dead men and thirty horses.

The weather was now improving, as far as the rain was concerned, and the days were fine and moderately warm. But the nights were growing colder, six degrees of frost having been recorded at the end of October, and ten a little later. The Russian troops were in good health, and supplies of food and warm clothing were coming in very satisfactorily. The better condition of the roads enabled reinforcements to detrain at stations further up the line, and to march thence to Mukden, thus relieving to a marked extent the pressure on the railway. Indeed, it would seem that, notwithstanding the recent reverses on the Sha-ho, and the absence of any compensating success, the condition of the Russian Army in, at any rate, the first half of November, was in pleasant contrast to the sufferings entailed by the long retirement which terminated in the evacuation of Liao-yang, and was also

free from many of the hardships afterwards undergone in the depth of winter.

At Mukden itself a rather quaint state of things was reported by Mr C. J. Hinds, the war correspondent of the *Daily Mail*. Here the Russians were actually spending money freely on Japanese productions. "The shops at Mukden," wrote Mr Hinds, "are packed with Japanese merchandise of all kinds which thousands of soldiers are eagerly purchasing. In particular, they buy up the little comforts which troops so much appreciate, namely articles of food, drink, clothing, canned milk, cheese, butter, beer, cognac, rum, whisky, champagnes, Bordeaux, woollen goods, and gloves. Almost without exception these goods are duplicates and imitations. The Japanese imitate everything European, including fashions, for which there is a great demand in China. All these articles are freely imported by Sinnington by Chinese merchants and Greek sutlers, and are distributed everywhere among the troops. Thus, curiously enough, the war has provided a new and rich market for Japanese commerce."

But Mukden luxuries were, of course, far out of the reach of a very large portion of Kurapatkin's brave soldiers, many of whom had not left the trenches for three weeks. For these the daily ration had to suffice, and, where close contact with the enemy existed, the ration was often not a daily, but a nightly one, which had to be eaten cold, since fires would be a guide to the ever-watchful enemy. But the Russian fighting man's cheerfulness was proof against these discomforts, and Mr Dun of the *Tribune de Paris*, in particular, was greatly impressed with his fighting men. Another correspondent mentioned that the Russians have taken a leaf out of the Japanese book, and have slightly

improved on the time-honoured method of drawing fire by exposing stuffed manikins as a target for the Japanese marksman.

It is pleasant to add that the cordiality which has so often been observed in similar circumstances, during previous campaigns, prevailed at this period at many points along the opposing lines, where the outposts were in particularly close touch. Cigarettes and other little luxuries were freely exchanged by the gallant fellows who had already perhaps met a dozen times in deadly conflict, and might at any moment do so again. Among various stories told is one of a sort of cove which used to be occupied by a Russian picket during the day, and by a party of Japanese at night, or *vice versa*, in accordance with the outpost schemes of the respective combatants. Quite a little friendship sprang up between the two pickets, messages being left by the retiring party, and grave complaints made if the retreat was not left in good order!

An honourable understanding was also established in regard to water. The wells along the railway line having failed, both armies were compelled to use the water of the Shiao for drinking purposes. No difficulty was experienced as to this, for a simple arrangement was made that the water should be fetched from the river by unarmed men, and it was made a point of honour not to fire upon these. Such amenities of warfare are common to all first-class armies, and it is gratifying to chronicle their occurrence at this period of the Russo-Japanese War.

Like the Russians, the Japanese were at this time busily engaged in building up reinforcements, and the Russian first reserve Division was the first to be

tain that a proportion was coming by way of Feng-hwang-cheng as well as from the south. It was supposed that a concentration was being effected for the purpose of assuming a brisk offensive, and this may well have been the case, since there is reason to believe that the Japanese were now confidently expecting the early fall of Port Arthur, and that they would have been extremely glad if they could have pushed on to Mukden before the really hard weather commenced. But week after week passed before it was possible to make any decided move, and by the third week in November the cold was beginning to be sufficiently sharp to render any general advance more and more difficult. On both sides the line of entrenchments was now dotted at intervals with great burrows, into which the men crept for shelter as much from the biting frost as from the artillery fire. When entrenchment has reached this point an advance always becomes improbable, for, even if one side succeeds in ejecting the other from its "dug-outs," it is prevented from making the occupation good if the frost turns the earth to iron, and puts it out of the question to throw up fresh cover. Accordingly, the Japanese soon abandoned the idea of a general advance, and began to make themselves as comfortable as the conditions would permit, even, it is said, going so far as to provide their dug-out shelters with camp beds and stoves.

A pleasant interlude is recorded as having occurred in the Japanese lines on November 9th. Lieutenant-General Sir William Nicholson, the British Military Attaché at Japanese headquarters, had been compelled to retire to Tokio on account of ill-health, but there were still several British officers present with the

force, the senior being Colonel Tulloch. To the latter, on our King's birthday, Prince Nashimoto, Marshal Oyama, General Kodama, General Oku, General Fukushima, and General Okubo sent representatives to offer their congratulations, and to wish long life to the King. An entertainment was also given to the British officers and war correspondents, a notable feature being an exhibition of Japanese national sports. The spirited participation of the war correspondents in the primitive Japanese dances enhanced the success of this pleasing function, and the utmost cordiality and good-fellowship prevailed.

But the Japanese did not allow these pre-occupations to divert them in any way from the more warlike business in hand. Wherever they were in contact with the enemy the utmost vigilance was displayed, and, indeed, was necessary, for the Russians made a number of small attacks, the effect of which must occasionally have been somewhat alarming. Especial care was taken to render Sha-ho station as strong as possible, the idea apparently being to construct a semi-permanent work to cover the railway line in case of a forced retirement. The task of fortification was carried out under grave difficulties, the Russians making strenuous efforts to frustrate the Japanese plans by throwing shells from their big guns, of which they now had a large number in position, into the space in which the enemy were working. On November 13th, for instance, more than 500 Russian shells fell in the vicinity of the station, the bombardment lasting from dawn till evening. After such an experience the poor little Sha-ho station can surely claim to rank honourably with any of the country-houses, farm-buildings, churches, or other peaceful

structures which have won immortal fame through being pressed into the grim service of war.

Another point to which both Russians and Japanese were compelled to pay close attention was the village of Lin-shi-pu, of the early fighting round which, on October 14th, mention was made on page 254. It is extremely typical of the operations subsequent to the Battle of Sha-ho, that for weeks the Japanese should only have remained in possession of part of this village, the remainder being so tenaciously held by the Russians that it was impossible to turn them out.

About the middle of November the rivers began to freeze, and several of the foreign Military Attachés and war correspondents left the front and returned to Europe, confident that there would now be no serious fighting until the spring. This view was evidently taken by Kuropatkin, who continued to devote himself to the task of organising his greatly increased forces. He had just been joined by General Liniévitch from Vladivostok, who had assumed the command of the First Manchurian Army under the new scheme of Russian military commands.

Kuropatkin himself seems to have been spending his time at this period very much as he did at Liao-yang, when the latter was still in Russian occupation. He still lived in a railway car, a light burning in his office all night, and officers being summoned to confer with him at all hours. His tours of inspection along the thirty-five mile Russian front were accomplished in a high-speed motor car, which was regarded by the Chinese with immense superstitious awe. Kuropatkin had, after careful enquiry, ordered, in addition to this car, twenty others specially constructed to carry ammunition speedily in case of emergency.

While our Army can certainly claim to have led the way in the matter of heavy motor traction in South Africa, it must be placed to the credit of the Russians in Manchuria that they were the first to make use of the high-speed car for the carriage of ammunition in the field.

For several weeks both armies carried on a series of more or less desultory operations, only here and there relieved by performances of distinct tactical interest or significance. Perhaps the most serious movement recorded is that made by the Japanese on November 24th against the extreme left of the Russian position, which, as we have seen, lay among the hills in the vicinity of the Ta-ling, General Rennenkamf being in command. The movement is described as an attempt to turn the Russian left, but more probably it was a mere diversion intended to disturb the Russians, and to check the activity of their reconnoitring parties. Certainly, there is no sign of a definite turning movement such as would undoubtedly have been designed on a much larger scale, and carried out with very much greater vigour and persistence. The chief fighting took place near the village of Sin-ho-cheng, at the base of the Ta-ling mountains, some sixty-five miles, as the crow flies, north-east of Liao-yang. The Japanese, according to Russian accounts, commenced the attack with a brigade of infantry and twelve guns, but seem to have made no headway either on the 25th or any of the four following days. On the 25th the Japanese, having been reinforced, attacked at noon, and again, under cover of a fog, at about 4 o'clock, but the Russians held their own manfully. On the 26th the fighting was renewed, with the same result. In the evening a very daring reconnaissance was made on the Russian

side by Captain Minkovsky, who with seven volunteers belonging to his company, crept up so close to the enemy's outposts, that the Captain himself was able to take prisoner a Japanese non-commissioned officer who had left his post. On the 27th the Japanese never got closer to the Russian position than 200 paces. Half-way through the fighting there was a blinding snowstorm, which caused a suspension of hostilities. When the weather cleared, about 3 p.m., the wary Japanese were seen to be creeping round the right of the Russian position. The movement was frustrated in time by the accurate fire of the Russian artillery, and about 6 p.m. the fighting ceased.

On the 28th the engagement was resumed, but closed at 11 a.m. There being no signs of any further attack, the Russians set to work to collect the Japanese dead, with a view to giving them honourable burial. By midday they had found 230 bodies, all of men of the 7th Reserve Regiment of the 6th Reserve Brigade. A large quantity of rifles, ammunition, and entrenching tools fell into the hands of the Russians, who were thus in a position to claim a considerable success, more especially as their own losses appear to have been slight. In the afternoon of the 28th the Japanese engaged in this affair began slowly to retire. The Russians pursued, and finding the Japanese on November 30th, killed in a pass seven or eight miles south-east of Sin-hsiang. General Renard ordered the offensive. Part of the Russian force effected a turning movement to reach the pass, while the General himself, covered by artillery, attacked from the front. The "fight" was a most interesting one, and sharp. The Japanese retired to the foot of the pass,

after burning their stores. Detachments of Chasseurs and Cossacks pursued the Japanese through the village of Suidun to the Taitse River, destroying the Japanese field telegraph. The Japanese burnt their depots at two other villages in the valley of the Taitse. The Russians suffered a repetition of the same committal killing, however, at a strong post at Suidun. The Japanese lost about 50 killed and 100 wounded. The Russians found 23 bodies of Japanese soldiers, and made seven prisoners.

The fighting in the Russian left lasted fitfully into December, and produced at least one rather gruesome incident, of which an account taken from the *Russki i Liudemosti* was transmitted from St. Petersburg by the Central News. The following is the translation furnished by the latter agency:—

"The attack was made from Udatun, a village on the right bank of the Shihun, surrounded by a grove, with a few rocky hillocks behind and before it.

"The order of battle chosen by the Russian colonel was originally three lines of deployed ranks, five companies, then three, and then four, with the regimental banner.

"In this order the regiment had to descend to the river, cross it, cross two large ravines occupied by infantry, then attack a steep but low hill, crowned by a redoubt and encircled by trenches. The assault was accomplished by the 10th Rifle Regiment of three battalions, which formed the right flank of the attacking line.

Those who fell remained where they dropped until the end of the battle. After a long time their feet rustled unpleasantly on the snow. They dashed past the ravines, the trenches, the redoubts without stopping.

batteries, and rushed after the enemy, who fled in a panic.

"The village with the Japanese still firing from the fansas, remained in the rear. With great difficulty the soldiers were forced to return. Fortunately, the 20th Regiment hurried up from the reserve. The village was surrounded and set on fire.

"Darkness set in, and the violent battle proceeded in the light of this huge torch. The Japanese, seeing themselves surrounded, had no strength to resist. The majority committed suicide. Many preferred burning to prison, and rushed into the fire."

Colonel Sychevsky, who was in command, thus described the affair to the *Viedomosti* correspondent. "I only cried the word of command, and the regiment marched on as though on parade. After crossing the river, I had not sufficient strength to walk. I cried, 'Hurrah!' and ran.

"Before the trench, at a distance of from ten to fifteen steps, we stopped—ourselves and the Japanese. It was a tragic moment. One false step, and the tables might be turned. But all was decided by Lieutenant Alexander—a man of mad intrepidity. He was torn to pieces by bayonets before our eyes, and they finished him with the butts of their rifles.

"Cracking, slashing, howling, shrieking—on the attacking party went irresistibly. I could not run so fast, and could not shout. I was choking, but the men ran on and on. When I ordered the halt the soldiers murmured, and would not return. Fortunately the commander of the 3rd Battalion—an experienced man—held them back near the banner.

"The 19th Regiment lost about 400 men, but all died with their arms in their

hands. It was worse with the Japanese. The fansas were still smoking, spreading a horrible smell of burnt flesh—the bodies of the suicides!"

Into further details of the collisions along the lines of outposts, collisions in the accounts of which the names of the villages of Lin-shi-pu and Li-mun-tun have perhaps the greatest prominence, it is not necessary to enter. More to the point is it to chronicle the on-coming of the true Manchurian winter, and to glance at the progress of the great organic changes which are taking place at Russian Army headquarters. As to the first, a correspondent with General Kuroki's force telegraphed, on December 11th, that on the previous night the thermometer had fallen to six degrees below zero, Fahrenheit. The days were cold also, but sunshine and the absence of severe winds made life tolerable. The hills were covered with snow, which was also lying an inch thick on the plains. All the streams were frozen over. Both armies were now living almost exclusively in subterranean shelters protected by pits, wire entanglements, and here and there by semi-permanent redoubts. There were now places where the distance between the opposing lines was only 400 paces, and it is said that never were the positions of two forces so close together along such an extended front.

To this period belonged a recrudescence of activity on the part of the Chunchuses, to whom the rigours of the season mattered less than to the regular troops of the two armies in the field. It is recorded that 1,500 of these brigands, with sixteen guns, appeared some twenty miles to the west of Tie-ling, which lies on the railway to the north-west of Mukden. They are said to have been repulsed by the Frontier Guard, and to

have lost 200 of their number. But it is significant that in the first week of December a Harbin despatch should have mentioned the blowing up of the railway line between Harbin and Mukden by Chinese, and there is no question that throughout December the latter were causing considerable uneasiness in Russian military circles by their swift and sudden raids.

By the middle of December all the three generals who were to have Army commands under Kuropatkin—General Issima, had arrived at Mukden. General Linavitch, commanding the First Army, had under him the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Siberian Army Corps, with Lieutenant-Generals Stielcher, Sissulitch, Jynoff, and Zarubneff as Corps Commanders, and Major-General Khrolevitch as Chief of the Staff. To Lieutenant-General Gripenberg, commanding the Second Army, the 8th, 16th, and 21st European Army Corps, and a Siberian Corps appear to have been assigned.

The Third Army, under Lieutenant-General Baron Kaulbars, with Major-General Martson as Chief of the Staff, is said to have consisted of the 1st, 10th, and 17th European Army Corps, under Moxendorf, Iserspitzy, and Bolderberg respectively, and a Siberian Corps, probably the 6th.

Of the new generals in chief command, the most self-assertive was General Gripenberg, of whom a striking portrait was given on page 103 of the present volume. In addressing one of his regiments at the time he took over command of his Army he said: "I am sure you will not give way to the enemy. There will be no retreating now. If my one of you abandons his position I will kill him. If I order you to retreat, I will. A little later the Commander of the Second Army in Manchuria was to realize both the utility of such language and the doubtful courtesy of a position for which it became evident that he was by temper and military capacity badly fitted.



THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN MANCHURIA

CHAPTER LXXV.

THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR—SUGGESTIONS OF SURRENDER—THE *KIZTOKOPNY* INCIDENT—DRAMATIC SEQUEL—OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GREAT FORTS—ATTACK BY JAPANESE SWORDSMEN—FIGHTING ROUND METRE RANGE—COSTLY ASSAULTS—FINAL ADVANCE—CAPTURE OF 203 METRE HILL.

AFTER the termination of the "Birthday Attack" on Port Arthur, of which an account was given in Chapter LXX., the Japanese, though somewhat disheartened by the limited success attained, made steady progress both with their sap work and with the bombardment. On November 6th the heads of the sap were within from 100 to 300 yards of the big forts, except in the case of those on Liau-tie-shan. The bombardment also continued with unabated vigour, and on November 8th the great Er-lung-shan and Sung-shu-shan forts were reported, for the first time, to have been silenced. The shells dropped, too, so incessantly into and round the dockyard, that repairing work had to be practically abandoned. Citizen volunteers and police were now reinforcing the regular garrison.

Increased attention was henceforth paid to I-tzu-shan, a particularly difficult fort to assail owing to the peculiar topography of the country in the immediate neighbourhood, which prevents direct artillery fire against it. On the mornings of November 5th and 6th fierce assaults were made against this powerful work, the Japanese advancing in both cases from behind distant hills in as great force as the ground would allow. But the absence of direct artillery preparation, and the long distance which the infantry had to traverse in the face of the

defenders' machine guns, crumpled up the attack, though not until the Japanese had reached and broken through the wire entanglements set close up to the fort. A lurid instance of the frantic tenacity displayed in these attacks was afforded by the spectacle of one unfortunate soldier, who, though his leg had been torn off by a piece of shell, was seen trying to bite through the wires in order to make the passage easier for those behind him.

During the assault on November 6th a shell soaring over the hills from the eastward plumped into a mine-controlling station in I-tzu-shan, and set off a quantity of high explosives, with the result, it is said, that between 600 and 700 Russians were killed and wounded.

About this time the Japanese were reported to have made a rather singular effort to induce the Russian soldiers in Port Arthur to surrender without consulting General Stoessel. A Russian prisoner, taken on October 26th, had declared that his comrades were sadly dispirited, and that they clearly realised the hopelessness of the struggle in which they were engaged. General Nogi, upon hearing the man's story, caused a letter to be drafted for circulation among the Russian soldiers. In this a statement was given of Kuropatkin's retreats, and his failure to make any impression upon Oyama's forces. It was pointed out that the Baltic Fleet had only just

started, that the advance of the Japanese against Port Arthur, if slow, was sure, and that the capture of the great forts was only a matter of time. In conclusion, the letter offered kindly treatment to all who surrendered, and urged the humanity of further useless slaughter. Several copies of this letter were written in Russian, and given to the above-mentioned prisoner, who, under cover of the darkness in the early morning of November 4th, regained the Russian lines unobserved by his officers. The man returned the same night, saying that his comrades would answer within a few days. He remarked that the men did not like the idea of an unofficial surrender, but that they were evidently impressed by the tone of the letter, which dispelled the idea, fostered by the Russian officers, that a Japanese entry into Port Arthur would be followed by a massacre. According to this man's statement, his own battalion, formerly 800 strong, had now dwindled to thirty men only.

Like a good many other of the circumstantial stories told about the siege of Port Arthur, this one may be of defective authenticity, but it can hardly be an entire invention, and, although no tangible results of any such offer is that indicated were forthcoming, it may be that a proportion of the besieged garrison were sensibly influenced in this way.

According to old-fashioned notions of military propriety, the offer, if made, was highly objectionable, but the case of Port Arthur is in so many respects, exceptional.

The Japanese plea that a professional soldier can only a senseless and fruitless sacrifice of lives, and that, "if the Japanese were to take the city, they would have to massacre the Russian soldiers," is perfectly true, but the latter fact does not

Copies of the Port Arthur journal, the *Yei Kren*, were now beginning to find their way pretty regularly to Chifu, being carried thither by the blockade-running junks. Some of the glimpses of life in the beleaguered fortress are very interesting, although by this time it is necessary to discount rather heavily the comparative cheerfulness of the earlier numbers. There is no longer any fun to be got out of the chief-hearted apothecary who, for a fortnight, played a prominent part in the columns of the *Yei Kren*. This useful person had found the siege so trying, that he closed his shop and vanished, but was pursued with such editorial taunts and reproaches for having left a part of the town deprived of its medicines, that he eventually advertised his new address. In November, again, there are no more anxious enquiries as to the whereabouts of a missing monkey, or offers to purchase a horse and carriage.

Yet, even up to within a few days of the period to which we have now arrived the Port Arthur journalist was occasionally enabled to supplement the bare record of the siege by some highly romantic 'copy.' Here, for instance, is the sensational story of a Russian woman who served with valour in many fights until she was killed. Her husband was serving in Port Arthur, and she, dressing herself as a man, arrived there just before the siege began. Enlisting in her husband's regiment, she took part in several sorties, and helped in the defence of Corner Hill. Her husband's sex was soon discovered, her record for bravery and heroism was recorded, and her personal appearance and features, which she had concealed in the disguise of the 'boy,' were described. Her husband, it is stated, died of typhoid fever.

She nursed him through the critical points of his illness, and then returned to the front, where she became a messenger to Captain Gouzakofsky, of the 13th Regiment, riding fearlessly to and from the various positions, unaffected by the din and danger of battle. On October 16th, when she was visiting the trenches with despatches, a huge shell struck the earthworks, and killed her together with eight others."

Reverting to the November chronicle of the siege, we find an incident recorded as having taken place on November 14th, the story of which, though not officially confirmed, was vouched for by an *Express* correspondent as having been obtained from an absolutely reliable source at Shimonoseki, one of Japan's principal naval stations. The details are as follows: On the night of the 13th three Russian destroyers put to sea from Port Arthur with despatches from General Stoessel in triplicate. Two of the vessels carried officers who were so badly wounded that it was deemed advisable to send them at any risk to Chi-fu rather than keep them in the crowded hospitals at Port Arthur. The fate of all destroyers was sufficiently tragic.

One was intercepted by the Japanese cruiser *Kasuga* and sunk, only four members of the crew being rescued, one of whom died subsequently.

The second was sunk by the *Matsushima* about twenty-five miles from Port Arthur. This vessel managed to hit the *Matsushima* with a torpedo, which, however, did very little damage.

The third destroyer was chased by two Japanese torpedo gunboats from midnight until four o'clock in the morning, when the fugitive's engines gave out off Liau-tie-shan. She pluckily hove-to for battle, but was promptly torpedoed, and

sank immediately with all on board. In all three cases the Russians on board the destroyers were admitted by the Japanese to have behaved with reckless bravery.

We now come to an incident which created at the time a very considerable sensation, and which was fully expected—though, as we shall see, the expectation was not realised—to create serious international complications. Two nights after the three destroyers just mentioned had come to grief, a fourth destroyer, the *Razorophny*, commanded by Captain Pelem, weighed anchor in Port Arthur harbour, and, in the teeth of a blinding snowstorm, ran out to sea. Owing to the heavy weather she was unable to make more than ten knots, but, even at this pace, thanks to the snow-storm, she succeeded in evading the Japanese ships on blockading duty, and early on the morning of the 16th she steamed into Chi-fu, and anchored near the Russian Consulate. Later she moved further in-shore among the shipping.

The crew of the *Razorophny* may well have been gratified by the sensation which their arrival created. An early visitor was Captain Ching, of the Chinese cruiser *Hai-Yang*, who came aboard and notified Captain Pelem that he would be compelled to disarm within twenty-four hours. The Aide-de-camp to the United States Admiral on the China station also had a short interview with Captain Pelem, and several Press correspondents followed, eager to seize such an exceptional opportunity of gleaning really up-to-date information concerning Port Arthur. These last found the commander of the *Razorophny* and his officers most communicative. As to Port Arthur, everything there was going on swimmingly: plenty of food, no chance of the



A. J. 12. 1870. G. L. 12. 1870. N. 12. 1870. T. 12. 1870. H. 12. 1870.
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 G. L. 12. 1870. N. 12. 1870. T. 12. 1870. H. 12. 1870. C. L. 12. 1870. A. 12. 1870. J. 12. 1870. S. 12. 1870. M. 12. 1870. D. 12. 1870.

water supply failing, the troops and residents in first-rate health and spirits, the warships steadily undergoing repair, and some of them likely to put to sea in the near future. Altogether an almost idyllic state of things considering the circumstances. Nor did the appearance of the *Razdoropy* and her crew belie these cheering statements. The officers and men were fit and well fed; there was a comfortable odour of steak, which was being cooked for breakfast; beer and tobacco were in evidence, and an added touch of repleteness was lent by a "fat, contented-looking bull pup," who "walked the deck with unsteady movements." But, notwithstanding these assurances, the optimism of the officers was thought to be a little strained, and the whole picture appeared to have been carefully arranged with a view to creating a desired impression.

The continued presence of the armed *Razdoropy* in the harbour of Chi-fu was, of course, out of the question, and it seemed clear that this time the Chinese would take the necessary steps to enforce the observance of the port's neutrality. The cruiser *Hai-yang* having cleared her decks for action, moved to a position commanding every part of the harbour, and dramatic events were naturally anticipated.

Meanwhile the *Razdoropy* lay anchored, with full steam up, in the midst of seven Japanese coasting steamers and two vessels flying the Chinese flag but owned by Japanese. The despatches brought by Captain Pelem had been taken off by the Russian Consul, and Captain Pelem had himself gone ashore. Towards evening it was understood that the Russians had agreed to disarm, but that it would be impossible to remove the guns immediately, owing to the heavy seas in

the roadstead. About seven o'clock the officers and crew of the vessel came ashore, and, when all had landed, a line was formed, kit-bags were placed on the ground, and officers and men stood to attention with their faces turned seawards towards the ship.

In a few moments there were three explosions heard in rapid succession, and, when the smoke cleared away, the *Razdoropy* was seen to settle down and sink. The last man who had left her had ignited slow fuses, which had done their work with completeness, and settled once and for all the question of the *Razdoropy's* disarmament. It was afterwards learnt that towards evening three Japanese destroyers had been seen at the entrance to the harbour, and there seems little doubt that their appearance had precipitated the blowing-up of the *Razdoropy*, the commander probably fearing a repetition of the incident of the *Reshitelny*, which took refuge (see Chapter LI.) in Chi-fu harbour after the action of August 10th, and was unceremoniously haled forth by the Japanese on the plea that she had not been duly disarmed.

The Japanese destroyers on the present occasion watched the entrance to the harbour all night, and came in the next morning to look for the *Razdoropy*. Although some indignation was expressed at the deception practised by the Russian commander, to which it was believed that the Chinese were parties, the fact seems to be that the Japanese were rather relieved than otherwise at the turn which affairs had taken. They were by no means anxious for a repetition of the *Reshitelny* incident, which would have aroused a good deal of ill-feeling, and yet, if they had not behaved again as they did in that case, it might be construed

city on admission that their previous action had been impracticable.

Later some argument occurred as to the small arms taken ashore by the crew of the *Rikofuna*, and also as to the disposal of the men themselves, but the controversy was not serious, and was eventually settled by the combustion of the weapons, and conveyance of the crew in the *Hu-yang* to Shanghai.

Returning to the third fighting round Port Arthur, we find the Japanese, at the end of the second week of November, resuming their vigorous attacks on Fushung-shan and East Chihuan-shan, and also redoubling their efforts against Metre Ringo in general and 203 Metre Hill in particular. What specially characterises this stage of the advance is the improved success of the Japanese in retaining positions they have won, a circumstance illustrating, it would seem, a feature in the Russian scheme of defence which has hitherto been of advantage to the defence, but is now being used to their detriment. In the old days of Chinese occupation Port Arthur had what is termed a reciprocal system of defence, that is, the forts were all constructed to help one another, so that, if one were attacked, the forts on the left or right could bring a heavy flanking or cross fire on the assailants. The objection to this system is obvious, and certainly was in the case of old Port Arthur, that, although it renders the capture of any individual fort a very serious matter, the fall of one fort is a speedily resultant effect of the others, not by a direct


flank attack, but by a bombardment from the sea. The case of Port Arthur, as that of the other forts, illustrates the fact that the defence of Port Arthur is based on the principle of the defence of the sea, and not on the defence of the land.

cost at an early stage of the present operations.

No longer was there any hope that the capture of a single important stronghold would mean the prompt reduction of the rest. It became necessary to treat each of the great forts as a separate objective, and hence the appalling loss of life and the protracted nature of the siege. On the other hand, in analysis of the attacks does not convey the impression that there was any reciprocal defence to speak of, and, accordingly, when a foothold was obtained close up to any of the great forts, it was easier to retake it than would have been the case if the guns from the forts on the right and left could have been used to render the besiegers' new position untenable.

On November 15th the Russian troops defending 203 Metre Hill, who had already distinguished themselves by their stubborn resistance, made a sortie, but were driven back, leaving twenty-six dead. A day or two later a Russian magazine was destroyed after an expenditure of 200 shells. The Japanese now began to widen their saps, and to use them to move guns forward, a sure sign that a very intense stage of the siege operations was about to commence.

On November 17th the Japanese blew up the counterscrops of the Fushung-shan and Sung-shan forts. They had also mined into the counterscrops galleries at North Chihuan-shan, but found it unnecessary to fire the mine, as the enemy had evacuated the galleries. It may be explained in passing that, in the case of a great permanent fort, the ditch with its steep often perpendicular sides dotted with galleries, can only be entered by the assailants by a very difficult and costly operation. The Japanese, however, had no such galleries, and the ditch was only a shallow trench, and the



nearest to the attack, have to be breached in order to make a descent into the ditch possible, and this can be done in one of two ways—either long shells of large capacity are fired at the crest of the gliers until that and the top of the counterscarp are cut down and blown into the ditch, or resort is had to mining. In the latter case, which alone was practicable at Port Arthur, mining galleries are run forward from the most advanced parallel and, when sufficient progress has been made, the mine is fired and the counterscarp blown in. The mining plan is always liable to be upset by the besiegers' countermines, and it involves an immense amount of labour. But when it is successful the results are generally excellent, and, at the worst, a sort of crater is formed, which forms an admirable cover in advance of the regular trenches.

Whatever may have been the actual case at Erlung-shan, Sung-shan-shan, and North Chih-hui-shan, there was yet a great deal of work to be done before those mighty defences fell into Japanese hands.

After more than a week of desultory fighting, during which considerable progress was made in sap and mine work, a general attack was commenced on November 20th against Erlung-shan, Sung-shan-shan, and 203 Metre Hill. The attack against the two first named forts was carried out by a specially picked body of troops armed with swords under Major-General Nakamura and Saito, and must have been one of the most thrilling feats of arms of the whole siege. Unfortunately very few details are available. The point is that the Japanese first of all went to the edge of the ditch and fired at the defenders' feet, the object of this being to cause the defenders to be

first on their feet, the practicable slopes made by the blowing in of the counterscarps. Those who were not lucky enough to find their way into the ditch by this means doubtless lowered themselves by means of ladders, and, once they were in the ditch, a terrible struggle must have ensued.

It is difficult to realise such a scene more especially with the aid lent by the use of swords in such hands as those of the Japanese. But, deadly as cold steel properly handled may be in hand-to-hand fighting, it has its limits, and probably there were many flanking defences in these ditches from which machine guns were brought to bear with fearful effect upon the masses of Japanese swordsmen. Whether from this cause, or because the ladders were too few or not long enough, or is the result of an overwhelming rush on the part of the defenders, the attack failed, and the swordsmen were compelled to retire after suffering terrible losses, General Nakamura himself being among the wounded.

But better fortune attended the Japanese efforts against 203 Metre Hill. Of the previous fighting on Metre Ridge an account was given in Chapter LXX. This may now be usefully supplemented by an extract from a lengthy and important letter from the *Times* correspondent with the Japanese Army before Port Arthur, which was published on January 28th, and which for a long time to come will probably remain the standard description of the operations against Metre Ridge, or to use another name, which is used in both the 203 and 210 Metre passes. Extract—It should be explained in reference to this extract that Nakamura was a lieutenant of the Japanese Army, and a representative of the Japanese Army in the *Times*. The letter is as follows:—

"On September 19th-20th an assault was made on the hill of Namaokayama, called by the Russians Temple Hill, which is situated a little to the north-west of 203 Metre Hill, and separated from it by a valley. The occupation of Namaokayama was a success of the highest importance for the Japanese, for, although the view from its summit did not come up to expectations, nevertheless the ships in Port Arthur were obliged to retreat into the eastern half of the inner harbour, and could not venture out without their every movement being known. On the day on which Namaokayama was taken, an assault was also made on 203 Metre Hill from the foot hill on its west front, and also from the south-west. The Japanese never fought better than they did on that occasion. There were no parallels leading down from the slopes, behind which they were encamped, across the little valley dividing them from 203 Metre Hill, and none leading up the steep slopes of that mountain. From the moment they left their camps there was not a particle of cover from the dreadful rifle fire from 203 Metre Hill and the hill further to the north known as Akasakayama.

"From my position I could only obtain an imperfect view of the attack, but I did see the manner in which whole groups of men were wiped out by shrapnel coming down the slope of the foot hill into the valley. In spite of all these obstacles, the infantry climbed the slopes at night, and obtained a lodgment on the south-west corner, which is known as 210, and also on the north-east corner, which is known as 203. The Russians, however, remained in possession of the crest, and could not be driven out. Probably at that time they knew better than their stubborn enemy the importance of retaining their hold on the hill. In spite

of the inadequate manner in which the mountain was fortified, they made up by their devotion for the incompetency of those who had been responsible for leaving it without permanent fortifications. The forts behind played such sad havoc with the infantry who had gained a lodgment just below the crest, that on the day following the Japanese were forced to evacuate the ground they had won, after losing an immense number of officers and men. With the repulse in September all active operations against 203 Metre Hill ceased until November 26th."

On November 27th the Russians held the whole of Royusan, both the 203 Metre Hill to the north-east, and the 210 peak to the south-west. The former is, with the exception of the Liau-tie-shan peaks, the highest mountain of those round Port Arthur. Royusan is described by the *Times* correspondent as being very steep. "On its west front, about two-thirds of the way up, the rocks buttress out, causing a sheer drop of about thirty to forty feet. It is possible to climb up this, but the feat is not an easy one. Above this natural obstruction comes the first of the artificial ones, in the form of a deep and broad trench running completely round the hostile front of the mountain. This was the first of the positions held by the infantry. On the crest there are numerous trenches and cross passages dug fairly deep and made of sand-bags. The summit is, in fact, divided into what might be called a number of little shell-tight compartments—that is to say, although it was impossible to prevent shells bursting among the infantry on the crest, an effort had been made to localise their effects as far as possible."

Although for some time after the failure

of the assault on September 19th 20th it had been doubtful whether any fresh attack would be directed against the formidable stronghold, the Japanese engineers were directed, as a measure of precaution, in case it should be found desirable to resume operations in this quarter, to run a series of parallel leading from the foot-hills, behind which the Japanese infantry were encamped down into the valley, and thence up the south-west corner of 203 Metre Hill towards the 210 Metre peak. At the close of November it became evident that the occupation of 203 would be of quite extraordinary significance to the besiegers, not only by reason of the serious gap which would be made in the system of defences, but also because the fleet in the harbour would then be entirely at the mercy of the Japanese guns. This would enable the blockade to be carried out by a few gunboats and destroyers, leaving Admiral Togo's Battle Fleet free to make

adequate arrangements for the warm reception of the Second Pacific Squadron under Admiral Rozhdestvensky.

As originally, a scheme of general utility was prepared, of which we have already seen a portion put into unsuccessful execution. As the magnitude of the project as against Roussin is revealed, it becomes clear that the rush of swordsmen to the duties of *l'Armée-Soleil* and *Soleil* Division was intended largely to serve as a diversion, or, to put it another way, a preoccupation which would have to hinder the Russians from attempting to take advantage of the retreat of *l'Armée-Mère*. Had

The first of the two letters
was written by the author of the
first letter, and the second by
the author of the second letter.
The first letter was written
on the 1st of the month, and
the second on the 2nd of the month.

tim the state of affairs at Port Arthur. A new division of fresh troops not before employed in the war was detached to assist in the attack, parallels were already in existence, and six of the largest howitzers ever used on land were in position to favour the points.

Throughout November 27th Koyasin was steadily bombarded by the great Russian siege guns, the infantry remaining among the foot hills until General Nogi should come up and take over command of the operations.

On the 25th a determined attack was launched against the 210 Metre peak at the south-west corner of Roynasin, eleven companies of infantry issuing at eight o'clock in the morning from their parallels, having left three companies in reserve behind an eminence called by the *Times* correspondent 174 Metre Mount on which, apparently, is distinct from the 180 Metre Hill of Mr. Norregård's narrative (pp. 316, 318) having been occupied as far back as August 22nd. Simultaneously with this advance two battalions were sent against Akiskawim, the hill to the north, from which an attack on 207 can be subjected to an enfilading fire. The idea was that, if a lodgment could be effected on 210 the men holding it could leap down the face of the Russian infantry on 207, in attack on the latter thus supported, and not harassed, by the enfilading fire from Akiskawim, the Garrison of which was to be kept busy by the two battalions sent against the latter would have an excellent chance of getting to the

[illegible]

noon about 150 Japanese soldiers won the crest of 210, and for a time remained established there. Unfortunately this encouraged the belief that the moment had arrived for a general advance up the west side of Roynsan against 203 Metre Hill on the north-east. That attack was duly delivered, but presently the whole plan fell to pieces. The little group which had gained a foothold on the crest of 210 could not maintain it, owing to the dreadful fire to which they were subjected, and, with their disappearance from the crest, and the repulse of the two battalions sent against Akasakayama, the attempt on 203 was foredoomed to costly failure.

Still, the day's work had not been entirely barren of results. On their withdrawal from the crest of 210 the Japanese infantry had pertinaciously halted a little distance down the slope, and in this apparently dead, or partly dead, angle had stubbornly ensconced themselves. Towards the point in question the sap was now pushed forward, so that it became possible for large bodies of infantry to "wind their way like a long snake through the parallels up the face of the south-west corner, and there debouch for a further advance against the crest."

November 29th was spent by the Japanese in consultations, and at 10 a.m. on the 30th the struggle was reopened by a fresh attack on 210. The Japanese guns had by this time rendered the crest of 210 untenable by the Russians, and a company of Japanese infantry were accordingly enabled to push forward from the point already occupied to one just below the crest, where a high wall of sand-bags was immediately built. The Russians responded by returning to the crest, upon which it was now impossible for either the Russian or Japanese artillery to

fire for fear of hitting their own men. Consequently there ensued a continual fight between the opposing bodies of infantry, who, in the intervals of "potting" one another with their rifles, used bayonets and hand-grenades freely.

"Throughout the day," writes the *Times* correspondent, "203 remained in undisputed possession of the Russians, and no attack was made in that quarter, but at 2 p.m. a regiment (I am not allowed by the rules of the censorship to make specification of names and numbers) advanced against Akasakayama. The attack was repulsed all along the line, except in one place, the centre of the first Russian trench below the crest of that hill. A party of Japanese soldiers drove out the defenders, and established themselves in their place, and for some time remained there unmolested. Then a curious thing happened. A party of forty or fifty Russian soldiers, either in sheer foolhardiness, or because they thought the Japanese holding the centre of the trench had evacuated the ground or had been killed, left their trenches on the crest of Akasakayama, and delivered a counter-attack on the Japanese in their front. They charged down the slope, and were allowed to get quite close to the trench, some of them actually entering it before the Japanese soldiers showed their hand; then a fight at close quarters settled the matter, for the Russians, knowing that to go back would be fatal, preferred to jump into the trench among their opponents and to die fighting. This they did. Not a man appeared again, so it is presumable that they were all killed.

"The turn of the Japanese came shortly afterwards, for their own field artillery, either in ignorance of the true state of affairs, or because they could not see, opened a fierce shrapnel fire all over



THEY ARE NOT A PART OF THE JURY, I SAY, AND I SAY THAT WITH CERTAIN VARIATIONS (AND PLEASE SEE)

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Akasakayama, sweeping the crest and the trench in which their own infantry were taking cover. These unfortunate men were so badly mauled by this fire that they took a choice of evils, and decided to evacuate the position, and run down the slope under the fire of the Russian marksmen on the crest, rather than be shot to pieces by their own guns. Naturally many were slain, and the day's fighting closed with the combatants occupying the same positions as on the previous day, not a yard of ground having changed hands."

During the night of the 30th the Japanese engineers ran a shallow trench at right angles to their most advanced parallel up the face of 203, and, just before daybreak, a party of infantry rushed forward out of this to the foot of the steep side of 203, and hastily constructed several shelter trenches parallel to, and just below, the first Russian trench. Being thus established close up to the crests of both 203 and 210, the Japanese decided to deliver another attack on both the two peaks in the afternoon of December 1st. Great preparations were made for this movement, and all was in readiness for a grand rush from the parallels when a strange incident occurred, which upset the planned movement altogether. The party which was holding the advanced shelter-trenches just under the crest of 203 suddenly, and without warning, bolted back, amid a storm of Russian bullets, upon the nearest parallel. This extraordinary, unforeseen, and unexplained occurrence determined the fate of this attack, which was forthwith abandoned, no further effort being made until an interval of three days had elapsed.

During December 2nd, 3rd, and 4th the Japanese artillery pounded away

ceaselessly at the crest of Royusan, occasionally dropping shells over the crest on to the reverse slope in order to hinder the approach of reinforcements. During the night the engineers constructed parallels up the centre of Royusan at a point where there was a slight dip in the ground which afforded some protection against the fire of Akasakayama. By the morning of December 5th these trenches had been pushed forward as far as was practicable, and a final infantry attack was decided on.

The preparations made by the Japanese for this final attack—for such it was understood to be in any case, since, in the event of failure, the enterprise would almost certainly have been abandoned—were characteristically thorough and complete. As a matter of course, from an early hour in the morning of the 5th, every gun that could possibly be brought to bear upon Royusan came into action against the two peaks. Howitzers of 11-in. calibre, throwing shells of 500 lbs., naval guns of great size, and field artillery are mentioned as taking part in that terrific bombardment, causing such a disturbance of earth and atmosphere, that Royusan is said to have resembled a smoking volcano, not an inch of the crest and near slopes escaping the tremendous cannonade save a small angle of the south-west corner, where the advanced parties of the Japanese held their ground ready to spring forward in the final rush.

By a happy inspiration the enthusiasm of the bulk of the attacking force, which had been lying in wait behind Namakayama, and in the valley of 174 Metre Hill, was raised to the highest pitch by a very simple and soldierlike ceremonial, of which the *Times* correspondent appropriately makes careful mention. The execution of the attack had been en-

trusted to Major General Saito, doubtless in recognition of his brilliant gallantry in the fighting to the eastward on November 26th. His command included eight battalions of infantry, and between 1 and 2 p.m. these began to fill in for the attack. As they marched down the little valley leading to the front line of trenches they passed a little group of officers standing on their left, and holding the regimental colours. As each battalion came level with these glorious emblems it was halted, faced to the left, and the word was given to salute. Colours have played a grand part on many a hard-fought field, and not a few are averse from the modern regulation which prevents their being taken into action by the British Army. Surely the noble and inspiring use to which they were put on this momentous occasion is an argument as forcible as any which previous history affords—which is saying a great deal—of the value of colours on the battlefield as a moral factor outweighing the considerations which have banished the colour-party from our own battle formation.

The end was now near at hand. When the most advanced parallel had been reached as many men as could be picked into the trench leading up the face of Levasseur were drafted into it, the remainder being the parallels in eager expectation. At half past three the soldiers behind the sand-bag wall on 210 pressed in, and having encountered very little resistance, were soon in possession of the crest.


Five hundred men were now seen to push forward from the trench leading up to it, at a full dash at the first Russian resistance. They ran straight away. The next instant their path was blocked by the Russian fire, and they disappeared into the trees. It was for a few minutes there

was a fearful pause. The Japanese artillery broke out into a roaring bombardment of the summit of the peak, and when this had ceased the Japanese soldiers were seen to be moving forward from the first captured trench. It was a terrible moment of suspense, for this was the stage which had proved so fatal in previous attacks. But the soldiers went steadily on, and hardly a shot was fired. Simultaneously the men on 210 moved forward, in a few moments the Japanese infantry were over the crest of both peaks, and Rouban had fallen! Only three live Russians had been found on the summit, the remainder having been killed where they stood by the bursting shells, or retreated down the reverse slope along a covered way to one of the forts in the rear.

The Japanese lost no time, as we shall see in a succeeding chapter, in making good use of the magnificent coign of vantage they had won at such tremendous cost. But their first care was to render the Russian post on Akasakayama untenable, and to this end they swiftly brought up heavy guns, and subjected that hill to a deadly plunging fire. On the evening of the following day the Russians could no longer stand this terrible punishment, and withdrew, the Japanese following them the same night in occupation of the position.

This chapter cannot be better concluded than with a final extract from the account given by the *Times* correspondent to whom every student of military history must feel indebted for his admirable lucid, coherent, and often extremely picturesque description of one of the most intensely interesting operations ever recorded in the annals of war.

"I will not dwell on the appearance of Rouban the day following its capture,



CHAPTER LXXVI.

SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR CONTINUED—SEQUEL TO THE CAPTURE OF METRE RANGE—
DESTRUCTION OF THE RUSSIAN FLEET—TORPEDO ATTACKS AGAINST THE *SEVASTOPOL*—
—A GRAND NAVAL RECORD—THE LAND OPERATIONS—THREE PRINCIPAL FORTS
TAKEN BY ASSAULT.

THE extraordinary advantages derived by the Japanese from the occupation of Metre Range were almost immediately to become apparent. It will be remembered that the Japanese had long ago secured a position—Wolf's Hill—from which it was possible to throw shells into a part of the Port Arthur harbour, a circumstance which the Japanese had turned to the best possible account. But 203 Metre Hill is a mile nearer to the harbour than Wolf's Hill, and from it a much more extended view is obtained. With two such gun positions in the hands of the Japanese, the fate of the Russian vessels in the harbour was, practically speaking, sealed. Either they must sally forth and do battle with the fresh and superior fleet of Admiral Togo, or they would be sunk at their moorings as soon as the Japanese could bring sufficient big guns to bear on them.

It is very natural that, with this depressing prospect opened out before them, the Russians should have made frantic efforts to recapture, more especially, 203 Metre Hill. Time after time they dashed themselves undauntedly against that peak of terrible memories, only to find that, with the rôles of attackers and defenders reversed, their losses were now far more serious than those of the enemy. It is believed that in these attempts 3,000 Russians were sacrificed, and to no sort of useful purpose. For

the Japanese clung to what they had won with the same pertinacity they had shown during the ten days' attack, and by the end of the first week in December it was evident that Nogi's men on Royusau had come to stay.

While the Japanese infantry were foiling the persistent Russian attempts to regain these advantageous heights, the artillery and engineers were busy bringing up and emplacing fresh guns wherewith to intensify the effect of those already firing from Wolf's Hill. The latter appear to have been very large calibre weapons brought from Tokio, where they had at one time formed part of the reserve armament of the forts in Tokio Bay. These guns had already done some damage on December 3rd, but this was nothing compared with the wholesale destruction which was now to ensue. For the possession of 203, as well as of Metre Hill, meant not only a much greater intensity of fire, but also much reciprocal benefit in the way of direction and observation of results.

The first use to which the Japanese put their guns on 203 Metre Hill was, as we have seen, to render the Russian position on Akasakayama untenable, and, when this had been easily accomplished, the storm of fire broke over Port Arthur harbour, and lasted for several days. It would not be easy to describe the experiences of the hapless Russian ships

mediately enveloped in smoke. The gunboat *Akagi*, which was engaged in shelling the enemy's position, ceased fire and steamed towards the *Sai Yen*, which sank forthwith. Launches from the *Akagi* and another gunboat saved 191 officers and men, but 39 were lost, including the *Sai Yen's* commander, Captain Tajima.

On December 12th there commenced a series of torpedo operations against the battleship *Sevastopol*, which recall in striking fashion the repeated attempts made against the Russian Fleet in the first six months of the war. The series was opened by an attack, delivered half an hour after midnight on the 12th, by a torpedo division under Captain Kasama. No marked results having been attained, two torpedo-boats under Commander Masado ran up under a hot fire, and discharged several torpedoes, the shock of whose striking was felt, but the *Sevastopol* remained unmoved.

"On the night of December 14th," wrote Admiral Togo in an official report, "several torpedo-boat squadrons carried out a bold attack on the enemy's ships. The various squadrons about midnight reached Port Arthur harbour, the leading squadron and a special squadron advancing for the purpose of reconnoitring. Our boats attacked at 1 a.m. in the face of searchlights and a heavy fire from the enemy's ships and batteries. One torpedo-boat was struck once, and another four times. In the latter three men were killed, and one man was wounded.

"Afterwards all the squadrons concerted a plan of attack. The first squadron was to break the enemy's obstructions and divert the searchlights, while the second, third, fourth, and fifth squadrons, following up, were to deliver attacks in succession. This programme was bravely put into execution between

2 and 3 a.m., the third squadron notably displaying much dash, but all closed up and discharged torpedoes at very short range and then retired in order.

"During the retirement one boat suddenly received many hits. The commander and five men were killed; and one man was wounded. The boat became unmanageable, but was taken in tow by a consort amid a hail of shot. The tow-rope was cut by a shell; the consort was hit once, one man being killed, while the boat which was being towed was again struck several times, and, being in a sinking condition, was unavoidably abandoned.

"After rescuing the survivors another boat of the same squadron was struck twice. A boat of the fifth squadron was also struck once, two men being killed, and a lieutenant and two men being wounded. Yet another boat was hit once, one man being killed and five wounded. The boat was temporarily disabled, but was towed away safely by two of her consorts. All the other boats, though exposed to a heavy fire, happily escaped uninjured."

It is worthy of note that this extremely spirited attack was carried out in a blinding snowstorm which, combined with the warm reception given to the torpedo-craft by the gunners on board the great *Sevastopol*, must have rendered the operation fully as perilous and exciting as any in which the "mosquito fleet" of Japan had as yet been engaged.

On the following morning it was observed that the *Sevastopol* was down by the head, and was no longer swinging with the tide and wind. Anxious to complete the work, Admiral Togo on the night of the 15th ordered the torpedo squadrons once more to attack the *Sevastopol*, the gunboat *Otvajni*, and



UNLIGNED FIGHTING LINE AT FORT ARTHUR

APRIL 1900

several destroyers, all of which were now grouped under Cheng-tau-Shan, the southernmost fort on the promontory which ends in the "Tiger's Tail." A number of officers and the whole of the crews of the Japanese destroyers volunteered for this attack, which was delivered in the teeth of another heavy snowstorm, and the difficulty of which was enhanced by the extraordinary precautions which the Russians had adopted. Not only had they put out the usual screen of torpedo nets, but they had shielded the *Sevastopol's* bows with a specially constructed boom composed of logs and iron, bound together with cables and heavy chains interlaced and entangled.

Admiral Togo's official report is, again, the best description available of the ensuing operation. "The leading squadron," he says, "passed in between the *Sevastopol* and the destroyers, and at 4.30 a.m. discharged torpedoes against the *Sevastopol* and *Otvajni* at close range. Every one was observed to strike. Moreover, the squadron engaged a destroyer at a range of 100 metres and inflicted more or less damage. One torpedo seemed to strike the destroyer. Throughout the attack the enemy maintained a hot fire, but, perhaps owing to the shortness of the range, the squadron was wholly unhurt.

"The second squadron attacked next. At least three torpedoes were seen to explode. This squadron also engaged the destroyers and then steamed out. Two men were killed and two wounded. One boat of this squadron, being delayed while making repairs, advanced to the attack alone. She approached the battleship and discharged torpedoes. The commander was killed and one man was wounded, but the boat remained uninjured."

With this fine performance, Admiral Togo's Fleet before Port Arthur may be said to have completed its appointed task. A few days later the Admiral reported that, though efforts were being made by the Russians to pump out the *Sevastopol*, her repair was, in the circumstances, hopeless, and she was "certainly unfit to fight or navigate." There now remained only the *Otvajni* and a few destroyers, and accordingly on December 24th Admiral Togo was able to announce the release of a section of the blockading squadrons, inasmuch as the bulk of the Russian Fleet in Far Eastern waters was now completely out of action. With characteristic generosity, the gallant Admiral put the army first in detailing the causes and agents which had produced this brilliant result.

In his summary of the operations up to this point, Admiral Togo made a suitable acknowledgment of the splendid work so unostentatiously done by some who were not privileged to take part in the actual fighting. "During the blockade," he observed, "all the ships under my command have splendidly accomplished the work and duty assigned to them. It is especially to be noted that some were engaged in the difficult and risky task of blockading; others untiringly accomplished the work of laying mines in the presence of the enemy; others, braving all dangers, were engaged in the work of clearing mines, and others were posted to watch the enemy and keep guard against the enemy's ships. Their combined work strongly contributed to the accomplishment of the blockade. I deem it my duty specially to mention for recognition the valuable service rendered by officers and men."

In the report of the blockade, mention was also made of the vessels un-

fortunately sunk or blown up since the commencement of the naval operations. The *Myōdo*, *Hatsune*, *Yoshino*, *Kaimin*, *Haiyū*, and *Saiyū* were enumerated. The circumstances attending the loss of all these, with one or two minor exceptions, have been described in the preceding narrative.

As may be imagined, the Emperor of Japan did not long delay in acknowledging the receipt of this magnificent record of arduous work thus superbly brought to a finish by his gallant sailors. An Imperial rescript was at once issued addressed to Admiral Togo, in which the Mikado said:—

"We hear with great satisfaction that our torpedo flotillas engaged in the work required of them at Port Arthur have gallantly and successfully accomplished the duties they were called upon to perform, and in so doing have had to brave the dangers of storms and shells by day and night, and that, notwithstanding difficulties, they have succeeded in discharging their duties without the least confusion, rendering mutual assistance. We especially note their brave and loyal performance of the duties required of them, and express our approbation of their gallant behaviour."

Returning to the record of the land operations, a personal allusion must now be made to Admiral Togo's gallant associate, General Nogi, whose satisfaction in the capture of Metre Range had been marred by a sad bereavement. Among the officers killed had been his second and only surviving son, the first being killed at the storming of Nanchang. It is characteristic of the Japanese character that the soldier has been so prone to betray the national cause, and that he has been so ready to sacrifice his life, expressed his regret

in having been able to give two sons to the service of his country and his Sovereign. In commenting upon this circumstance, a Japanese correspondent pointed out that such an attitude was only to be expected from a leader of "the old-fashioned Samurai school, whose adherents counted it honour to die sword in hand." It was further mentioned that General Nogi had some time previously resigned a divisional command, purely because an officer who had formerly served under him had brought himself into some disgrace. So punctilious was the General in everything in which military discipline was concerned, that he regarded the misbehaviour of a subordinate as reflecting on his own ability and character.

Certainly General Nogi did not allow his bereavement to influence his conduct of the operations against Port Arthur. Even while the attacks on Metre Range were in progress, the siege works against the forts to the eastward were pushed on by day and night, and on December 4th, the day before 203 Metre Hill was won, the Japanese captured two quick-firing guns in the kopong of Itrushin. A little later they commenced to follow up their capture of Metre Range by working in advance along the shores of Pigeon Bay, on comparatively level ground, against the Itrushin group of forts—namely Itrushin itself and Antzushin—and also against the Tsinan Lu Fort, really due west of the town. The approaches were said to be easy, and the support of the guns now mounted on 203 Metre Hill was invaluable, but the forts were extremely strong, and especially was this experienced in pushing forward the expected fighting front.


On December 15th, so far as the exchange of fire was concerned, the

cations took place between Generals Nogi and Stoessel, the latter having complained that the Japanese were firing upon hospitals in Port Arthur, the Red Cross flag flying over which, he thought, should be observable from the Japanese positions. He trusted that this would cease in the interests of honourable warfare, and out of consideration for the brave soldiers, Japanese as well as Russians, who were lying wounded in the hospitals in question.

General Nogi replied that the Japanese had never during the whole of the siege intentionally trained their guns on any building or ship flying the Red Cross flag. But much of the interior of Port Arthur was invisible from their gun positions, and, moreover, the deviation of the

places which otherwise the Japanese would have gladly respected. General Stoessel now suggested that the Japanese should refrain from firing on the whole of the new town, and on the north-east quarter of the old town, limitations to which, of course, the Japanese could not consent. A friendly compromise was eventually arrived at, the Russians promising to furnish a plan showing the positions of the hospitals.

A good deal of the fighting round Port Arthur during the first fortnight of December is very difficult to follow, owing to the troublesome reduplication which occurs in the nomenclature of some of the minor forts and hills. Thus there is a Wang-tai Fort in the I-tzu-shan group, and another a long way to the



RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP *SIUSTOPOL*.

guns had naturally extended—a subtle compliment this—in consequence of the protracted and valiant resistance of the Russians. It was therefore impossible to guarantee that no shells should reach

east of the railway. Pei-yu-shan and the East Pei-yu-shan Forts are similarly separated by a considerable distance, while, as has been before noted, the great Chi-huan-shan Forts to the north-east of

The town have no topographical connection whatever with the South Chi-hu'ins-shan. It is on the higher land promontory. Not much importance, however, is attached to the incidental operations of this period compared with the great work now in hand of reducing the larger strong holds in the main ring of defence.

On December 15th a fresh general assault was launched against Lung-shan, Sing-shu-shan, and the north spit of Fat Chi-hu'ins-shan (Hoo-



GENERAL ESSEN, FIRST COMMANDER THE V.I.A. AND
AFTERWARDS THE 3rd.

kwang) the result being a triumphant occupation of the latter named. This was an extremely well constructed work, with a ditch forty-two feet wide at the bottom, twenty-one feet wide at the top, and twenty-seven feet in depth, not so formidable, it would seem, as some of the other forts, but still a very hard nut to crack. The Japanese had so much to be said for the past six weeks had been badly engaged with it, and the Japanese themselves were still in the fort, with the exception of a few stragglers, and the Japanese were still in the fort.

On December 15th a fresh general assault was launched against Lung-shan, Sing-shu-shan, and the north spit of Fat Chi-hu'ins-shan (Hoo-

were exploded, and a large section of the parapet was blown into the air. The red badge volunteers charged out across the ditch prematurely, and about fifty of them were killed by the falling of the bridge. The white badge party followed, forcing their way through the gap caused by the explosion, and were immediately met by a most stubborn resistance on the part of the garrison, who used their machine guns with deadly effect against the crowded attackers. The onslaught was

thus temporarily checked, but at 7 p.m. the veteran Lieutenant General Sumiyama, himself leading the reserves into the counterscarp gallery, advanced into the fighting line. A final grand charge was delivered, and a little before midnight the Russians retired, covering their retreat by blowing up some mines which they had placed near the "gorge" of the fort. The fighting from half past 10 to half past eleven is described as "awful," bayonets and hand grenades doing terrible work. The Russians brought up 200 men as reinforcements, and fought bravely, but the Japanese were persistent, and were eventually successful in the strength. It is stated that the strength of the Japanese was 1,000 men, and the strength of the Russians was 1,000 men.

Er lung-shan was an extraordinarily powerful work, standing at an elevation of some 270 feet above the sea. It was arranged on two levels. On the lower were the infantry trenches with machine gun trenches in rear. On the higher level were the quick firers and heavier guns and behind these the barracks, magazines, and kitchens of the garrison built of concrete.

Reuter's correspondent with the Japanese Army before Port Arthur gave a striking account of the actual *finale* of the attack on Er lung shan. At ten o'clock in the morning of the 28th the mines were exploded. "The spectacle was magnificent. The entire front of the walls of the fort seemed to be lifted into the air shrouded in a huge opaque curtain of earth and *debris* of all kinds. There was no preliminary bombardment to give the enemy a hint of what was in store for them. Half the garrison perished in the explosion and in the subsequent charge of the besiegers. The force of the explosion was tremendous. The entire hillside was covered with earth and *debris*, and the moat was filled level with the broken fragments of the walls of the fort.

As soon as the mines were fired, the besieging artillery concentrated upon the fort a tremendous fire, under cover of which the force in the nearest Japanese trenches rushed out over the filled in ditch and attacked the line of infantry trenches on the lower level. The Russians to their everlasting credit although thrown into confusion by the tremendous explosion in which many of their number had perished, stood nobly to their posts, and worked their machine guns on the swarming Japanese with steady gallantry, but to no successful purpose. After twenty minutes of desper-

ate fighting the infantry and machine gun trenches fell into the hands of the irresistible attackers.

When the assailants captured the lower level at the first spirited charge, they were unable, writes Reuter's correspondent, 'to advance any further, but with splendid courage they maintained their position in face of the awful concentrated fire of the artillery from Antzu shan and I-tzu shan forts across the gorge of Shuishi valley, and made a trench line from the broken walls of the fort in order to capture the machine gun trenches. All this time the Japanese artillery kept up a bombardment on the rear of the fort and the Chinese wall, to prevent reinforcements from being sent. At four o'clock in the afternoon the assailants massed and captured the machine gun trenches and the lower section of the fort. Pressing forward they charged the walls on the higher level, swarming up by twos and threes until a large body had gained the crest of the north eastern corner. Before dark the walls on the higher level were black with men, who gained the interior in small parties notwithstanding the fierce fire poured upon them.

In the meantime another body of Japanese had gained the higher level from the gorge on the west side of the fort, and an attack in overwhelming numbers was made on all sides. The remnant of the garrison continued the fight with splendid courage, contesting every inch of the interior of the fort. Under cover of the darkness the Japanese were reinforced, and captured the last works at three o'clock in the morning. One hundred and fifty of the garrison escaped through the connecting trenches in the rear of the fort, which they destroyed by mines to prevent pursuit. Three

prisoners only were taken, and the rest of the garrison was killed. The losses of the assailants during the daylight attacks were about 1,000 killed and wounded."

Among the spoils at the capture of Er-lung-shan were four large calibre guns,

Once more, at ten o'clock in the morning, a deafening explosion rent the air, the Japanese infantry rushed in armed with bayonets and hand grenades, and an hour after the explosion the fort was virtually in possession of the Japanese.

In retreating, the enemy exploded a



Photo: A. Laviantieff.

THE ENGINEER WHO FORTIFIED PORT ARTHUR.

General Kondratchenko—who by universal testimony proved himself the "life and soul of the defence." He is here seen superintending the construction of land mines on the Wolf Hills. The harbour of Port Arthur and the Tiger's Tail will be recognised in the dim background.

seven small calibre guns, thirty 37 millimetre guns, and two machine guns.

On December 31st the great stronghold of Sung-shu-shan, which is seventy feet higher than Er-lung-shan, fell to a Japanese attack on almost identical lines with those followed in the case of Er-lung-shan and North Chi-huan-shan.

mine within the fort, which apparently had the disastrous effect of entombing a number of their comrades who were within the bombproof gallery of the gorge. It is pleasant to be able to add that, immediately the capture of the fort was assured, the Japanese dug a passage into the gallery, and succeeded in saving two



THE GHOSTLIEST POST BEFORE PORT ARTHUR THE THIRTY MINUTE TRENCH

The worst part of the last night (Pan'ing shan) position formed a line of endeavor to win the command. In a few days the enemy was so near that the death of the last assault could be seen. This fact and the manner of the Japanese who were lost in a hundred yards away made the trench very painful and gloomy. The men who were killed were there in a very short time.


officers and 160 men. A hundred and fifty others are said to have been smothered and killed.

With the fall of Sung-shu-shan the very last stage of the siege of Port Arthur may be said to have been reached. Our narrative of the operations may, therefore, advantageously be suspended at this point, the story of the actual fall of the fortress being deferred to a future chapter. In the meantime it may be regarded as one of the curiosities of military chronology that the close of the last day of this eventful year should have witnessed what, to all intents and purposes, was the final operation in a long and crowded series which virtually began when General Oku's Army landed at Pitsu-wo, on the east coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, as far back as the beginning of May.

It is not difficult to realise the added gloom which the capture of Sung-shu-shan must have cast over the beleaguered garrison. From details available after the fall of Port Arthur it is evident that in many ways the condition of affairs within the fortress was becoming deplorable, even as regards discipline and *moral*. Wrangling between Generals Stoessel and Smirnoff became frequent,

even in public, and the drunken behaviour of the officers of what their scornful military comrades called *la flotte peureuse* was gravely scandalous. Even the men were becoming unmanageable, instances having occurred of forcible entry into spirit stores with serious results in the way of excess and insubordination.

It is an interesting fact that the first public note of despair was sounded in the *Novy Krai*, hitherto consistent in its efforts to inspirit the garrison, just before the capture of Er-lung-shan. The numbers for December 24th and 25th are full of lurid pen-pictures of the condition to which the town had been reduced, more particularly since the capture of 203 Metre Hill and the destruction of the Fleet. Speaking of the rain of 800-lb. shells, the *Novy Krai* asks: "Who but Providence can save us from these thunderbolts?" and adds with desperate pessimism, "We do not expect the Baltic Fleet. We do not look for relief, but we can fight to the death. What Port Arthur goes through it is impossible to describe, but Russia will know what her sons have suffered, and yet it is past the power of human genius to paint or to describe Port Arthur's sufferings as they really are."



CHAPTER LXXVII.

THE SECOND PACIFIC SQUADRON—AN INSTRUCTIVE VOYAGE—THE THREE DIVISIONS—
SHAMFUL BEHAVIOUR IN CRETE—PASSAGE OF THE SUEZ CANAL—OFF MADAGASCAR
—JAPANESE PREPARATIONS—THE KILDO INCIDENT—A THIRD SQUADRON—NEW
RUSSIAN NAVY.


IT is expedient now to take up the story of the progress of the Baltic Fleet, or, to give it its official name, the Second Russian Pacific Squadron, at the point at which we left it in Chapter LXIX. It will be remembered that in the first week of November (pp. 307-8) it became known that the Squadron had left Tangier in two divisions, one proceeding eastwards with the evident intention of making its way through the Suez Canal, the other going south with a view to rounding the Cape of Good Hope. In ordinary circumstances the transmission of reinforcements to the theatre of war is not a process of any particular interest, or even of significance, to others besides the combatant parties. But from this particular voyage depended such remarkable issues, and it was accompanied by so many risks of international import, that it is desirable to record it somewhat fully, more especially as it was, in itself, a naval operation of quite extraordinary magnitude, and one conveying some serious strategical lessons.

With the indignation aroused in this country by the departure of the Squadron from Tangier before, as it seemed, any adequate arrangements had been made for the punishment of those responsible for the North Sea outrage, we are no longer concerned. The whole of that question had passed almost immediately,

as has been narrated in Chapter LXIX., into the region of diplomatic settlement, and henceforth in this narrative a clear distinction will be drawn between the progress of the Second Pacific Squadron and the course of what came to be known as the North Sea Inquiry. But it is only fair to Russia to point out that the deplorable Dogger Bank episode went a long way towards obscuring the credit due to the Russian naval authorities for what was, after all, if only by virtue of its amazing audacity, a very remarkable performance.

Even a first-class Naval Power might well have hesitated to send a numerous and extremely valuable fleet on such a voyage with such certain difficulties ahead in the way of coaling, and the fact that Russia did not only despatch the Second Pacific Squadron, but got it as far even as Madagascar, must be accounted no mean feat.

Reflections on the elasticity of the neutrality laws which made the achievement possible are, of course, permissible. But the hard fact that a Power without any coaling stations *en route*, many of whose ships can only carry a very limited supply of fuel, was able to send a powerful squadron all these thousands of miles, is a lesson which other Powers with widely scattered colonies cannot afford to disregard.



AN INTERNATIONAL SCENE AT TANGIER DURING THE RUSSIAN FLEET'S STAY AT THE MOROCCAN PORT.

To the left is the Russian cruiser "Aurora." To the right is the French cruiser "Kleber" (with four funnels), whilst in the foreground is the galley of H.M.S. "Diana" bringing the captain on board the "Briser" in order to confer with Lord Charles Beresford, who had gone from Gibraltar in the latter vessel.

Thus early, then, may attention be drawn to the circumstance that, while at first no ridicule seemed too keen, no criticism too harsh for the Second Russian Pacific Squadron, as time wore on the mere fact of its continued existence as a "fleet in being" extorted some respect from those who understood the true possibilities of the situation. There was one great nation of keen naval critics to whom the performance especially appealed, since it had for them a piquant retrospective suggestiveness. Had the Spanish-American War taken place after Russia had sent her Second Pacific Squadron to the Far East, trusting to colliers to take the place of coaling-stations, there is very little doubt that the United States Navy would have profited by the example, and perhaps have attempted some curious alterations in the

political geography of Europe by actually despatching a squadron to the coasts of Spain.

Apart from these considerations, the voyage of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Fleet was marked by a very curious feature. It is not often that an intended reinforcement becomes the main force itself. Yet this, as we have already seen, was what was soon to happen to the Second Pacific Squadron. Originally designed for the relief of Port Arthur, it was not only to lose the chance of making that harbourage, but the Fleet which it should have reinforced had ceased to be before much more than half the distance from Libau to the Sea of Japan had been compassed. By the capture of 203 Metre Hill the Japanese not only paved the way to the fall of the fortress, but they practically converted the Second

Pacific Squadron into the First and transition the dramatic completeness of which must rank as one of the curiosities of naval history.

Let us now turn to the actual journeying of the Russian ships after their departure from Tangier. The first division that which went south remained under command of Admiral Rozhdestvensky and consisted of the battleships *Anna Suaroff* (flagship) *Alexander III*, *Orel*, *Borodino* and *Ossliabya* the cruisers *Dmitri Donskoi* *Admiral Nakimoff* and *Aurora* various transports a water tank condensing steamer a hospital ship (also called *Orel*) a scout tug and an interesting addition in the shape of a French restaurant steamer named *Esperance*.

Working its way cautiously down the west coast of Africa this rather varied squadron eventually after giving the Cape a pretty wide berth turned up at St. Mary's Island on the east coast of Madagascar above Tamatave at the end of December.

During this seven weeks voyage the Russian warships were coaled from colliers often in very trying circumstances. Several of the colliers were reported to have been badly knocked about during the operations alongside and all or nearly all received some damage. In some cases it was found impracticable to bring the colliers alongside at all and the latter had to lay off and work into

the fleet's boats which transferred the coals to the ships a truly troublesome and tedious process.

It is not unlikely that in a fleet so constituted as Admiral Rozhdestvensky's some rather untoward incidents occurred during the voyage down the coast of Africa. It is a well known fact that Russian naval officers are not guided by such strict disciplinary rules as those sailing under most other flags and that the consumption of strong waters on Russian warships is as a rule on a very extensive scale. For the truth of one episode reported in the *Echo de Paris* it is impossible to vouch but the dissemination of such a yarn in an allied country was not without significance. The story

was to the effect that three officers of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron offended so seriously in the matter of drunkenness that they were reported to the Admiral himself who after investigating the circumstances is said to have devised a very Draconian punishment. The three officers were merely placed in a small boat with money and food—marooned, in fact—and told to get home as best they could.

by sail or oars whichever they preferred.

Meanwhile the second division of the Squadron under command of Admiral Fokersahm had steamed eastwards. This division consisted of the battleships *Sissoi Veliki* and *Varyagin* the cruisers



REAR ADMIRAL FOKERSAHM

Svetlana and *Almaz*, seven destroyers, and several transports.

On November 7th a supplementary division of the Baltic Fleet left Libau, and, cautiously avoiding the Dogger Bank, proceeded to follow leisurely in the wake of Admiral Fölkersahm's ships. This division consisted of two armoured cruisers, the *Oleg* and *Izumrud*, three auxiliary cruisers, the *Rion*, *Dnieper*, and *Terck*, and a torpedo-flotilla, the whole under the command of Admiral Botrovsky. It is interesting to note that two of the auxiliary cruisers, the *Rion* and the *Dnieper*, were simply our old friends the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, of Red Sea renown, under new names! The voyage of this supplementary division was unattended by any remarkable incident beyond the breaking down of one of the destroyers, which, however, was successfully repaired at Brest, the French Government having decided that this proceeding would involve no breach of the laws of neutrality.

This decision, a somewhat important one, was based on the fact that the damage to the vessel was of a nature to involve the safety of the crew and the proper navigation of the ship. It is not surprising that the incident aroused some indignant criticism at Tokio, but the matter did not become one of diplomatic gravity. France could claim that in this and other cases she acted according to the rules she formulated during the Spanish-American War, and there was a general feeling that, making some allowance for her natural sympathy with her allies, she was acting throughout as befitted a high-minded and chivalrous nation, not fussily scrupulous as to the letter of the law, but frankly observant of it in spirit.

Somewhat sensational was the early

progress of the second division of the Baltic Fleet under Admiral Fölkersahm. Arriving at Canca, the capital of Crete, some of the officers and men of the squadron went ashore, and behaved in the most disgraceful fashion. In a case of this kind suspicion of partiality is best avoided by quotation of chapter and verse. Telegraphing on November 22nd, Reuter's correspondent said: "There were constant scenes of drunkenness, in which, unfortunately, several officers took part, and frequent brawls occurred every day. One Russian seaman was killed by his comrades, and several others were severely wounded.

"Some drunken seamen stripped their clothes off in the principal square of Canca.

"The wife of the manager of a foreign agency was insulted on the public promenade, and her husband, who tried to protect her, was subjected to ill-usage.

"The authority of the officers was utterly disregarded, no sort of discipline being observed. Many shops windows were broken.

"The population of Canca and its environs have lost all respect for the Russian sailors, who, it is considered, are completely demoralised. Many seamen have been left behind, having either lost their way or deserted."

Against this must be set Admiral Fölkersahm's subsequent assertion that the trouble was only trifling, that no one was killed or wounded, and no desertions took place. Russian official contradictions, however, have always been regarded as open to question, and the testimony of Reuter's correspondent is so plain and circumstantial that it is likely to be accepted as the permanent record of a very shameful episode.

The passage of the Suez Canal was

effected without mishap, but with an accompanying of precautions which were simply ludicrous, and recalled in striking fashion the nervous apprehensions of Rozhdestvensky in regard to the Dogger Bank fishing fleet. The squadron was preceded by three yachts said to have been chartered for the purpose of exploring certain reefs in the Gulf of Suez in advance of the warships. Early in the morning of November 25th seven destroyers acting as scouts steamed at eight knots through the first section of the Canal. The battleships and cruisers followed with the men at gun stations, and Admiral Folkersham and his officers anxiously scanning the banks. Wireless telegraphic communication was maintained between the various vessels, and when, towards evening, Ismail was reached, the risks of a night attack from the desert were considered so great that the plan of allowing the battleships and cruisers to proceed with the assistance of their searchlights was abandoned, and the squadron accordingly dropped anchor in the Bitter Lakes. Although assured by the officials that no other vessels were in the Canal Admiral Folkersham sent out launches on patrol duty, and during the night the searchlights of the battleships and cruisers swept the Lakes.

Meanwhile, quite a large international fleet of liners and merchant ships was assembling at Suez owing to the delay caused by the passage of the Russian vessels through the Canal. "Irish shippers" wrote an *Express* correspondent, "stemming in from the Red Sea and learning that they must wait until the squadron had passed out of the Canal commented upon the fears of the Russians in a variety of languages."

"Police and coastguard launches, manned by painfully zealous Egyptian

officials, patrolled the harbour, and, when the seven Russian destroyers arrived this afternoon, escorted them to an anchorage. The crews were still at gun stations.

"Two destroyers made an hour's reconnaissance tour of the harbour. All merchant ships were carefully scrutinised."

Of all the many and varied passages in the history of the Suez Canal this must surely be accounted as one of the most interesting, and that, too, for reasons some of which do not lie upon the surface. The precautions taken by the Russians were, of course, preposterous in the circumstances, since, even had Japan been disposed to attack the Russians at this point, and could have made secretly the necessary elaborate and extremely difficult preparations, she would hardly have dreamt of provoking the ill will of Great Britain, France, and Germany by interfering in such a warlike fashion with an international fairway. The fact seems to be that Russia here, as in many other instances, gauged the possible conduct of her adversary by the measure of methods which she herself would not scruple to adopt, and subsequently, if necessary, repudiate as quite foreign to her open and bland disposition.


It is generally understood that at a certain critical juncture in European politics a Russian tramp steamer was sent through the Suez Canal under orders to spring a sudden leak, if a certain signal were observed, the idea, of course, being that she would settle down in a very narrow part of the 'Ditch, and that the navigation would thus be effectually impeded for some days. A nation capable of a device of this sort would be naturally fearful when using the same canal for the passage of a naval reinforcement, and,

after what occurred in the North Sea, it is not, perhaps, surprising that excusable apprehensions were fantastically magnified into visions of stealthy attacks by Japanese disguised as Bedouins, or skirmishing round the Bitter Lakes in submarines.

That there were Japanese agents at Port Said and Suez goes without saying. No combatant nation would lose such a

a rather contemptuous smile, especially when Russian naval negligence at Port Arthur is recalled.

At Suez the Russian squadron came into friendly contact with two British cruisers, the *Hermione* and *Fox*, with which visits were exchanged. It was reported that the two British vessels had been detailed to keep an eye on Admiral Fölkersahm's division until they were



THE RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP *KNIAZ SUVAROFF*: ADMIRAL ROZHDESTVENSKY'S FLAG-SHIP.

chance of watching the movements and "sizing up" the strength of an appreciable portion of the enemy's naval forces, and we may take it for granted that long and interesting reports of the condition of the ships and crews were at once cabled to Tokio. But the bare suggestion that any attack was contemplated may be scouted as absurd, and it will probably be many years before the story of Admiral Fölkersahm's impressively cautious navigation of a naval highway which was really not more dangerous to his ships than the mouth of the Neva fails to raise

clear of the Red Sea, and this, coupled with similar suggestions with reference to Admiral Rozhdestvensky's ships, led to the angry assumption that the British Navy was "shadowing" the Russian reinforcements. The idea was repudiated, and, indeed, with the facilities which this country possesses for watching and recording the movements of any ship or ships over about three-quarters of the ocean surface of the globe, any deliberate "shadowing" of a fleet belonging to a country with which we were not at, or on the point of, war, would be unnecessary

as well as objectionable. But it could hardly have astonished the Russians if, after what had occurred, more especially with regard to the seizure and sinking of British vessels, our Admiralty had not made some provision for subjecting to occasional scrutiny the passage of these divisions through waters in which we

of a good deal of international intrigue. Conflicting accounts were forthcoming as to the methods adopted in obtaining coal and supplies, but it seems probable that here as elsewhere the laws of neutrality as regards coaling were successfully circumvented by sending in the "neutral" colliers to obtain coal which was after-



RUSSIAN BLUEJACKETS DRINKING THE ADMIRAL'S HEALTH ON BOARD SHIP

have enormous commercial and political interests.

Having made their way down the Red Sea and through the "Gate of Tears," the squadron commanded by Admiral Fölkersahm, and, later, the supplementary division under Admiral Batrovosky, made a brief sojourn at the French port of Jibutii in Tajurra Bay, that great inlet of the sea which in times past, like most of the Somali coast and the African littoral of the Red Sea, has been the scene

wards transferred to the Russian war-ships at sea.

It is not necessary to go further into the details of the journeying of the Russian ships prior to the junction of Admiral Fölkersahm's division with the main squadron under Admiral Rozhdestvensky off the coast of Madagascar. It is sufficient to say that early in the new year Admiral Fölkersahm's division was at anchor in the Bay of Passandava, while Admiral Rozhdestvensky's ships,

in order to avoid the bad weather in the Mozambique Channel, had doubled Cape St. Mary, and proceeded to Antongil Bay. Both divisions had sent several vessels to Nossi Bé, Majunga, and Tamatave, where they had made large purchases of stores, particularly of champagne, which has hitherto been an apparently indispensable adjunct to all Russian naval movements. At that time the supplementary division was about to enter the Suez Canal. A fortnight previously Admiral Rozhdestvensky had received at one of the Madagascar ports telegraphic communication of his appointment as Commander-in-chief of the entire reinforcing Fleet. This was doubtless accompanied by tidings of the destruction of the Russian ships at Port Arthur, tidings which, in due course, would be followed by an announcement of the final capture of the fortress.

It was officially stated that Rozhdestvensky was prepared for these events, and that no change in his plans would be rendered necessary by them. But it must have been a serious blow to the whole Fleet to learn that the last ray of hope had vanished, and that Vladivostok was now the only harbour in the Far East which could possibly be reached by naval reinforcements. Grave indeed was the prospect thus opened out. Assuming that the concentration were effectually and completely carried out, Admiral Rozhdestvensky would have at his disposal seven battleships, eight or ten cruisers, some of them merely converted liners, and sufficient torpedo-craft to make, perhaps, three flotillas. On paper this seems a most formidable force, but, as we have seen, it was by no means a homogeneous one, either as regards speed or armament, and it was entirely dependent for coal upon colliers which

might themselves become a serious encumbrance, if they did not fall an easy prey to a smart enemy.

Of course, as long as this was purely a reinforcing Fleet, and the best part of the Japanese Navy was tied to Port Arthur, Admiral Rozhdestvensky and his officers were buoyed up with all sorts of brilliant possibilities, including an off-chance of knocking loudly at the door of Tokio itself. But with the whole battle Fleet of Japan let loose, the utmost that could be looked for was a terrific combat with Togo's ships, which had already given such deadly proof of their fighting efficiency, and which would soon be emerging fresh and splendidly ready for action from the well-equipped dockyards of Japan.

Even in point of tonnage, number of guns, and crews the Russian Fleet was now in a condition of serious inferiority. Indeed, according to a Russian calculation the tonnage of the Baltic Fleet was only 95,000 against the 216,000 tons representing the Japanese Navy, while of heavy guns the Russians had only 36 against the 63 mounted by the Japanese ships. The Russian crews, again, only numbered 8,500, as compared with the 14,400 carried in the Japanese Fleet. Of course, such comparisons are by no means conclusive—far from it. But in their way they are instructive, more especially as at the outset Russia relied largely on such figures.

We may take it, then, that Admiral Rozhdestvensky spent some very bad quarters of an hour off the coast of Madagascar during January. It was continually reported at the time that he was being recalled, but whether these reports were false, or whether, as is suggested, the Admiral simply refused to retrace his steps, the Russian Fleet continued in this

neighbourhood, somewhat to the dissatisfaction of the French, who were beginning to fear that a very delicate situation might arise. Here, for the present, we will leave the "Second Pacific Squadron" to its sombre reflections and its stores of champagne, and turn first to the preparations which Japan had been making to receive the newcomers, and next to Russia's further efforts to regain her former boasted naval superiority in the Far East.

As a matter of course the Japanese took time by the forelock in the matter of their arrangements for giving Admiral Rozhdestvensky a warm welcome. As far back as November 14th the Emperor presided over a long conference of the Military and Naval General Staffs at the Palace, the proceedings of which were secret, but were clearly understood to be connected with the approaching advent in Eastern, if not Far Eastern, waters of the Baltic Fleet. Doubtless in consequence of this great council meeting the attacks on Metre Range were renewed with fresh vigour, with the result already chronicled that, before another six weeks had elapsed, the naval authorities were free to deal on broad and vigorous lines with the new situation. It is characteristic of Japanese methods that the problem was not regarded as affecting the Fleet alone. The long-headed advisers of the Mikado even anticipated the rather remote possibility that the new Russian squadron would make a descent on Nanchang with a view to cutting the Japanese communications with the Liao-tung Peninsula. So carefully was even this contingency forestalled, that arrangements were made by which the Japanese armies in Manchuria could hope to carry on the campaign, if necessary for months, without communications from home.

As usual, the exact nature of the Japanese naval preparations was shrouded in the strictest secrecy, and for some little time the only indication that any movements at all were taking place was the receipt of telegrams from Manila, Singapore, and Penang, stating that cruisers had been sighted or had made a hurried call. It soon became evident that these were merely scouting ships to which had probably been entrusted the further task of establishing a network of naval intelligence over the whole of the Malay Archipelago. There was early talk of a squadron of powerful cruisers which was reported from Shanghai to have gone south retently to meet Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Fleet, and on January 25th the Navy Department at Tokio formally announced the formation of a Special Service squadron, no details being given. It was not, of course, in the least likely that the Japanese would adventure their cruisers against the Russian battleships, but it is very possible that a considerable detachment was despatched very shortly after the capture of 203 Metre Hill in the hope of picking up a Russian straggler or two, and still more, with a view to cutting off some of the attendant colliers.

Returning to Russia, it now becomes necessary to place on record an incident arising out of the despatch of the Baltic Fleet, which, while unconnected with the actual progress of the war, has a distinct bearing upon it, since it materially influenced public opinion as to the naval situation. It may be remembered that on page 307 of the present volume mention was made of a Captain Klado or Khodo who had been left behind at Vigo with three other officers to bear testimony at the forthcoming inquiry concerning the North Sea outrage. Captain Klado was said to be the bearer to St. Petersburg

of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's official report, but no one imagined for an instant that in the course of the ensuing few weeks this officer would spring into quite extraordinary prominence and popularity by reason of his own plainness of speech with reference to the naval situation generally.

Arrived at St. Petersburg, Captain Klado set himself at once to agitate for the speedy despatch of a Third Squadron to reinforce Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Fleet. He had evidently formed strong and accurate opinions as to the importance of the part to be played by the Russian Navy in deciding the question of Russia's position in the Far East. "However great our Army may be," he said in a lecture on December 6th at the residence of Admiral Birileff, Commander-in-chief at Kronstadt, "however rich our resources, it is impossible to expect a definite victory, even if Port Arthur does not fall, if our Fleet does not gain the upper hand in the Pacific. If the Japanese capture Port Arthur, the rôle of our Fleet will become still more important."

There was nothing to which exception could reasonably be taken in this frank, but by no means original, statement of one of the elementary principles of the Command of the Sea theory. The question of despatching a Third Squadron had already been anxiously considered by the naval authorities, and it is said that on the day following the delivery of Captain Klado's lecture at Admiral Birileff's house an authoritative decision on the subject was arrived at.

But Captain Klado, unfortunately from some standpoints, did not confine himself to the enunciation of sound naval doctrine in an atmosphere of official encouragement. For some time past he had been

contributing to the *Novoe Vremya* a series of articles on the naval situation, and in these he now began to reveal the weakness of the Second Pacific Squadron, and to formulate serious charges against the Ministry of Marine. The Ministry retaliated by an Order of the Day, accusing Captain Klado of having consciously misrepresented the facts and garbled the truth, and condemning him to fifteen days' arrest. From his seclusion the high-spirited Captain sent a letter to the papers warmly repudiating as a deliberate falsehood the charge brought against him of having distorted facts which he had obtained from a trustworthy source. He declared that the accusation was a stain not only upon his position, but also on his personal honour. Such charges, he added, should only be made by legal process, and, accordingly, he asked to be brought before a Court-Martial.

To this last request no reply was forthcoming, and as if by magic Captain Klado leapt into a popularity comparable with that of "le brav' Général" in the very palmiest days of Boulangism. Over 500 people called to see him at the house where he was undergoing detention, all of them being refused admittance, and letters and telegrams from all parts of Russia poured in upon him in shoals. As an "exalted personage" remarked to a French correspondent in St. Petersburg, the incident was beginning to occasion great anxiety in Government circles. "Klado is becoming the head of a party of malcontents, and Heaven knows that there are many of them. His punishment has made a martyr of him."

But the sudden popularity of Captain Klado was not the only difficulty. The Ministry of Marine, by its Order of the Day accusing the outspoken officer of deliberate falsehood, had placed the whole

Russian Government in a most awkward position. Captain Klado was not only the idol of the hour in St. Petersburg; he was also the chief Russian witness in the forthcoming inquiry into the North Sea incident. To brand him officially as a liar was to invite the obvious suggestion that his testimony before the Commission was worthless. The dilem-

Grand Admiral of the Navy, directing his release. This order being understood to have its origin in the Tsar himself, was held to have cancelled the previous Order of the Day entirely, and was thus supposed to clear Captain Klado, without the awkward formality of a Court-Martial, from the charges levelled against him. The gallant Captain on his release



ADMIRAL BIRILEFF.

ma thus created was unmistakable, and in Paris especially the position was discussed with much freedom, and, perhaps, some humorous appreciation of its perplexity.

The Russian Government were not long in grappling with the difficulty. Captain Klado had not undergone half of his prescribed punishment when another Order was issued by the Grand Duke Alexis,

attended a meeting at the City Hall, where a tremendous reception awaited him, and his subsequent appearance at the Naval and Military Club was the signal for a burst of cheering. A subscription was at once set on foot for the foundation of a Klado scholarship at the Naval College, and contributions came flowing in from many towns, notably Moscow and Nijni Novgorod. But by this time the Inter-

national Commission of Inquiry into the North Sea incident was getting to work, and accordingly on December 17th Captain Klado was packed off to Paris by the Russian Government, who were doubtless heartily glad to be rid for a time of his inconvenient presence.

The Klado incident may be variously regarded, and there will not be wanting those inclined to qualify the Captain's passionate assertion of his unblemished accuracy by references to his evidence concerning the presence of torpedo-boats among the North Sea fishing smacks. But the real significance of the affair had not a great deal to do with Captain Klado personally. It lay chiefly in the clear indication thus provided of a growing anxiety on the part of the Russian public to know what there was to know about the situation, to the exclusion of Grand Ducal and other bureaucratic efforts at concealment and misrepresentation. The vigorous encouragement given to Captain Klado was a healthy sign of better times in Russia, and the fact that the Government found itself unable to disregard the incident was one which may some day receive historical recognition.

As will be seen, the world was yet to hear more of Captain Klado's views on the naval situation generally, but in the meantime it was evident that his vigorous demand for the despatch of a Third Squadron had galvanised the Russian Admiralty into a spasm of real activity. He had himself suggested that an immediate reinforcement of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Fleet should be made with certain ships which he declared were ready at Libau to take the sea at any moment.

These were the *General Admiral Apraksin*, of 4,200 tons, 15 knots, built in 1896; the *Admiral Seniavine*, 4,126 tons, 16 knots, built in 1894; the *Admiral*

Oushakoff, 4,126 tons, 16 knots, built in 1893; the *Vladimir Monomach*, 6,061 tons, 15·2 knots, built in 1882; and the *Khrabry*, a sea-going gunboat, 1,735 tons, 14 knots, built in 1895. Captain Klado had specially recommended the last-named vessel on account of her up-to-date armament. As he afterwards explained at Paris to a representative of the *Times*, he considered that a great mistake had been originally made, largely owing to the weakness of Admiral Rozhdestvensky in not demanding the despatch of the entire naval forces of Russia to the seat of war. But the initial blunder having been made, Russia must repair it as best she could. Clearly his idea was that no time should be lost in sending out the ships actually available at once, his hope being that even such a *petit paquet*—to use his own expression—as the above would give Admiral Rozhdestvensky the needful superiority.

While accepting in principle the necessity for sending out a Third Squadron forthwith the Russian Ministry of Marine preferred to attach at least one battleship to the cruisers and gunboat mentioned by Captain Klado, and accordingly orders were given to push on the preparation for sea of the *Imperator Nikolai I.*, a turret ship of 9,700 tons launched in 1889, and now incapable, it was said, of maintaining under service conditions a greater speed than 13 knots. There was a new battleship approaching completion, the *Slava*, which might have been made available, but unfortunately it had been heavily drawn upon to supply deficiencies in its sister ships, the *Alexander III.*, *Borodino*, *Kniaz Suvaroff*, and *Orel*, which had gone forward with the Second Squadron. Thus, when the *Orel's* engines and machinery were found in the summer of 1904 to be faulty, duplicate

parts in their place were taken from the *Slaas* as she stood a system of robbing Peter to pay Paul which is eminently characteristic of the Russian naval system.

Simultaneously with Captain Khodo's departure for Paris Admiral Birleff, Commander-in-chief at Kronstadt, left St. Petersburg for Labau to superintend the formation and despatch of the Third Squadron. Before he went he addressed to the *Novoe Vremya* a letter inviting that journal to cease its polemics in connection with the despatch of naval reinforcements now that the step in question had been decided upon and the work of getting ready the ships had actually commenced. Such agitation was to be deprecated as was any attempt to dictate to Admiral Rozhdestvensky what line of action he should take.

Admiral Birleff further made a strong effort to allay public anxiety respecting the Second Pacific Squadron upon the weakness of which Captain Khodo had expatriated so forcibly. It was he contended an enormous force well constituted and equal in strength to the Japanese Fleet which it had every chance of crushing in a fleet action. The intelligent, firm, brave, and persevering commander of this squadron will shelter himself behind his instructions but will seek and destroy the enemy. He will not look for a co-efficient of the opposing forces but will adopt the Russian maxim that strength does not lie in material force but in brave resolve and love for the Fatherland.

It is typical of the mental crisis through which Russia in public opinion was passing, that the expressions which as Thucydides would have called them, were not allowed to pass unchallenged. Captain Khodo who only three weeks before had

been lecturing at Admiral Birleff's house, wrote from Paris accusing the Commander-in-chief at Kronstadt of endeavouring to console the Russian people by painting the state of the Second Pacific Squadron in rose colours as though he were soothing a petulant child. He would have been better advised and the uncompromising Khodo to use the language of figures and not shrinking from the logic of facts frankly to admit the superiority of the Japanese Fleet over Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Fleet in ships and men.

As it can no longer rely on the Port Arthur and Vladivostok squadrons, Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Fleet adds Captain Khodo has not all the chances of success that we might desire. Admiral Birleff should have contented himself with exhorting the people to act promptly and energetically with a view to hastening the despatch of the Third Squadron, delay in which would be criminal and should not have undertaken to hoodwink the Russian public.

A little later, in interviews with Parisian journalists and in further communication to the *Novoe Vremya*, Captain Khodo continued to illuminate the naval situation from the Russian standpoint with characteristic frankness. His remarks are so valuable for what they admit as well as for what they reveal that they may be freely quoted from the paragraphs given in the *Times*. Thus in conversation with an interviewer from the *Matin*, he unhesitatingly dismissed Admiral Birleff's contention that the Japanese Fleet must now be suffering from exhaustion and from deterioration of its guns and machinery. The Japanese Fleet was he said in excellent condition. New guns had been substituted for those too long in use. 'It is all o

said that the Japanese have no more cast shells, that their powder is inferior, and a number of other absurdities are uttered. The Japanese have an abundant supply of all they require. . . I have the best information, and I know that the fighting value of the Japanese is about equal to what it was at the beginning of the war."


Writing, in the middle of January, to the *Novoe Vremya*, Captain Klado combated the rumours that Admiral Rozhdestvensky would return or would delay his voyage until he could be joined by the Third Pacific Squadron. Neither of these alternatives was practicable, and Captain Klado's explanation is a luminous proof of the fact that he was under no illusions as to the French view of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's stay off Madagascar, nor was, by any means, attempting to frighten his compatriots into clamouring for peace.

"To wait at Madagascar is impossible. The French have already done everything that they could do without transgressing the limits of benevolent neutrality." A return "would involve the necessity of organising afresh the vast and complicated scheme of coal supply during a second voyage round Africa, and the abandonment of the arrangements already made for the voyage across the Indian Ocean. It appears to me that the return of the Fleet would be equivalent to the conclusion of the war, and in present circumstances that is unthinkable. No, the die is cast, and we must drain our cup to the dregs. We must help the Second Pacific Squadron by every means at our disposal; we must display all the energy of which we are capable in order to compensate for the weakness which was not prevented at its departure—but there can be no going back. I repeat—

that would mean the end of the war. It cannot be denied that a fleet divided is weaker than a fleet united, but half a fleet is much weaker when alone than when there is another half behind it, even at a great distance. We have only ourselves to thank for the position in which we are placed, and there is no way out of it; we must take the consequences of our mistakes. We should have been glad, indeed, to have the assurance of success, but we have no more than a hope. . . All we can do, therefore, is to foresee the possibility of failure now, and at once to make energetic preparations for counteracting its consequences."

The nature of those preparations Captain Klado discussed in a subsequent article, the main point of which was that particular attention should be paid to Vladivostok even at the risk of subordinating to its claims those of the army. This suggestion fits in well with the estimate given of the situation as regards Vladivostok in Chapter LXXIII. But it is of further interest and significance as a final illustration of Russian inferiority, in comparison with Japanese methods, where co-ordination of naval and military action is concerned. It is a seriously instructive fact that at this stage of the war a Russian naval officer should be pleading for a clearer recognition of the essential requirements of the Fleet, while the Japanese naval and military plans of campaign were continuing to work in the most perfect harmony, and without the slightest indication of any desire on the part of either fighting service that the other should temporarily forego its claims to paramount consideration.

Reverting to the preparations for the despatch of the Third Squadron, these were, from the first, hampered by almost hopeless deficiencies in the supply of



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OUTSIDE PORT ARTHUR. MITHI PANGI FROM HOOFAN HILL.

223 Mithi Hill is the double peaked craggy seen in
the right middle distance and wooded on the left
back by a white tent. The red craggy - of the
upper is far better known
the Japanese fire. The
distances led on the 10

engine-room artificers. This difficulty had already been severely felt in connection with the Second Squadron, for which heavy drafts had been made on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet. The Russian Admiralty was now getting down to the bed-rock in this matter, and into the ships of the Third Squadron were drafted heterogeneous batches of engineer cadets, engineer reservists, who for many years had not sailed the sea at all in charge of a marine engine, and reserve artificers, while an urgent call for artificers was made on various private Russian shipping companies. Nor does the supply of seamen appear to have been much more abundant. A correspondent writing to the *Times* at the end of January stated that a batch of 200 reservists had been called up from Archangel, and that this batch exhausted the seasoned reservists from the northern and Baltic area. Further requirements would have to be filled by raw conscripts. Here again was a most unfavourable contrast with the state of affairs in Japan, which had an immense reserve of fisherfolk and other men inured to the sea to draw upon for the supply of deficiencies in her fighting ships.

It is rather characteristically impressive of Russia that, surrounded by these serious disabilities, she should have not only pushed ahead with the work of getting ready a Third Squadron, and talked confidently of despatching a Fourth in April, but that her thoughts should turn to the construction of an entirely new and powerful navy. A building programme had been in contemplation at the commencement of the war, and in March, 1904, it had been practically agreed that two battleships should be laid down, and the contingency of having to lay down four was discussed.

In July and August the naval commission engaged on the subject recognised that at least four, and possibly five or six, new battleships would have to be started at once, but the Navy Department continued to procrastinate, the officials being "unable to shake off entirely their optimism in regard to the outcome of the situation at Port Arthur." In December, after the capture of Metre Range and the destruction of the ships in Port Arthur harbour, it was proposed to lay down a minimum of eight first-class battleships, and a minimum of five first-class armoured cruisers. But not until the last day of the year was Reuter's correspondent at St. Petersburg able to announce that the Tsar had sanctioned the expenditure of £160,000,000 for rebuilding the Russian Navy, the programme of construction occupying ten years. According to Reuter, the ships which it had already been decided to build, and the delivery of which had been provided for in three years, were sixteen first-class battleships; six cruisers of the *Bayan* type, six improved *Noviks*, and six *Bogatyr*s; 50 destroyers of 500 tons, 100 destroyers and torpedo-boats of 150, 240, and 350 tons; 10 mine-layers of the type of the ill-fated *Yenisei*; and 4 floating workshops.


The financial obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of so vast a project might be thought to be insuperable. But it soon became evident that no serious difficulty need be anticipated on this head, since foreign dockyards were ready to commence the proposed construction immediately if Russia would consent to pay interest on outstanding amounts due. Not even a foreign loan would thus be rendered necessary. A useful lesson this on the difficulty of wearing out the financial resources of a really great Power. But there still remained the question of

personnel as to which even the highest Russian naval authorities began to express some doubts. One of them in discussing the question let out the interesting fact that in Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron an officer of the Grndno Hussars had to be employed! With which "side-light" we may fitly conclude a re-

view of the naval situation at a stage which, though only intermediate, is of the greatest interest and importance in relation not only to the prosecution of the war, but also to Russia's place among the armed strengths of Europe, and to the balance of naval power throughout the whole world.



Photo G. Burger, St. Petersburg
CAPTAIN ALADO



"THE GRIM ESCARPMENT OF PILUSAN."

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

MORE FIGHTING ROUND PORT ARTHUR—THE BEGINNING OF THE END—NEGOTIATIONS FOR CAPITULATION—HISTORIC MEETING OF DELEGATES—TERMS OF SURRENDER—THE FORTRESS FALLS—PRISONERS AND SPOILS—NOGI AND STOESSEL—DEPARTURE OF THE RUSSIANS—VICTORS AND VANQUISHED—STRIKING CONTRAST—REJOICINGS AT TOKIO.

THE New Year opened with a brisk renewal of the operations against the remaining great forts. For reasons which will immediately be apparent, there is no need to enter closely into the details of these attacks, but it may be recorded that in the course of January 1st the Japanese left and centre operated vigorously against Wang-tai—not the fort of that name in the I-tzu-shan group, but another to the east of Sung-shu-shan—and, skilfully taking advantage of the accompanying bombardment, pushed home their charge, and captured the fort and four guns between three and four in

the afternoon. Meanwhile sharp fighting in the direction of Pigeon Bay had resulted in the steady progress of the Japanese right.

On January 1st, too, a proclamation was issued over the signature of Admiral Togo diminishing the extent of the Port Arthur blockade. The new blockade line was to begin at the south head of Talien-wan, and run in a north-westerly direction, clearing Dalny to the south head of South Bay. It had evidently been intended to open Dalny gradually to foreign shipping, but the naval as well as military situation was on the point of



being altered in such a way as to put all these plans and precautions on a very different footing.

Our story of the actual fighting round Port Arthur may be concluded with a brief reference to a number of explosions which took place in the forts on January 2nd from shortly after midnight until a little past noon. It was afterwards found that the Russians were now beginning to blow up their magazines prior to further evacuations, a wholesale destruction by dynamite also taking place among the ships in the harbour. To the appropriate accompaniment of the gloomy reverberations caused by these explosions, the existence of Port Arthur as a Russian stronghold was hurrying to a close.

On the morning of January 1st a telegram was received at St. Petersburg from General Stoessel in which, according to Reuter's Agency, he gave an account of the loss of Sung-shu-shan, and added :— "The greater part of the eastern front is in the hands of the Japanese. We shall not be able to hold our new positions long, and when they fall we shall have to capitulate.

"But everything is in the hands of God. We have suffered great losses. Two regimental commanders, Gandourine and Semenuoff, are wounded, the hero Gandourine very grievously. The commander of No. 3 Fort, Captain Seredoff, perished in the explosion.

"Great Sovereign! Forgive! We have done all that was humanly possible. Judge us, but be merciful. Eleven months of ceaseless fighting have exhausted our strength. A quarter only of the defenders, and one-half of these invalids, occupy twenty-seven versts of fortifications without support, and without intervals for even the briefest repose. The men are reduced to shadows."

The events of January 1st deepened General Stoessel's despondency and hastened the final step. At 9 p.m. on that date General Nogi received a letter from General Stoessel, which ran as follows :—

"Considering the conditions within the belligerent area the further resistance of Port Arthur is useless. Therefore, in order to avoid needless waste of life, I desire to open negotiations for the evacuation of the fortress. If your Excellency agrees, I beg you to appoint delegates, and to indicate a place whither I also may send delegates to discuss terms and details of evacuation."

According to the *Times* correspondent at Tokio, this letter was dated December 31st, which would indicate that it was written before the above-quoted telegram to the Tsar. The point, however, is immaterial as regards practical results, and is only interesting as an example of the discrepancies which cluster round great historical episodes of which one would have thought the details would be forthcoming with photographic accuracy.

To General Stoessel's missive General Nogi replied :—"I have the honour to express assent to your Excellency's proposal to hold a conference with reference to the terms and details of the evacuation of the fortress, for which purpose I have appointed as delegate Major-General Ijichi, Chief of the Staff, to whom are attached certain staff officers and secretaries. They will meet delegates from your army at noon of January 2nd at Shui-shi-ying. The delegates of both sides should be invested with plenipotentiary authority to conclude an agreement for the evacuation of the fortress, which should become operative immediately upon signature without awaiting ratification. These plenipotentiary cred-



HUMANITY TRIUMPHS RUSSIAN RESCUING A WOUNDED JAPANESE OFFICER
UNDER FIRE AT PORT ARTHUR.

entrals, attested by the Commander in-chief of each side, will be exchanged.

Having despatched this reply, General Nogi telegraphed to Tokio what had occurred, and received from Field Marshal Yamagata a prompt acknowledgment, in which the following striking passage occurred —

‘When I reported to the Emperor General Stoessel’s proposal to evacuate the fortress, his Majesty expressed high appreciation of the loyalty and endurance displayed by General Stoessel on behalf of his country, and desired that all the honours of war should be extended to him.’

Of the meeting of the delegates to discuss the conditions of the capitulation a deeply interesting account was furnished by the correspondent of the *Times* with the Japanese Army before Port Arthur. This account, published on March 1st, we shall now proceed to lay under contribution as affording a standard description of a historic episode. Unfortunately, as the correspondent himself complained, the scene was not one which lent itself to picturesque description, and there was nothing in it of such a dramatic nature from the spectator’s standpoint as was afforded for instance by the epoch-making capitulation after Sedan.

The meeting of the delegates took place at the village of Shu-shu-jing, the name of which has so often figured in the preceding narrative. It lies nearly due north of the town of Port Arthur, and the house at which the delegates met was a rude thatched hut in the centre of the village, with a large open space before it forming a sort of village green. Nearer came about one o’clock the Russian *parlementaires*, consisting of Colonel Reiss, Chief of the Staff


to General Stoessel, three other colonels, the captain of the *Retvisan*, Lieutenant Maltshenko, and a midshipman who spoke English. The party was attended by an escort of a non-commissioned officer and eight Cossacks, one of whom carried a long pole with a square of ordinary linen as a flag of truce.

The weather was perfect, the finest day, it was remarked, in the whole course of the siege, and, as a suspension of hostilities had been arranged, the open space in front of the house of peace was soon thronged with eager onlookers. Inside the house the Japanese delegates had been for some time awaiting the arrival of the Russian party. They were General Inchi, Chief of the Staff to General Nogi, Major Yamakura an excellent Russian scholar, Captain Tsunoda, Mr Iwamura clerk in the Foreign Office, Dr Ariga a celebrated international lawyer, and several official interpreters. When the Russian *parlementaires* arrived they immediately passed into the house, leaving the escort outside, and the proceedings began behind the closed doors. Meanwhile on the sunlit open patch in front of the house an interesting scene was being enacted. Mention has already been made of the Cossack bearing the Russian flag of truce. Seated with his comrades on a little bank he was joined by a Japanese cavalry trooper holding a similar pole with a similar square of linen. Everyone took his cue from these two soldiers, and the utmost good nature was written on the child-like faces of the Japanese privates, and on the furrowed countenances of the broad-shouldered, well-set-up Cossacks who showed no sign of hardship or privation as they met the gaze of their adversaries and commented on their appearance, frequently indulging in laughter as some point in

the dress or the bearing of the Mikado's soldiers struck them as comical. The Japanese soldier also apparently found something irresistibly funny in the Cos-sacks, and so the afternoon passed in much good-humoured chaff, from which all trace of animosity was absent. A mile to the south of the meeting-place

valley 200 yards in width separated the combatants. To the west the Russians still remained in full possession of their forts, those which had not been attacked during the siege."

Inside the house the negotiations were being carried on, it is interesting to note, in English, "with occasional asides in



PALLADA.

POBIEDA.

USELESS FOR THE FIGHT: THE SUNKEN POBIEDA AND PALLADA IN HARBOUR OF PORT ARTHUR.

one's eye rested on the late scene of strife, only finished at 2 o'clock that very morning, on Shojusan still smoking; on the grim escarpment of Nilusan, the embodiment of determined defence succumbing to the repeated assaults of soldiers who knew not defeat; on the other hills and forts swarming with black-coated Japanese soldiers; while on the ridges beyond, the Russians came out for the first time from their trenches, and a narrow

Russian." There were some fluent English scholars among the Japanese, but on the Russian side the only capable interpreter was the middy, who is probably the youngest commissioned officer who has ever assisted so importantly at such a tremendous function. The proceeding commenced with the presentation of the Japanese terms, General Ijichi stating that they were absolute, but that he and his colleagues would be glad to consider

materials, Government buildings, objects owned by Government, horses, warships and other ships including their contents excepting private property, shall be left in their present positions, and commissioners of the Russian and Japanese armies shall decide as to the method of their transfer.

"Article 7 The Japanese army, considering the gallant resistance offered by the Russian army honourable, will permit the officers of the Russian army and navy, as well as the officials belonging thereto, to carry their swords, and take with them private property directly necessary for the maintenance of life. The previously mentioned officers, officials, and volunteers, who will sign a written parole pledging their word that they will not take arms, and will in no wise take action contrary to the interests of the Japanese army until the close of the war, will receive the consent of the Japanese army to return to their country. Each military and naval officer will be allowed one servant, such servant to be specially released on signing his parole.

"Article 8 Non-commissioned officers and privates of both the army and navy and of volunteers shall wear their uniforms, and, taking their portable tents and necessary private property, and commanded by their respective officers, shall assemble at such place as may be indicated by the Japanese army. The Japanese Commissioners will indicate the necessary details for this.

"Article 9 The Sanitary Corps and accountants belonging to the Russian army and navy shall be retained by the Japanese while their services are deemed necessary for the purpose of caring for the sick and wounded prisoners. During such time such corps are required to render service under the direction of the

Sanitary Corps and accountants of the Japanese army.

Article 10 The treatment to be accorded in residents, the transfer of books and documents relating to municipal administration and finance, and also the detailed files necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this compact, shall be embodied in a supplementary compact, the supplement to have the same force as this compact.

"Article 11 One copy each of this compact shall be prepared by the Japanese and Russian armies, and shall have immediate effect upon signature.

After the signature of the agreement the delegates immediately fraternised and sat down to dinner together in a very friendly spirit. It was a little unfortunate that the information now volunteered by General Stoessel's Chief of the Staff as to the desperate straits to which the garrison had been reduced should have afterwards been found wildly inaccurate, but doubtless it served some present purpose in enhancing the respect of the Japanese for their late antagonists, and thus promoting the cordiality of a very remarkable gathering.

The celebration of their great triumph which took place among the troops of the investing army, was in itself a curiosity. It lasted two hours, was over before midnight, and the next morning not a trace of the festivities could be seen. But during the two hours in question the enthusiasm is described as intense. Fires were lit on every hill along the crest of the Russian positions, and for miles in the rear of the army these beacons marked the site of some post in the commiserated camp. Round these fires the soldiers congregated and shouted themselves hoarse, singing patriotic songs, uttering 'huzzas' as they cheered leaders

and danced round the flames. If you happened to be an Englishman or an American you would be sure of a great reception, and the soldiers would insist on your joining in their festivities and drinking their *saki*, which that night was freely served out to the troops. To a spectator standing on one of the numerous hills, the country presented an extraordinary spectacle, for it was lit up for over twenty miles with innumerable fires, looking more like some great city half hidden by mist than open plains and hills. The shouts of 'banzai' resounded from every side, for, as one camp uttered the national war cry, it would be taken up all along the line, until it became lost miles to the west, almost in Pigeon Bay."

On the following day—January 3rd—a transference of I-tzu-shan and other forts took place as a guarantee of capitulation, and the Japanese forthwith began to take steps for the maintenance of order in the captured fortress. It was at once discovered that, while there was no urgent scarcity of provisions, there was a total absence of medical necessities. The Japanese speedily set to work to supply this deficiency, and to give all possible succour to the sick and wounded.

In this connection an incident took place which, although it had a somewhat unfortunate ending, deserves to be recorded as an instance of British good-feeling. Acting on his own responsibility, Admiral Sir Gerard Noel, the Commander-in-chief of the British China Squadron, on hearing of the fall of Port Arthur promptly despatched from Wei-hai-wei the cruiser *Andromeda* with supplies, medical appliances, and comforts for the Russian sick and wounded. In the ship were carried two surgeons and nearly the entire staff of the Government

hospital, 80 tons of stores, including 350 beds, and 100,000 lbs. of provisions. By some inadvertence the Tokio authorities were not duly advised of the despatch of the *Andromeda* on this humane mission, and when she arrived at her destination she was refused admittance, and not even allowed to anchor in the neighbourhood, on the ground that she might run risks from mines. This refusal caused some soreness, but was diplomatically explained, and none but pleasant memories need be retained of this striking instance of the impartial generosity of the British Navy, which elicited from the Russians a warm expression of grateful appreciation.

A number of Japanese prisoners were found in Port Arthur, and released by their comrades amid scenes of great enthusiasm. Some of these were soldiers who had been captured during the recent sorties of the garrison, but others had been imprisoned for months, being blue-jackets who had been unable to regain their ships during the early attempts to block the harbour. There was special joy over the recovery of these men, who were believed to have been drowned or killed.

We shall examine presently the condition of the Russian ships in the harbour after the attempts made by the Russians to destroy them, but meanwhile it may be mentioned that General Stoessel's action in blowing up the ships, after offering to surrender, was warmly condemned by the Japanese Press. In Japanese naval circles, on the contrary, the opinion was freely expressed that the action, if not morally justifiable, was quite natural, and would have been taken by Japanese officers in similar circumstances. It may be added, on the authority of a *Daily Mail* correspondent, that, so far

from exhibiting any resentment in consequence of this proceeding, the Japanese, on January 3rd, paid a singularly handsome tribute to the Port Arthur garrison

escaped to Kiao-chau. On January 3rd, says Mr. Norregard, four more destroyers—which by the terms of the capitulation, were now Japanese property—left



THE ANGEL OF THE SIEGE

As a vessel who took a life of the ship, it was of the kind that only did she give to the wounded her own services but she paid for them with her life.

by allowing several of their destroyers to escape. Four of these craft had already got away during the night of January 1st to Chi fu where they were disarmed, and two torpedo-boats had es-

Port Arthur their departure being known and observed by the Japanese fleet. The Japanese Navy would not move against them or attempt to stop them, word having gone from ship to

ship that, in consideration of the bravery the Russians had shown, the boats were to be allowed to escape."

The flag of the Rising Sun now floated over Port Arthur, and the captors were able at their leisure to count their prisoners and reckon up their spoils. To their surprise they found the number of the former far in excess of what even Colonel Reiss, Major-General Stoessel's Chief of the Staff, had led them to expect by his statement after the signature of the capitulation agreement. Excluding some 15,000 wounded, and about 4,000 non-combatants—many of whom were volunteers—no fewer than 878 officers and 23,491 men were afterwards found to be within the fortress. Of these eight were generals, four admirals, while there were 57 colonels and majors, and about 100 naval captains and commanders.

When the list of captures had been completed it was found that 59 permanent forts and other works had surrendered. There were 54 large guns taken, 149 of medium, and 343 of small calibre, with over 80,000 rounds of gun ammunition. Among other spoils were some 35,000 rifles, over 2,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, and nearly 2,000 horses.

Special interest was, of course, attached to the ships found in the harbour, of which the official return was as follows:—Battleships, 4 (excluding the *Sevastopol*, which was entirely sunk); cruisers, 2; gunboats and destroyers, 14; steamers, 10; steam launches, 8; various vessels, 12. All of these were sunk or injured, but there were 35 additional steam launches which could be repaired. In view of the extraordinary significance of any possible addition to the Navy of Japan, the following special account of the condition of the ships, which was published in the *Times*, is deserving of at-

tentive study. According to this valuable authority, the *Sevastopol* was sunk in water 150 feet deep, and there was no hope of raising her.

The *Retvisan* was terribly damaged above and below. Her superstructure was riddled with shell, and her turrets had been blown up. Her deck was visible at low tide.

The *Pobieda* had a heavy list to starboard. Her masts were broken short, and hanging over the side. She was much damaged below and burnt above.

The *Retvisan* and the *Pobieda* had suffered more than any of the other ships, and both appeared unfit for further use.

The *Peresviet* was slightly damaged below. The superstructure and the funnels were much injured, and both fighting tops were gone.

The *Poltava* was the least damaged both above and below.

Both these two vessels could easily be refloated.

The *Pallada* and *Bayan* were apparently not seriously damaged, and could be refloated.

With the exception of the *Retvisan*, the ships were not much damaged by shell fire. Their main armour had hardly been pierced, and their conning towers were intact except where they had been burnt; the howitzer shells had inflicted only slight damage.

Three days before the capitulation the ships had been set on fire with kerosene oil, and mines had been exploded alongside.

To sum up, there was hope that the *Peresviet*, *Poltava*, *Pallada*, and *Bayan* might be saved at great expense, but the difficulties would be very great, as there was no dock for the battleships. The case of the *Retvisan* was considered hopeless, that of the *Pobieda* was doubtful.

As regards armament, the turret guns had all been destroyed by explosion before the surrender. Some of the guns of the secondary armament were intact, and most of the small guns had been removed to the forts.

The Russians stated that the fleet was unfit for further service after the engagement on August 10th. Coal had been abundant, and had been used to protect the decks against howitzer shell. On the capture of Rajushan, the ships were sunk by opening their sluices in order to protect them from the Japanese fire.

The reference to the abundance of coal is quite at variance with the reports of scarcity which reached Chi fu at earlier stages of the siege. It is said that there were 70,000 tons in the dockyard alone, including more than 32,000 tons of Cardiff coal in the large coal sheds. At the same time it is quite possible that at one time the supply ran somewhat short, and that the later sufficiency was due to the persistent blockade runners who would hardly have been encouraged to run such risks if there had all along been ample coal in the dockyard and fortress for both naval and military requirements.

The illusion to the absence of a dock for the repair of the battleships also needs some explanation. It appears that the Russians had ingeniously blocked the great dry dock at Port Arthur before surrendering. They had towed the transport *Amur* inside the dock, where they blew her up. The vessel turned turtle, and sank with her hull lying across the dock. The dock gate was then blown up.

It was found that the stories of scarcity of provisions inside the fortress had been strangely exaggerated. "There was ample food," says a very high authority after close personal investi-

tion, "for three months, even if we assume that the supplies would not be replenished by junks from the mainland." One large building in the Naval Dockyard contained 6,000 tons of flour, and many private stores were full of provisions.

Of the damage to the buildings some interesting details were given by Dr. George Morrison, the famous Peking correspondent of the *Times*, who knows Port Arthur well, and who visited the captured fortress immediately after the surrender. He says: "Practically no buildings in the whole of the New Town are injured, nor has any injury been done to the fine barracks in Torpedo Bay. No buildings from the dockyard eastward in the sea have been damaged. The Japanese, with rare humanity, directed their fire on the docks, workshops, and ships in the harbour, wasting little ammunition on the buildings. It is true that the Old Town between the eastern end of the railway and the engineer's residence and the creek were subjected to a severe bombardment, but, even in the midst of the destruction, Clarkson's offices and other buildings remained habitable. Only two shots struck the Viceroy's house, inflicting trifling damage, while one shell exploded near the church. General Smirnov's and General Stoessel's residences, and many others round about are entirely uninjured. Practically no damage has been inflicted on any of the large buildings. On the road to the ricecourse there was much destruction, especially at the end of the street which leads to the quay, and in which the offices of the *Yok Kai* are. Altogether the number of damaged buildings is so small, especially the number of inhabited buildings, that the success of the Japanese fire could not have been the

reason for surrender. Many buildings are marked with the Red Cross ; but in only one could I find any appreciable damage, the hospital which is in an exposed position above the railway, and in a direct line with the dockyard, being struck by one shell. Stories about the Red Cross buildings being wrecked by Japanese fire are admitted by reputable residents to be pure fabrications spread to excite sympathy."

We need not now pause to examine the rather mixed sentiments which were aroused when it became evident that Port Arthur, at the time of its surrender, was by no means in such straits as regards defenders, provisions, fuel, and shelter as had been imagined. For the present it is sufficient to say that on January 4th the work of taking over the property inside the fortress was energetically continued, and preparations made for clearing the mines as soon as the Russian mine-charts should be handed over.

It was very typical of Japanese forethought that thus early General Nogi should have been enabled to contemplate seriously the repair of the battered fortifications of Port Arthur. It transpired that for months past agents had been at work recruiting an army of Chinese coolies for this purpose. Vast quantities of timber and cement had been accumulated on the Yalu, and steel plates and other manufactured material was being held in readiness in Japan. "What we have we'll hold" was clearly the new view regarding Port Arthur among those into whose hands it had fallen for a second time, and, although any attempt on the part of Russia to regain possession of the stronghold seemed a rather remote contingency, the Japanese plans provided not only for re-fortification, but also for a renewal of the stores of ammunition,

food, and medical supplies on a scale sufficient to last the new garrison for years.

On January 5th a meeting took place between Generals Nogi and Stoessel, a meeting which, in a sense, was historic, but the record of which it is not easy to invest with all the dignity that could be desired. The place chosen was the rude hut in Shui-shi-ying where the capitulation had been arranged, a building romantically designated in some accounts "Plum Tree Cottage." By mistake General Stoessel was before his time, and was received on arrival by a junior officer. He had dashed up mounted on a beautiful grey Arab, and attended by his Chief of the Staff, two other officers, and a small Cossack escort. A big man with heavy features and a masterful air, he was dressed in full uniform, and he and his officers made a brilliant patch of colour as they remained on horseback awaiting General Nogi's arrival. The latter having been summoned by telephone, came up at the trot on a bay waler accompanied by General Ijichi and three other officers, and preceded by a couple of troopers. The first personal encounter of the two generals who had for months been engaged in such a constant conflict was interesting. "They at once," says the *Express* correspondent, "raised their hands in a ceremonious salute. There was the slightest moment of hesitation, as if each general wondered whether the other desired to shake hands. Then, with a smile, General Nogi alighted from his horse, and General Stoessel dismounted also. They walked to the cottage, chatting easily together, and at the rude doorway General Nogi politely gave precedence to his opponent."

In the one bare room of the hut, the walls of which had been roughly papered

1 P T
MALINGI PAKO 1 P T N. ISSAY
S #1 of 50
aman Cor. A. Akou Camp.

C. LONEL RYSS, C. P. T. ODA,
house
Ch. of aff

GEORGE I. C. L. M. K. A. K. A. L.
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THE SLEDGE OF HONOUR NOGI AND STOESSEL DRINKING TO EACH OTHERS HEALTH
AFTER ARRANGING THE TERMS OF CAPITULATION OF PORT ARTHUR.

with Japanese newspapers, the sole furniture consisted of a table and a few Vienna chairs. The two generals now did shake hands, General Nogi saying that he was proud to do so with such a gallant soldier. After various amenities General Nogi read the telegram from the Emperor of Japan, in which he had been ordered to treat General Stoessel with all possible honour, and said that in consequence of this message the Russian officers had been allowed to wear their swords. General Stoessel expressed gratitude to the Mikado for thus saving the honour of his family. His descendants would appreciate the thoughtful kindness of the Mikado. The same was true of his officers. He also expressed his gratitude for the despatch of a message to the Tsar, and the transmission of his Majesty's reply, which ran as follows :—

"I allow each officer to profit by the well-merited privilege to return to Russia under the obligation not to take part in the present war, or they may share the destinies of their men. I thank you and the brave garrison for your gallant defence."

After compliments on the bravery of the Russian and Japanese soldiers had been passed and reciprocated, General Stoessel condoled with General Nogi on the loss of his two sons. General Nogi replied: "One son gave his life at Nanshan, the other on 203 Metre Hill. Both these were positions of the greatest importance to the Japanese army. I am glad that the sacrifice of my sons' lives was made at the capture of such important positions, as I feel that the sacrifice has not been made in vain. Their lives were as nothing compared with the objects sought."

General Stoessel now asked if he might

present his charger to General Nogi as a token of appreciation, but the latter replied that, as he considered all the horses of the garrison to be the property of Japan, he could not accept this gift. He promised, however, that when the charger was handed over it should be treated with special consideration out of respect for its former gallant owner. He went on to desire that General Stoessel should remain in residence at Port Arthur until arrangements were completed for his return—he having given his parole—to Russia. Various other expressions of cordial good-feeling were exchanged, and, after luncheon at which the two Generals sat together, a group photograph was taken, and General Stoessel rode back to Port Arthur.

While these interesting tokens of newly-born amity were being given and received, the exodus of the Russian garrison from Port Arthur was taking place, the prisoners being removed in batches to a village called Lahutse close to Pigeon Bay, where they were given temporary accommodation until proper arrangements could be made to convey them to Dalny, and thence to Japan. On January 7th a first instalment was marched from Lahutse to the railway station at Cherashi, some fifteen miles distant. Of this march and the subsequent entraining some notable descriptions are available, but none finer than that of the same *Times* correspondent to whom we are indebted above for details concerning the signing of the capitulation agreement.

"Wonderfully picturesque," he says, "was the appearance of the procession of prisoners along the high roads. First came some officers, some mounted, and others trudging along carrying their swords. The officers were all splendidly dressed,

and looked, in their light blue overcoats and patent leather boots, as if they had come off an Emperor's parade, rather than just having gone through a siege of six months. As for the soldiers, their clothes, and especially their boots, were in poor condition, and many wore Chinese costumes and sheepskin coats, but physically they appeared in excellent condition, and in the best of health. Never were prisoners more lightly guarded. At intervals in the column, rising a cloud of dust as it passed along, you could catch a glimpse of a few little khaki-clad figures, with red blankets on their backs, and carrying rifles, apparently swallowed up in the dense column of Russians. These were the soldiers sent with the prisoners to guard against any attempt to escape. It seemed almost comical to see these few Japanese soldiers guarding these thousands of Russians but the latter, although they could have scattered all over the country, knew perfectly well that to leave the peninsula was an impossibility, and were therefore content to walk along to their prison in Japan not, for the most part, dissatisfied with the change in their lot.

Perhaps the most disagreeable part of the journey for them was when they passed through the streets of the Chinese villages, and heard the jeering remarks of the Chinese, for, the last time they had passed that way, they had passed as a retreating, but not as a defeated, army, and were still masters. Now the spell was broken, the glory had departed from them and the Chinaman unable to preserve the soil for himself, at least was not going to miss the opportunity of having a laugh at the expense of those who had so ruthlessly made themselves his masters. The Chinese were enjoying a few days of comparative freedom

between the exit of the one Government and the installation of the next.

A camp was formed at Cherashu station, and here the prisoners were housed, pending the arrival of the trains to convey them to Dalny. Here, also, was food served out to them with no stinting hand, each soldier having as many tins of meat and as many packages of army biscuits as he could possibly desire. All were apparently in excellent humour, and none seemed to feel their positions very keenly. The officers provided the platforms smoking cigarettes and joking as if the surrender of the strongest fortress ever known was nothing but an everyday event. This callousness of the Russian officers to the disgraceful defeat their country had suffered has been the most marked feature of the surrender, and perhaps explains better than anything else the reasons for that defeat.

But at least some credit was due to the officers who took part in this humiliating performance. They had elected to go into imprisonment with their men rather than give their parole and return to Russia, and both in Russia and Japan this conception of duty was warmly applauded. General Stessel, as we have already seen, had already given his parole, and his example was followed by about 400 officers, most of whom also were entrained at Cherashu for Dalny on January 12th. With them were a number of women and children a few officers' wives, the families of some of the civilians and non-commissioned officers, and a number of maids. "One poor woman had three children to look after, one only a few months old, they were crying, and too much for her to manage, but no helping hand was left out to her by the crowd of officers whose privations

*From the Russian
Army.*




A PANORAMA OF THE RUSSIAN
SCENE, BY Mr. F. J. J. J. J. J.

she had so bravely borne. They laughed and they talked, they brushed by her, and took not the slightest notice. Then it was that the Russian soldier showed his superiority as a gentleman to his officer, as he had so often done as a soldier in the field. One dirty ill-kempt man, a humble peasant, perhaps unable to read, went up and took one of the children in his arms, and kept him until the train moved off. This is only one little incident, but there were many more like it in this truly miserable scene."

For in many ways it was a miserable scene, indeed, more particularly as regards the behaviour of the officers, which, it was evident, aroused the keenest feelings of disgust and contempt in the minds of their captors. They strutted about the platform, and received the polite assistance of the Japanese officers

in sorting their baggage and arranging their effects with an arrogance so utterly out of place that the sympathy of the onlookers evaporated into an irritated conviction that any such kindly feeling would be wasted on men so strangely forgetful of their true position.

Among those who were to travel to Dalny by this particular train were General and Madame Stoessel, the latter accompanied by five children whose fathers had been killed during the siege, and whom she and the General had adopted. Every sort of respect was paid to General Stoessel by the Japanese present, but it was noticed that the salutations of the Russians present were none too cordial. As he was making his way to his carriage the General caught sight of a little group of Russian soldiers. He turned towards them and offered his hand

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to one. The men were curiously unresponsive. Possessing not the slightest regard for their General, and, totally unaccustomed to be shaken by the hand, they merely gazed on his friendly advances with a look of mingled awe and stupidity. Stossel turned on his heel and entered the train.

Then occurred a scene which those who witnessed it will never forget, and will ever remember with shame and disgust. Even third-class carriages are scarce on the Dalm Port Arthur line, one has to be content to make the journey in open trucks, but on this occasion there was a saloon for Stossel with a few carriages for women and children. Directly the General and his wife had entered the train one expected to see the women and children led forward and assisted into the returning vacant seats,

but no, the crowd of generals and officers pushed forward and entered the carriages, pushing past the women and children without paying the slightest regard to them. Soon every single carriage was packed with these gentlemen, and the women and children were left on the platform sitting on their luggage. The indignation of every foreigner present, and every Japanese, was instantly aroused by this last exhibition of callousness and brutality. They treat their women like so many beasts, was the comment of one. Some of the station officials and Japanese officers intervened and assisted the helpless ones into the most empty of the open trucks, which were already nearly full of the officers' servants, who taking the cue from their masters were not going to wait for the women and children to be seated first.

Some of the women found seats in the trucks, intermingled with the dirty soldiers and the luggage of the officers in the closed carriages. One beautiful widow whose husband had been killed in the siege, whose very appearance one would have thought might have aroused a spark of dormant gallantry in the breast of one of the Tsar's chosen warriors, was left wandering about, and would have missed the train had not General Nogi's A.D.C., Captain Matsuda, cleared out some of the soldiers and found room for her in a truck.

"Then, with a last whistle, the train moved slowly off, carrying with it the true cause of Russia's downfall in the Far East, and leaving seated on the platform, to await for hours the arrival of the next train, the majority of the women and children. It was a miserable scene, and dissipated the last remaining feeling of regret for the misfortunes of the garrison."

It is a relief to turn from this scathing account of a disgraceful episode to the much more pleasant contemplation of the attitude of the Japanese in victory. Attention has already been drawn to individual acts of courtesy and consideration, and it now remains to chronicle a crowning piece of forbearance on the part of General Nogi towards a foe who would certainly have behaved very differently in similar circumstances. It has been mentioned that General Stoessel took train for Dalny on January 12th, and no allusion has yet been made to any formal entry of the conquering army into Port Arthur, for the simple reason that General Nogi deferred this proceeding until the

day after General Stoessel's departure out of sheer deference to Russian susceptibilities. Few more striking instances of magnanimity are on record, and the world will not readily forget the contrast between Japan and Russia at this moment of well-earned triumph on the one part, and well-deserved humiliation on the other.

In another chapter we shall give the story of the entry into and occupation of Port Arthur, together with some remarks on the changed situation and the opinion of the outside world on the surrender and its consequences. But it seems appropriate to conclude now with an allusion to the rejoicings in Tokio, and to the Rescript issued by the Emperor of Japan on January 7th, thanking General Nogi and the Third Army, and Admiral Togo and the combined Fleet, for their services in the capture, or rather, recapture, of Port Arthur. Of the jubilation at Tokio it is sufficient to say that festivities were already in progress before the actual surrender, owing to the return of Admiral Togo, whose task had come to an end in the destruction of the Russian ships by the fire from 203 Metre Hill. The news of the final fall of Port Arthur naturally aroused a fresh burst of rejoicing, and so for a week the Japanese capital was ablaze with joyous enthusiasm. The celebration terminated fitly on the day of the Emperor's Rescript, the closing episode being a banquet given to 500 of those who had been wounded before Port Arthur, but had recovered sufficiently to permit of their removal from the hospitals for the purpose of being publicly fêted by their admiring fellow-countrymen.

CHAPTER LXXIX

JAPANESE ENTRY INTO PORT ARTHUR—A NOTABLE PROCESSION—THE KAISER DECORATES NOGI AND STOISSH—FOREIGN OPINIONS ON THE FALL OF THE FORTRESS—THE NEW SITUATION—WAS SURPRISED JUSTIFIED?—OPINION IN RUSSIA—A TRIUMPH FROM THE TSAR

GLORIOUS sunny weather marked the formal entry of General Nogis Army into Port Arthur on January 13th. But it should be understood that the event was impressive more from the sentimental than from the spectacular standpoint. In particular the entry must be divested in the mind of the reader from any idea that it was a triumphal one of the sort commonly associated with a decisive victory, or the return of the troops after a long and harassing campaign. The Japanese themselves recognised the doubtful propriety of indulging in any such official demonstration while the war was still in progress and the main army in Manchuria was still by no means assured of complete success. Again, there were practical difficulties in the way of holding a really comprehensive review of all the very numerous troops which had taken part in the siege. Accordingly, what really took place on January 13th was a procession, one moreover, restricted to representative detachments: each infantry regiment sending a company, each cavalry regiment a troop, each artillery brigade a battery. The true character of the display was emphasised by an interesting detail noted by the *Times* correspondent: "Even the commissariat trains to which it had fallen some of the most arduous and also some of the most dangerous work—the conveying of daily

supplies to the fighting line along roads fully exposed to the artillery fire of the enemy—were not forgotten, and the little carts, unloaded, from every commissariat train, if they looked somewhat incongruous alongside the other troops, thoroughly deserved their place in the procession.

The representative detachments paraded at 10 a.m. on the road leading into the city, and an hour later the column, headed by his Staff the Foreign Attaches, and the band, marched slowly through the streets of the city and of the new town, which lies to the west of the harbour, until an open space in front of the harbour was reached. Here General Nogis and his *entourage* took their places at a saluting point, and the detachments marched past in order of divisional numbers, the 1st, 7th, 9th and 11th Divisions, followed by the two independent reserve brigades from Kolb. The spectators were comparatively few in number. Besides the Foreign Attaches there were only the remaining inhabitants of Port Arthur and a few ladies, mostly nurses from the still crowded hospitals.

"There was nothing very showy," writes the correspondent who quoted, "about this review, there was in the entire absence of a flag, and the music was but a poor excuse for a band."



Photo. I Rosenthal.

THE FIRST JAPANESE TO ENTER PORT ARTHUR AFTER THE CAPITULATION.

fortably stand; the salutes were often badly given, and many of the troops had apparently forgotten their drill, as such a long time had elapsed since it had been required. The efforts made by the stubborn little infantrymen to conquer once more the intricacies of the German goose-step were often ludicrous, as also were their endeavours to keep in line and to march in step. Their uniforms were not up to much, and sadly in need of repair, their boots were very worn, and even their rifles not very clean. The regimental buglers, who had been ordered to attend in full strength, also made sad noises in entire conflict with the efforts of the band, which got on the nerves of the Chief of Staff, General Ijichi, who often left his post to stop the discord. But, in spite of these defects, did ever anyone see a spectacle which impressed them more or even so much? I certainly never did, and the absence of parade effect, so essential in times of

peace, only served to emphasise the hardships and exigencies of war, and showed up on a finer background what these men had just accomplished and what they had gone through during the past five months."

The 1st Division was led by Lieutenant-General Matsumara, and consisted of representatives from the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 15th Regiments. It was followed by detachments from the 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th Regiments, constituting the 7th Division, under command of Lieutenant-General Osaka, with whom was Major-General Saito, of Metre Range renown. Next came the famous 9th Division, some of the colours of which had been so badly worn in the constant fighting that they had recently been replaced, while the remainder were the most tattered of all that went by the saluting point. The commander of this Division was Lieutenant-General Baron Oshima, one of the most popular fighting leaders

in the Japanese Army. The Division consisted of the 6th and 18th Brigades, the former made up of the 7th and 35th Regiments, and led by Major-General Ichinoye, described as the real hero of the siege, one who went into the firing line with his men and remained always well to the front even at the trying times when the Russians were making the most desperate efforts to regain lost positions. The 11th Division marched past with General Samejima at their head. Mention was made on page 414 of the present volume of this fine veteran in connection with the capture of North Chi-huan-shan (December 18th), on which occasion he led the assault in person. General Samejima had succeeded General Tsuchaya, the former commander, who had been severely wounded. The Division consisted of the 12th, 22nd, 43rd,

and 44th Regiments, but the two first had been practically wiped out by losses incurred in constant direct attacks upon the strongest positions.

After the review General Nogi with the Staff, the Foreign Attaches, all the mounted officers, and the correspondent, passed through the town, halting for lunch at General Stoessel's former official residence. The latter may well have been grateful to be spared participation in a function so terminated, and one to which, perhaps, no more appropriate reflection could apply than *sic transit gloria*.

The formal entry into Port Arthur was followed by a memorial service for the dead, at which General Nogi was present and paid a glowing tribute to the devotion of those who had fallen during the siege. "Death or victory," had been, he said, their guiding principle, and he



15. A LATER VIEW

THE RUINS IN THE PALACE. GENERAL STOESEL'S STAFF INSPECTING THE RUINS

himself desired to share the honour of victory with the spirits of those who had died in order to achieve success.

Intercourse with the remaining inhabitants of Port Arthur now began to reveal certain features of the siege to which guarded allusion has already been made in this narrative, but which from this point onward may be discussed with greater freedom. In the first place it is necessary to emphasise the painful certainty that although conspicuous heroism was exhibited possibly by the majority of the garrison, the behaviour of a large number was such as to deprive the defence of much of the glory with which it should have been surrounded.

As already stated, the naval officers were distinguished by drunkenness and incapacity, complete demoralisation having set in after the death of the gallant Makaroff. Many of the military officers, too, were useless, applying for leave on days when there were attacks, and leaving sergeants to do their work for them. It goes without saying that such shameful performances reflected the gravest discredit not only on the worthless cowards themselves, but on the superior officers who permitted such gross shrinking from honourable duties.

It is not easy to discriminate among the recriminations, the assertions, the charges, and the excuses, which were forthcoming in rank abundance shortly after the conclusion of the siege. But a piece of credible, because impartial, evidence is forthcoming in the shape of a communication from one of the Russian Admirals who was taken and remained a prisoner, to Reuter's correspondent at Tokio. Very eloquently did this Admiral expatiate upon the gallant part which, as previously indicated in Chapter LXXVI., is known to have been played

by General Kondratchenko throughout the operations.

"General Kondratchenko, until he fell, was the life and soul of the defence. Further, he possessed in large measure the qualities of a peacemaker. He intervened in all cases where divisions arose in the garrison, eloquently pleading that the cause of the Tsar and the needs of the defence must have priority above all private differences. His ceaseless energy, patience, and courage won the confidence of the higher officers of the Army and Navy, as well as of the rank and file, and, fortunately for the defenders, he was able largely to direct the policy of the defence. General Stoessel left much to him, and the officers of the Navy recognised him as the one man capable of reconciling the discordant elements. Day and night Kondratchenko visited every portion of the positions, constantly risking his life. He was our inspiration. No Russian need be ashamed of the defence made by the garrison while Kondratchenko lived."

But of the end the Russian Admiral spoke very bitterly. It was, he said, worse than a mistake, it was a disgrace. If Kondratchenko had been alive the fortress would have held out for months longer, since he was the only man whose tremendous earnestness influenced General Stoessel. The Admiral declared that there was enough food and ammunition for another month at least. He proceeded to give an account of the Council of War held on December 29th, at which the first proposal to surrender was made. "For nearly two weeks it was known to the officers through the gossiping of General Stoessel's servants that the Commander-in-Chief and his Chief of Staff, General Reiss, were preparing to surrender. The soldiers were aware of what was coming, and, brave as they

were, the knowledge destroyed their enthusiasm. A Council of War was held three days before the capitulation, twenty-two higher officers of the Army and Navy being present. General Stoessel represented to the Council that if the place was taken by assault there would be fighting in the streets, and possibly a massacre. He referred to the

and felt, and how the men viewed their surrender, will all be known later, but I say now, and I believe that the majority of the officers of the garrison will support me, that it was a disgrace to Russia."

As a matter of fact, unpleasant revelations had already been made of the behaviour of the Russian soldiers on hearing of the surrender. Disgraceful



GENERAL KONDPATCHENKO

women and children of the garrison, and said he thought it was their duty to avoid such a possibility. In spite of the commander's arguments, only three officers, General Reiss and two others, also on the Staff, spoke in favour of capitulation. General Stoessel's note to General Nogi came without warning, and to say we were surprised inadequately describes our state of mind on hearing of it, after the sentiments expressed by the majority of the Council. What the officers said

scenes were enacted, the men breaking into the warehouses and looting vodka in complete defiance of their officers. From one store 5,000 bottles of this potent Russian spirit were seized, and disgusting orgies at once took place in the streets, the revellers being joined by the troops sent to quell the disturbances. Artillery destroyed their guns, and infantry threw their rifles and ammunition into the harbour, shouting that the fortress had been given away.

It is only fair to General Stoessel to say that the statements of the capacity of Port Arthur to hold out much longer were qualified by others drawing attention to very grave drawbacks. Further reference will be made to this matter later, but in the meantime it must not be forgotten that the garrison were terribly disheartened not only by the death of Kondratchenko but also by the receding prospect of relief. When hope of a rescue by Kuropatkin had disappeared, there were many who for a long time daily expected the arrival of the Baltic Fleet, and it was even said that several Russian soldiers were killed on the hill-tops while looking vainly for the squadron from home which was to put a glorious end to their present hardships.

As to provisions there was certainly plenty of flour and a quantity of tinned meats in the private stores, to say nothing of nearly 2,000 horses, out of which the garrison, profiting by the example set at Ladysmith, might have produced up-to-date preparations in the way of sausages and "chevril," without being reduced to coarser styles of hippophagy. But there must have been some scarcity, since towards the end of the siege a chicken fetched £2, a goose £6, and a pig £30. There was no milk and there were no vegetables, and the absence of the latter caused a raging outbreak of scurvy, with which the doctors found it impossible to cope successfully. There seems no question as to the grave deficiency of medical supplies, and it was said that at the end the wounded had to be bandaged with dressing obtained by unravelling cables.

As to the ammunition, some generous allowances need to be made. Two and a quarter million rounds of rifle ammunition was really not more than would have

availed the entire fighting force at Fort Arthur for a single important action. Again, as to shells, the Japanese themselves shot away more shells in each of the two battles of Liao-yang and the Sha-ho than were found in the fortress, and both shells and rifle ammunition must have been so scattered that it would have been difficult for General Stoessel to obtain an exact return. Also it may be urged by the Russian officers after the surrender that much of the ammunition that was surrendered was of little use, as it did not fit some of the more important guns, the supply of cartridges for which had been quite exhausted.

Whether General Stoessel was or was not premature in his capitulation, he was destined to receive, in common with his adversary, a particular mark of distinction at the hands of a very important critic of military performances. The German Emperor, who, it will be remembered, conferred the order of the Black Eagle upon Lord Roberts at the time of the South African war, was prompt to mark the close of the siege of Port Arthur by a characteristic acknowledgment of the military virtues of the protagonists. To the Tsar at Tsarkoe Selo the Kaiser telegraphed as follows:—

"The defence of Port Arthur will ever remain an example for the soldiers of all nations. The hero who commanded your troops is admired by the whole world, and especially in my Army, and by me. In order to give expression to our sympathy and admiration for General Stoessel and his gallant troops, I hope to have your consent when I confer upon him our highest military distinction, the Order 'Pour le Merite' founded by Frederick the Great. I intend to bestow the same tribute of honour upon his gallant adversary, General Nogi."

To the Mikado the Kaiser wired —
 "The siege and capture of Port Arthur
 have exhibited General Baron Nogi as a
 gallant and skilful leader whose heroic

when I confer upon General Nogi, as an
 outward token of my admiration, the
 highest Prussian military distinction, the
 Order 'Pour le Merite, which was



PERILS OF RED CROSS WORK EFFORT PORT ARTHUR

At the time of the siege of Port Arthur, the work of the Red Cross was very difficult and dangerous. The soldiers were often killed or wounded, and the work of the Red Cross was to care for the wounded and the dead. The work of the Red Cross was very difficult and dangerous, and the soldiers were often killed or wounded.

deeds like those of his troops will ever
 excite the admiration of all soldiers and
 particularly that of myself and my Army.
 I hope that your Majesty will approve

founded by my forbear, Frederick the
 Great for bravery in the field. His
 gallant adversary, General Stoess
 received the same distinction.

just to deny even to the enemies of 'the friendly and allied nation' a tribute of frank admiration. It is indeed," this same correspondent went on to observe, "not the least singular feature of this in many ways most extraordinary war that it has not excited fanatical partisanship

a day telegrams giving news from the seat of war were posted in the Casino. They were read in silence. Officers and civilians, as also priests, of whom there were a large number, scanned the grave intelligence from the Far East with hardly any comment, and therefore I am



Photo: J. Rosenthal.

MEN OF THE JAPANESE 9TH DIVISION AWAITING THEIR TURN IN THE "THIRTY-MINUTE" TRENCH.

anywhere. After the first engagements had been fought, and the emotion caused in France by the one-sided version of the sinking of Russian ships at Port Arthur had subsided, the French watched the war, if not with indifference, at all events with nothing more than conceivable interest for their allies. I was at Vichy this summer during the exciting battle of Liao-yang. There were people there from all parts of France, and four times

little surprised to find there is nothing like excitement at the fall of Port Arthur."

The comments of important papers like the *Temps*, the *Siècle*, and the *Journal* contained some shrewd and accurately prophetic estimates of the results of the surrender. The *Temps* was prompt and clear in its statement that the Russians would never recover Port Arthur without previously recovering the supremacy of



CHAMPAGNE AND SHELLS: OFFICERS' CONVIVIALITY
INTERRUPTED AT PORT ARTHUR.



the sea. M. Cornély, writing in the *Siccle*, anticipated an inevitable reaction upon the domestic situation in Russia. The convulsions, he hinted, might even be such that the Tsar would need all his armies at home. Such a frank statement from a French pen was not without a peculiar significance. The *Journal*, like the *Temps*, emphasised the difficulty which the Russians would experience in dislodging the Japanese from this new base as long as the latter retained command of the sea. While recognising the advantages secured by Japan, which would now be able to concentrate her attention upon Kuropatkin's Army, the *Journal* still nourished hopes of a Russian triumph, and added, "If, as we firmly hope, the friendly and allied nation issues victorious from this severe trial, it must not forget the heroes of Port Arthur, whose self-sacrifice will have prepared that revenge."

The German Press was somewhat academic in its reflections upon the fate of Port Arthur, and the opinions of military experts as to whether Japan had been justified in locking up so many of the troops in order to secure the capture of the fortress were permitted to crowd the columns of the papers to the partial exclusion of broader and more practical views. Still, it was frankly recognised that the capture of Port Arthur was a great moral and material success, and here and there was observable a renewed tinge of apprehension lest German interests in the Far East might not suffer through the masterful manner in which Japan had regained possession of a stronghold almost inconveniently adjacent to the cherished centre of German interests in the Far East, Kiao-chau.

There was little else in the European Press of striking commentary on the new

situation. But a characteristically strong note of satisfaction was sounded in America, which, indeed, had a special right to speak freely on the subject of Port Arthur, since she had never failed to express the strongest opinion on the conduct of Russia, France, and Germany in robbing Japan nine years before of the fruits of her victory over China. For the rest, the people of the United States took it for granted that Japan would keep Port Arthur for all time, and they were content, in the interests of peace, to have it so. But, putting Tsardom, in other words "irresponsible despotism," aside, there was no want of sympathy with Russia as a great Power and a great people, and genuine anxiety was felt lest the continuance of a disastrous struggle in Manchuria might now lead to worse disaster in St. Petersburg.

It would have been fortunate for Russia if the loss of Port Arthur had no more damaging effect upon her prestige than was indicated in the Press of Europe and America. But it goes without saying that far more real detriment was done to her as a World Power by the influence which the surrender had upon the numerous peoples with which Russia directly or indirectly came into contact by reason of her expansion in Asia.

The effect in China was, it is needless to say, immediate. The native Chinese Press may not, according to Western ideas, sway the minds of the nation to any remarkable extent, and, even with such a proof of Russian inferiority before them, the Chinese editors did not think fit to expatiate upon the weakness of a Power which had made itself unpleasantly felt throughout the Celestial kingdom in the past, was still very much in evidence, and might again be able to render the lives of pig-tailed journalists—never

very secure—extremely precarious. The 'note' of the Chinese Press was accordingly cautious. The fall of Port Arthur was held to demonstrate not the weakness of Russia but the strength of Japan, and China was urged to follow in the Japanese footsteps and to become equally great. Other straws showed which way the wind blew. At Shinghu, for instance, the local Chinese officials suddenly took a firm stand in regard to the murder of a Chinaman by a Russian sailor, and they even went so far as to demand the surrender of the sailors implicated in order that they might be tried by a special Chinese court. The astonishment of the Russian consul at this demand must have been instructive to witness.

But Russia looms large in Asiatic connections outside the sphere of her interests in China, and far beyond the circles reached by the quaint little sheets which represent native journalism in the East.

Throughout India, especially northern India, it soon became known that, in addition to previous reverses which might have been accounted for by unpreparedness, Russia had just been compelled by main force to give up a fortress deemed impregnable and defended by a numerous army, a strong fleet, and many guns. And who were those who had made the "Goroks" yield up this mighty pile of arms? Not the one white people comparable with Russia, not only in greatness and power but also in singular capacity to bend the nations of the East to its will. Not the English had taught the "Goroks" this lesson but the Japanese who until five years ago no one but a few and possibly, a few Russians had up with its less knowledge had ever heard of.

What wonder if the tidings of this marvellous happening crept swiftly along the Indian borderland and crossed the frontier, provoking hoarse comment among the fanatics in the Kabul bazars received with wonderment in the pleasant Persian valleys, and wafted northward until in Bokhara, and Merv, and Khiva it became known that the mysterious Japanese had dealt a terrible blow against the mighty Power which had so long and so assiduously courted the friendliness of the Ameer and the Shah, and had brought into such complete subjection the strongest khansates of Central Asia, the wildest tribes of Turkestan.

The comments of Asiatics on the fall of Port Arthur were, naturally, exaggerated, while it is hardly too much to say that speaking generally, Continental criticism, at any rate, was either partial or narrow minded. The real effect of this great event upon the campaign may be said to lie about midway between these two estimates since, in truth it was equally remote from the annihilation assumed by the one and the peaceful anticipations of the other. Port Arthur in the hands of Japan continued to be, as it had been in the hands of Russia, of far greater naval than military importance.

The fall of the fortress released some 60,000 to 80,000 Japanese troops while it added not a man nor a gun to the forces under Kuropatkin and could not but have a moral effect upon his already somewhat disheartened legions. But none the less the news of the capitulation must have come to Kuropatkin as a distinct relief. Strategically speaking, he was already freed from any real responsibility in regards Port Arthur. He had been pressed against his better judgment to attempt to raise the siege, and he had

that the Russian commander-in-chief, Admiral Kuropatkin, although he could not but regret the loss of the brave and gallant defenders of Port Arthur, with deep regret, it is true, but still, at this juncture such a sacrifice would not have been a crime.

Port Arthur was a Russian city, and it was a Russian city which was to be defended. When, then, the matter comes to be decided, and dispassionately, the question of the fall of Port




FIGURE 11
JAPANESE SOLDIERS AT HINGOON. HERE THEY HIT 500-RUSSIAN SHILLS INTO THE DOOMED CITY.

That was unfortunate, and, of course, Kuropatkin knew well that in many parts of Russia he would be blamed for what had occurred. But there must have been some compensation in the thought that the problem before him was one to which he could now give undivided attention. As long as Port Arthur had held out he had been compelled to take it, at any rate sentimentally, into account. Now it had gone there was an end to that embarrass-

ment. From the Japanese and Russian standpoints does not present any striking divergence. The Japanese had got what they wanted, but the price they had paid had been extremely heavy, exactly how heavy it is not easy to compute. For it must always be a question whether, if the Japanese had been content merely to blockade Port Arthur, they could not have smashed Kuropatkin before he had time to obtain such substantial reinforcements

as he did eventually obtain and made more or less good use of. Then Port Arthur and Vladivostok too might have been worried or starved into submission

classical example of the way in which the value of a fortress may be artificially inflated by sentiment on the part of the attackers as well as on that of the defence.



THE COST OF CONQUEST THE SCENE AFTER AN ATTACK UPON THE COCASCOMB FORT
Painted by the artist on the spot by Mr. Frederick J. Jones

with very little difficulty, assuming that Japan had remained masters at sea.

If Japan was satisfied with the bargain she actually secured, there is not much more to be said on the subject, but to many it will perhaps seem that here was a

From the naval point of view, of course, a totally different set of considerations comes into force. With the command of the sea, Port Arthur is a stronghold indeed. It was so, hypothetically, to Russia at the commencement

of the war, and might again have become so at a much later period if the Russian Navy had not shamefully neglected its duty. If, even after Japan had temporarily asserted her naval supremacy, the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur had been handled solely with a view to crippling the Japanese battleships, the importance of the place might have even been intensified. For, on the subsequent arrival of the Baltic Fleet, which might then have been rendered possible, the value of such a naval base to Russia would have been incalculable. But the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, save for Makaroff, never had a man over it who could rise to the situation. Vitoft's heart failed him at a critical moment, Uhtomsky exhibited what could only be politely described as excess of prudence, and one by one the ships of the Port Arthur Fleet were either sunk, or were disarmed at neutral ports, or fell into Japanese hands, and all this with little or no damage to the naval strength of Japan.

It is not difficult to be wise after the event, but even in Russia there were wise heads in which the conviction was strong that Port Arthur should have been abandoned when once it was clear that, temporarily at any rate, the naval game was "up." Had a really resolute effort been made to evacuate Port Arthur at a comparatively early date there is no question that a certain proportion of both ships and men would have been saved, and that the chances of regaining possession of the fortress, chances which were quite ethereal at the time of the actual surrender, would have substantially improved.

Into the question whether the surrender was a discreditable one it is not necessary to enter judicially, if only for

the reason that here the question is one largely of national sentiment. The duration of a siege, like the plan of a campaign, cannot always be gauged with accuracy by strict military rules, and many will be disposed to agree with the Japanese that, taking everything into consideration, General Stoessel deserved far more praise than blame. The indictment formulated by Dr. Morrison, the Peking correspondent of the *Times*, whose memorable despatch headed "Discreditable Surrender" created such a painful sensation some three weeks after the surrender, was a formidable one. It ended with these scathing words:—

"All accounts agree in condemning General Stoessel, who, if he had not been checked by the resolution of General Kondratchenko, would have capitulated weeks before. All accounts agree in condemning the majority of the Russian officers, who had more fear of the failure of other comforts than of ammunition. All accounts praise the courage of the Russian rank and file, who were in too many cases shamefully commanded by their officers. All accounts agree that no man who ever held a responsible command less deserved the title of hero than General Stoessel.

"Those who have witnessed the condition of the fortress, contrasting the evidence of their eyes with the astounding misrepresentation of General Stoessel, had their sympathy turned into derision, believing that no more discreditable surrender has been recorded in history.

"Had the Kaiser waited until he had received the reports of the German and other military attachés, he could never have conferred the Order 'Pour le Merite' upon General Stoessel."

This is a hard saying, and coming from the pen of an acute and brilliant

critic, who himself had undergone the perils of a siege at Peking, it is entitled to every respect. But it is impossible to deprive General Stoessel of all the credit of what was unquestionably a great achievement. A siege may be a tremendous strain upon the nerves and resources of a commander, even if he has not to cope with starvation and has still a few rounds of ammunition left. The ordeal to which Port Arthur was subjected had had no parallel in history, if we take into combined account the stirring vigour of the operations against the harbour, the awful intensity of the artillery fire, and the frantic fury of the infantry assaults. It is easy to draw scornful pictures of untouched buildings and well filled cellars of champagne, but 15,000 men in hospital constitute in themselves a drawback of no common seriousness, and one which the severest critics of poor General Stoessel seemed to treat with singular levity, if not complete forgetfulness.

On the subject of the actual surrender the evidence already quoted of one of the Russian admirals may be regarded by some as even more damning than Dr. Morrison's scornful diatribe. But here again a few planks may be entered on the hull of one who did not actually capitulate until he had gone through a very protracted and terrible experience with very few rays of comfort or encouragement.

It must first be remembered that General Stoessel was altogether wrongly placed as the responsible chief of a fortress which it would have been far better to have placed under the supreme command of a naval officer. As it was he had to suffer greatly for the incompetence and inactivity of the fleet whilst perpetually bickering among his naval and military subordinates was anything but conducive to enthusiasm and effi-

ciency. Secondly, we do not know, shall probably never know, how much in the way of replenishing the stores and of strengthening the defences had to be done after the siege had commenced, and how far the knowledge of deficiencies in the last line of defence contributed to the final surrender.

Finally, there is the broad fact that, even if Port Arthur had held out another month or two no useful purpose could have been served, and it was pretty clearly apparent at the end of December that this was the case. There was no earthly hope of relief, and no possible chance that Port Arthur could afford shelter to the Baltic Squadron. For 24,000 Russians to leave 15,000 sick and wounded behind them and attempt to cut their way out through a cordon of 80,000 Japanese would simply have been to invite a massacre. Many weeks before the Tsar had been criticised for not commanding Stoessel to surrender in the interests of common humanity. Stoessel himself had been called names for his obstinate refusal to consider his garrison. It was not altogether reasonable that, when capitulation came as the almost inevitable result of almost unparalleled pressure, a chorus of indignation should have arisen because it had been found that possibly Port Arthur might have held out though with precisely the same result in the end a few weeks longer.

We have left to the end of this chapter the few words we have to say on the reception of the news of the fall of Port Arthur in Russia. A painful feature was the stupefaction produced among the lower classes, who had been carefully educated into the belief that such a disaster was not possible, and whose simple religious convictions were shocked by the loss of a place for which their Emperor



A NEAR VIEW OF 203 METRE HILL FROM THE RUSSIAN SIDE, BEFORE ITS CAPTURE.

had said so many prayers. Among the shop-keeping classes it was thought that the chariot wheels of internal reform would be accelerated by a calamity for which bureaucracy was so clearly to blame. In official and military circles there was at first a marled disposition to praise General Stoessel for having acted according to dictates of humanity, after compelling the admiration of the whole world by his protracted resistance. Later, these sentiments undoubtedly underwent modification, but certainly the earlier reception of the news by the bureaucracy savoured little of humiliation or despair. Not that emotion of one sort or another was not freely exhibited. The St. Petersburg correspondent of a Paris paper declared that he saw officers weeping freely at the club. To the office of the General Staff came relatives and friends of officers in the garrison "trembling with anguish" to ask for news. They all wanted to telegraph for details, and to know what fate was reserved for the prisoners.

On January 13th at Tsarkoe Selo, in the presence of the Tsar, the Tsarina, and the Imperial Family, a solemn requiem was celebrated in memory of those who fell at Port Arthur, and on January 14th the Tsar issued an Order of the Day to the Army and Navy with reference to the loss of the fortress. It ran as follows:—

'Port Arthur has fallen into the hands of the enemy. The struggle for its defence lasted eleven months, and for over seven months the glorious garrison was cut off from the outside world. Deprived of help and without murmuring, the garrison endured the privations of the siege and moral tortures, while the enemy

continued to gain successes. Unsparing of life and blood, a handful of Russians sustained the enemy's furious onslaughts in the firm hope of relief. With pride Russia witnessed their deeds of heroism, and the whole world bowed before their heroic spirit. The resources gave out while the onset of fresh hostile forces was constant, and the garrison, its deed of heroism accomplished, had to yield to superior numbers. Peace to the ashes of the dead, and eternal memory to the never to be forgotten Russians who perished in the defence of Port Arthur! For many from Russia you died for Russia's cause, filled with love for the Emperor and the Fatherland. Glory be to you the living! May God heal your wounds and give you the strength and the patience to bear your sore trials.'

Our enemy is bold and strong, and the struggle with him at a distance of 10,000 versts from the sources of our strength is indescribably hard. But Russia is powerful. In the thousand years of her life there have been still harder trials, still more threatening dangers. Every time she emerged stronger and with fresh power from the struggle. Our failures have been severe. While we lament our losses we will not allow ourselves to be led into distraction. With all Russia I trust that the hour of victory will soon dawn, and pray to God that He may bless my dear troops and fleets in order that, united, they may overthrow the enemy and uphold the honour and glory of Russia.'

With this Imperial tribute to the gallant defenders, a tribute marked by no little eloquence and dignity, our story of the siege and fall of Port Arthur may appropriately be closed.



THE ROYAL FAMILY.

CHAPTER LXXX.

TROUBLE LOOMING IN RUSSIA—THE BLESSING OF THE NEVA—SENSATIONAL INCIDENT—STRIKES AT ST. PETERSBURG—FATHER GAPON—PETITION TO THE TSAR—RED SUNDAY—SHAMFUL SCAFFOLD—FURTHER REPRESSION—SPREAD OF THE MOVEMENT.

IT would be erroneous to suggest that the fall of Port Arthur was primarily responsible for the startling series of events at St. Petersburg which followed it. At the same time it is impossible not to suppose that this gigantic disaster, so obviously due to an unhappy mixture of Imperial obstinacy and bureaucratic bungling, did not have a serious influence upon a public now at last beginning to see the war in its true light, and already wavering in its former blind allegiance to the idea of an all-powerful Russia and a wholly beneficent Tsar. For many weeks before the surrender of the fortress a growing tendency to call a spade a spade had been observable in the Russian capital, and, though the actual loss of Port Arthur came as no surprise, and was attended by no particular demonstrations against

the ruling powers, there can be no question that it intensified the resentment of the working classes against the Government, and stiffened their determination to make some sort of firm and combined stand against their cynical and overbearing masters.

The storm did not burst suddenly. As far back as the second week of December serious riots had taken place in St. Petersburg in furtherance of what had come to be known as the Russian Reform movement, which was, in plain language, an agitation for a Constitution, and a Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen. On December 25th the Tsar had issued an Imperial Ukase to the Senate, in which a revision of the peasant laws was ordered, ostensibly with the idea of enabling the peasant community to enjoy to the full the rights of

a free and privileged country people. Judicial reforms were also indicated, and hopes held out that persons of all classes should be equal before the law, and that the independence of all judicial authorities should be assured. But these high-sounding promises came too late to stay the course of a movement which was being rapidly merged into the semblance, if not the reality, of a revolution. A public, which a few months before might have been pacified by a few kindly words from the Tsar, now dared to discuss his 'reform proposals' in a very independent and unfriendly spirit.

A marked sensation was created by the publication of a letter addressed to the Minister of the Interior by Prince Troubetski, President of the Moscow Zemstvo, or Elective Municipal Council, in which attention was frankly called to the state of internal unrest, and to the fact that what had occurred was not merely the result of youthful effervescence, but rather the reflection of the existing general condition of society. In this remarkable communication it was urged that the Tsar should allow himself to be approached by those who represented the great forces at work and so avert an almost certain revolution.

Although no steps were taken to punish Prince Troubetski for this outspoken letter, the authorities made strenuous efforts in other directions to combat the growing agitation. Meetings were suppressed, demonstrations checked, but the violence employed tended only to rouse the revolutionary element to reprisals. An attempt was made on the life of the Chief of Police at Ekaterinof, and fatal riots took place at Warsaw, in which the troops were fired upon from the crowd and a non-commissioned officer of the *gendarmerie* was shot dead.

At St. Petersburg the disaffection took the form of extended strikes, more especially among the *employes* at the great Putiloff, the Neva ship-building and other leading works and by January 18th the number of strikers in the Russian capital was estimated at 50,000.

While matters throughout Russia were in this generally combustible state an incident occurred which drew the attention of the whole civilised world very forcibly to the possibilities of the situation. On January 18th the Tsar took part in the annual ceremony of Blessing the Neva, which marks the Epiphany in the Russian Church Calendar. The ceremony as usual was one of great impressiveness taking place in the immediate vicinity of the Winter Palace, opposite to the grand entrance of which a small wooden chapel had been built on the ice near the river banks. Steps from the chapel led down through a hole cut in the thick ice. The ceremony consists in the thrice-repeated immersion by the Metropolitan of his great gold Cross. The Metropolitan then stoops over the opening in the ice and makes the gesture of dipping into the river his gold chalice which has previously been filled with water from the Jordan. The chalice is then handed to the Tsar, the Metropolitan pronouncing a prayer that the river may not overflow its banks and that the Divine blessing may rest upon the ships which ride upon the Neva's waters. The Emperor raises the chalice to his lips, a signal rocket is fired to show that the ceremony is over and an Imperial salute is fired from a battery of guns posted on the Bourse Quay at a distance of about 400 yards on the other side of the river.

From the description furnished to the *Daily Mail* by its special correspondent, Mr. Hinds, we learn that up to the

moment of the firing of the salute the ceremony had passed off with its accustomed stately calm. About noon the Tsar, attended by his Personal Staff, inspected detachments from every regiment in the St. Petersburg military district, which, after inspection, fell in with their colours behind the Imperial party. At one o'clock a procession was formed, which, moving out from the Palace, crossed the quay to the chapel on the ice-bound river. The Tsar and his Staff, in which were included many members of the Imperial Family, were received at the chapel by the Metropolitan gorgeously arrayed in tall gold-fronted head-gear, and vestments heavily embroidered with gold and jewels. The military detachments ranged up on three sides of a square to form a guard, and, when the Epiphany Service had been chanted by the priests, the Metropolitan performed the blessing ceremony detailed above, and the Tsar drank the Jordan water from the golden chalice.

As the guns on the opposite bank thundered forth the Imperial salute it was noticed that the third report was harsher in sound than the two first, and simultaneously one of the line of *gendarmerie* guarding the pavement on the Palace Quay was seen to fall forward on his face. It was at first thought that the man had been overcome by the cold, but on raising him he was found to be bleeding from a wound in the head. A little later it transpired that several windows in the Palace had been broken, and the façade above the grand entrance damaged by bullets, and the ugly fact became apparent that these bullets must have come from a round of shrapnel or "case" fired from one of the guns of the saluting battery.

Thanks largely to the demeanour of

the Tsar, who did all he could to affect disregard of the incident, no public excitement immediately followed. The ceremony was solemnly concluded, the Tsar walked back with his suite to the Palace, and there held a reception, conversing with the ladies of the Court and with various diplomatists, and endeavouring in every way to inspire those around him with the belief that what had happened was merely an untoward incident. Meanwhile a messenger had galloped over the bridge which here spans the Neva, and prompt steps were taken to place the whole of the officers and men of the battery which had fired the salute under arrest. The battery in question belonged to the Horse Artillery of the Guard, and was commanded by Captain Davydoff. An official inquiry into the circumstances was immediately ordered, and a reassuring official statement was issued to the effect that an "accident" had occurred, resulting in the wounding of a policeman and the shattering of a few windows.

The finding of the Court-Martial appointed to try those concerned in this remarkable occurrence may be anticipated to the extent of saying that the absence of malicious intent was held to be definitely proved, but that all the battery officers and two of the gunners were sentenced to various punishments for neglect of duty. But, even had this official conclusion been arrived at forthwith, it is unlikely that it would have gone far to diminish the sensation which had been created by the news that shots from a gun supposed to be firing blank cartridge and belonging to a battery of the Artillery of the Guard had passed within a few feet of the sacred person of the Tsar. For some time even the Russian police openly held that the occur-



rence was the result of a deliberate attempt on the Tsar's life, and, despite the finding of the Court-Martial, it will always remain to the outside world a singular coincidence that a loaded shell should have been in this particular gun at the suggestive moment when it happened to be pointed in the direction of the spot on which the Tsar must have been clearly seen by the gunners to be standing.

Incidentally it is rather interesting that the Captain Davydoff who was concerned in this strange episode, and who was subsequently sentenced by Court-Martial to dismissal from the Army and internment in a fortress for a year and a half, was the great grandson of one of the famous aristocratic revolutionaries known as "Decembrists" or "Decabrist" who, in 1825, assembled in front of the Winter Palace shouting, "Down with Nicholas! Long live Constantine!" That demonstration was quickly crushed by Nicholas, who ordered artillery to be taken on the roof of the Palace in order to fire on the rebels. Davydoff, among others, was transported to Siberia. The Captain Davydoff of the Neva incident was the son of a well-known judge, and nephew of the celebrated composer Tchaïkovsky. He was much esteemed, and the Tsar is said to have entertained a strong personal liking for the ill-starred Guardsman.

The crop of rumours and surmises concerning this supposed attempt on the life of the Tsar might have been even more luxuriant than it was had not another Russian happening of much more tragic significance intervened to occupy the attention of Europe. Allusion has already been made to the progress of the strikes in St. Petersburg, and, without going into details, it may be briefly stated that at the close of the third week in January

the movement had attained positively threatening dimensions. Some of the strikes were distinctly serious from a patriotic standpoint, since they involved the stoppage of naval construction and other urgent work in connection with the preparation of war material. Apart from this, the attitude of the men was very disquieting, a strong disinclination to listen to reason, and a tendency to resort to violent measures being everywhere observable, notwithstanding demonstrations on the part of the police and the military.

At the Putiloff works the negotiations with the management were conducted on behalf of the strikers by Father Georges Gapon, whose name was destined to become very prominent in connection with the domestic history of St. Petersburg during the next few days. This man, who was about thirty-five years of age, was the son of a peasant, and was by birth a Ruthenian; that is to say, he belonged to that branch of the Little Russian division of the Slav race which dwells on both sides of the Carpathians, in Galicia and North-West Hungary. While a student at the Theological Academy in St. Petersburg he had taken a very active part in the work of an institution having for its object the dissemination of religious knowledge and ethical teaching among the working classes, and, as head of one of the branches of this institution, he had visited many of the factories, and had been appalled by the conditions of life he found existing there. After leaving the Academy he had founded a Workmen's Union, and since 1898 he had laboured in the interests of this organisation, preaching and teaching in the suburbs of the capital, and winning much popularity among the factory hands. He is

described as a man of commanding personality, with flashing eyes, and of a fiery eloquence.

On Monday, January 20th, a strange scene was witnessed in St Petersburg. At daylight the strikers from the Putiloff works marched through the industrial suburbs calling upon the men in the various factories on the way to join them. Swollen by fresh contingents, the procession drew along the left bank of the Neva and then crossed over the frozen river to the great industrial quarter known as Vassili Ostroff, where further factories contributed their quota and many establishments were hurriedly closed through fear of pillage. But there was no violence on the part either of the strikers or the police. Having accomplished their purpose of calling out the men from practically all the great factories in the capital, the organisers of the procession ordered a peaceful dispersal after arranging for a monster demonstration on Sunday, at which it was proposed to present a petition to the Tsar. From the paraphrase of this petition which was telegraphed by Reuters correspondent, the following are typical extracts:—

Sire—We have arrived at the extreme limits of endurance. We have reached the terrible moment when death is to be preferred to the continuation of our intolerable sufferings. We have left our work, and declared to our employers that we will not resume till our demand is conceded. We have not asked much. We have asked but the means of livelihood without which life is a burden and labour a continual torture.

After begging for an investigation into their case, and pleading for an eight hours day and other concessions, the petitioners continued—

We have been exploited, and we shall continue to be exploited under your bureaucracy. Any one of us who dared to raise his voice in the interests of the people and the working classes has been thrown into prison or transported. Kindness and good feeling have been treated as a crime. The bureaucracy has brought the country to the verge of ruin, and by a shameful war is bringing it to its downfall. We have no voice in the heavy burdens imposed upon us. We do not even know for whom or why this money is wrung from the impoverished people and we do not know how it is expended. This state of things is contrary to the Divine laws and renders life impossible. It were better that we should all perish we workmen and all Russia, than good luck to the capitalists and exploiters of the poor to corrupt officials and robbers of the Russian people.

Assembled before your Palace we plead for our salvation. Refuse not your aid, raise your people from their tomb and give them the means of working out their own destiny. Rescue them from the intolerable yoke of officialdom. Throw down the wall that separates you from your people in order that they may rule with you the country which was created for the happiness of the people—a happiness which is being wrenched from us leaving us nothing but sorrow and humiliation. Receive favourably our demands, inspired as they are with a desire for your and our own good, and by the knowledge of the necessity of emerging from the intolerable situation. Russia is too great and her needs are too diverse and manifold for officials alone to rule. National representation is indispensable, for the people alone know its real needs. Do not reject its assistance. Accept it and order at once the convocation of re-

representatives of all classes, including the working classes. Let all be equal and free in the right of election. Direct, therefore, that the elections for the Constitutional Assembly be made by general secret ballot. That is our chief demand. Everything is contained therein ; it is the sole balm for our wounds, which will otherwise bring us promptly to our death. But one measure alone will not suffice to heal all our wounds, and consequently we point out to you, frankly and openly as to a father, other measures in the name of the whole Russian working classes."

On Saturday, January 21st, a deputation of three workmen proceeded to Tsarkoe Selo with the futile intention of delivering a copy of this petition to the Tsar in order that he might have a day on which to consider it. As a last appeal Father Gapon despatched to the Tsar the following letter :—

"Sovereign,—I fear the Ministers have not told you the full truth about the situation. The whole people, trusting in you, have resolved to appear at the Winter Palace at two o'clock in the afternoon in order to inform you of their needs. If, vacillating, you do not appear before the people, then you tear the moral bonds between you and the people. Trust in you will disappear, because innocent blood will flow between you and the people. Appear to-morrow before your people, and receive our address of devotion in a courageous spirit. I and the representatives of labour and my brave working men comrades guarantee the inviolability of your person."

During the Saturday the strikers behaved with complete moderation, the demonstrators who crowded the streets making no attempt to interfere with the traffic, and abstaining carefully from any-

thing like violence. Fifty men were told off to act as bodyguard to Father Gapon, and a further picked body of 400 was sworn in to act as a guard to the Tsar in the event of his Majesty consenting to confer with the strike leaders.


Meanwhile the authorities had been busy with measures contrasting painfully with the touching confidence of the strikers in the magnanimity of their autocratic Sovereign. All the cavalry regiments had been called in from the districts round St. Petersburg with the object of forming a cordon round the Palace, and an infantry division was also brought from Reval to aid the normal garrison of the capital in dealing with the poor wretches who so fondly hoped that an appeal in the name of common humanity would have some effect upon the "Little Father" of an oppressed race.

The morning of Sunday, January 22nd, broke fine and cloudless, and until ten o'clock there was little in the aspect of the city to betoken a coming tragedy. There were as yet no troops even in the Palace Square, the bridges across the Neva were still open to traffic, church bells were ringing, and St. Petersburg, in its cloak of fresh-fallen snow, presented everywhere the aspect of outward peace. But at the hour named a general movement of troops began to take place, detachment after detachment marching out of quarters, and passing along the thoroughfares of the industrial suburbs. Soon at every point where there were cross-roads detachments were posted, and all the bridges, especially those leading to Vassili Ostroff, were strongly held. A little later, into the great square in front of the Winter Palace regiments of the Guards trooped out from the Palace courtyards, the Czarina's own Regiment



FATHER GAYN'S FRUITLESS APPEAL

This was the scene of sorrow and strife by the front on 1st July and 1st August 1900. Many men round Father Gayn were killed and wounded.



THE PRECINCTS OF THE WINTER PALACE, ST. PETERSBURG.

of Cuirassiers, mounted on black horses, the Preobrajensky, Paulovsky, and Grenadersky Guards in their striking uniforms, the officers conspicuous by their glittering appointments, and the spectacular element still predominating in the whole display. But the last regiment had hardly wheeled into its place in the Square when elsewhere in the city the conflict had begun which was to make a Red Sunday of this beautiful white morning, and to besoul the name of the master of these resplendent soldiers with undying horror.

At ten o'clock a procession of about 15,000 workmen left the neighbourhood of the Putiloff works, and marched towards the Narva Gate, where a body of troops and police were concentrating. With the men walked Father Gapon, escorted by his bodyguard, and dressed in his ordinary clothes, it having been his intention to array himself in his vestments at a later stage in the march, so certain was he that the procession would not be impeded. With Father Gapon were attendants carrying holy pictures

and the Tsar's portrait. At the head of the procession marched two priests in vestments, and carrying crosses in their hands. The demonstrators comforted themselves with the thought that even if anything in the nature of a collision with the soldiery took place the latter would take no serious action. "Why should soldiers harm us?" they said; "they are our brothers, they think as we think." In the ranks were women and children, for the workers had said the night before, when Father Gapon had warned them that the Government was obdurate, that they would go with their wives and children to the Winter Palace to bespeak their Sovereign's gracious intervention in the quarrel with their immediate masters. "Our Tsar is a good man. He has little children of his own," they said, "and he will see we have justice." And so they trudged on singing, "God save Thy people. Give victory to our Orthodox Emperor."


At eleven o'clock the procession was brought to a halt at one of the bridges by two sotnias of Cossacks, who were

drawn up in five rows completely barring the way. The Cossacks tried to turn the strikers first with whips, then with the flut of their sabres, but the procession showed no signs of backing, and the order was given to fire three volleys of blank cartridge. At this some of the strikers fled over the ice on the Neva, but the remainder stood firm and implored the Cossacks to let them pass, urging that the reforms which they were seeking would improve the lot of the Cossacks as well as their own. But the Cossacks were obdurate, and sent brief a galloper for reinforcements. Fresh troops came up, rifles were loaded with ball cartridge, a bugle rang out, another volley was fired, and the head of the strikers' column became in an instant a ghastly huddled mass of dead and wounded. One of the priests at the head of the procession was wounded, and the holy pictures and the portrait of the Tsar were riddled with bullet holes. Some of the leading demonstrators who had been wounded or thrown to the ground—

either Gapon among them—crawled into neighbouring houses and the remainder fled leaving according to one account, 300 dead and 500 wounded.

What happened here was repeated in several other quarters. Every procession found its way barred and on attempting to advance was met by volleys, which mowed down scores of unarmed men, and many women. Only in one instance did the soldiers show any reluctance to fire upon the strikers. A crowd coming from Vassili Ostroff was stopped by a strong force of cavalry and infantry. The strike leaders appealed to the soldiers not to fire upon their brothers, and a number of infantry laid down their rifles. But the cavalry, obeying orders charged the demonstrators, and wounded many with their swords. Between eleven and twelve there were half a dozen collisions, all resulting in volleys or charges in which the wretched strikers were killed or wounded with little or no attempt at reprisals.

Meanwhile a terrible climax had also



THE GRAND ENTRANCE WINTER PALACE ST. PETERSBURG

been reached in the Palace Square. Here the workmen had been gathering by twos and threes, until some thousands were assembled in close proximity to the troops. About noon the officer in command ordered the crowd to disperse, and, no movement being apparent, tried the usual expedient of firing blank volleys. Some of those in front tried to retreat, but were pressed on by those behind. The cavalry now tried to push back the crowd by pressing forward their horses at a walk. This again proved useless. A volley with ball cartridge followed, and the strikers, not pent up here as at the bridges, and maddened at the sight of the dead and wounded, still pressed on with a roar of anger. The cavalry drew their swords and charged, another volley was fired, and soon the Palace Square was a reeking shambles. The snow was trampled into blood-stained slush, and not until half-past two was the place cleared of the populace, now quite infuriated and heedless of the weapons of the soldiery.

Throughout the afternoon and early evening the carnage continued, more charges were delivered by the Cossacks down the great Nevsky Prospect, and another deadly volley was fired on the Palace Bridge. In Vassili Ostroff there was incessant fighting, the workers dragging down the telegraph poles, making entanglements across the streets with wires, and using the poles as weapons against the troops. Stones were hurled especially at the officers, who were hooted and asked with angry jeers why they were not fighting the Japanese instead of their own countrymen. Of ghastly incidents there was a grim abundance. An aged general was dragged from his sledge and beaten and trampled to death. Twenty-six children who were

playing on the ice in the Alexander Square were killed or wounded by the firing.

Night fell on a city terrorised by slaughter, and the next morning the whole civilised world shuddered at the news of the awful punishment inflicted by an irresponsible despotism upon hundreds of poor wretches whose only crime had been a childlike yearning to lay their grievances before their mighty ruler. The disgust, the withering contempt, of most dwellers in free countries were intensified when it transpired that this puissant Autocrat, not content with hiding himself from his people behind a cordon of soldiery, well knowing that the latter had been ordered to slay or maim all who sought nearer access to the Palace, had fled to Tsarkoe Selo in the hope of placing a yet more comfortable interval between him and his hapless subjects. No Sovereign ever had a greater opportunity of proving himself great than was offered to Nicholas of Russia on the morning of this Red Sunday. No Sovereign could have more completely forfeited than he did the goodwill of those at home and the respect of all thinking and honourable men abroad.

Coupled with outspoken expressions of horror and reprobation throughout Europe and America there were many sinister prophecies as to the inevitable result of this frightful massacre. But for the moment, the shocking severity with which the authorities dealt with the situation was effective as far as checking the progress of the revolution in St. Petersburg was concerned. On the night of January 22nd the capital was in a condition of terrible suspense, accentuated by the fact that the strikers had been joined by the *employés* at the electric light works, and that consequently many quarters of the city were plunged in dark-

ness. It was feared that the revolutionaries might next morning obtain arms, and that further and still more sanguinary conflicts might ensue. But, although

between St. Petersburg and Moscow ceased; in Moscow itself another large strike was commenced, and news of serious disturbances in other parts of



NEVSKY PROSPECT, ST. PETERSBURG

there was still a good deal of incidental rioting, and a general state of panic prevailed, there was no organised opposition on a large scale to the military measures which continued in force. The newspapers were stopped, the train service

Russia was fitfully circulated. Although unconnected with the industrial strike movement, a simultaneous outbreak of mutiny among the sailors at Sevastopol, resulting in the wholesale destruction of naval works and barracks, created a most

serious impression of extended disorder. But for the time being the revolutionary movement, at any rate in St. Petersburg, had been strangled, and in another week,



"MAXIM GORKY."

despite all gloomy forebodings and some disquieting incidents, the city had resumed its normal aspect.

During the week in question the Government policy of repression was pursued with unflinching vigour. On January 24th an Imperial Decree was issued, creating the new post of Governor-General of St. Petersburg, to which General Trepoff, ex-Minister of Police at Moscow, was forthwith appointed. This official had an unenviable reputation for arrogance and heavy-handedness, and his selection for the newly-formed office was at once accepted as the signal for a series of indiscriminately harsh measures. General Trepoff's performances did not belie the popular anticipation. The mili-

tary having maintained their occupation of all the principal strategic points, and an attempt on the part of a mob to march to Tsarkoe Selo with a fresh petition having been sharply checked, the police were given special orders to "act with energy," orders which they carried out with characteristic alacrity and thoroughness. Arrests were freely made among persons of the better class who were suspected of revolutionary tendencies, and who had taken part in meetings, or had been connected with propaganda antagonistic to the Government and its methods. By this means a number of inconveniently loud voices were silenced, and, the system being extended, many troublesome critics were brought into Trepoff's net, including, among others, the famous Russian author, "Maxim Gorky," who was arrested at Riga, and brought to St. Petersburg. As "Maxim Gorky" had somewhat freely identified himself with the workmen's cause, General Trepoff was at first inclined to give

him short shrift, but eventually, owing perhaps, in some measure to strong protests in the European Press against the summary removal of a literary genius of such international value, he was released from prison, and sent back to Riga under strict surveillance.

To the strikers a special proclamation was issued in which strong allusion was made to the "evil-disposed persons" who, for the execution of their own designs, and "by means of false and impossible promises," had led the workmen astray. The proclamation went on to say that the Government was now, as ever, ready to listen attentively to the just desires of the working classes, and to satisfy their demands as far as possible.

But an indispensable preliminary to any action in this direction was a return of the strikers to their employment. The proclamation was accompanied by police intimations to the effect that those who did not within a very short space of time resume work would be deported to the villages. These pronouncements soon had a marked effect. The strikers perceived that for the present they were powerless to cope with the forces which the Government could readily bring against them, and, accepting the inevitable, the majority returned to work, and the great strike was over.

But it must not be supposed that the triumph of Autocracy was final, or even temporarily complete. Not only did disturbances continue for many weeks to arise in other parts of Russia, not only did a later lurid incident at the capital show how bureaucratic, and especially that section of it with which the Grand Dukes were personally connected, was still in object of dangerous detestation among the lower orders of the Russian people. An even more serious blow to Imperial Russia was the loss of the confidence formerly placed by the proletariat in the Tsar. Father Gapon had written on the evening of Red Sunday, "There is no Tsar now. Innocent blood has flowed between him and his people. Long live the struggle for freedom!" Not all that a Government with such a weapon as Trepoff in its hands might do could obliterate the memory of that awful day when St. Petersburg ran with the blood of unarmed workmen and their

wives and the children, while the Emperor hid himself in cowardly seclusion out of reach of the entreaties of those who merely prayed the rights of citizenship, out of hearing of the shrieks of those cut down and shot because they vainly fancied they would get simple justice from the 'Great White Tsar'.

In connection with the spread of the revolutionary movement in Russia certain incidents occurred in which this country was directly interested, and the occurrence of which at such a juncture was



GENERAL TREPOFF

sharply indicative of a very bitter feeling against Great Britain among the Russian official classes. At Moscow the police thought fit to post in all the streets copies

of a telegram purporting to come from the *Agence Latine*, of Paris, in which the extraordinary statement was made that the disorders at the Admiralty works in St. Petersburg, Libau, and Sevastopol, and at the coal-pits in Westphalia, had been provoked by the Japanese, assisted by their Allies in Europe! It was suggested that the object of the Anglo-Japanese league was to hinder the naval

ment. The latter promised that an inquiry should be instituted, and steps taken to prevent any repetition of such publications. With much *bonhomie* the officials at the Ministry ridiculed the idea that any such charge as that contained in the objectionable telegram would meet with general acceptance. "Unfortunately," said one of them pleasantly, "they are our own Japanese who are at



WORKMEN OF ST. PETERSBURG.

reinforcements, and it was added that enormous sums of money had been sent to Russia from England in order to organise a workmen's revolt.

The mere publication of such a monstrous charge in a country the Press of which is so well under control as it is in Russia would have savoured of unfriendliness. But that the telegram should have been deliberately disseminated by the police was a serious matter. The British colony in Moscow immediately informed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg of what had occurred, and he forthwith made a strong representation on the subject to the Russian Govern-

ment. The latter promised that an inquiry should be instituted, and steps taken to prevent any repetition of such publications. With much *bonhomie* the officials at the Ministry ridiculed the idea that any such charge as that contained in the objectionable telegram would meet with general acceptance. "Unfortunately," said one of them pleasantly, "they are our own Japanese who are at the bottom of the disturbances." But meanwhile, the Prefect of Odessa had issued a proclamation to the local workmen, in which the calumnies of the *Agence Latine* were repeated. A day or two later placards similar to those exhibited in Moscow were posted in Libau, bearing the signature of the Governor of Courland. This was manifestly intolerable, and, accordingly, Sir Charles Hardinge's protest was renewed in a very vigorous fashion. He pointed out that such proceedings could not but have a deplorable effect, and hinted plainly that the existing friendly relations were being wantonly endangered.



The Russian Government now took action, and every trace of the telegram was removed. It transpired that the *Agence Latine* was a hole-and-corner affair of no standing, and it was generally regretted that such a trivial institution should have been afforded the opportunity of doing so much genuine mischief.

this fresh outrage was that the soldiers had got completely out of hand, and that a combination of excitement and vodka had made them incapable of discriminating between rioters and the official representatives of a foreign Power.

In Poland the disturbances continued for many weeks almost without inter-



GRAND DUKE VLADIMIR.


Another untoward incident of the outbreak in Russia took place in Warsaw on January 28th. In the course of the rioting Mr. Murray, the British Consul-General, and the pro-Consul were attacked by soldiers, and the pro-Consul, who was a Russian subject, was injured by a sword-cut. Here, again, pressing representations were made by Sir Charles Hardinge. The explanation offered for

ruption. But there is no need here to follow further the progress of the outbreak, sufficient having been said to indicate the character of the movement and the extent of its influence upon the war. There is little doubt that it was at one time almost universally expected that a general revolution throughout Russia would overthrow the reigning dynasty, and bring the war to a dramatic and

sudden end. That it did not do so was attributed by some not so much to the stern measures of repression adopted by the Government as to the fact that the Russian masses were not yet fitted for a Constitution.

But at this point the relation of earlier aspects of the outbreak to the war ceases, and the painful narrative of internal disorders may, accordingly, be checked, to be resumed later by the discussion of a fresh episode so startling and tragic as to afford a new standpoint from which to view these extraordinary embarrassments of a belligerent nation. Somewhat, it will be understood that, moral

influence apart, the outbreak reacted materially upon Russia's warlike resources, delaying as it did the preparation and despatch of supplies and stores, and effectively blinding the mobilization of reinforcements. In a sense it was even more disastrous to Russia's chance of success, for it made the Tsar and his Grand Ducal advisers anxious to create a diversion, and led to the hyperbolic upon European soil of a fleet of iron freight with the greatest concentration at a critical moment when a partial and peremptory repudiation of the loan would at the front might have proved of very different results.



CHAPTER LXXXI.


ON THE SHA-HO—CONDITION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES—KUROPATKIN'S GOOD SPIRITS—
TYPICAL ENCOUNTERS—TRYING TO PIERCE THE LINE—MISHTCHENKO'S RAID—
RAILWAY WRECKING—ATTACK ON A STORE DEPOT—CHINESE NEUTRALITY VIOLATED.

IN Chapter LXXIV. the story of the operations in the region of the Sha-ho was brought down to about the middle of December. The ensuing six weeks which are covered by the present chapter constitute a period not, perhaps, of sensational importance, but extremely interesting for a variety of strong reasons. The military significance of this interval was twofold. In the first place there were two enormous armies in close touch along an immense front, armies so powerful and alert that, notwithstanding the severity of the season, and the natural reluctance to take costly risks, the revelation of any distinct weakness on the one side would inevitably have been followed by a swift attempt on the other to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered. Secondly, as we shall see, this period was actually marked by a very striking example of the cavalry raid. But, apart from these military considerations, we have to remember that from the middle of December to the end of January events were taking place far away from the banks of the Sha-ho, which could not but gravely influence morally, if not materially, the progress of the operations in that direction.

For the correct weighing of this last reflection the two previous chapters have been a useful preparation. The writer has already expressed the belief that, all things being considered, the news of

the fall of Port Arthur must have come as something of a relief to Kuropatkin personally. But, none the less, the positive tidings of such a disaster could not fail to produce throughout his army a feeling of very grave depression, if not of utter gloom. The Russian authorities at home were evidently apprehensive of this result, for, with singular fatuity, they withheld all news of the capitulation from the army at Mukden, and the announcement of the loss of Port Arthur was made to the Generalissimo of the Russian armies in the field by his immediate antagonist. According to the Mukden correspondent of the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger*, Marshal Oyama addressed a letter to General Kuropatkin, in which he announced the surrender of the fortress, and expressed his admiration for its gallant defenders. The correspondent added that the effect of the news was overwhelming, since, during the last few days, information had been received which seemed to warrant the hope that the defence would be prolonged. "The impression created was, therefore, that of a sudden disaster, which it was felt must inevitably influence the situation on the Sha-ho."

Of the effect created upon the army at the front by such news as was permitted to reach it concerning the outbreak at home it is impossible to speak clearly and conclusively, but it goes without say-



IN FRONT OF CAMP TWO, LOCATED IN THE THICK FOREST AT AL-AN-SHAN

From Camp Two, looking
towards the camp.

ing that the troops, a large proportion of whom were reservists fresh from home, were profoundly moved by the terrifying intelligence of the strikes and their results. What made the situation more dreadful was the fact, to which the war correspondent of one of the Russian papers drew particular attention, that from the start the Russian soldiers in the field had been keenly interested in the prospect of domestic reform. About the middle of December they were beginning to talk of little else. They seemed to understand thoroughly the meaning of the reforms, and it was rather a pathetic circumstance that these simple fighting men should attribute the movement to the desire to reward the army for the hardships it was enduring. "The idea," said the correspondent of the *Russ*, telegraphing from Mukden, "has infused new life into them, together with the desire to finish off the Japanese quickly in order to get home to live as men with liberties." The revulsion of feeling produced by the news of "Red Sunday," and the deepening conviction that the immediate prospects of internal Russia lay rather in the direction of anarchy than in that of reform, can be better imagined than described.

As to the state of the Japanese troops in Manchuria during this period, there is little or no information available beyond what has already been utilised in Chapter LXXIV. In a telegram from Reuter's correspondent with General Oku's army, which was despatched by way of Fusan on December 18th, a serious shortage of fuel and food was regarded as imminent; but if the Japanese soldiers suffered in this way, they kept the fact to themselves, and there is certainly no indication of exhaustion or privation in their subsequent performances.

As to the actual condition of the Russian armies there were conflicting reports. According to one authority, the frightfully cold nights worked havoc with General Kuropatkin's forces, 700 men being reported to have died from exposure. "Messages to the highest quarters have been received from General Kuropatkin, bitterly complaining of the tardiness of the commissariat department in sending supplies necessary to the soldiers, who are insufficiently clothed to meet the rigours of a winter campaign, and insisting that until there is better organisation military operations are impossible. The supplies which are arriving are of an exceedingly poor quality, and are insufficient in quantity. General Mavis has, by special order of the Tsar, gone to Moscow, empowered to examine all stores sent to the Far East. His first examination of a trainload of goods showed the necessity of his presence. A large portion of the stores were reported as useless, and much of the rest as not of a particularly high character. Eleven hundred pieces of clothing described as 'warm overcoats' delivered by a Moscow firm had to be rejected. General Mavis is remaining at Moscow to continue investigations."

Here is another and different picture:—

"The Russian camps present a picturesque appearance. The sides of the hills and the fields around the villages are dotted with mud huts and the little chimneys of the dug outs, from which the smoke is rising. Even more comfortable than the officers' quarters in Chinese houses are the huts of the private soldiers, which are well built and roomy, with small glass windows, and provided with sheet-iron stoves. The men have every comfort possible, including great

quantities of warm clothing and heat producing food.

The transport is working well, as the roads are frozen hard, and are in excellent condition. Large supplies of hay and grain are being brought from Western Manchuria by the roads, several of which extend direct to the southern and eastern positions of the army.

According to this writer, the stores at Mukden were stocked with every class of goods, although prices were high, and some depreciation in the value of the trouble had taken place. On the whole, there seems no reason to doubt that for the greater part of the period with which we are dealing the Russians were very fairly well fed and cared for, but towards the end of January a falling off doubtless began to be observable, owing partly to the disturbances at St. Petersburg and Moscow, and the increasing difficulty of getting supplies started on their way to the front.

Unhappily, the very well being of the Russian troops meant a fearful drain upon the surrounding country, and accounts agree as to the misery inflicted upon the hapless inhabitants of the country round Mukden by the increasing demands of the Russian soldiery. Here is a telling extract from a private letter published in the *Times*—

'Latest reports from Mukden say that the villagers have been flocking in there by tens of thousands. The country along the railway and for a wide radius has been utterly devastated. Nothing remains. The most populous and best-cultivated section of Manchuria is a complete wilderness. The islands of pretty well thriving villages and market towns are in ruins. All the fine groves of trees are gone. Furniture, doors, windows, and every vestige of the woodwork of the

houses the Russians have burned for fuel. Crops were cut down—thousands of acres—by Russians two hundred and more thousand troops as forage. Further afield, the stacks of corn have been all seized or destroyed, and not a cent paid or even promised as some compensation to the innocent sufferers. The rice and wide the crops were ruined, eaten, or trampled down. Food is rising in price, even in places unaffected directly. Millet has been fixed as to price by the Chinese local governors, but it must rise in spite of this. Cattle are decreasing or becoming extinct in wide areas.

Horses and mules are being sacrificed by hundreds to meet the military demands. Animals leave their homes, never to return, or, if so, often overstrained and useless.

From another letter written by a foreign officer who had just left the Russian forces in Manchuria we obtain some useful details concerning the military position towards the latter end of December. In the estimation of this evidently competent authority the Russian army was stronger than the Japanese by some thousands, although according to the Russian Intelligence Department, the strength of the two forces was about equal. All the Siberian reserves, including the 61st Division, had arrived, as well as the whole of the 8th Army Corps and a division of the Don Cossacks. Reinforcements, moreover, were coming through regularly. It took about six weeks for a corps to arrive from Russia. One important new development was that General Mishchenko had been given the command of all the cavalry, to be formed into an enormous division, Rennenkampf and Samsonoff retaining their former cavalry commands. There was a grand total of 1,057 guns, includ-



EVACUATION

Over 100,000 Chinese are being evacuated from the Japanese-occupied Chinese cities and towns in the north of China. The evacuation is being carried out by the Japanese military and is being described as a "humanitarian" measure. The evacuation is being carried out in a series of trains and trucks, and the evacuees are being taken to the interior of China.

bourhood of the railway bridge over the Sha-ho, towards which the Japanese had been steadily creeping with a view to effecting a passage in some force. For three nights the Russians sapped up towards the bridge, and then, getting within short range, they hurled gun-cotton bombs into the enemy's trenches communicating with the bridge, dislodging, at any rate temporarily, the occupants. These gun-cotton bombs were largely used by the Russians at this period, and appear to have been fairly effective. It will be remembered that similar projectiles were employed by the Japanese before Port Arthur for clearing the enemy out of kaponiers and other defences.

A somewhat curious revival is here indicated of the application of the old hand grenades, which were shells of metal about two and a half inches in diameter, filled with fine powder, and burst by means of a small fuse. They used to be thrown by the "Grenadiers" — who were the tallest and stoutest soldiers in the regiment, and were formed into a picked company, and posted on the right of a battalion — into places where the enemy stood thickly, and particularly into trenches or other places of lodgment. We ourselves had long ago discarded the grenade and the grenadier companies in our service, but the experience of this war may tend to the re-introduction of a weapon which, in these days of high explosives, can be made much more destructive than it used to be in the first half of the last century.

On December 25th a typical little combat took place at the village of Lin-shi-pu, which has been frequently mentioned before in connection with the Sha-ho fighting. This was the village, one end of which, it will be remembered, remained for weeks in the hands of the Japanese,

while the Russians remained in stubborn occupation of the other. Some huts in the Japanese end had been damaged by gun-cotton bombs on the night of the 22nd, and three nights later a Russian detachment made an effort to occupy these buildings. What followed is an instructive example of the difficulty of catching the Japanese napping in anything relating to soldiers' work. In the first place they were very much on the alert, and the Russian detachment, as it crept towards the coveted huts, came under a hot cross fire. When, moreover, the huts were reached, it was found that the walls facing the enemy's position had been thoughtfully razed to the ground. Instead, therefore, of settling down more or less comfortably in a roofed building, from the inside of which they could exchange fire with the enemy, the Russians simply gained the far side of a wall, and were again exposed, this time at a range of fifty yards, to a cross-fire from the enemy's trench. An officer and a couple of soldiers were promptly killed, and the rest got away as best they could to a less warm corner than the one they had aspired to occupy.

On New Year's Day a pleasant instance occurred of those amenities of warfare to which allusion has been previously made in connection with the Sha-ho operations. Two junior officers of the opposing forces had for some time past carried on a jocular correspondence by means of notes left in the huts alternately occupied by their respective detachments, and on New Year's Day it was resolved to extend this merry intercourse by a little friendly conversation. Arrangements were accordingly made for a meeting, and the two officers, each attended by an escort of two soldiers, came out into the open with refreshments, and a

two hours' chat was indulged in, at which, we are told, 'war matters were not discussed.'


In the first ten days of January the operations along the Shiroha consisted almost entirely of minor affairs varied by occasional bombardments, and, indeed, until the end of the month the cavalry raid which we are about to describe formed the only real break in a somewhat monotonous series of petty skirmishes. But the importance of such spells of apparent inaction must not be underestimated. They are excellent tests of efficiency, and the fact that for such a prolonged period, along such an immense line, the Russians and the Japanese were shaving up against each other in such close contact, with so little war given on either side, is one of the most interesting instances of equally balanced strength in military history. For by this time the objections to a forward movement on the part of either antagonist were fast disappearing. The Russians had obtained numerous reinforcements, and were becoming inured to the trying conditions under which they were working. For them the rupture of the Japanese line at any important point might have paved the way to an advance against Hiroshima, the possible recapture of which must have been in the mind of every one of Kuroki's generals at this period.

To the Japanese, on the other hand, the thought of their enemy with Mukden at his back, and fresh relays of men and stores reaching him almost daily was a terrible thought. The extraordinary length of the Russian front—at one time it is reported must have extended over really a hundred miles and any attempt to turn the flanks for the present was out of the question. If there was still

one point or another, and the right sort of impression properly followed up might have led to further openings.

How the Russians attempted a diversion which, if successful, might have had important consequences, we shall see presently. But, judging by the account published in the *Asahi* *Yemsa*, the Japanese seem to have been the first to make a serious effort to pierce the Russian line by a movement which, although in itself insignificant, may well have been intended as a prelude to a much more serious advance. On January 9th they opened a bombardment which lasted the whole day against the Russian positions on both sides of the railway. At two o'clock the next morning the offensive was taken by a whole regiment of infantry, which, even if we discount the rather one-sided report in the leading Russian organ, is a much larger force than had for a long time past been seen in warlike motion along the banks of the Shiroha.

The Russian outposts were driven back, and the Japanese continued to advance in the teeth of a hot fire from the Russian artillery positions and infantry trenches. This time the Russians showed considerable wisdom, for their outposts retiring slowly, lured the enemy on towards a concealed battery. At a range of only 400 yards the battery opened fire upon the advancing Japanese, and at the same time a party of Russian infantry attacked them in the flank. Taken at a complete disadvantage, the Japanese are said to have escaped annihilation by a precipitate and disorderly retreat and with that completeness which sometimes unfortunately, sometimes rather crudely, marks the account of the most trivial Russian success, we are assured that the enemy were finally driven from their



A CHANGE OF SIDES: BIG RUSSIAN GUNS BEING USED BY THE JAPANESE ON THE SHA-HO.
These three guns were captured by the Japanese at Nan-shan, and were brought up to the front by the railway. They were carried on trucks, which were pushed along the line by Chinese coolies.

original positions by their victorious adversaries.

We have now to give attention to an operation of a very different description from the foregoing, namely, a Russian cavalry raid, having as its object the cutting of the Japanese railway communications and the destruction of the Japanese supply depôt near the mouth of the Liao River. Not since Chapter XLII., in Volume I., has there been occasion to make more than incidental reference to the Japanese occupation of Ying-kau, the port of Niu-chwang, and to Old Niu-chwang, which lies some twenty-eight miles further up the river. But the despatch of stores by this route has been carefully kept in view, and it has gone without saying that, with their accustomed thoroughness, the Japanese have turned this important new base to the best possible advantage.

As a matter of fact, in addition to organising a vast emporium of warlike stores at Old Niu-chwang, they had constructed another great commissariat depôt at Niu-kia-tun, some three miles north of Ying-kau, with a view to the accumulation of as many stores as possible before the mouth of the Liao River should become ice-bound. The latter event took place towards the end of November, and it is thought that by the end of the first week in January most of the supplies accumulated at Old Niu-chwang must have been exhausted. But those at Niu-kia-tun are estimated to have been still worth nearly a million sterling in actual money, while, of course, in such warlike conditions as those which were present in Manchuria they were, practically speaking, priceless.

It must also be remembered in connection with the raid about to be de-

scribed, that the railway in rear of the Japanese position on the southern bank of the Shu-ho had, in the early part of January, a double significance. Not only

needed before Port Arthur to reinforce the main armies under Marshal Oyama. Any serious interruption of the railway communication could not but delay con-



A TYPICAL JAPANESE TRENCH IN MANCHURIA

The nature of the large openings during the winter months did not permit of any further on the part of the engineers. The positions on each side were continuous in fact and it was necessary to know their positions as far as possible. It was therefore necessary to have a system of communication between the two sides and to protect the communication.

was it in constant requisition for the transport of warlike stores and supplies, but it was about to be subjected to an additional strain in the matter of bringing up the troops and guns now no longer

siderably the arrival of this body of seasoned soldiers and this highly important addition of far-ranging artillery of large calibre.

The Russians, then, had every

ment to make a quick dash southward with a body of extremely mobile troops, and to endeavour to cause the enemy serious annoyance both by cutting his railway communications and by destroying his reserve supplies. Nor were the means wanting to this end. In the early part of this chapter an extract was given from a letter written by a foreign officer formerly with the Russians in Manchuria, in which mention was made of a significant consolidation of the large force of cavalry at Kuropatkin's disposal. Towards the end of December this huge body of mounted men was assembled at the extreme right of the Russian position, and a little later an indication was given that there was no intention of allowing it to remain idle.

At the same time, however favourable the juncture may have been for the execution of a raid, there was one serious drawback to any such attempt. We have seen that the Russian cavalry were drawn up in readiness on the Russian right, and it will readily be understood that this was the only flank on which they could be expected to operate to any good purpose. A big cavalry raid from the Russian left would have been foredoomed to failure, for the necessary *détour* would have been such a long one that, even had the objective been reached, the raiders would inevitably have been cut off before they could get back to the Russian line. On the other hand, a force operating from the extreme Russian right had only to traverse about a hundred miles in order to be in a position to inflict serious damage on both communications and supplies.

But there were two obstacles. To attempt to break directly through the Japanese left would have been suicidal, and Kuropatkin had already been taught by

experience that if here and there a gap seemed to exist in the Japanese hedge, there was generally an unseen obstacle on the other side to render any attempt to scramble through extremely risky. Theoretically, any idea of getting well round the extreme Japanese left was also out of the question, for here Chinese neutrality came into play. By agreement the Russians had no more right to cross the Liao River and operate on the other side than they had to use Peking as a base of supplies. And though it might be possible to dash down south without crossing the Liao, it was morally certain that it would be necessary to traverse purely Chinese territory on the return journey unless the raiding force were prepared to meet annihilation from the Japanese troops closed up to bar the way back.

Russian views on the subject of Chinese neutrality had already been proved to be very one-sided, notably at Chi-fu, where, as we have seen, Russian warships had sought refuge under very questionable conditions. The Russians had also, for weeks past, been drawing stores from the Chinese railway terminus at Hsin-min-tun or Sin-ming-ting, which lies about thirty-five miles to the west-north-west of Mukden, notwithstanding an express embargo placed by the Chinese Government on this traffic. They had been collecting ponies, too, in large numbers from Mongolia, and these experiments in violation of Chinese neutrality had proved successful, for the simple reason that China was impotent to check them, and no other Power but Japan would assist her to do so. The small additional risk to be encountered by making a convenience of the trans-Liao territory for the purpose of a cavalry raid was, accordingly, not sufficient to

deter Russia from an enterprise which a more scrupulous nation would have regarded is barred by considerations of simple honour.

At the end of the first week in January a large force of Cossacks had been collected in the neighbourhood of Sin-ming-tung by General Mishtchenko, the well-known cavalry leader, who had redeemed the early and not very sparkling reputation he made in connection with the Russian evacuation of Korea by his subsequent vigorous handling of his Cossacks on every available opportunity.

A portrait of this fine-looking officer is given on page 305.

The Japanese should not have been wholly unprepared for the movement of this force. For on New Year's Day a detachment of Cossacks accompanied by some Chuncheuses is guided appeared suddenly on the railway a little to the north of Hsicheng, which lies thirty-five miles south west of Liao-yang. According to the *Times* correspondent at Tokio, who subsequently sent some interesting details of the larger raid, these adventurous troopers placed explosives at three points, one beside the rails, and the other two at the bases of telegraph posts, and they succeeded in firing these just at the moment when a train was passing. No damage was done, however, and the attempt being on a very small scale did not attract my attention. A Cossack disguised as a Chinaman was captured by the railway guards, but nothing could be got from him.

Later it became evident to the Japanese that this little party must have belonged to a detachment some 200 strong which on January 2d moved down the west bank of the Liao nearly as far as Old Nanchwang and then withdrew. It was reported in the *Times* correspondent,

that these troopers had Chinese assistance, and that in riding down the west bank of the Liao they had openly violated Chinese neutrality. But it was supposed that a mere reconnaissance had been intended, and again no serious notice was taken of what was really a prelude to a very serious performance.

On January 8th General Mishtchenko crossed the Hun River from the main Russian position south of Mukden at the head of a cavalry division of Cossacks, Cuirassiers and Dragoons in three brigades estimated to number about 6,000 mounted men, with six batteries of light artillery. This imposing force swept southward on a five mile front. It was accompanied by only one foreign correspondent, Mr. Francis McCullagh, the representative of the *New York Herald*, to whose vivid description of the raid the writer is indebted for many of the details contained in the following account.—

The raiding force must have presented an extraordinary appearance as it dashed over the broad Liao Plain. Although its composite nature detracted from its fighting efficiency, it must have enhanced its picturesqueness, and it is doubtful whether any body of cavalry actually employed it one time in a warlike operation has afforded a more striking spectacle.

With the respect of the average Cossack the reader of this history has been rendered familiar by numerous pictures, but there were many others besides ordinary Cossacks in this mixed division. There were Kirghiz, Kalmucks, Buriats and Cuirassiers, who could not speak a word of Russian, the last named for a Mohammedan brigade led by officers from the Russian Cavalry of the Caucasus. One can picture them swarthy bearded, rudely uniformed, and as a rule, with turbans, their lean horses in the hard

est condition ; their weapons bright with constant handling and that careful attention which most Asiatics bestow lovingly on all personal fighting gear ; many of them with a skinny fowl or other plunder already dangling from their saddles ; and all in high good humour at the prospect of further spoil. At the head of the three brigades rode Generals Samsonoff, Abramoff, and Tyelschoff.

The first two days of the march were uneventful, only a Japanese transport cart being snapped up. But it soon became evident that the progress of the division was becoming known to the Japanese, for, as night fell on the 9th, the Russians saw signal bonfires lit one after another, and stretching away into the far distance eastwards. During the remainder of the raid the Japanese or their Chinese agents kept up this method of signalling, even during the daytime, when dense pillars of smoke indicated the passage of the raiders more effectually than flames alone would have done.

At eight o'clock in the morning of January 10th the Russians met a band of 500 Chunchuses, and the latter opened fire, the first bullet killing a Russian captain. Thereupon the Begistan Regiment charged, according to Mr. McCullagh, with incredible swiftness and fierceness. The Chunchuses, who were armed with Mausers, resisted bravely, but were overcome, and lost 100 of their number. A Japanese flag was captured from them.

Towards evening on the 10th a brisk encounter took place between the Cossacks forming the rearguard of the left brigade and a company and a half of Japanese infantry. The Japanese were holding a village covering the railway, and on the approach of the Cossacks they occupied a factory, and prepared to offer a stubborn resistance. The Cossacks

under Lieutenant Nekrasoff approached the wall of the factory, and the Russian leader was first wounded in the head by a bayonet thrust, and then killed by two rifle bullets. A French lieutenant named Bertin was also killed.

As the Japanese, wrote Kuropatkin in reporting this affair to the Tsar, were found to be securely posted behind the strong factory wall, the Cossacks were compelled to summon artillery to their aid, and these opening fire at 400 yards, compelled the Japanese to evacuate the building. As the defenders retired they were dispersed by the Cossacks, and some were taken prisoners. But the encounter was hardly a fortunate one for the Russians, who lost two officers and seven men killed, and thirty-three soldiers wounded.

On January 11th the Cossacks advanced unopposed, and at noon entered Old Niu-chwang, which had been previously occupied by a company of Japanese infantry and two squadrons of cavalry. The majority of these retired, but fifty Japanese shut themselves in a house and refused to surrender. Some of them were killed, others were captured, and, according to the Russian official report, those who had previously retreated were followed up and severely dealt with. But the raiders had now to attend to other business besides that of inflicting insignificant casualties upon small detachments. During the 11th the Caucasian brigade destroyed about 600 yards of the railway north of Hai-cheng, and dragoons blew up the bridge at Tashi-chao. The telegraph and telephone lines were cut, and a train and two locomotives damaged. During the 10th and 11th 500 transport carts were captured.

The Caucasians and dragoons appear to



have done their work of railway and bridge wrecking very badly, for, according to the Japanese report, the mischief was promptly repaired, and traffic even along the main line cannot have been interrupted for more than a day or two at most.

A striking instance, this, of the folly of entrusting work which ought to be scientifically and most thoroughly performed to half-trained irregulars. There is no question that if the Russians had used the opportunity now afforded them with real skill they would have caused the Japanese an infinity of trouble, and, moreover, would have done much to render the remainder of their enterprise a brilliant success instead of an almost complete fiasco. For Ta-shi-chao is, as was explained in the narrative of the advance of Oku's army up through the Liao-tung Peninsula, the junction for the branch line running to Ying-kan or the Port of Niu-chwang. As the latter was to be made one of the main objectives of the raid, the interruption of communication by this branch line should have been most carefully carried out with a view to preventing the swift reinforcement of the Ying-kan and Niu-kia-tun garrisons. But the dragoons who went to Ta-shi-chao must have scamped their work sadly, with the result that on the next day a train with reinforcements, as we shall see, got through to Ying-kan, and modified an extremely critical situation.

According to the Japanese report there was a sharp encounter in the forenoon of the 11th between a Japanese cavalry detachment and four Cossack sotnias to the westward of a place called Tungmasa, resulting in the dispersal of the Russians. There was further sporadic fighting which shows that during this day the raiders must have been a good deal split up.

On January 12th the culminating point of the raid was reached, General Mishtchenko dashing with the main body of his force to Niu-kia-tun, where, as has already been mentioned, there was a great commissariat depot containing army stores to the value of £600,000. This valuable property was normally defended by about 500 Japanese soldiers, and when General Mishtchenko first appeared before the place at four o'clock in the afternoon of January 12th, he might have taken it by a *coup de main*, notwithstanding the failure of his dragoons to wreck the branch line from Ta-shi-chao with something like thoroughness. But, in any case, he was a quarter of an hour too late. For as he came within sight of Niu-kia-tun a train of sixteen trucks, each carrying thirty Japanese, steamed in, actually passing the Russians. By dint of great exertions this train had been got through from Ta-shi-chao with a reinforcement furnished by the garrison still maintained in the north of the Liao-tung Peninsula. The Japanese soldiers fired from the trucks on the Russians, and, on arrival at Niu-kia-tun, promptly joined the garrison, which now numbered about 1,000 resolute men well intrenched, and quite prepared to do battle with any number of Cossacks.

At first Mishtchenko did not despair of success, more especially as he had no intention of entering Ying-kan, but desired merely to destroy the Niu-kia-tun depot. The six batteries of artillery were ordered to open a cannonade, 1,000 Cossacks were detailed to make a front attack, and the rest of the force attempted a diversion on the right. Some of the buildings in the depot were set on fire by the artillery, and the Cossacks made three desperate charges, carrying on the attack for a short time after dark. But cavalry in

such circumstances are no match for infantry when the latter are intrenched, and know how to shoot straight. The Russians kept dropping to the well aimed fire of the defenders, and eventually General Mishchenko, fearing that, even if he partially succeeded in attaining his object, he would be heavily encumbered with wounded, gave the order to retire. It afterwards transpired that sixty-two dead and six wounded Russians were left on the field, and that the Japanese casualties amounted only to two killed and eleven wounded.

The accounts of the return of the raiders are a little confusing owing doubtless, to the fact that the force did not keep together closely, and that detached parties were engaged in isolated encounters by the now thoroughly awakened Japanese. One such encounter was reported to have taken place on January 13th, when the Russians, in temporary occupation of Old Nanchwang, were driven out in confusion.

On the following morning another engagement occurred in the west of Nanchwang at a place called Sinehlin. The Russians were preparing to strike northward, when one column found itself outflanked by a strong Japanese detachment of all arms, which had crept round under cover of the mist. A smart running action ensued, from which the Russians claim to have retired in good order after losing five officers and fifty men killed and wounded. Marshal Oyama's account of the proceedings is somewhat different, his report stating that the enemy were driven back in disorder with over 300 casualties, and that they abandoned a quantity of weapons and other articles.

On the 15th the Russians, who were now once more moving in a pretty con-

cent mass, were spied by a detachment of Japanese cavalry moving in a north-westerly direction. They appeared to be thoroughly exhausted. It was noticed that some of the Russians wore Chinese overcoats and caps, while many of them were dressed entirely in Chinese costume, including pigtail.

Although it is not completely established that the Russians violated Chinese territory during the march southward, there can be no question that they did so on the return journey, in order to avoid the punishment which would certainly have been inflicted on them by the Japanese, who had much extensive property at stake for intercepting them. Thus far done detracts largely from any value which the raid might otherwise have possessed as a military operation for it is clearly impossible to deduce military lessons of first class importance from a performance in which one side saves itself by departing from the rules of the game as it is ordinarily played by honourable nations.

But in any case, Mishchenko's raid could not have taken a very good place among the recorded operations of war. Even if its very conception had not been vitiated by the necessity of violating Chinese territory either in the march to the south or the dash for home, or both, the execution of the movement was very faulty. In the first place, the pace was much too slow; in the second, the work of demolition was most carelessly done; and thirdly, there was no effective final attempt upon Nanchwang after the arrival of the second column, and the retreat of Japanese infantry.

Unopposed the raiders then they taken more than two days to retreat to the border, and to report for a while to Nanchwang, the first of the first of the

chao to Ying-kau, the main line, and Old Niu-chwang could have been, simultaneously, if necessary, threatened. Of the

soldiers made, of course, all the difference in the world, and with so many straight-shooting infantry in trenches—which, by



GENERAL MISHTCHENKO.

perfunctory fashion in which the railway-wrecking was carried out mention has already been made. As to the attack of Niu-kia-tun, the arrival of the 500 fresh

the way, were protected by obstacles in the way of barbed-wire entanglements and so forth—an attack on the part of dismounted irregular cavalry was bound

to be a costly failure. Some impression might have been made on the depot by continuous artillery fire, or an attempt might have been made under cover of the darkness to set alight some of the buildings. But the actual measures taken were absurd.

The return of the raiders to their original position on the Russian right is shrouded in obscurity, but it is assumed that Kuropatkin sent out a supporting column to aid Mishchenko's division in regaining the security of the Russian lines. In his reports concerning the operation the Russian Generalissimo did his best to enhance the value of the performance, which, he declared, had greatly alarmed the Japanese rearguard. His statement of the total casualties was to the effect that 7 officers and 73 men had been killed, 32 officers and 257 men wounded. In addition there were 21 men missing. Of the horses, 69 had been killed and 75 wounded.

That the Japanese were somewhat disturbed by the raid goes without saying, but to represent them as greatly alarmed or to reel on the damage they had sus-

tained as serious is to pass from the region of cold fact into that of pure imagination. In view of the preceding reconnaissance and the practical certainty that in that case also Chinese territory had been violated the Japanese appear to have acted foolishly in not having strengthened the garrisons of Old Mu-chwang and Mu-ki-tun. But when the larger raid had once developed, they acted with commendable vigour, and the total damage they inflicted on Mishchenko's three brigades may well have been rather greater than appears from the Russian list of casualties, having regard to the sixty-two Russian corpses left in front of Mu-ki-tun alone. For the rest the lesson had been learnt it is great, not that raids through Chinese territory were possible, and that in future not only would precautions be necessary, but no scruples need be felt by Japan herself as to restrictions which Russia had so openly ignored.

The return of the raiders brings us to about January 18th, at which point the narrative of the fighting along the Shih ho will be resumed in the succeeding chapter.



EXAMINING PASSENGERS ON THE HANCEI RAILWAY IN TIMES OF PEACE

THE HANCEI RAILWAY IN TIMES OF PEACE

CHAPTER LXXXII.

THE NORTH SEA INQUIRY—THE COMMISSIONERS—FIRST PUBLIC SITTING—BRITISH AND RUSSIAN CASES—THE EVIDENCE—QUESTIONABLE TESTIMONY—THE FISHERMEN EXAMINED—A BRITISH NAVAL EXPERT.

THERE is hardly any feature of this great war more significant and, withal, more self-assertive than the number of points at which it comes in contact with the politics of the outside world. Admirably as "the ring" was kept, we have already seen not only this country and France—the allies respectively of the two combatant nations -- and China—to some extent the bone of contention—taking a more than sporting interest in the proceedings, but also Germany, the United States, Spain, and Holland, brought into closer connection with the conflict than is usually the case with spectators. For much of this the progress of the Russian Baltic Fleet to the Far East was directly responsible, and, of course, of all the complications and embarrassments created by that squadron's historic voyage none was more serious or surrounded by more tremendous possibilities than the trouble arising from the North Sea Outrage. In Chapters LXVIII. and LXIX. a careful account was given of the Outrage itself and its striking consequences in the way of British naval preparations and diplomatic action. Since then the fortunes of the Baltic Fleet up to about the end of January have been followed, without reference to the host of delicate questions and awkward contingencies it had left in its wake. The time has now arrived to devote a chapter to the circumstances of the holding of the great North Sea Inquiry, the

Agreement leading up to which formed the conclusion of Chapter LXIX.

Before proceeding to the actual narrative of events a few words may be said in the hope of inducing the reader to give such a chapter as this rather closer attention than he might otherwise be inclined to give to a record of a purely peaceful development sandwiched into a chronicle of lusty and exciting warfare. It is an old truism to say that peace, as well as war, has victories. More to the present point is the historical fact that probably in the annals of the world there was never a peaceful victory to which the smell of war clung more closely than it did to the Agreement upon which the North Sea Inquiry was founded. But the interest of the investigation did not end here by any means. Apart from its origin, apart even from its result, the Inquiry furnished a magnificent example of what can be done internationally to avert an international calamity. It was a triumphant application of "the commonsense of most" to the adjustment of a difficulty which a generation or two back would almost inevitably have led to terrific slaughter, and very possibly to a marked alteration in the map of the world. If the Russo-Japanese War had produced nothing else but the North Sea Inquiry it would, historically speaking, have been a great war, and it is by no means certain that the Inquiry will not hereafter come to rank in the minds of thoughtful men as of

graver significance to the welfare of the human race than the fall of Port Arthur or the battle of Taro yung.

Nor is the Inquiry lacking in curious interest of its own, provided that those who read the record of it let their imagination loose in either of two directions in which it is impossible for the writer to be more than incidentally suggestive. There is something strangely impressive in the fact that not only Russian naval officers, but also humble British fishermen, had to be carried to Paris to take a prominent part in this great function in which the honour of two of the greatest of the World Powers was so intimately concerned. There is a perfect swarm of instructive associations clustering round the reception of the foreign delegates representing three great Empires and an equally great Republic, by the modest son of a peasant proprietor whom the French nation had, with such admirable good sense, chosen six years before as the head of their Government. Paris herself has played more thrilling parts, has witnessed more dramatic scenes, than any other city on the face of the globe. But she never took a nobler *role*, never saw a surer consummation of her best efforts than was indicated in the holding and ending of the Commission which prevented the outbreak of a disastrous war between her ally and a nation with which her relations had hitherto grown to be almost enthusiastically cordial.

To turn to our narrative—the Agreement respecting the Commission of Inquiry was signed; it will be remembered, on November 25th and was promptly followed by the appointment of the Commissioners, and in the case of the two Powers immediately concerned, of a Legal Assessor and an Agent. Great Britain in such matters is generally for-

tunate in possessing men whose special qualifications mark them as extraordinarily well fitted for the work in hand. As our Naval Representative on the Commission it would have been impossible to make a better choice than that of Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Beaumont, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. This well known officer had recently been in command in Australian waters, having been transferred thither from the Pacific in order that he might be in personal attendance on the Prince of Wales during the Australian portion of his Royal Highness's tour in 1901. He had previously been Director of Naval Intelligence, and the fact that he had also served as Naval Attache both at Paris and St. Petersburg and was thoroughly acquainted with the French language, made his selection a particularly happy one.

As Legal Assessor to the British Commissioner the Right Hon. Sir Edward Fry was selected, and in him too several special qualifications were united for he had not only been a High Court Judge and a Lord Justice of Appeal, but was a member of the Court of International Arbitration at the Hague. Mr. Hugh O'Barne, of His Majesty's Embassy at Paris, a First Secretary in the Diplomatic Service, was appointed as British Agent. Like Sir Lewis Beaumont, Mr. O'Barne had been attached to the Embassy at St. Petersburg, where he had qualified in Russian.

The Russian Naval Commissioner originally appointed was Vice Admiral Kaznikoff, for whom Vice Admiral Dubassoff afterwards officiated. The latter had recently come into considerable prominence by reason of some rather indiscreet utterances having reference to alleged intention on the part of the British to pitch up at no distant date



VICE-ADMIRAL D'ASSOLANT.



VICE-ADMIRAL D'ASSOLANT.

COMMISSIONERS

OF THE



NORTH SEA

INQUIRY.

VICE-ADMIRAL TOURNIER (PRESIDENT)



Photo Eug. Pivou, Paris.
AUSTRIA: ADMIRAL BARON VON SPAUN.



Photo: Eug. Pivou, Paris.
UNITED STATES: REAR-ADMIRAL DAVIS.



A BRITISH WITNESS BEFORE THE NORTH SLA INQUIRY COMMISSION.

Exploiting the nature of the lights used by the fishing fleet

peace with Japan in order to revise her resources and carry hostilities to a successful termination at her future convenience. To have blurted out such a tactless proposition was not the mark of high-class diplomat as most naval officers of flag rank are expected to be, but, in the event, Admiral Dubassoff proved himself an able and courteous coadjutor in the work of the Commission, injurious to his susceptibilities as some of the proceedings must necessarily have proved.

A special interest was naturally attached to the selection of the French delegate, and general satisfaction was expressed when it became known that the choice had fallen on Vice-Admiral Fournier, lately in charge of the French Higher Naval School. Admiral Fournier had previously been in command of the French naval division in the Far East, and had greatly distinguished himself after the French naval operations against China in 1884 by his diplomatic ability. Although he had to deal with the astute Li-Hung-Chang, he succeeded in procuring a treaty with reference to Tong-king which completely satisfied French requirements. Admiral Fournier was the inventor of an instrument for the regulation of ships' compasses, and the Paris correspondent of the *Times* raised a general smile by his witty suggestion that the Admiral's colleagues on the International Commission would doubtless deplore with him the fact that his invention was not used on board the Russian vessels which wandered from their bearings in the North Sea.

Rear-Admiral Charles H. Davis was appointed by the President of the United States to act as American Commissioner. He was the son of the Admiral Davis who became famous in the Civil War, and was himself an officer of distinction

and wide experience, including active duty during the Spanish-American War. Admiral Davis had been Superintendent of the United States Naval Observatory, and had been connected with various scientific expeditions.

It will be recalled that under Article I. of the Convention respecting the Commission of Inquiry, a fifth member was to be chosen by agreement among the four original members, and that, failing an agreement, the Emperor of Austria was to be invited to make a selection. It is sufficient to say that by mutual consent the veteran Admiral Baron von Spaun was asked to join the Commission as fifth member.

Shortly before Christmas the original Commissioners assembled in Paris, and were formally received by the President of the French Republic. Two handsome salons in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs were set apart for the purposes of the Inquiry, one for the examination of witnesses, the other for the deliberations of the Commission.

The first plenary sitting of the Commission was held on January 9th, when the chair was taken by Admiral von Spaun. The latter, although his age and rank would have entitled him to the presidency, immediately proposed that Admiral Fournier should be elected to that post. "I am convinced," he observed, "that it is not only our duty to this hospitable country, but it is also essentially in harmony with our common end—namely, the transaction of our labours as promptly as possible, considering that independently of his personal qualities, Admiral Fournier has at his disposal the assistance of his numerous excellent coadjutors in the bureau." Such a tactful proposal could not fail of unanimous acceptance, and, accordingly, Ad-

miral Fournier took the chair, and delivered an admirable little homily on the delicate and important duties which the Commission was called upon to discharge, and upon "the great example of wisdom and moderation" given to the world by the institution of such an Inquiry.

For the first few days the Commission was occupied in drawing up rules of procedure, and it was not until January 19th that the first public sitting was held for the purpose of reading the text of the cases submitted by the two Governments chiefly concerned in the North Sea incident. On this occasion the room in which the Inquiry was held was filled with a distinguished audience, an enclosed space being reserved at the top of the hall for the five Admirals, who occupied a table in the centre. The British delegation was seated at tables ranged along the room on the right hand of the Admirals, the Russian delegation being on the left.

The presentation of the British and Russian cases was, of course, a matter of the most critical importance, and the documents respectively need to be very carefully examined in order to appreciate all the points raised. It is not, however, necessary here to do more than extract a few leading paragraphs, the whole incident having been so thoroughly dealt with in Chapters LXXVIII and LXXIX.

Taking the British case first, attention was drawn to the fact that the Dogger Bank was well known as a fishing ground, and a clear statement was made as to the methods observed by the trawlers, the functions of the "Admiral" of the fishing fleet, and the regulation lights. The state of the weather was described, and the movements of the fishing fleet detailed. The statement went

on to say that at the time named, and in the circumstances recounted, two sections of war vessels passed the fishing fleet, of which the second fired on the trawlers. Other cases of firing were mentioned. It was stated that the vessels which fired were warships of the Imperial Russian Navy, and attention was called to the fact that no assistance was given or offered to the trawlers by any of the Russian vessels.

The essence of the British case was in the concluding paragraphs, which were as follow —

"16 No warships of any description other than those of the Imperial Russian Navy were among the trawlers or in the neighbourhood on the night in question, and no war vessels had been seen by any of the trawlers for some time before. There was no war material of any description on board any of the ships of the fishing fleet. There were no Japanese war vessels of any description in the North Sea at that time, nor were there any Japanese on board any of the vessels of the fishing fleet.

'17 As a result of the firing two men were killed and six were wounded, one trawler, the *Crane*, was sunk and five other trawlers, the *Snipe*, the *Umo*, the *Moulmein*, the *Gull*, and the *Majesty*, were hit by shot and damaged. Other trawlers were damaged by the concussion caused by the explosion of shells close to them, and thus a number of British trawlers peacefully engaged in pursuit of a lawful calling on a well known fishing ground in the North Sea were subjected to a violent interruption of a customary and properly conducted occupation of trade at a spot out of the way of the ordinary course of ships passing between the Skagerrak and the Straits of Dover, and were, without war

fired upon by men-of-war of the Imperial Russian Navy."

The Russian case opened with an account of the warnings which the Russian Government had received as to possible attacks by the Japanese upon the outgoing Baltic Squadron. The disposition of the Fleet with a view to this "alarming intelligence" was described, and the progress of the navigation recorded up to the night of the incident. In the following extracts giving the Russian statement of what occurred, the dates are given according to the Russian calendar; the dates according to the "New style" being in

brackets. First we have the story of the famous torpedo-boats:—

"During the night from October 8th [21st] to October 9th [22nd] towards midnight the sky became clouded and the horizon misty. At 55 minutes past midnight, in lat. 55.18 north and long. 5.42 east of Greenwich, the first ship of the last section, the Admiral's ship, *Kniaz Suvaroff*, perceived ahead the outlines of two small craft approaching at great speed, all their lights out, towards the armourclads. The whole detachment at once began to work their electric searchlights, and as soon as the two suspicious craft came within the rays projected they were recognised as torpedo-boats. The armourclads directly opened fire on them.

"Immediately afterwards were seen near the Russian ships and within the zone lit up by their searchlights, first one and

then several small steamers resembling fishing smacks. Some of them did not show their regulation lights. Others only showed them tardily, and finally

some of them placed themselves across the course being taken by the detachment. As it was clear in these conditions that the fire directed against the torpedo-boats might also hit the fishing boats, the necessary measures were taken as far as possible to prevent any injury to them. It was thus that the rays of the electric searchlights of the Admiral's ship *Kniaz Suvaroff* were alternately thrown on the fishing boats, and then

quickly raised 45°, which signified the order not to fire on the vessel thus pointed out. Nevertheless, the very distinct feeling of danger to which the armourclads were exposed, and the imperious duty of protecting them against the attacks of the torpedo-boats, necessitated the continuance of the cannonade, notwithstanding the evident risk of hitting not only the fishing boats, but also the ships of the squadron itself which might be, and actually were, within the zone of fire to port of the division of armourclads, as was proved by the presence, immediately discovered, of the *Dmitri Donskoi* and the *Aurora*."

The Russian explanation and vindication of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's performance were as follow:—

"Meanwhile the two torpedo-boats retired, and soon afterwards disappeared.




Photo: T. Fall, Baker Street, W.

THE RIGHT HON. SIR EDWARD FRY, D.C.L.,
F.R.S., BRITISH LEGAL ASSESSOR.

At that moment the division of armour-clads, on a signal given by the Admiral's ship, at once ceased firing. The cannonade had lasted altogether about ten minutes. Fearing, on the one hand, that some of the fishing boats had been damaged by the fire of the squadron, but, on the other hand, not being sure that all danger coming from the two torpedo-boats, or perhaps from some others, was completely over, Admiral Rozhdestvensky deemed it indispensable that the whole squadron should continue its course without stopping. In these conditions the vessel which, according to the first evidence of certain fishermen, remained until morning on the scene of the incident, and which was taken by them for a Russian ship, could not in any way belong to the division of armour-clads and cruisers, and still less, to the detachment of torpedo-boats, as these last were at that moment very far from the scene of the incident.

"Considering the circumstances above recalled of the incident which occurred in the North Sea during the night from October 8th [21st] to October 9th [22nd],

1904—an incident which, as subsequently ascertained, caused the loss of a boat and the death of two persons belonging to an English fishing flotilla, as also damage to other boats and injuries to their crews—considering the proofs obtained in the matter, and the categorical testimony of the officers of the Imperial Navy who witnessed the incident, as also some further evidence subsequently supplied to the Russian Government by third persons of various nationalities, it may be affirmed that, in view of all the above circumstances, Admiral Rozhdestvensky upon whom rested the heavy responsibility of providing for the security of the forces entrusted to him, and of maintaining them in their integrity, had not only the right, but was under the absolute obligation, of acting as he did—that is to say, that while quite clearly aware of the damage he might cause to inoffensive fishermen the subjects of a neutral Power he was nevertheless obliged to use the means in his power to destroy the torpedo-boats which had attacked his squadron."



RUSSIAN CRUISER "ALICE"

In view of this fairly ample reproduction of the British and Russian cases, it is hardly necessary to go at all deeply into the detailed evidence of either side. But it is important to chronicle one remarkable circumstance in connection with the Russian testimony, which excited considerable sensation at the time, and the general view of which was anything but favourable to Russia. The Russians were so infatuated by the notion that they had actually seen torpedo-boats among the fishing fleet, that agents were despatched to Hull with the object of collecting further evidence on this point. Exactly by whom these agents were employed, and what instructions they received, cannot be traced, but it is clear that in the first place they were utterly unscrupulous, and in the second that they did their dirty work very clumsily. Their performance amounted to something very like an attempt to suborn witnesses from among the sailors of the fishing fleet, to whom they gave drink and money on the understanding that the men would sign a sworn statement that Japanese torpedo-boats had, in truth, been seen among the trawlers. The matter was taken up locally, the evidence thus questionably obtained was warmly repudiated, and the Russian agents narrowly escaped being thrown into the harbour for their pains.

It is not surprising that this discreditable attempt to collect false evidence in support of the Russian case should have been brought up before the Commission of Inquiry. On behalf of the British Government it was asked that the matter should be investigated by the Commissioners, and the British Agent, Mr. O'Beirne, was prepared with witnesses to substantiate his account of what had transpired. Ultimately the Commission

decided to discuss this question in private, at the same time exonerating the Russian Government from any knowledge of the highly objectionable performance complained of.

Indeed, there is no doubt that the Russian Government was very ill served by the agents who tried to collect evidence in England, and who seem to have primed the Russian authorities with a quantity of quite baseless information. For example, the Russian Government had evidently been told that there was a Japanese on board the Dogger Bank mission ship *Alpha*, and that he was masquerading under the name of Danielson. But the attempt to establish this statement by cross-examination of the British witnesses broke down completely. The surgeon of the *Alpha*, as well as the skipper, were closely questioned on the point. Dr. Colmer was asked whether before, during, or after the incident any Japanese was on board the *Alpha*. Never, he replied; indeed, he had never seen any Japanese in the North Sea, nor had he ever seen any person on board their vessel who could be mistaken for a Japanese. Did he know a man named Danielson? asked the Russian legal representative. No, replied Dr. Colmer, he had never heard of such a person. Mr. White, the skipper of the *Alpha*, said he had never seen any Japanese on board his ship, and he knew nobody of the name of Danielson.

Much interest was aroused by the manner in which the British fishermen gave their evidence. One of the best witnesses was Thomas Carr, the "Vice-Admiral" of the Gamecock Fleet, who was severely heckled by the Russian legal assessors as to some supposed discrepancies in his statements. Carr explained the vagueness of some of his own impressions

by the fact that he was running away at the time, and pointed out that the men were so frightened by the firing that some inconsistency in their estimates of its duration was not unnatural. On the whole, Mr Carr, like his comrades, made an excellent witness, and his medal for saving life won him a graceful compliment on his standing down from Admiral Fournier. A similar compliment was paid by the President to Mr John Brooks skipper of the *Robin*, on his noble conduct in saving four ships' crews of forty hands in all. Speaking in the name of the Commission, Admiral Fournier said that the medal conferred on him ought to have been of gold.

On another occasion Admiral Fournier, whose tact and impartiality were the theme of universal admiration, rendered notable assistance to one of the British witnesses. John Thomas Fletcher, master of the steam carrier *Swift*, was sharply cross examined by the Russian legal representative, Baron Trube as to the possible presence of Japanese torpedo boats with the fishing fleet. Fletcher had said he was sure that no strange craft had joined the trawlers, but, as he had previously admitted that he could not see further than half a mile, he was asked how he could be sure that there were no strange craft beyond that limit. That was a poser for Fletcher, who did not understand it, while Admiral Fournier expressed the opinion that the question was embarrassing and superfluous. As Baron Trube, however, seemed to attach considerable importance to it, Mr Acland, K.C., at the suggestion of Admiral Fournier, repeated the question in a more manageable form, which covered everything that Fletcher could answer. The reply was a comprehensive negative. Thereupon Admiral Fournier, who evi-

dently understands the sailor's way of thinking, observed that as Fletcher had said he could not see over three quarters of a mile it was no use asking him what lay beyond that distance.

This may be taken as a typical instance of the hair-splitting methods adopted by the Russians to discount the straightforward testimony of these simple fishermen, who naturally were at some disadvantage owing to the difficulty they experienced in understanding some of the questions put to them and in expressing themselves with clearness and precision.

The British case was further supported by the evidence of the captain and the mate of the Swedish steamer *Allegrin* which, as narrated on page 301 of the present volume, had been chased by a Russian warship, and fired upon on the evening of October 21st a few hours before the fishing fleet was attacked.

The Russian witnesses were Captain Khado, and Lieutenants Walrond, Lillis and Schramchenko. These witnesses did not take the oath, that being in Russia a strictly religious ceremony, but they pledged their word of honour for the truth of their testimony. Captain Khado was described by a correspondent as speaking very deliberately, though without hesitation or pause. "He is," the correspondent wrote, "a well set up man of forty two, of medium height and wears eye glasses." The evidence offered by the four Russian officers was an amplification of the statements presented in the Russian case, and need not be recapitulated.

In consequence of certain professions and opinions expressed by Captain Khado, the British representatives considered it desirable to procure the evidence of a British naval officer of great experience in the command of torpedo boats. Accord-

ingly, Captain R. Keyes was called and examined by one of the British legal representatives, who elicited the fact that the gallant officer had spent five years in command of a destroyer, and had spent about half the time at sea, night and day. He had nearly always cruised in close company, sometimes with lights and sometimes without. He had also commanded torpedo-boat divisions in manœuvres—from fourteen to sixteen destroyers—and had acted as an umpire in torpedo-boat manœuvres. The evidence given by this officer was so extremely interesting and instructive, that the writer quotes *in extenso* the summary given in the Paris correspondence of the *Times*. In the opinion of Captain Keyes it was quite impossible for an officer, however experienced, to be quite sure in estimating distances at night either with or without searchlights. One was particularly liable to mistake in using the searchlights if the object was at such a distance that the whole of it could not be clearly illuminated. Without the searchlights one was liable to mistake a large ship at a distance for a smaller one nearer at hand. A large cruiser far off might well be said to have the same appearance as a destroyer at a shorter distance. If an object was at a distance of a mile and a half to three or four miles, according to the degree of the light, the searchlights would not only fail to illuminate it, but by lighting up a portion of the intervening space it would set up a sort of screen between the observer using the searchlight and the object. Small vessels between the observer and the object under the searchlight might be confounded with that object. The distance at which a searchlight would light up the whole of a vessel was very much less than was generally supposed. In torpedo attacks


he often fancied he was exposed, but afterwards found that the men using the searchlight had not seen him. A searchlight would not pick up a small object like a destroyer much further than a mile off, and he did not think it would be possible to identify her as a torpedo-boat at a greater distance than five or six cables. Captain Keyes then mentioned numerous recorded cases at manœuvres, including one in which a flagship leading the British Mediterranean Fleet mistook a battleship for a destroyer. The battleship *Devastation*, which was about ten cables ahead, altered her course suddenly eight points to the south, which brought her in view on the starboard side of the leading vessel, which she took for a destroyer, and opened fire. Another case occurred at the manœuvres in 1902. The *Doris* observed through glasses what she thought to be a four-funnelled destroyer. The searchlight was directed on her, but failed to reveal anything. Yet in reality the boat thus taken for a destroyer was the four-funnelled cruiser *Andromeda*. He thought it quite possible at five or six cables to mistake any small vessel for a torpedo-boat if it were not clearly illuminated, but otherwise not. At night it would be easier to distinguish the outline of a small vessel a mile and a half or two miles off from a position five or six feet above the water than at forty-two feet, as her outline would be thrown against the sky. Captain Keyes maintained this opinion, although Admiral Fournier supported a contrary view. Captain Keyes thought that on an ordinary night a torpedo-boat could not be distinguished further off than a mile or three-quarters—an opinion in which Admiral Fournier agreed. The Admiral added that in the French Navy they could never distinguish the difference between a torpedo-

boat and a large vessel at much more than half a mile with the naked eye, or with glasses without a searchlight.

With this very *a propos* testimony, which drew special thanks and congratulations from the President, the hearing of the evidence was practically concluded. On February 4th it was announced that for the present there would be no more public

sittings, as the British and Russian Government Agents required some little time in which to draw up their conclusions, and the interval would be usefully spent by the Admirals in examining and appreciating the evidence.

The story of the termination of the Inquiry and the finding of the Commission must be reserved for a later chapter,



From a photograph supplied by the Royal National Mission to Deep Sea Fishermen.

THE HOSPITAL MISSION SHIP ALPHA




Photo J. J. Archibald.

SUPPLIES FOR THE RUSSIANS: COUNTRY PACK TRAIN COMING INTO A MANCHURIAN TOWN.

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

IN THE SHA-HO REGION—SEQUEL TO MISHTCHENKO'S RAID—A LIKELY BATTLE-GROUND
—GRIPENBERG CROSSES THE HUN-HO—AN IMPRESSIVE MOVEMENT—THE BATTLE OF
HEI-KOU-TAI—DEFENCE OF SAN-DE-PU—JAPANESE ATTACKS—RUSSIANS DRIVEN BACK
—GRIPENBERG AND KUROPATKIN.

RESUMING the story of the operations in the Sha-ho region at the point at which we left it in the last chapter but one, we find that Mishtchenko's raid had left the relative positions of the opposing armies to all intents and purposes unaltered. At the same time such an extensive and suggestive movement was not likely to be wholly disregarded by those against whom it was directed, and we may take it for granted that an immediate result was the display of increased vigilance on the Japanese left, coupled with a shrewd anticipation of fresh developments in that quarter.

A second raid was hardly to be expected, at any rate for some little time, but Liao-yang still remained a natural objective for a great Russian attack, and it was practically certain that any serious movement against Liao-yang would be heralded by pressure from the Russian right, from which alone any sort of forward movement had for many weeks been possible. Accordingly, towards the end of the third week in January the Japanese left had been thrown back in a south-westerly direction from the village of San-de-pu so as to screen Liao-yang from an attack from the north-west.

It was soon apparent that these precautions were fully justified. About the middle of January Kuropatkin made certain important changes in the disposition of his forces as noted on page 389 of the present volume, with the evident intention of rendering his right capable, sooner or later, of a serious forward movement. According to a German military authority the Russian force in this quarter now consisted of the 1st, 8th and 10th Army Corps, the 1st Siberian Army Corps, the 61st Reserve Division, and the 2nd and 5th Rifle Brigades, making with Mishchenko's cavalry an effective fighting force of about 85,000 men with 350 guns. These troops constituted the Second Russian Army under General Gripenberg, and they were grouped along the right bank of the Hun ho. The latter river flows in a south westerly direction from below Mukden. At this time of year it is frozen to a thickness of three feet of ice, over which heavily laden carts can travel safely. The course of the Hun in this region is in a well defined bed, with steep and often overhanging banks from fifteen feet to twenty feet above the level of the ice.

Thirty miles down stream from Mukden lies the little fort of Chang tau, said to have been once a thriving market town but now composed of two small hamlets on either bank of the river, the town having been washed away by a flood some years since. The German authority above quoted makes Chang tau the most southerly point occupied by the Russians at this period. To the south of Chang tau, at a distance of four or five miles, lie Hei kou tau and San de pu, the latter a large village of some 100 houses. San de pu is described by a writer in the *Times* as being, like all the

other numerous villages around, a collection of farmsteads with a courtyard for winter travellers. Each farmhouse is surrounded by high walls of sun dried bricks well plastered with loam mixed with chopped straw. These walls can be neatly loop holed, are about three feet thick, and form a splendid defence against bullets. The houses and farm-buildings have all their windows and doors opening into the large courtyards, the gables and rear walls are very thick and built of the same materials as the compound walls.

"With rare exceptions, every house is thatched. The military would, however, especially the Japanese probably cover the thatch very thickly with mud or earth to prevent fire. The roofs are of heavy timbers, resting on posts, and thus can support great weights. All buildings are low and one storeyed. The country round San de pu is quite level and open, excepting for the villages and burial places, where there were groves of trees, which have now largely been burned for fuel. The villages are, roughly, about two miles apart, and vary from twenty to one hundred families.

From the above description it will be gathered that the Japanese posts, notably at Hei kou tau and San de pu, were by no means ill placed for enabling a stout resistance to be made to a Russian attack even on a large scale, while the country generally is favourable for the movement of large bodies of troops, thus permitting the Russians, in the first instance, to develop an attack with far rapidity and on broad lines, and later, giving the Japanese an equal chance of bringing up fresh troops to relieve threatened points, and, ' hurl back the oncoming

We may glean a

quoted source of information to the effect that the Russian line of retreat in case of failure was a somewhat advantageous one. For it not only terminated in the useful sandhills to the south of Mukden, but also lay through villages, many of them "quite well fortified with earth ramparts and moats by the robber bands which for two years after the Boxer outbreak held this region, guarding those villagers who paid them, and keeping out all other robber bands."

There were further indications which favoured the chances of another attempt on Kuropatkin's part to restore the prestige of the Russian arms. He had now received reinforcements fully sufficient to compensate the additions made to Marshal Oyama's force in consequence of the fall of Port Arthur, and in cavalry and artillery he seemed to enjoy a marked superiority over his adversary. By the judicious employment of the latter as a screen, he had been able to make the transference of at least one Army Corps to his right, and shortly after the middle of January it began to be openly stated that a strong effort was about to be made to force a decisive action in the plain between the Hun-ho and the railway.

A not unlikely, and, as it proved, a rather accurate forecast was even made of the course of the coming operations. General Gripenberg with four Army Corps and strong forces of cavalry and field artillery would, it was asserted, carry out an offensive movement in the Hun-ho Plain, while General Liniévitch and a portion of General Kaulbars's army guarded the Russian lines south of Mukden. The rest of General Kaulbars's force would harass the Japanese right, and General Kuropatkin would concentrate in the centre the main body to reinforce his wings when necessary. A

Russian success obtained in this way and in this region would, it was thought, force the Japanese to fall back, and render their retreat particularly difficult and dangerous.

As a rule the republication of such forecasts is, historically speaking, purely futile and entirely uninteresting. But the present example is of rather singular interest by reason of the context. The above outline of what might be expected was received by the *Echo de Paris* from its St. Petersburg correspondent, and printed in its issue of January 18th. Such instances of the prediction in detail of an immense military operation are quite rare, and we may be sure that it was not the wish of Kuropatkin himself that his movements should be foreshadowed in this inconveniently previous fashion. It is true that he himself had been credited with having heralded the great battle of the Sha-ho by an absurdly unnecessary Order of the Day, but the evil consequences of that untimely pronouncement would alone have checked the repetition of such an error. Moreover, there is little or nothing to show that, although the Russian Generalissimo was undoubtedly preparing to take the offensive in some such form as that indicated, he judged the present a fit juncture at which to attempt a most difficult and risky task.

In all the circumstances it is difficult not to believe that here again a deliberate effort was made at St. Petersburg to force Kuropatkin into an advance before he was as fully prepared for it as he could have wished. On this hypothesis alone can the extraordinary clearness of vision enjoyed by the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Echo de Paris* be explained. Is it likely that anything but a desire, either to do Kuropatkin a bad turn or to force his hand, would have



From Stereograph Copyright, 1903, by Underwood & Underwood, London and New York
A REMARKABLE SCENE OF ACTIVITY BETWEEN THE HILLS OF MANCHURIA: JAPANESE BUILDING THEIR DUG-OUTS, TRENCHES, AND TEMPORARY PLACES OF SHELTER.

prompted the premature publication of such important news as the fact that General Gripenberg would commence the attack with four Army Corps from the Russian right, while the feinting movements to the eastward would be made by only a portion of the army of General Kaulbars?

But not only has the existence of undoubted intrigues against Kuropatkin to be taken into consideration in this connection. The internal condition of the Russian capital was now becoming so obviously serious that both the Grand Dukes and the lesser bureaucrats may well have been intensely anxious for a diversion at the point calculated to distract the attention of a thoroughly disaffected populace from the excited contemplation of their own miserable affairs. This reflection brings us round to the fact that January 22nd was the "Red Sunday," of the probable influence of which upon Kuropatkin's soldiery something has been said in a previous chapter. It is not positively recorded that, as a result of that ghastly performance, the Tsar telegraphed to Kuropatkin at all hazards to take the offensive, but the fact that, three days later, the Russian Second Army was on the move lends a certain amount of colour to the suggestion.

To turn from the region of speculation to that of fact, the forward march of the Second Russian Army was commenced on January 25th, and was carried out by columns in the following order:—The first column, constituting the right wing, was composed of the cavalry and the 61st Division. It struck to the south-west, and crossed the Hun at two places only about fifteen or twenty miles to the north-west of Liao-yang. Its direction was nearly due east towards a place

called La-pu-tai, about midway on the road between Liao-yang and San-de-pu. The second column, consisting of the 10th Army Corps, marched by way of Hei-kou-tai on Lan-tung-kou, which lies between La-pu-tai and San-de-pu. The third column, composed of the 8th Army Corps and 2nd Rifle Brigade, marched on San-de-pu, crossing the Hun a little below Chang-tau; and San-de-pu was also the objective of the fourth column, which was made up of the First Siberian Army Corps and 5th Rifle Brigade, and started from Chang-tau itself. The fifth column, consisting of the 1st European Army Corps, and constituting the left wing of the Second Army, kept touch with the Third Army under General Kaulbars.

The weather was intensely cold, so cold that only two days previously the *Times* correspondent at Tokio had telegraphed that on this account no early movement seemed probable. But the Russian soldiery were becoming quite inured to the rigours of the Manchurian winter, and, from the standpoint of marching, the clay of the district was greatly preferable in its present frozen state, with a liberal "top-dressing" of snow, to the sloughs and morasses of the rainy season. We may take it, then, that the Army of General Gripenberg pushed forward with much briskness this bitter January morning, and that through every great column ran a thrill of satisfaction that once more there was a chance of getting at handgrips with the enemy, instead of bandying shots and shouts with him over the thin interval which had been separating most of their respective "burrows."

A very notable movement, too, was that indicated by the almost simultaneous passage of four out of these five columns

across the frozen Hun. At least two must have numbered over 20,000 cavalry, infantry, and artillery, and we in this country think ourselves fortunate if we can collect a single force of that size for important manoeuvres. It is true that the intervening distances were sufficiently great, and the country sufficiently flat, to deprive the operation of any marked spectacular attributes. But the moral impressiveness implied by the actual movement of a body of troops which, at a low computation, must have been over 70,000 strong, and may well have been considerably larger, is none the less very great. With less than the half of 70,000 men Lord Kitchener smashed the Dervish tyranny at Omdurman, there were only about 11,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 60 guns actually engaged on the British side at Tel el Kebir, and, to soar to another plane, with between 67,000 and 68,000 men Wellington won the Battle of Waterloo.

Before we follow Gripenberg's columns in their forward march it is particularly important to realise, as far as possible, the nature of the enterprise on which they were engaged. The words "as far as possible" are used advisedly, since, as will be seen, there was a subsequent sharp difference of opinion between Gripenberg and Kuropatkin himself as to the real object of the operation. It may be that this very difference will bring us a little closer to the heart of things in regard to this curious action, emphasising, as it seems to do, the suggestion made above that Kuropatkin entered upon the operation almost as unwillingly as he did upon the attempted relief of Port Arthur by the force which, under General Strickelberg, came to such considerable grief at Telissu. The Commander in chief himself is said to have urged that,

in any case, he never intended this particular advance to be more than a preliminary movement, and his description of the commission entrusted to General Gripenberg was that the latter had been "entrusted with the execution of a raid with a considerable force." It will be easier to examine this all important question now that we are standing at the entrances to the field of operations than it will be later on when the fighting has assumed a complex interest of its own. Let us, then, glance briefly at the direction of the various columns, as well as to the general idea that seems to underlie a thoroughly ill-starred but not necessarily ill-conceived, effort.

In the first place Kuropatkin's suggestion of a raid rather than a deliberate attempt to force a decisive action seems to be supported by the fact that the force engaged was not stronger by a couple of Army Corps than it was. Only by such a marked preponderance in this quarter could he have hoped to overcome Marshal Oyama's left wing sufficiently to render a subsequent descent on Liao yang practicable. Assuming his total strength to have been between 300,000 and 350,000 he would surely have sought to place more than a quarter of this in the position where the decisive struggle for mastery would take place. It is quite conceivable that this is what he ultimately proposed to do, and might have done with some hope of success had he not been first hurried into this needless demonstration, and then saddled with the consequences of his subordinate's rashness.

The direction given to the third and fourth columns, again, does not favour the idea of an attempt to force a big battle. It points rather to an attempt to score a minor success by overwhelming

the Japanese post at San-de-pu with two Army Corps, the first and second columns being employed partly on raiding business, and partly to give timely warning of the approach of Japanese reinforcements from the east or south. Such a programme properly carried out would not have been a very splendid performance, but it would have been a very useful one, since it would have heartened the whole army at the front, created an excellent impression at home, and have afforded a valuable breathing-space for the development of plans of much greater import.

Whether all this was or was not at the back of Kuropatkin's mind in launching Gripenberg with 70,000 or 80,000 men across the Hun-ho, all trace of any such conception disappeared shortly after the leader of the Second Russian Army had put the river between him and his chief. From quite the first he acted as if he had been deputed not only to drive in the enemy's outposts, but to push forward, and bring him without more ado to instant and comprehensive battle.

Let us now follow the movements of the various columns in such detail as is procurable from the rather meagre sources of information at the disposal of students of this particular battle. In passing, the reader may be asked to remember that nearly all the newspaper correspondents were at this time a very long way from the front, the supposition being that no serious fighting could reasonably be expected for a good many weeks. Such representatives of Russian journals as may have accompanied General Gripenberg were naturally reticent on the subject of an operation so disadvantageous from the attackers' standpoint, and Marshal Oyama's despatches, though clear and eminently

soldierlike, can hardly be said to have done complete justice even to the remarkable qualities of resistance and recovery displayed by the Japanese when the latter had realised the nature of the Russian movement. In fact, it is hardly too much to say that of all the battles of the war this one, which, following the Japanese official designation, we shall call the Battle of Hei-kou-tai, is the least satisfactorily illuminated by the narratives of individuals engaged in it, or by the picturesque descriptions of the "Knights of the Pen."


Notwithstanding the sixteen degrees of frost shown by the thermometer on January 25th, the passage of the Hun was effected with sufficient rapidity to enable some brisk fighting to be accomplished on the opposite bank before nightfall. The first column had a brush with the enemy shortly after crossing at Maminkai and Khailatosa, the latter being taken at the point of the bayonet. But the 10th Army Corps, constituting the second column, had a much stiffer task to capture Hei-kou-tai (which appears in some accounts as Kheigutaya), notwithstanding the fact that they must have greatly outnumbered the small garrison of that post. The Japanese fought most stubbornly, and Kuropatkin himself bears testimony to the gallant stand they made until ten o'clock at night, when, finding further resistance out of the question, they slipped away in the darkness. At another village called Tu-tai-tse, on the Hun-ho, about half-a-dozen miles below Chang-tau, the Russian advance was stoutly opposed, the Japanese not retiring until they had accounted for fifty of the enemy. In the struggle for the possession of these various villages the Russians took about 100 prisoners.

On the morning of January 26th the



A RUSSIAN BATTERY BATTERED BY THE SMOKE OF A VILLAGE FURIOUSLY SET ON FIRE BY THE JAPANESE.

This device here illustrated has been by no means uncommon during the campaign. It was first produced during the Russo-Japanese war when the Japanese obtained a large quantity of a similar device from the Japanese.



fighting assumed another phase. By this time the 10th Russian Army Corps was in complete possession of Hei-kou-tai and the adjacent country, and had begun to take steps to defend the place itself against a Japanese counter-attack. Here was an early indication of Gripenberg's evident intention to assume an independent rôle, and to court the chances of a regular battle instead of adhering to the first principles of a raid. As has been explained above, there is reason to believe that the original idea was that the 10th Army Corps, after capturing Hei-kou-tai, should press on to the San-de-pu—Liao-yang road, where at least it should have been able to acquire some useful information of the enemy's strength and probable movements in this quarter, at the same time masking the attack on San-de-pu. By remaining at Hei-kou-tai the 10th Army Corps merely invited a Japanese attack, which was not long in coming, for Oyama, warned by the expelled Hei-kou-tai garrison, was now fully alive to the urgent requirements of the situation. By noon on the 20th, notwithstanding the driving snow, which greatly impeded the movements of the troops, a considerable Japanese force had advanced to within striking distance of Hei-kou-tai, and had commenced preparations for its recapture. To the further fighting in this quarter we shall return presently.

Meanwhile, either the first column or a detachment from the second had occupied Sa-erh-pai (which, in some accounts, is called Sha-ho-pai, and which seems to be identical with the Tao-pao of Oyama's general despatch) with a regiment of infantry and a brigade of cavalry with twelve guns. As Sa-erh-pai lies only about five miles to the south of Hei-kou-tai, the Russians were now

pretty strongly established on this line, and the semblance of preparation for an extensive battle was hourly becoming clearer.

We must now pay attention to the movements of the third and fourth columns in the neighbourhood of San-de-pu. Throughout the 20th the Russian offensive movement against that place was continued, suffering some interruption towards the afternoon, when a relieving column of Japanese troops sent up from the south and south-east by Marshal Oyama arrived on the scene, and vainly endeavoured to dislodge the Russians from their positions. The fighting round San-de-pu was of an extremely severe character, and must have severely tried the 8th Army Corps, which had only recently arrived from Russia, and had not previously been in action. This corps, by the way, was commanded by General Miloff, and consisted of two divisions, one the 14th, named after the veteran Dragomiroff, the other the famous 15th Division, which defended the Malakoff in the Crimean War. It was a terrible baptism of fire for these untried troops, for the Japanese garrison clung with the tenacity of wild-cats to San-de-pu, which had further been fortified with much skill.

By seven o'clock in the evening the Russians had gained possession of the greater part of the village, having lost 24 officers and 1,000 men killed and wounded in the process. But they now, to their chagrin, found themselves confronted in the north-eastern corner of San-de-pu by a strong redoubt, with a triple row of obstacles, which had been hardly damaged by the Russian fire, and was armed with field-artillery and quick-firers. It was clear that this hard nut could not be cracked without preliminary

bombardment, and, as a prolonged stay in the captured portion of the village would have meant costly exposure to the guns in the redoubt, the Russians set fire to some of the houses, and more or less gracefully withdrew.

thus acquired a new battle front so clearly useful that Kutepoff might have been induced to take advantage of it, even though his orders had been executed. But with Sandopeu still held by the Japanese, the Russian position



GENERAL SUIFU.


The importance of this brilliant defence of Sandopeu against a greatly superior attacking force can hardly be overestimated. Had it not been decided in early September that at this point there is no possibility of a successful offensive, the Japanese would have been very different from what they are now. Sandopeu and Hailu had been the only strongholds, the Japanese would have

been able to capture them, and the war would have been over.

But the Japanese were not to be so easily defeated. They were determined to hold on to their strongholds, and they were not to be so easily defeated. They were determined to hold on to their strongholds, and they were not to be so easily defeated.

pu) to Sa-erh-pau, but this was frustrated by the elementary fact that, as shown above, the Russians were now strongly holding the latter place. Accordingly, the deployment was carried out along the San-de-pu—Liao-yang road itself on the line Su-ma-pao—Wu-chia-tzu

The 27th was a day of hard and bitter fighting, and one which, but for their extraordinary tenacity, might have proved disastrous for the Japanese. For it soon became evident that, although the latter had now assumed the offensive, they were not in sufficient numbers to



SKETCH MAP OF THE BATTLE OF HEI-KOU-TAI.

(a village eight or ten miles north of Liao-yang), with the object of retaking Sa-erh-pau as well as Hei-kou-tai. The double task was no easy one, for the Russians had placed thirty guns skilfully round Hei-kou-tai, and with these they enfiladed the attackers at Sa-erh-pau. Nightfall on the 26th saw the Japanese still vainly struggling to dislodge the Russians from these two positions.

push it at present to a successful issue. Although, moreover, San-de-pu still remained in Japanese occupation, very large Russian forces were clustered around the place, and the Japanese were hard put to it to withstand the pressure. Still, they not only held on manfully to San-de-pu itself, which was vigorously bombarded, but kept hammering away at the 8th European and 1st Siberian Army

Corps, at the same time vigorously renewing the attack against *Hei-kou-tai* and *Sa-erh-pau*. But they suffered pretty heavily, especially at *Su-ma-pao*,

portion of the Russians," says the Japanese official account, "remained concealed at *Su-ma-pao*. On the morning of the 28th they fired into the rear of the



WHAT MODERN WAR LOOKS LIKE. A FIERCE ARTILLERY ENGAGEMENT IN THE MANCHURIAN HILLS

where a Russian force succeeded in catching and destroying a Japanese detachment. For this mishap, however, the Japanese obtained some compensation early on the following day. "A

Japanese centre. The Japanese turned and attacked, and practically annihilated the Russians, only 200 surrendering."

Throughout the 27th and 28th the tide of battle ebbed and flowed, many desper-

ate hand-to-hand encounters taking place, and small successes being scored by both sides. Two Russian generals, Mishtchenko and Kondratovitch, were slightly wounded, and the Japanese at San-de-pu suffered heavily from the continuous bombardment. During the 28th Sa-erh-pau was captured by the Japanese, and the Russian infantry position south of Hei-kou-tai was also seized. But Marshal Oyama was not yet by any means satisfied with the progress made. As he remarked in his despatch with reference to the fighting on the 28th, the Japanese object had not been attained, since, although the Russian advance had been effectually checked, it had not been repulsed, and the continued Russian occupation of any territory on the left bank of the Hun-ho in itself constituted some evidence of superiority. Accordingly, the word was given to the Japanese forces to have resort to night fighting, and throughout the night of January 28th-29th a series of attacks was delivered in the same spirit of reckless bravery which had distinguished so many previous Japanese onslaughts of the same character. "All the columns of the attacking parties," wrote Marshal Oyama, "expected annihilation. We attempted several attack movements, but suffered heavily from the enemy's artillery, and especially from his machine guns, but all the columns continued the attack with all their might. The enemy was unable to resist our vigorous attack, and began to retreat at half-past five in the morning. Our forces charging into Hei-kou-tai occupied the place firmly and entirely by half-past nine."

That spell of night fighting and the recapture of Hei-kou-tai decided the battle, and what remains of the operation is little else but the record of the Russian

retreat across the Hun-ho, and a somewhat confused tale of minor conflicts arising out of sporadic attempts on the part of individual Russian commanders to create a diversion by small and ineffectual counter-attacks. By their failure to gain possession of San-de-pu, the Russians had been forced to make Hei-kou-tai the key to their position, and that key once lost, there was nothing left but a general withdrawal. By midnight on January 29th the whole of the first two columns of the Second Russian Army were across the river, and only to the north of San-de-pu was there any attempt made by the Russians to carry on the conflict. To some extent the Japanese had pursued the beaten Russians across the river, but it was necessary to be cautious owing to the number of strong fortified villages on this bank, to the existence of which attention was drawn early in the course of this chapter, and a determined stand at any one of which might have caused the pursuers very serious loss. It must be remembered, too, that the Japanese were in no great strength on their extreme left, and must themselves have been considerably exhausted by the recent struggle. It is not, therefore, surprising to find them in the early days of February in positions little, if at all, in advance of those which they had occupied before General Gripenberg's passage of the Hun. It is clear, however, that the left had now been considerably and permanently strengthened, and when, on February 3rd, a Russian detachment ventured to make another attack on Hei-kou-tai it met with a very warm reception, and was driven back, leaving 160 dead.

No precise official account of the losses of the Russians in this great operation is available, but it is quite safe to reckon

them, as the Japanese did, at not less than 10,000. The Japanese themselves admitted a very heavy casualty list, 82 officers and 760 men being returned as killed, and 8,014 as wounded, including 271 officers, and 526 missing. There were no fewer than 505 cases in which officers and men were compelled to leave the fighting line owing to frostbite, and nearly half the wounded were also affected by frostbite, due to the freezing of blood round the wounds while the latter were being exposed for the purpose of being bandaged. Such returns from the admirably organised medical service of the Japanese army afford ground for the belief that the sufferings undergone by the unfortunate Russians must have been still more terrible owing to their much longer exposure and the greater distance over which the wounded had to be carried.

With reference to the Japanese "missing," it is painful to be obliged to add, on the authority of the *Times* correspondent at Tokio, that the profoundest indignation was caused in Japan by reports of Chinese eye-witnesses to the effect that 126 wounded Japanese, roped together like felons, had been led through the streets of Mukden on February 4th amid proclamations of a Russian victory. It might have been supposed that such a statement would have been at once officially and publicly contradicted by the Russian military authorities, but it remained unchallenged. Such an incident would, of course, be a foul blot on the honour of any civilised nation, and is almost incredible in the case of one whose own "missing" had always received such peculiarly handsome treatment at the hands of their high-minded adversaries.

The immediate sequel of the Battle of

Ilei-kou-tai was largely of a personal character. It transpired that General Gripenberg had, on the 26th and 27th, demanded reinforcements to enable him to continue the battle in which he had become involved, and that General Kuropatkin had not only refused those reinforcements on the ground that to send them would weaken his centre, and give the way for an immediate Japanese advance, but had, on the 28th, conveyed to the Second Army a peremptory order to retire. The rest of General Gripenberg's case may be briefly stated in his own words to a correspondent of the *Novoe Vremya* —

"On the morning of the 28th we successfully repulsed four desperate Japanese attacks, but I was unable to advance owing not only to the want of reinforcements, but to the fact that I had not received permission to do so. Victory was in our hands, and I cannot tell you how anxiously I awaited men and authorisation to advance. Neither came.

"On the evening of the 28th General Kuropatkin ordered us to retire in view of a possible attack from the Japanese centre.

"It is not for me to criticise, but I must say that the Japanese could not possibly have attempted any serious attack on General Kuropatkin's centre. It is difficult to describe my feelings on receiving General Kuropatkin's order.

"On the night of the 29th we retired, carrying away all our wounded men, and even picking up broken bayonets. The men retired unwillingly with tears in their eyes. I decided that it was impossible for me to remain any longer at the front, and next day I reported myself to General Kuropatkin, asking him to relieve me of my command immediately. He did so."

After tendering his

General Gripenberg proceeded at once to St. Petersburg, where he was received in audience by the Tsar. The reports of his reception are hopelessly conflicting, some saying that it was extremely cool, and that the Tsar, who had in the meantime received the Commander-in-chief's explanation by telegram, made use of the words, "I am entirely of Kuropatkin's opinion." According to other accounts General Gripenberg was listened to attentively, and was subsequently treated by the Tsar with distinguished consideration.

As a matter of fact it is not of material importance to the present narrative to decide what was the Imperial estimate of the extraordinary line of action taken by the former commander of the Second Russian Army, having regard to certain subsequent happenings which completely modified Kuropatkin's relation to the Russian army in the Far East, and rendered past differences of opinion between him and Gripenberg of but secondary importance. Still, one would like to believe that the Tsar in this instance supported the absent Commander-in-chief, and blamed his subordinate, at any rate for leaving his post and exposing to the whole world, as a French correspondent plainly put it, "the dissensions and incapacity of the high command in Manchuria."

Of Kuropatkin's position in this unfortunate controversy it is not now necessary to say much more than was suggested in the earlier part of this chapter. Everything hinges on the precise commission entrusted to Gripenberg, and if Kuropatkin only intended that the latter should accomplish a species of raid, and gave him clear orders to that effect, the leader of the Second Army had not the slightest justification for deliberately

seeking, as he appears to have done, to fight a battle.

But to many the weak point of Gripenberg's case will seem to be the grave question whether, even supposing that he had been more or less justified in allowing himself to be drawn into a regular battle, his position was ever such that, even with considerable reinforcements, he could have hoped to accomplish anything really definite.

In his statement to the correspondent of the *Noroe Vremya* quoted above, he speaks as if he had already obtained substantial successes, and only needed a stiffening of his forces to carry all before him. But the truth is that, beyond capturing Hei-kou-tai and Sa-erh-pau, and repulsing a few Japanese attacks delivered by columns much smaller than his own, he had accomplished little or nothing. Even if he had been reinforced, he would still have had to take San-de-pu, which he had hitherto signally failed to do, although he had directed two whole Army Corps against that stoutly defended village. Judging, moreover, from the subsequent incoherence of the counter-attacks made by his subordinates after the loss of Hei-kou-tai, he had not his troops by any means sufficiently well in hand to warrant the belief that, with a moderate reinforcement, he could brush back the Japanese columns which were now so determinedly attacking him, and easily penetrate to a vital spot in Oyama's position.

Only the main points of a very large military argument are given above, but it may be hoped that these will serve to create some real interest in a very remarkable operation to which, as far as this narrative is concerned, a particular epoch-marking interest is attached. For it is at this point we arrive with suffi-



cient exactitude for all practical purposes at the termination of the first year of the Russo-Japanese War. To a line nearly level with this point the story of other developments connected with the war has been brought in preceding chapters, and with this account of Gripenberg's abortive attempt to restore Russian prestige by a big battle on the Hun-ho plain another large section of our war chronicle may be definitely closed with some degree of dramatic appropriateness. For, if it has had no other effect, the battle of Hei-kou-tai has, in one sense at least, proved a very effective "curtain." It marked the final disappearance of any hope that Russia would be enabled to

use Mukden as a base from which to regain possession of Liao-yang. Later we shall see this bald statement of the situation expanded into a development of tremendous significance, compared with which the Liao-yang, Sha-ho, and Hei-kou-tai battles will lose much of their prior importance. In a subsequent chapter the past course of the war and its lessons up to date will be lightly sketched. But for the subject matter of the last few pages it may be claimed that it represents at least the outcome of long and careful planning to bring the actual story of the first year of the war into a compact and logical system of arrangement.



Photo: J. J. Archibald.

CAPTURED CHUNCHUSES BEING TORTURED BEFORE A CHINESE MAGISTRATE'S YAMEN.

The combatants sometimes turn over their prisoners to be dealt with by the Chinese.

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

A YEAR OF WAR—THE LESSON OF MAINTENANCE—AN EXCEPTIONAL STRUGGLE—
 DRAMATIC ATTRIBUTES—THE ACTORS—THE "SCENERY"—NAVAL AND MILITARY
 LESSONS.

A YEAR of war! There are at least half-a-dozen standpoints from which that phrase possesses a significance splendid, terrible, pathetic, cruel, instructive, or demoralising, according to the mental attitude in which the subject is approached.

For the purposes of this narrative, however, there is one great lesson, half military, half historical, which is conveyed by the duration of a war for twelve long months, and upon which particular emphasis should be placed by the thoughtful reader. This is the lesson of maintenance as opposed to the lesson of preparedness. It may be said that the one includes the other, and that the nation which is properly prepared for war should certainly be prepared to wage it for at least a year. That is true enough of some cases, but certainly not of all, since often the essence of preparedness consists in the capacity to strike one paralyzing blow at the outset.

In the Spanish-American and Greco-Turkish conflicts the United States and the Porte were sufficiently ready to bring matters to a logical conclusion after a short, sharp struggle, and there have been other and far greater wars in which, to all intents and purposes, the issue was decided at a very early date in the history of the actual fighting. In the case of the tremendous duel in the Far East there is extraordinary impressiveness in the

fact that a whole year of war both by land and sea, war vigorously waged with armies, at any rate among the largest that the world has ever seen, has left both combatants still in full fighting trim, still alert, still eager, still backed by no inconsiderable reserves.

Taking all things into consideration, another such example of sustained pugnacity cannot readily be quoted. The more closely, too, we look into the details of this monumental trial of strength the more amazing it seems that not one, but three or four intervening agencies have not sooner put an end to it. Apart from the question of foreign interference or complications, the circumstances of the war have been such that nothing but an exceptional tenacity and determination on both sides could for twelve long months have enabled a financial and physical strain so severe to be endured without the exhibition of signs of genuine exhaustion. If we take any great war of a century past, shall we find a single instance in which, after a whole year of pretty constant fighting, in which tens of thousands of casualties have occurred, many big warships have been sunk or disabled, very many millions of pounds have been spent, both opposing forces have still been so full of "grit and go," with fleets in being, and huge armies eagerly awaiting the chances of yet another violent collision?


HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

This "lesson of maintenance," as we have ventured to call it, is, of course, the more striking in that it has reference to the simultaneous warfare by land and sea, which lends such a peculiar interest to this cataclysmal and prolonged rupture of the world's peace. We have to go back to the Napoleonic period to find anything like a resemblance to the conditions prevailing in the Far East during the struggle between Russia and Japan, and even here the similarity is only fragmentary and, to some extent, deceptive. Neither in the early days of the nineteenth century nor at any other period

can we find a true parallel to the beautifully sustained co-ordination of the Japanese naval and military systems on the one hand, and on the other, to the astonishing recuperativeness of the Russians as exemplified by what may almost be termed a succession of fleets.

To put the matter in a few words, it is impossible now to get away from the fact that the Russo-Japanese War has begun to stand in a class by itself as one of the most surprising, as well as one of the most instructive, wars which have ever been waged.

In its earlier stages it was easy to



SKETCH MAP SHOWING THE SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1905, AND, BY THE SHADED PORTION, THE TERRITORY THEN IN THE HANDS OF THE JAPANESE.




Photo A. Lavrantieff.

PORT ARTHUR'S HEAVY ARTILLERY A BIG GUN READY FOR ACTION

apply to it the ordinary canons of military and naval criticism, and to treat it as a by no means abnormal development of self-repeating history. But then the chance existed that at short notice the flame of war would suddenly dwindle in intensity, and, gradually diminishing, leave, at the end of a few months, nothing but smouldering embers, upon which the onlooking nations would be throwing buckets of peaceful water. The half-sturdy, half-ferocious maintenance of hostilities at such a high level of activity and striking power lifted, at any rate, the historical consideration of the war clean out of the region of mediocrity, and in February, 1905, even naval and military experts were beginning to wonder whether there were not more things about to happen in the Far East than

had hitherto been dreamt of in their philosophy.

Having sought to establish in a rudimentary fashion the exceptional character of the struggle with which this popular history deals, we may shortly pass to a general review of the leading events in this year of warfare, and a brief discussion of the outstanding lessons to be derived therefrom. But before doing this it will be well to touch lightly on the relation of this volume to the last, with a view to the correct estimation of the stages respectively arrived at, and the inter-significance of the various events.

The first large volume of this work carried the narrative of the war down to about the end of the first week in July, 1904, by which time Port Arthur had been effectively isolated beyond hope of relief,

at any rate by land, and co-operation between the three main armies of Japan had, to all intents and purposes, commenced. The condition of affairs thus disclosed pointed to two main developments, the struggle for Port Arthur and the struggle for Liao-yang, subordinate points of interest being the tightening of Japan's grip upon Korea, and certain possibilities connected with Vladivostok. An incidental feature of some current importance was the existence of a considerable state of tension between this country and Russia in regard to the latter's treatment of neutral shipping.

In the six months from the beginning of August, 1904, to the beginning of February, 1905, there ensued, at the same time, a very orderly sequence of events and some very astonishing developments. Both Port Arthur and Liao-yang fell in due course, and Korea passed completely under Japanese influence. Vladivostok, after playing a somewhat curious but not wholly unexpected rôle, was brought several stages nearer to the point at which its real fate would be decided.

The performances of the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, and other outrages upon British shipping, were carried into the region of diplomacy with more or less satisfactory results in the way of peaceful adjustment. But other and very grave happenings combined to give this second six months of the war a special character quite outside such nearly foregone conclusions as the successful result of the concentrated effort against Liao-yang, and of the long succession of desperate assaults upon Port Arthur. The revolutionary outbreak in Russia disclosed possibilities of tremendous moment, and the despatch and arrival at Madagascar of the Baltic Fleet not only brought Russia once more within an ace of a rupture with

Great Britain, but introduced an entirely new factor in the conduct of the war itself.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the dramatic quality of the period covered by this volume of our history, quite apart from its noteworthiness on naval and military grounds, and the writer will, he thinks, be excused for drawing special attention to this peculiar attribute. In the earlier stages of the war there was, to be sure, no lack of stirring incident. The opening torpedo attack at Port Arthur; the Battle of the Yalu; the sinking of the *Petropavlovsk*; the storming of Nan-shan; the Battle of Telissu, and Oku's hard-fought progress up the Liao-tung Peninsula—all these contained adequate material for descriptions far more flamboyant than those which have been deemed appropriate to the purposes of this record, and more than one of them will doubtless, in due course, receive particular treatment at the hand of the artist, the poet, or even the playwright. But none of these episodes equals in tragic intensity the hell of slaughter which raged round Port Arthur for some weeks prior to its fall. The Battle of Telissu is an "affair" by the side of the Battle of Liao-yang. The sinking of the *Petropavlovsk* recedes into the background when the naval action of August 10th comes to be carefully considered. To turn to the "incidentals," there is only a strained comparison possible between the exasperation—keen as it was—which attended the exploits of the Russian Volunteer "cruisers" and the flaming indignation with which the people of Great Britain received the tragic news of the outrage in the North Sea. On an entirely separate plane the events leading up to "Red Sunday" constitute a chapter of the history not only of the war, but of the civilised

world, which for centuries to come will in men's minds leave much the same impression as has been left by St Bartholomew's Day and other sanguinary instances of savage inhumanity backed up by kingly or Imperial weakness or want of scruple

Taking the story in some detail and laying a certain emphasis upon the order in which the bigger occurrences of the period in question have presented themselves, the dramatic aspect is enhanced, and the effect is almost the same as that created by the perusal of some great classic tragedy. As far as Liao yang and Port Arthur were concerned the closing months of 1904 were conclusive, and there will be little or no need to lift the curtain on either of these two scenes again. But the wonderful comprehensiveness and fecundity of history is finely shown by the manner in which other developments came to be interwoven with the battle story, and not only added largely to the interest of the current months, but produced fresh situations, and introduced new factors tending to make the narrative quite as full of interesting contingencies at Chapter LXXXIII as it was at Chapter XLVI.

Surely there never was a war in which the student was more naturally carried on from one point to another, and in which all the time the different movements and disturbances progressed more harmoniously on their appointed course. Such combined attractiveness and orderliness ought to be common characteristics of military history, but they very seldom are, and for the conspicuous example it affords in this respect the Russo-Japanese War may, in future, become more popular with both students and the general public than any other campaign, not excluding those of which Napier and

Kinglake have given us monumental chronicles.

A few words may usefully be given to the personal interest of the story during the phase covered by this large volume. It is not a little strange that, in spite of the widening area of the military operations, very few new actors should have come on the stage during the six months from August, 1904, to February 1905. The case was very different with us in South Africa, and in most other great wars one generally has found that in the second half of the first year, even if no entirely fresh personalities are introduced, men became prominent who previously had been altogether obscure.

In the Far East, with the exception of Generals Linavitch and Gripenberg on land, and Admiral Rozhdestvensky on sea, practically all the leading characters were sustaining much the same roles in December, 1904, as they had been sustaining in the previous June. Kurapatkin was still in superior charge of the Russian Army in Manchuria, Oyama was still controlling the armies of Japan, Nogai was still pressing upon Port Arthur, Stoessel was still conducting a defence, the precise merits of which were subsequently called rather acrimoniously in question. Oku, Nogi, and Kuroki were still in charge of separate Japanese armies, Mishchenko was still the foremost cavalry leader on the side of Russia. Each during the period under review acted much as was to be expected of him from his previous performances. Of the additions, only Gripenberg distinguished himself on the actual field, and his conception of a subordinate general's duties, as instructed by the Battle of Mukden, hardly entitle him to much consideration. The veteran Linavitch had not, as yet, come forward in his new

part as a commander of a field army, and Rozhdestvensky had yet to face any more dangerous foes than harmless British fisherfolk.

On the other hand, one figure disappeared from the front during the latter half of 1904, upon whom by far the most serious responsibility for two-thirds of what had occurred since the early days of February had undoubtedly rested. It is true that the recall of Alexieff did not have all the useful results which were expected from it, and there is further reason to believe that "the arch-intriguer" was able at St. Petersburg to score quite as heavily against his great adversary, Kuropatkin, as he had been during his Viceroyalty of the Far East. But the removal of such a powerful agent for good or ill from the actual direction of affairs at the front was a feature of what may be termed the third phase of the war, to which it is necessary to assign a certain importance.

Having expatiated upon the dramatic quality of the period under review, and said a few words as to the *dramatis personæ*, some circumstances of time and place may now occupy our attention. Not a great deal need be said as to changed conditions of climate, since the effect of winter upon the conduct of both naval and military operations had been, to some extent, observed in connection with the earliest stages of the war. But there is no doubt that the cold experienced during, for instance, the Battle of Hei-kou-tai, was of a far more penetrating and numbing sort than that in which the upward march through Korea was conducted and the Battle of the Yalu fought. It is important, too, in this connection to remember how completely all the predictions that the Japanese soldiers would be shrivelled up by cold, to which Rus-

sian soldiers had been fully inured, were falsified. It is true that in the Battle of Hei-kou-tai—a typical instance—the Russians were not hindered by sixteen degrees of frost from attempting a very large and toilsome operation, and that the cases of frostbite in the Japanese forces engaged were very numerous. But everything of this sort is best judged by results, and the fact that the Japanese not only met, but checked and finally drove back, the attackers is hardly suggestive of any serious paralysis of their fighting capacity by cold as severe as they are likely to encounter at any period of the campaign.

From a warlike standpoint, scenery—to carry on our theatrical metaphor—chiefly means communications, and in this respect some very significant progress was indicated during the second six months of the war. Attention has already been drawn in the body of this work to the sturdy efforts made by the Japanese to push on the construction of the lines from Seoul to Wi-ju, and from the Yalu to Liao-yang, and now a word may be added as to the actual opening on December 27th of the line from Fusan; the southern part of Korea, to Seoul, a section of which some interesting details were given in the *Times* by a well-known Welsh gentleman, Mr. David Davies, who was one of the earliest travellers by this route. According to Mr. Davies this railway had been built by a company subsidised by the Japanese Government. When the work of construction was commenced it was not expected that the line would be open for traffic until 1906, but the exigencies of the war made quicker progress imperative, and by dint of tremendous exertions the task was finished a year earlier than had been anticipated. The line had a particular interest, as it



From *Stratigraph*, copyrighted 1901, by Underwood & Underwood, London & New York
THE HUGE SHELLS HURLED BY THE JAPANESE SIEGE ARTILLERY AGAINST THE RUSSIAN SHIPS AND FORTS

These 11-inch shells produce an explosion equal to that of a small magazine, and it became known after the capture of the guns that the Russian forts were often hit by their own shells as well.

was to be, of course, linked up with the Seoul—Wi-ju extension, and thus eventually it might be possible to travel from Fusan, as well as from Port Arthur, direct to St. Petersburg.

In his account Mr. Davies confirms the general idea of Japanese thoroughness by the details he gives showing the care with which the line was constructed, notwithstanding the labour involved. The iron bridges, in particular, were extremely well built on stone foundations, while the part of the construction across the mountains is described as "a feat of engineering which reminds one of the railways of Switzerland. Two ridges have to be crossed, and in each case the line makes a wide curve gradually ascending the steep slopes, and half way up it enters a tunnel which pierces the mountain at a height of 2,000 feet." All the rolling stock was imported from the United States, the locomotives from Philadelphia, the cars from Delamere, and the 90-lb. rails from the Carnegie steel works.

It is a very striking reflection that Japan should have been pushing forward not only this line, but also those from Seoul to Wi-ju, and from the Yalu to Liao-yang—to say nothing of keeping the line from Port Adams to Liao-yang in constant active employment—all the time that she was hammering at the fortifications of Port Arthur, keeping Kuropatkin to the line of the Sha-ho, and preparing to give a warm welcome to the Baltic Fleet. The breadth of conception, the patience and thoroughness in execution, in circumstances in which it would not have been surprising if such enterprises had been temporarily abandoned are truly extraordinary, and calculated to make the student of history wonder whether some previous campaigns hitherto regarded as well-nigh perfect examples of the military

art would not have both assumed a different complexion and produced widely different results had the victors super-added to their military activity such energy in railway construction as was exhibited by the Japanese during the latter half of 1904.

In any case the emphasis that has here been laid upon this subject is more than justified by the obvious necessity which will arise in the future of taking this work of railway construction during hostilities most seriously into account. For years Russia fondly imagined that her railway extension southwards from Harbin to Port Arthur had given her a grip upon Manchuria which could be tightened at will, and the loosening of which was a contingency so absurd as hardly to bear thinking about. A year of war did more than merely expose this stupid fallacy. It put Korea in a fair way to become a really vertebrate country—for what better backbone can a peninsula have than a railway running its entire length?—and it saw marked progress made with a strangely important connecting link between the Yalu and Liao-yang, the influence of which upon the future strategic value of the latter may be immeasurable. At an early stage in this history the writer dwelt in simple language upon the strategic importance of forks. The fork which has its handle in the line from Harbin to Liao-yang, and its two prongs in the roads from Liao-yang to Port Arthur and the Yalu respectively, was always of distinct importance. But its strategic value was altogether altered when, instead of a mere mountain road, choked by at least one pass which might have been made formidable, a full-sized railway line was in course of construction, and meanwhile a narrow-gauge line for horse traction had enormously increased

the facilities for the transport of supplies to the Manchurian front.

Before we finally leave this portion of our subject it will be interesting to note in relation with it the curiously important additions made during the second six months of the war to the resources possessed by Japan for the feeding of her troops in the field, and the transmission to them of reinforcements and fresh equipment, arms, and ammunition. During the first half year, in which, as explained in the first volume, two phases were indicated, the Japanese had landed troops at Pitsun wo and Tr ku shan as well as at Che mai po and Chin nam po and had also used Port Adams, to some extent, as a base from which supplies could be furnished to General Oku's Second Army during the latter's further progress in the north of the Liao tung Peninsula. But in the later period the occupation of Dalny and Niu chwang made a most important difference both to the tenure of the Liao tung Peninsula and to the continuance of the advance on Mukden.

The Russians, on the other hand, had not only required no new sources of supply, and had suffered considerably from the loss of the stores which they had been compelled to destroy or abandon at Iro i ro, but had been put to serious inconvenience by the Japanese entry into Niu chwang, from which previously a quantity of supplies had been drawn for the use of Mukden. They had now a largely increased force, not only to feed, but to find in winter clothing, and the Siberian Railway still remained, practically speaking, the only means by which the absolute necessities for a huge and growing field army could be brought to the front. It would be foolish to reproduce all the rumours current at this period

of Kuropatkin's grave dissatisfaction with the manner in which his service of supply was being maintained. But there is little question that the commissariat problem, at all times a serious one for Russia, became during the winter of 1904 one of extraordinary difficulty, and to many it will seem that even its imperfect solution was a very remarkable feat, extremely creditable alike to those responsible for the maintenance and conduct of the rail way, and to the capacity of the Russian soldier to fight splendidly on a very poorly-filled stomach.

It is now time to examine in some detail the moral and military aspects of the war up to date, without particular reference to the past six months but rather with a view to seeing how the lessons of that period coincide with or confirm the lessons of the earlier phases.

Professionally or technically speaking, it is possible to deal with such a subject by one of two instructive methods. Either one can dwell on the eternal principles of strategy and the larger settled facts of tactics, and point out how, broadly speaking, the Russo-Japanese War, like every other war, illustrates these, and does not, mainly because it could not, present any marked divergences from the more or less mathematical certainties of war mathematically considered. There is much to be said if there be to the average student little attractiveness, in this method, because in any case it serves to keep things in focus and to prevent our regarding incidental and purely topical lessons as modifications of established principles.

But such technical statements, however clear and accurate, would be out of place in a popular history which has to explain, as well as lay down, the law. Not less inappropriate would be the alternative

technical or professional process of studying minutely each operation of the campaign and culling from it particular lessons, without reference to their repetition elsewhere, and at the risk of boring everyone but the enthusiast or the student by constant quotations from, and comparison with, well-known textbook examples.


To adopt a quaint rendering of a Latin saw, "the ibis is dead in the middle," and, accordingly, the attempt to give here some idea of the war up to date from an educational standpoint will only faintly resemble the more strictly critical method. Yet it is to be hoped that by this middle course not much that is of serious significance will be lost, while the risk of tedium may, perhaps, be happily avoided.

The more closely we look into the strategy demonstrated by the first year of the war, the more surely are we brought round, time and again, to the cardinal question whether the lines which the Japanese have followed with, hitherto, such consistent success have been altogether justified. Justified, this should be understood to mean, not by the results secured, but by the situation reached, which may be a somewhat different thing.

The capture of Port Arthur and of Liao-yang, and the battles of the Sha-ho and Hei-kou-tai were all unquestionably splendid achievements conferring, both individually and collectively, very substantial advantages upon Japan. But time is often of the essence of the contract in the conduct of war as in business, and what we have to consider is not so



THE COST TO JAPAN OF THE CAPTURE OF 203 METRE HILL, PORT ARTHUR.



THE BATTERED PERESVET IN PORT ARTHUR HARBOR.

much whether Japan won useful victory after useful victory in the first year of her struggle with Russia, but whether she would have been in a better position at the end of that year if she had adopted other methods.

The historical and expert replies to this momentous question may be that the Japanese did everything for the best, but the subject must not be too hastily assumed to be unworthy of serious argument. For, although only a week or two later the position was to be importantly modified by another great Japanese success, we have to remember that at the beginning of February, 1905, the tables were liable to be inconveniently turned, and that even a partial reverse might conceivably have had the gravest consequences for the armies of the Mikado.

It is at this point that the associated but distinct lessons of preparedness and

maintenance, of which one aspect was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, assume another shape, and we begin to ask ourselves whether the Japanese did not actually lose in the first year of the war something of the advantage which their magnificent readiness gave them at the outset. It is now quite clear that Japan could easily have placed in Manchuria at a very early stage forces amounting to at least a quarter of a million men, exclusive of those required for the isolation of Port Arthur. Such a force could surely within the first three months of the war have forced its way even to Harbin had it been handled with vigour. It is, moreover, extremely probable that the process would have been found far less costly, as well as more effective, than the trying business of marching up the Liao-tung Peninsula and Korea, and then approaching Liao-yang

with an elaboration and precision of movement reminding one somewhat of the performances during the Marlburian epoch in the great Flanders quadrilateral.

For in those early days the Russian forces were in such an incoherent state, and, as regards Manchuria itself, were so fundamentally weak, that they could not have hoped to offer any but a trivial resistance to a swift convergence of superbly equipped and powerful Japanese armies upon the point from which the railway bifurcates to Port Arthur and Vladivostok. It would have been risky, of course, but the question is, and it must steadily be kept in mind, whether it was not much more risky to give Russia the chance of recovering from her first surprise, and collecting her enormous strength. This question has been lightly touched upon at previous stages of this narrative, and the discussion of it will not be laboured now. But no attempt to give even a hasty generalisation of the course of the war during the first twelve months would be worth anything that did not take into account the grave alternative here indicated.

The possibility that the Japanese originally intended to strike at Harbin, but that the treacherous disclosure of their plans made it difficult to put them into really successful execution, has also been briefly noted in this history; but by the end of a whole year of fighting a speculation of that sort has lost interest. More absorbing are two other considerations which may have directly influenced the Japanese plan of campaign. Japanese strategy was learnt in the school of German caution and thoroughness, and the Mikado's military advisers may have dreaded the chance of an initial repulse. Had, for example, two or three armies

without reference to Liao-yang and Mukden, one of them might, very probably would, have been a good deal knocked about *en route*, and the moral effect upon the people of Japan might have been serious. A patient game, consisting, in the first place, of well-ordered landings and the almost foregone conclusion of a victory on the Yalu, may have seemed to the Japanese military authorities to offer peculiar advantages, pending a clear demonstration that the Japanese soldier was man to man equal, if not superior, to his Russian adversary.

A much larger field of thought is opened up by the second of the two considerations to which reference was made above. It was said repeatedly by Japan herself during the early days of the war that she was engaged in a veritable struggle for existence, and this circumstance, without any embroidery, may have determined her cautious proceedings with regard to Korea and the Liao-tung Peninsula. She may have said to herself that a grip upon the Hermit Kingdom and upon Port Arthur would enable her to exist even if Russia, by pouring reinforcements into Manchuria, enabled the greater part of that province to remain in effective occupation by her soldiery. Port Arthur, defended not only by a Japanese garrison, but by a Japanese fleet, might prove as really impregnable as Gibraltar in the hands of Great Britain. Korea, with a line of Japanese fortifications stretched across it, and desperately held by Japanese troops, might not seem such a tempting morsel even to a partly victorious Russia as it did in 1903 to Alexeieff and others of the Forward Party. In other words, Japan may have thought it wise to make sure of winning a small stake, in addition to preserving her national independence, rather than

run the risk, however slight, of—to use an expressive American term—‘biting off more than she could chew’ during the first three or four months of the war.

But a year’s experience of Japan’s methods rather induce the reflection that this would be a narrow minded construction to place even upon the cautious military counsels favoured by the Mikado’s advisers. As concurrently with the relentless pertinacity of the siege of Port Arthur, the armies of Japan gradually drove the enemy before them and made good their foothold at point after point south of Mukden, it became more and more a question whether this, after all, might be the strategy, not of caution, not of a struggle for existence, but of resolute Imperial expansion, or, at any rate, of racial development. The time has not come to speak freely of the historical and political aspects of this proposition, but the argument in its military relation is allowable and full of instructive suggestiveness. To a nation seeking only to trip up a giant adversary, and to get even with that adversary in the matter of a one sided deal ten years ago, and to write *Noli me tangere* in characters that would endure perhaps for a quarter of a century, one really smashing victory—such as might, perhaps, have been best attained by making Harbin a first and final objective—would doubtless have been sufficient. But there was much ulterior benefit involved in the utter eradication of the Russian element from every nook and cranny of what had previously been on the point of becoming a Russian province. The exhibition to China of the improving spectacle of large Russian forces driven back by Japanese armies of no greater strength at the point of the bayonet was calculated to impart some sort of backbone even to such a

flabby organisation as the Celestial Empire in the latter’s future dealings with the nations of the West. In a word if Japan was not only actuated by a stern resolve not to allow Russian designs upon Korea to endanger her own existence but had also formed the conception of a permanent and exclusive Chinese-Japanese dominion in the Far East there was much advantage in her plan of gradual advance, and so to speak serial occupation of successive strategic points.

After this brief incursion into a realm of discussion which, as time goes on will probably be the arena of much learned and verimonious controversy let us seek a somewhat lower plane and after a few words on the lessons of Port Arthur, endeavour to appreciate the two or three main tactical lessons of the campaign. As to Port Arthur there is very little to be said that is not almost obvious from the perusal of the actual narrative of the siege. The biggest lesson of all is of course, the one which the Russians so carelessly disregarded—the fact namely, that the chief value of such a fortress lay in its capacity to serve as a base for an active fleet. Beyond the fact that it locked up, in the sense of detaining, a good many more Japanese than Russians for a good many months, Port Arthur was of little real value to the Muscovites after the death of Makaroff, and of no value at all after the naval engagement of August 10th. On the other hand the loss of such a stronghold, so obstinately clinging to in the fatuous hope that mere fortifications would render it impregnable was not only a more serious blow to Russian prestige than its abandonment would have been, but meant the imprisonment of Russian and the release of Japanese soldiers in sufficient numbers to create an important difference in the strategical

situation at a very critical juncture. It is not too much to say that the immediate issue of the capture of Port Arthur was twofold, since it not only allowed a prompt reinforcement of Oyama's armies


two of the divisions which had fought round Port Arthur were noticed in action at the Battle of Heikou-tai but also paved the way for a vigorous movement against Vladivostok.

The actual fighting round Port Arthur presents no novel feature of first-class importance beyond the employment of siege-guns of unparalleled size and power, but the siege abounds in so many examples of extraordinary self-devotion and reckless gallantry that it will always seem to be a far more important performance than it was, at any rate from the educational standpoint. Literally, outside such comparatively minor details as the Russian types of land-mines, the extended use by the Japanese of hand grenades, and the free employment of searchlights, the records of the siege produce practically nothing which has not been partly anticipated if not better exemplified in previous similar operations of war.

Turning to cavalry and infantry tactics, one of the marked features of the first year of the conflict was undoubtedly the disappointment of the high hopes entertained of the Russian cavalry, more especially the Cossacks. It is little less than extraordinary that these far-famed mounted troops should have not only failed utterly to realise the expectations formed of them, but have made such a remarkably poor show on almost every occasion on which they were pitted against even the Japanese cavalry, of whom such an unfavourable estimate had been formed—chiefly, it is true, on the ground of their poor mounts—by apparently competent European critics. Here

and there some useful reconnaissance work was done by leaders like Rennen-Lampf and Mishchenko, but there was little initiative displayed, and, in the case of Mishchenko's raid, the damage inflicted was not one-fifth of what might have been inflicted by better trained and more intelligently controlled troops. The Japanese cavalry, notwithstanding their inferior mounts, closely approached the European standard, and it is probable that, with better horseflesh, their excellent equipment and scouting capacity will enable them in a future campaign to take a much higher place, and play a more prominent part. But the much vaunted Cossack at the end of the first year of the war was of far smaller reputation than he had been at the outset, and had shown that while, of course, he could never be trusted to act against really good European regular cavalry, he was of very doubtful use for any mounted infantry purposes save the incidental and occasional one of providing, by more or less unscrupulous means, food for himself and forage for his horse.

As regards the infantry fighting, the Russians taught us nothing, save the general lesson that the bravery and tenacity of the Russian soldier must still be respected, and that the Russian officer can be even more wanting in self-respect and self-control than was previously known to be the case. But from the Japanese we learnt much that was useful, as to the effect and cost of frontal attacks, and still more as to the value of night-fighting as a consequence, and in continuation, of fighting by day. The value of density in attack formations may be said to have remained an open question at the close of the first year of the war, since it appeared likely that some modification had taken place in the views



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which the Japanese had originally put into practice as the result of their German training. But on this particular point, as well as on the question of frontal attacks, a clearer estimate was to be anticipated at a subsequent stage of the operations.

As to the value of night attacks, not of the old text-book pattern, but following on repeated unsuccessful attempts to capture a position by daylight, the first twelve months of the Russo-Japanese War afforded sufficiently conclusive evidence. Our illuminating instance, that of the night attack at Ta-shi-chao, was dealt with in some detail in pp. 513-516 of the first volume of this history. Another and almost equally convincing case was that of the recapture of Hei-kou-tai, narrated in Chapter LXXXIII., when once again an object which could not be attained by a succession of desperate attacks by day was triumphantly achieved by a well-planned and extraordinarily resolute advance under cover of darkness. Both these examples are strangely instructive, and attracted the close attention of foreign military experts. It is obvious that, to some extent, the efficacy of such attacks may be discounted by the future efficiency of searchlights. But it is unlikely that searchlights will ever be freely carried in the field except by considerable bodies, and there must always be numerous cases in which comparatively small detachments with, perhaps, a few machine guns can ensconce themselves in such strong positions that their dislodgment, even by greatly superior forces, by day becomes an extremely difficult and costly, if not wholly impossible, process. In such circumstances highly trained troops will certainly profit by the lead given them by the Japanese at Ta-shi-

chao and Hei-kou-tai, which for a time, at least, must remain "sealed patterns" of night fighting of this class, just as Tel-el-Kebir remained for years the sealed pattern of the old style of "night attack," which was really not a night attack at all, but one at dawn ensuing on a night march.

The only other infantry lesson to which prominence need be given in a popular history is the use made by the Japanese not only of regimental colours, but of national flags on the battlefield. Some exceedingly sensible remarks on this point are made in the "United Service Magazine" for April, 1905, by Major Hampden Crawler, of the Essex Regiment, who recalls the fact that colours were last taken into action by British troops in European warfare in the Crimea, but were used in savage warfare as late as the Battle of Ulundi. In the Egyptian Campaign of 1882 they were taken to Egypt, but were left at the base. In the South African War the colours of units which were on the spot at the commencement were safely stored, and in other cases were mostly not embarked. This was due to our experience that, as hand-to-hand combats became rarer, the colours were less serviceable as rallying-points, and that, as a general rule, officers carrying the colours were shot down almost as soon as they were observed. It is significant that, after carefully weighing these considerations, the Japanese should have decided that the advantages of taking colours into action outweighed the disadvantages.

"In the present war," says Major Crawler, "in addition to regular regimental colours, it would appear that the Japanese troops are provided with a plentiful supply of national flags, and that these latter are useful in assisting

the artillery and infantry to support the advance of an attacking line without risk to the attackers, and also to inform the reserves below that a position is won. This information, it will be said, might be given equally well by signallers, it might, but would it? In the excitement of victory, would not valuable minutes often elapse before any message was sent? It is conveyed automatically when the victor's flags are seen on the crest line.

Of the artillery lessons to be gleaned from the first year of the war, and more especially from the second six months it may be said that they are chiefly effective as confirming what we ourselves were taught by our experiences in South Africa. The central fact of all the artillery fighting in Manchuria is that the best gun has an advantage which, within reasonable bounds, highly superior mobility does not compensate, but highly superior training and judgment, to some extent, does. The Japanese field artillery was quite outclassed by the field artillery of the Russians, and it was only by their superior skill in gunnery that the Japanese were able to gain many important artillery successes.

The special correspondent of the *Times* with General Kuroki's force, after pointing out that the great artillery lesson learnt in Manchuria is that the most effective gun is the biggest gun compatible with the field artillery degree of mobility, goes on to say —

"The Russian field gun is a heavier piece than the Japanese, throwing a projectile 25 per cent. heavier 1,500 yards further, and, though not a quick firer according to modern ideas it is capable of being fired much more quickly than the Japanese weapon. The advantages of a heavier shell and a greater range are self-

evident. How often have I seen Japanese gunners sheltering from a storm of shrapnel poured upon them by guns which their own artillery was incapable of reaching. How often have I seen Russian batteries concentrate a rapid fire upon opposing batteries and silence them by rendering the opposing emplacement a hell in which gunners could not live.

But a little later he adds that the Japanese 'proved themselves better range finders, better shots, more cunning in emplacement, more astute in choice of position, and more indefatigable in overcoming engineering difficulties. What would have happened at Tsingtau if the belligerents had exchanged guns (no horses and drivers) one can only conjecture. And what will happen when Japan fights again her gunners more used in skill, and handling guns of the latest pattern?

Turning to the naval lessons of the war, it would be difficult to compose of a better summary of these than was contained in a speech by that brilliantly distinguished veteran, who had himself made history in the Far East, Admiral Sir Edward Seymour, when replied to the toast of the British Navy at the Royal Academy Banquet on April 29th 1905. Sir Edward's first reference to the war was a general, but none the less pregnant one. The conflict appeared to him, he said, to justify fully both Lord Bacon's aphorism that "in the master of the sea is the abridgment of a monarchy" and also the wonderful lessons taught to the world by Captain Mahan. The actual naval lessons of the war, he went on to say, were, shortly, these: "First, that your lines of defence and offence are one, namely, on your enemy's coast; secondly, that a ship is a mobile fort, and is no use at all when it is tied to



THE FORTIFIED HILL OUTSIDE FORT ARTHUR, CALLED BY THE RUSSIANS "THE EAGLE'S NEST," WHICH WAS CAPTURED BY THE JAPANESE ON JANUARY 1, 1905.

This photograph shows very clearly the labyrinth of shelters used by the defenders during the bombardment.

hour ; thirdly, that naval battles in future will probably be fought at increasingly long ranges, thus giving pre-eminence to our old friends, the guns ; and, fourthly, that submarine mines are extremely deadly weapons, but that the ordinary torpedo is not quite so fatal as it was expected to be."


Many will find this admirably lucid and convincing summary quite sufficient for every purpose, but a few added observations may be of assistance to others to whom the clear-cut phrases of such an *ex cathedra* pronouncement may seem a too brief dismissal of a copious and, to some extent, controversial subject. In the first place it seems desirable to point out how seriously the effect of such lessons as the two first enumerated by Admiral Seymour were impaired during the early stages of the war by Japan's inability to play the rôle for which she was

best fitted by the temperament of her naval officers and men, as well as by the fine quality of her ships. There will be many inclined to place in front of any professional and technical lessons to be derived from the handling of the Japanese and Russian fleets the solid fact that Japan could not do one-half of what she might have done, because she was fettered by the smallness of her navy. It is pre-eminently sound, of course, to talk of lines of naval offence and defence being one, and certainly for this country the frequent enunciation of this doctrine, fortified by every available example, is most strongly to be advocated and encouraged. But it has been patent at half-a-dozen points in the history of the first year's operations in the Far East that Japan was debarred from taking the right sort of offensive from the ever present fear lest her hardly won mastery of

the sea—only temporary and precarious—might be endangered by the loss of one or two of her precious battleships. Like other lessons, this has received passing attention in the course of the preceding narrative, and careful regard has been had to Japan's appreciation of her own disadvantages in this direction, and to the steps she is taking to rectify them. But the present is the right moment at which to emphasise the fact that the significance of naval lessons must always depend largely upon their degree of applicability to any particular navy, and to that navy's capacity to put such lessons into really businesslike and profitable practice. Let us, then, presume to subordinate Admiral Seymour's little catalogue entirely to the great postulate involved in his preliminary general reference, namely, that any struggle for a mastery of the sea should be conducted

with a sufficient margin to enable operations to be carried out at sea with not too rigidly cautious husbanding of resources.

Yet another departure may be made from the brief limits of this compact list of actual "lessons." It has been hinted in a previous chapter that the progress of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's fleet to the Far East was full of suggestiveness to a Power possessing, as Great Britain does, widely-scattered colonies, to the whole of which it would be impossible in time of war to afford complete naval or military protection. Hitherto the fact that only two great naval Powers, England and France, controlled a really useful chain of coaling-stations extending to most quarters of the world had been held to restrict the question of colonial defence within certain well-defined limits. It was assumed that no Power which could not count on being able to coal *en ro*



THE CASEMATES OF FORT NO. 11, FORT ARTHUR, WHERE GENERAL KUNIKATCHEVICH WAS KILLED

would venture to send warships to trouble the enemy's distant colonies for fear lest the battleships, cruisers, or gunboats in question might be "hung up" in mid ocean with empty bunkers. This view was an extremely comforting one to the dwellers in rich, if remote, Colonial coast towns, who felt that the thousands of miles of sea which separated them from the nearest station at which a possible enemy's warships could draw a fresh supply of coal were a better protection to them than a small garrison of soldiers or a gunboat, such as at most could be spared them from the Mother Country's main armies or fleets.

The voyage of the Baltic Squadron to the Far East rudely shattered this illusion, and made it tolerably certain that in the next great war the more or less irresponsible collier would play a part, less dignified and important, of course, than that played by our Adens, Gibralters, and Hong Kongs, with their mountains of coal, and their spacious harbours in which that sometimes priceless commodity can be easily and swiftly taken on board, but still a *rôle* of very great seriousness indeed. It was a very disquieting reflection that, unappalled by the risk of meeting with one of a powerful enemy's numerous warships, "auxiliary cruisers" might henceforth be expected to slip forth, attended by a collier or two, for the sole purpose of despoiling out-of-the-way colonial coast towns, and doing casual damage to commerce *en route*. It has always been difficult to prevent a "neutral" collier, with the means of paying handsomely for coal, from obtaining practically as much as it wants from one or other of the ready and obliging world-traders in this article. But the possibilities connected with the transshipment of the coal thus obtained to the warships of

a belligerent Power had never been clearly understood until the voyage of the Russian Baltic Fleet enlightened the whole world on this interesting subject.

It will be observed that Admiral Seymour did not reckon the preponderant value of the battleship or the employment of wireless telegraphy among his naval lessons, doubtless because he regarded the first from the standpoint of established conviction, and the second as still to some extent in the experimental stage.

As to the naval strategy displayed during the first twelvemonth of the operations, there was so little scope for the exhibition of higher qualities than those of ordinary discretion, and—as regards Japan—first-rate seamanship and dauntless courage, that it would be a mistake to labour the point at this stage. But with reference to the mistake which the Russians committed in not making better use of the Port Arthur ships, the following extract from a letter headed "Togo's Work," and sent to the *Times* by its correspondent at Tokio, is of very singular interest as giving the Japanese view of a very grave waste of splendid opportunities.

"Probably no incident in the whole war shook so signally Japan's faith in her enemy's martial sagacity. Her naval officers speak very plainly about the affair. It sets the seal, they say, to the indictment which events have steadily framed against Russia's strategy. From first to last she has shown herself lacking in offensive initiative. As a most signal instance of that defect they cite the pusillanimous pageant of June 23rd, when a noble fleet of six battleships and four cruisers, with full accompaniment of torpedo craft, steaming out of Port Arthur, caught sight of a solitary Japanese squadron on the horizon, and hastily

fled back to the shelter of the batteries. Had the Russians pushed on resolutely then, they could surely have won their way to Vladivostok with comparatively trifling losses. It was an apt preface to the vital error of subsequently offering themselves as an immobile target for the enemy's heavy siege guns. As to this latter proceeding, Japanese expert opinion is that the Russians, having lost their great opportunity in June, lost themselves afterwards by failing to recognise the necessity for some signal sacrifice. When, after their abortive, but still not irresolute, attempt to escape on August 10, they returned to port more or less wounded and minus a battleship and three cruisers, they seem to have come to the conclusion that until their hurts were all healed no new sortie must be made. But the time never came when their hurts were all healed. No sooner was one repair effected than their active enemy created need for another, and finally even their capacity to effect repairs was destroyed. Granted that the vessels were then lame, they had still sea-going capacity as well as some fighting potentiality, and had they dashed out, thrown themselves on Togo's squadrons, and fought to kill or be killed, the command of the sea might still be within reach of recovery by Russia.

From this brief study of individual naval and military considerations it is easy for the intelligent reader to generalise. The conclusion of the whole matter of these volumes is that hitherto the best side has won because it deserved to win, because it spared no effort, no sacrifice, to attain its object, and because not only the leaders and soldiers were skilful, patient, and heroic, but the nation also as a whole rose with superb patriotism to a great occasion. On the other hand, Rus-

sia, in spite of terrible drawbacks, presented at the commencement of 1905 a figure by no means contemptible. Her Ruler had emerged from a great domestic crisis with a sadly tarnished name, her people were torn by internal dissensions and inflamed by revolutionary tendencies, her leaders were bickering, and her soldiers suffering from various privations of which a badly organised and inadequate medical service was not the least, and, finally, no real victory had relieved the ghastly monotony of a long and grievous chain of disasters and defeats. Yet she was fighting on proudly, her armies still presented an imposing array of men and guns along a great stretch of territory, a new fleet was on its way to replace that which had been lost at Port Arthur, and the Russian Government still held a place in the councils of Europe which not even the greatest of the Great Powers could affect to disregard. For the rest with the exception of Port Arthur no chapter of the active history of the war which had been opened could be considered closed, and even to Port Arthur the possibility of a consolatory sequel seemed to be indicated by the imminent movement against Vladivostok. Still could the Russian patriot say *sout peut se relever*, although to be precise the trend of Russian patriotism seemed rather to be in angry denunciations of the war and clamours that it should be brought by any means, however undignified to an end.

Such conclusions and reflections apart, we come back to the point on which emphasis was laid at the beginning of this chapter, namely, the appalling magnitude of this terrific combat as it appears to the vision of the thoughtful student who has followed it throughout the first twelve months of its course. Many of

the former hopes concerning the duration and conduct of the war had vanished, many new fears had arisen, many intensely desirable limitations seemed on the eve of being broken down. The prolongation and intensity of the fighting were beginning to get on the nerves of Europe, and more than one onlooker nation counted afresh its chances of being drawn into the arena, and made characteristic precautions against that dreaded eventuality. Great Britain looked to placing the power and readiness of her Navy beyond question, and did all that was possible, by sending a mission into Afghanistan and levelling up her system of frontier defence, to guard against possible attack on India by the Russian legions concentrating in Central Asia. France found greater satisfaction in an *entente cordiale* with England than would have been remotely possible a few years ago, her abler politicians knowing well that, with an Ally so unscrupulous as Russia, awkward questions of neutrality must soon arise. Germany, restless at the thought of isolation, and doubtful as to the future of her pretentious schemes in China, sought refuge in diplomatic efforts to bring the newly-formed Anglo-French friendliness to a full stop.

But over these more selfish imaginings and actions on the part of individual nations towered the one tremendous fact that the war in the Far East was not only still raging, but was daily giving clearer evidence of the birth of a new world-force, with which not a nation of the earth could now say with confidence that it might not have, sooner or later, to reckon. Sane men could still laugh at the thought of a real "Yellow Peril," but no one who "dip't into the future far as human eye could see" could any longer fail to discern one object now beginning to stand out with growing distinctness on the shadowy courses of the coming years. That object was not the outstretched claw of the Russian Bear, not the mailed fist of the German Emperor, not the flapping wing of the American Eagle, not even the bristling mane of the British Lion. It was merely a small dark man waving a not very conspicuous flag on a high crestline, and, as one looked closer, the crestline seemed to indicate a tolerably lofty ridge of international ambition. The small dark man might be a soldier, sailor, or a civilian, it was uncertain which. But there could be no question, as to his nationality, no shadow of doubt as to the identity of the emblem on the flag with the Rising Sun of Japan.



